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Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November = 13,=20 2007.

 

In The

 

Fourteenth=20 Court of Appeals

____________

 

NO. 14-05-01229-CV

____________

 

BRUCE R. LIVELY,=20 Appellant

 

V.

 

J. RANDLE HENDERSON,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A PARTNER IN = HENDERSON &=20 HAMMON, L.L.P., Appellee

 

 

 

 

On Appeal from the 151st = District=20 Court

Harris County,=20 Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 03-61821

 

 

M E M O R=20 A N D U M  O P I N I O N

In this breach of = contract and=20 fiduciary duty case, Bruce R. Lively contends the trial court = erred in=20 granting summary judgment in favor of J. Randle Henderson = individually and=20 as a partner in Henderson & Hammon, L.L.P. because Henderson = failed to=20 establish, as a matter of law: (1) Bruce lacked standing; (2) the=20 parties=3D Mutual Release = negated=20 Bruce=3Ds claims; (3) = Henderson did not=20 owe Bruce a fiduciary duty; and (4) Henderson was entitled to a=20 no-evidence summary judgment.  Bruce further asserts  = the trial=20 court erred in disposing of claims raised in his second amended = original=20 petition upon which Henderson did not move for summary = judgment. =20 Because the terms of the release negate Bruce=3Ds breach of contract = claim and=20 there is no evidence that Henderson owed Bruce a fiduciary duty at = the=20 time of any alleged breach, we affirm.

I.=20 Factual and Procedural Background

When the events = giving rise to=20 this lawsuit occurred, Bruce was the sole shareholder of Lively = Energy=20 & Development Corp. (Ledco) and Harry Lively, = Bruce=3Ds father, was the = sole=20 shareholder of Lively Exploration Co. (Lexco).  Both = companies were=20 involved in oil and gas exploration and development, and Harry and = Bruce=20 had agreed to work together on pursuing various oil and gas=20 projects. 

JIMCO Enterprises, = Inc. was a=20 pumping company owned by other individuals not involved in this = lawsuit=20 that, among other things, provided pumping services to several = wells owned=20 by Lexco.  In 1998, Bruce and Harry began efforts to jointly = acquire=20 JIMCO.  Henderson represented both Bruce and Harry in their = joint=20 effort to acquire JIMCO.  Harry, for reasons unknown and not = relevant=20 to this dispute, decided not to pursue the acquisition.  = Bruce=20 continued his efforts to acquire JIMCO, and  Henderson = assisted Bruce=20 in forming RWR Holdings, Inc. for purposes of the = acquisition.  In=20 turn, RWR became the sole shareholder of JIMCO, and Bruce was the = sole=20 shareholder of RWR.  Henderson represented Bruce and RWR = through the=20 acquisition of JIMCO, and, as a result, was aware of = Bruce=3Ds investments and = obligations=20 because he assisted Bruce in making the financial arrangements for = the=20 purchase.

After the JIMCO = closing, a=20 dispute arose between Henderson and Bruce regarding legal fees and = Henderson=3Ds representation of=20 Bruce.  To settle those issues, Henderson and Bruce entered = into a=20 mutual release on July 6, 1999.  Under the terms of the=20 release,  Henderson released Bruce from all claims for = payment of=20 legal services rendered in connection with the JIMCO acquisition = and=20 agreed to refrain from representing Harry in any claims for = reimbursement=20 relating to the JIMCO acquisition.   In return, Bruce = released=20 Henderson:

from all claims made, known and unknown, = arising=20 out of Henderson=3Ds representation of Bruce R. Lively in = the JIMCO=20 acquisition, and without waiver of any conflict of interest = that may=20 arise in the future from Henderson=3Ds representation of Harry B. Lively, = inclusive of=20 any corporation or entity owned or controlled by Harry B. Lively, = in any=20 matter affecting Bruce R. Lively from and after the date of this = mutual=20 release, does hereby = release=20 Henderson and J. Randle Henderson from any claims arising out of=20 Henderson=3Ds representation of Harry B. Lively, = inclusive of=20 any corporation or entity owned or controlled by Harry B. Lively, = in any=20 matter affecting Bruce R. Lively prior to the date of this mutