Reversed=20
and Rendered and =
Memorandum Opinion filed December 13, 2007.
In The
Fourteenth Court=20
of Appeals
____________
NO. 14-06-00436-CV
____________
ALLSTATE=20
INDEMNITY COMPANY AND ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE=20
COMPANY, =
Appellants
V.
HADLEY=20
MEDICAL CLINIC, HAMPTON MEDICAL CLINIC, IMPERIAL VALLEY MEDICAL =
CLINIC,=20
AND SOUTHWEST HOUSTON PHYSICIAN CENTER, =
Appellees
On Appeal from the =
County Civil Court at Law No. 1
Harris County, =
Texas
Trial Court Cause =
No. 830807
M E M O R=20
A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellants,=20
Allstate Indemnity Company and Allstate Property and Casualty =
Insurance=20
Company, appeal from a judgment favoring appellees, Hadley Medical =
Clinic,=20
Hampton Medical Clinic, and Imperial Valley Medical Clinic. =20
Appellees, healthcare providers who treated individuals =
purportedly=20
injured in automobile collisions with drivers insured by =
appellants, sued=20
appellants claiming to be third-party beneficiaries of settlement=20
agreements between appellants and the individual patients. A =
jury=20
found that appellees were indeed third-party beneficiaries of the=20
agreements, that appellants breached the agreements, and that =
appellants=20
were estopped (quasi-estoppel) from denying appellees=3D =
third-party-beneficiary status. Based on the verdict, the =
trial=20
court entered judgment favoring appellees for a total of =
$35,728.22=20
(including pre-judgment interest and attorney=3Ds fees),=20
plus post-judgment interest.
In three=20
issues, appellants=20
contend that: (1) the evidence is legally and factually =
insufficient=20
to support the finding that appellees were third-party =
beneficiaries of=20
the settlement agreements; (2) the trial court erred in submitting =
the=20
third-party-beneficiary issue to the jury because it was a matter =
for the=20
court to decide; and (3) the evidence is legally and factually=20
insufficient to support the finding that appellants were estopped=20
from =
denying=20
appellees=3D =
third-party-beneficiary status. Because the =
evidence is=20
legally insufficient to support the jury verdict that (1) =
appellees were=20
third-party beneficiaries and (2) appellants were estopped=20
from =
denying=20
appellees=3D =
third-party-beneficiary status, we reverse and =
render=20
judgment that appellees take nothing.
I. =20
Background
As stated=20
above, appellees=20
treated patients who were purportedly involved in automobile =
accidents=20
with drivers insured by appellants. At the time of =
treatment,=20
appellees required the patients in question to sign Aassignments of=20
rights@ that granted certain =
rights to=20
appellees, including the Aright to any cause of =
action .=20
. . against any insurance company@ for damages, at =
least to the=20
extent of the incurred medical bills. Each of these =
assignments also=20
included a section titled ADemand for =
Payment,@ which was addressed=20
A[t]o any insurance =
company=20
providing benefits or damages of any kind to [patient(s)] for =
treatment=20
rendered by the doctor/clinic/healthcare provider named =
above.@ This section =
further=20
purported to instruct insurers to Apay in full the bill =
for=20
services rendered,@ to make checks =
payable to both=20
the patient and the healthcare provider, and to mail the checks to =
the=20
healthcare provider=3Ds =
attorney=3Ds office.
Although it appears =
unlikely=20
from the evidence at trial that appellants ever received the =
assignments=20
themselves, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that =
appellants=20
received letters from appellees referencing the assignments and =
excerpting=20
key language about the assignment of rights and Demand for =
Payment. =20
The appellants subsequently settled the patient=3Ds claims by drafting =
checks=20
payable solely to the patients and delivering the checks directly =
to the=20
patients. In conjunction with the settlements, appellants =
required=20
that the patients sign releases. As will be discussed in =
greater=20
detail below, of the eight patients on whom the judgment was =
based, three=20
signed one particular form of release, three signed another form =
of=20
release, and for two of the patients, no release was admitted into =
evidence. Appellees argue, however, that the jury could have =
inferred from the existence of the settlement checks and the other =
releases that the two remaining patients had indeed signed=20
releases.
Appellees sued =
appellants=20
alleging that because they (appellees) were third-party =
beneficiaries of=20
the settlement agreements, appellants breached the agreements by =
failing=20
to pay appellees directly for the health care provided to the=20
patients. In the alternative, appellees alleged that =
appellants were=20
estopped (quasi estoppel) from =
denying=20
appellees=3D =
third-party-beneficiary status, apparently based on =
appellants=3D use of =
appellees=3D medical bills in =
calculating=20
how much to pay the patients in settlement of their claims. =
The jury=20
found for appellees on both issues (third-party beneficiary and =
quasi=20
estoppel). =20
On =
appeal,=20
appellants: (1) attack the sufficiency of the evidence on =
the=20
third-party beneficiary finding; (2) contend that the court erred =
in=20
submitting that issue to the jury; and (3) attack the sufficiency =
of the=20
evidence on the estoppel finding.
II. =20
Third-Party Beneficiaries
In their first issue, =
appellants attack the legal and factual sufficiency of the =
evidence to=20
support the jury=3Ds finding that =
appellees were=20
third-party beneficiaries of the settlement agreements between =
appellants=20
and the various patients. We begin by considering the legal=20
sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. In doing so, we =
utilize=20
the usual standards of review, considering the evidence in the =
light most=20
favorable to the verdict and indulging every reasonable inference =
that=20
would support it. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 =
S.W.3d=20
802, 809-23, 827-28 (Tex. 2005).
The legal rules =
governing=20
third-party beneficiaries are well-established, as recently =
recited by the=20
Texas Supreme Court:
First, there is a =
presumption=20
against conferring third‑party‑beneficiary status on =
noncontracting=20
parties. In deciding whether a third party may enforce or =
challenge=20
a contract between others, it is the contracting =
parties=3D intent that =
controls. =20
The intent to confer a direct benefit upon a third party must be =
clearly=20
and fully spelled out or enforcement by the third party must be=20
denied. Incidental benefits that may flow from a contract to =
a third=20
party do not confer the right to enforce the contract. A =
third party=20
may only enforce a contract when the contracting parties =
themselves intend=20
to secure some benefit for the third party and entered into the =
contract=20
directly for the third party=3Ds benefit. To =
qualify as=20
one for whose benefit a contract was made, the third party must =
benefit=20
more than incidentally; he must be either a donee or creditor=20
beneficiary. A person is a donee beneficiary if the =
performance=20
promised will come to him as a pure donation. If performance =
will=20
come to satisfy a duty or legally enforceable commitment owed by =
the=20
promisee, then the third party is considered a creditor=20
beneficiary.
S. Tex. Water Auth. =
v.=20
Lomas, 223=20
S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2007) (internal quotation marks and =
citations=20
omitted).
Generally, the =
question of=20
whether a particular party is a third-party beneficiary to a =
contract is=20
treated as a matter of contract interpretation; thus, it should =
only go to=20
a jury if the contract is deemed to be ambiguous. See MCI =
Telecomms. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. =
1999)=20
(AOur analysis of the =
third-party=20
beneficiary issue requires us to interpret the contract . . . =
. When=20
a contract is not ambiguous, the construction of the written =
instrument is=20
a question of law for the court.@); Pratt-Shaw v.=20
Pilgrim=3Ds Pride =
Corp., 122 S.W.3d 825, 829 =
(Tex.=20
App.CDallas 2003, no pet.) =
(containing similar language and analysis). Here, there =
appears to=20
have been neither argument from the parties below nor an explicit =
ruling=20
from the court as to whether the settlement agreements in question =
were=20
ambiguous. Although in their second issue on appeal, =
appellants=20
contend that the trial court erred in submitting the third-party=20
beneficiary issue to the jury and not deciding the matter itself,=20
appellants cite no portion of the record wherein this argument was =
preserved below. Our review of the record has likewise =
revealed no=20
such preservation.
Appellants also did =
not object=20
to the language used in the charge. Because appellants did =
not=20
object to the charge and did not argue below that the=20
third-party-beneficiary issue was one for the judge and not the =
jury, we=20
shall review the sufficiency of the evidence in light of the =
charge as=20
given. See Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.=20
2000). The charge given to the jury instructed on the=20
third-party-beneficiary question only as follows: =
AA party suing [as] a =
third=20
party beneficiary must show: 1) it is not privy to the written =
agreement;=20
2) the agreement was actually made for its benefit and that; [sic] =
3) the=20
contracting parties intended it to benefit by the =
agreement.@ Appellants =
make no=20
arguments regarding the first element presented in the charge =
(that=20
appellees were not privy to the contracts in question), but they =
do=20
contend that there was no evidence to support the finding that the =
agreements were made for appellees=3D benefit or that the=20
contracting parties intended appellees to benefit from the =
settlement=20
agreements.
Appellees=3D theory of the case =
is that=20
because evidence demonstrated the patients=3D and =
appellants=3D awareness of the =
assignments=20
of rights to appellees at the time they entered into the =
settlement=20
agreements (as evidenced by the letters sent by appellees =
referencing and=20
excerpting the assignments), the use of the term Aassigns@ in the releases =
necessarily=20
referred to appellees. Thus, according to appellees, the =
parties to=20
the settlement agreements must have intended to confer a direct =
benefit=20
upon them. As mentioned above, of the eight patients on whom =
the=20
judgment was based, three signed one particular form of release, =
three=20
signed another form of release, and there is only inferential =
evidence=20
that the remaining two signed any form of release. One of =
the=20
releases signed by three of the patients contained the following=20
language:
[I]n consideration of =
[a sum=20
certain], receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, for myself and =
for my=20
heirs, personal representatives and assigns, I do =
hereby=20
release and forever discharge [the insured driver] and any other =
person,=20
firm or corporation charged or chargeable with responsibility or=20
liability, their heirs, representatives and assigns, from any and =
all=20
claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, loss of services, =
actions and=20
causes of action, arising from any act or occurrence up to the =
present=20
time and particularly on account of all personal injury, =
disability,=20
property damages, loss or damages of any kind already sustained or =
that I=20
may hereafter sustain in consequence of an accident that occurred =
on [a=20
specific date at a specific location].
(Emphasis=20
added).
As stated, appellees =
assert=20
that the first reference to Aassigns@ in this paragraph of =
the=20
release form evidences the parties=3D intention to confer =
a direct=20
benefit upon them. We do not agree that the language is =
capable of=20
this interpretation. To begin with, even assuming appellees =
were=20
intended to be included in the reference to Aassigns,@ the release says =
nothing about=20
any payment to the assigns, direct or otherwise. In fact, =
the=20
release essentially negates the very idea that appellants were to =
pay any=20
additional sums or any sums to anyone other than the particular=20
patient-signatory. In each signed release, the patient =
acknowledged=20
receipt of a sum certain and in consideration for that specific =
amount,=20
released all claims for him or herself as well as his or her =
assigns.=20
The language, indeed, appears specifically tailored to =
negate the=20
possibility that appellants could owe any additional sums to the =
patient=20
or anyone else to extinguish any claims made by or through the =
patient.
The other release =
admitted into=20
evidence and signed by three patients contained the following=20
language:
The undersigned, [patient], (hereinafter =
referred=20
to as RELEASOR) acknowledges the receipt of [a sum certain] in=20
consideration for the judgment and release in this cause, and =
RELEASES,=20
QUITCLAIMS AND FOREVER DISCHARGES [appellant, insured driver], =
their=20
spouse(s), [sic] heirs, executors, assigns, agents . . . from all=20
liability claims . . . demands, damages, costs, expenses, loss of =
service,=20
actions and causes of action arising from any acts or occurrences =
up to=20
the present time, and particularly on account of all personal =
injury,=20
disability, property damage, loss or damages of any kind which =
have=20
accrued or may accrue to the RELEASOR, RELEASOR=3DS spouse, heirs, executors, =
assigns,=20
agents, servants, employees, insurance carriers, and attorneys in=20
consequence of an incident that occurred on [a specific date], =
which gave=20
rise to this suit . . . . RELEASOR agrees that this release =
shall=20
apply to all unknown and unanticipated injuries and damages =
resulting from=20
the incident, casualty, or event, as well as to those now =
disclosed which=20
form the basis of this suit.
As further consideration for full and =
final=20
payment, RELEASOR warrants that RELEASOR has made no assignment of =
RELEASOR=3DS claims, or any part of them, to any =
other=20
person, firm, or corporation other than RELEASOR=3DS attorneys, and that there are no =
current or=20
outstanding hospital or other liens in connection with or arising =
out of=20
the incident made the subject of this suit.
In further =
consideration for=20
the payment of this sum, RELEASOR hereby agrees to indemnify and =
hold=20
harmless RELEASED PARTIES against and from any and all claims, =
demands,=20
causes of action and/or judgments asserted or caused to be =
asserted=20
against RELEASED PARTIES which any person, firm, or corporation =
has or may=20
claim by, through or under RELEASOR in connection with the matters =
made=20
the subject of this lawsuit and release.
(Emphasis =
added). =20
Again, appellees =
assert that=20
the reference to Aassigns@ in the release =
language=20
evidences the parties=3D intention to confer =
a direct=20
benefit upon them, and again, we do not agree that the language is =
susceptible of this interpretation. As with the release form =
discussed above, by signing this release form, each patient =
acknowledged=20
receipt of a particular sum and, in consideration for that sum, =
released=20
all claims on behalf of him or herself and his or her assigns, =
among=20
others. Nothing in the release form suggests that any =
additional=20
sums must be paid to anyone or that payment should be made in any =
other=20
manner than directly to the patient. Even assuming that one =
of the=20
appellees was an assignee of the particular patient, this release =
form=20
contains no language requiring or even suggesting that a =
particular=20
appellant had to pay anything to any assignee or =
appellee.
Furthermore, other =
language in=20
the release affirmatively contradicts any assertion that a =
particular=20
appellant was promising to pay any sums directly to any =
appellee. The=20
patient-signatory (1) warranted that he or she had made no =
assignment of=20
any claims, in whole or in part, to anyone other than his or her =
attorney,=20
and (2) agreed to indemnify and hold harmless the particular =
appellant=20
against any and all claims that may be made through the patient in =
connection with the subject auto collision. These additional =
terms=20
negate the possibility that the parties may have intended for any=20
third-party beneficiary to have an enforceable right to recover =
any=20
portion of the settlement proceeds directly from=20
appellants.
Regarding the two =
patients for=20
whom no release was admitted into evidence, appellees argue that =
the=20
existence of letters notifying appellants about assignments from =
these two=20
patients and checks issued to the two patients supports the =
reasonable=20
inference that the patients each signed releases with the same =
language or=20
similar language to the other releases that were admitted into =
evidence.=20
Assuming appellees=3D argument is correct, =
the=20
evidence concerning these two patients fails for the same reasons =
as the=20
evidence regarding the other patients and the admitted=20
releases.
Appellees =
additionally cite=20
several cases in which courts held that third parties mentioned in =
releases were intended third-party beneficiaries and thus could =
enforce=20
the terms of the release in any action against them by the =
releasor. =20
See Pratt-Shaw, 122 S.W.3d at 830-31; Temple Eastex, =
Inc. v. Old=20
Orchard Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 730 (Tex. =
App.CDallas, writ denied); =
Derr=20
Constr. Co. v. City of Houston, 846 S.W.2d 854, 860 (Tex.=20
App.CHouston [14th Dist.] =
1992, no=20
writ). These cases, however, do not support =
appellees=3D position. In =
each of the=20
cited cases, the release in question expressly granted a specific =
benefit=20
to a clearly identified third party, i.e., the third party =
was=20
released from any liability to the releasor. See =
Pratt-Shaw,=20
122 S.W.3d at 830-31; Temple Eastex, 848 S.W.2d at 730; =
Derr=20
Constr., 846 S.W.2d at 860. Here, as discussed above, =
even to=20
the extent that appellees were included in the releases (via =
Aassigns@), it was in the =
context of the=20
patients=3D waiver of=20
appellees=3D rights to sue as the =
patients=3D assignees. The =
releases=20
do not affirmatively convey any rights on appellees. The =
suggestion=20
that appellees might have received payment derived from =
settlement=20
funds paid by appellants to the patients would render appellees, =
at most,=20
incidental beneficiaries, not intended beneficiaries. See =
MCI=20
Telecomms. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. =
1999)=20
(holding that any benefit to the third party under the contract at =
issue=20
was merely incidental and did not evidence a clear intent of the =
parties=20
to contract for the direct benefit of that third party); see =
also=20
restatement (Second) =
of=20
Contracts '' 302, 315 (1981) =
(defining=20
intended and incidental beneficiaries and explaining that =
incidental=20
beneficiaries possess no right to enforce the contract against the =
promisor or the promisee).
There is no evidence =
that the=20
settlement agreements were entered into for appellees=3D benefit or that =
appellants and=20
the patients intended for appellees to benefit from the =
agreements. =20
Therefore, we hold that there is no evidence to support the=20
jury=3Ds finding that =
appellees were=20
third-party beneficiaries of the agreements.=20
Accordingly, we sustain appellants=3D =
first=20
issue. Because of our holding on this first issue, we need =
not=20
consider appellants=3D =
second=20
issue, in which appellants argue that the trial court erred in =
submitting=20
the third-party-beneficiary issue to the jury.
III. =20
Quasi Estoppel
In their third issue, =
appellants attack the legal and factual sufficiency of the =
evidence to=20
support the jury=3Ds finding that =
appellants were=20
barred by the doctrine of quasi-estoppel from denying=20
appellees=3D =
third-party-beneficiary status. Again, we =
consider the=20
legal sufficiency of the evidence first and apply the usual =
standards of=20
review. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 809-23,=20
827-28.
The doctrine of =
quasi-estoppel=20
precludes a party from asserting, to another=3Ds disadvantage, a =
right=20
inconsistent with a position previously taken by the =
party. Lopez=20
v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tex. =
2000);=20
Steubner Realty 19, Ltd. v. Cravens Road 88, Ltd., 817 =
S.W.2d 160,=20
164 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] =
1991, no=20
writ). The doctrine applies when it would be unconscionable =
to allow=20
a party to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which it=20
acquiesced or of which it accepted a benefit. Lopez, =
22=20
S.W.3d at 864; Steubner Realty 19, 817 S.W.2d at 164. =
Thus,=20
quasi‑estoppel prevents a party from accepting the benefits =
of a=20
transaction and then subsequently taking an inconsistent position =
to avoid=20
corresponding obligations or effects. Eckland =
Consultants, Inc.=20
v. Ryder, Stilwell Inc., 176 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tex. =
App.CHouston [1st Dist.] =
2004, no=20
pet.). The trial court tracked these principles in the =
charge, and=20
no objections were made thereto.
Appellees=3D theory of =
quasi-estoppel is=20
that appellants (1) took an inconsistent prior position in that =
they=20
accepted medical records from appellees and used them in =
settlement=20
negotiations with the patients, and (2) derived a benefit from the =
earlier=20
position because they were able to induce more favorable =
settlement terms=20
by using the bills during negotiations. Regarding the =
allegedly=20
inconsistent prior position, even if appellees are factually =
correct that=20
appellants used the bills in calculating settlement amounts, it is =
difficult to see how receiving and using medical records in =
negotiations=20
would be inconsistent with denying that appellees were third-party =
beneficiaries to the later-signed settlement agreements.
Appellees imply that =
by=20
receiving the records and using them to settle the cases, =
appellants=20
essentially admitted that they were liable for paying the medical=20
bills. We disagree. Settling a case generally does =
just=20
that: it resolves the issues between the parties without =
admission=20
of culpability, fault, or liability. See Henson v. S. =
Farm Bureau=20
Cas. Ins. Co., 17 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex. 2000) (holding that =
the fact=20
of settlement alone did not establish fault). Here, both =
release=20
forms in the record contain specific language denying that in =
settling,=20
appellants were admitting to any liability for damages. =
Thus,=20
settling the cases did not constitute an admission that appellants =
(as=20
insurers of particular drivers) were liable for the medical bills, =
much=20
less that appellees were intended third-party beneficiaries of the =
settlement agreements. The evidence demonstrates at most =
that=20
appellants simply relied upon the amount of the bills in making =
their=20
settlement calculations.
Next, we turn to the =
question=20
of whether appellants derived any benefit from using the medical =
records=20
in settlement negotiations. Although arguably, in a general =
sense,=20
it can be said that appellants benefitted from settling the cases, =
e.g., from the fact that the one-time potential liability =
could=20
then be concretely ascertained, there is no evidence that =
appellants=20
benefitted by receiving the medical bills and using them in =
calculating=20
settlement amounts. Without citing supporting evidence, =
appellees=20
suggest that appellants benefitted because the bills were so=20
reasonable. Our review=20
of the record reveals no evidence that the bills in question =
represented=20
relative bargains to the insurance companies. One witness, a =
former=20
administrator for appellees, testified that sometimes doctors =
discount=20
bills to encourage patients to pay, but she did not testify that =
any=20
amounts were deducted from bills involved in the present case or =
that the=20
bills represented any type of bargain or benefit for the insurance =
companies. No other witness testified on any matter related =
to the=20
reasonableness of the medical bills. Finding no=20
evidence to support the jury=3Ds verdict=20
on quasi-estoppel, we sustain appellants=3D =
third=20
issue.
Having sustained=20
appellants=3D first and third =
issues, we=20
reverse the trial court=3Ds judgment and =
render=20
judgment that appellees take nothing on their causes of action =
against=20
appellants.
/s/ =20
Adele Hedges
Chief =
Justice
Judgment=20
rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed December 13, =
2007.
Panel=20
consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and=20
Seymore.
All claims of plaintiff below and =
titular=20
appellee Southwest Houston Physician Center were nonsuited prior =
to=20
trial. None of the issues on appeal concerns this=20
appellee.
The jury was also asked whether =
appellants=20
intentionally interfered with the contracts between appellees and =
the=20
patients. The jury answered these inquiries in the=20
negative.
The charge, therefore, omitted =
several=20
principles explicit in the case law, most notably: (1) the =
presumption=20
against conferring third-party-beneficiary status, and (2) that =
the intent=20
to confer a direct benefit must be clearly and fully spelled out =
in the=20
contract. See Lomas, 223 S.W.3d at 306.=20
In his testimony, the former =
attorney for=20
appellees who drafted the assignments made the focus of this case, =
acknowledged that Alooking at the face of the =
release@: (1) the patient was purporting =
to accept=20
money on behalf of himself and his or her assigns, (2) the patient =
was=20
purporting to release any claims of his or her assigns in exchange =
for the=20
amount received, and (3) the release did not indicate whether any =
of the=20
money was to go to the assigns.
Under well-established rules of =
contract=20
construction, specific provisions cannot be read in isolation but =
must be=20
considered in the context of the whole contract. In re =
Ford Motor=20
Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 298 (Tex. 2006); Coats v. Farmers Ins. =
Exchange, 230 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2006, no=20
pet.).
As described in the Restatement, =
the=20
quintessential third-party-beneficiary scenario occurs as =
follows: =20
AA owes C $100. For consideration B =
promises=20
A to pay the debt. B breaks his contract. C may sue B =
and=20
obtain judgment for the amount of the debt.@ restatement (Second) of =
Contracts=20
' 302, illus. 1. In the case before =
us, the=20
settlement agreements reference direct payments from appellants to =
the=20
patients but do not mention any payment of debts to third =
parties. =20
Indeed, as described in the text above, the releases themselves =
negate the=20
possibility that appellants were promising to pay anything =
directly to any=20
third party.
As evidence that the bills were =
used in=20
negotiating settlement, appellees point to language in the =
releases=20
stating that the parties took into account the damages incurred by =
each=20
patient in determining the settlement amounts.
The true import of the medical =
bills=20
received by appellants and used to calculate settlement amounts =
appears to=20
be that they helped the patients establish that they incurred a =
certain=20
amount of healthcare expenses as a result of the auto =
collisions. In=20
other words, if anything, the bills resulted in =
appellants=3D paying claims that included medical =
expenses;=20
whereas, without such documentation, the settlement amounts might =
have=20
been lower, not higher. In fact, appellees stated in their=20
brief: AThe extent of the medical bills, in =
large part,=20
determined the amount of the settlement.@ |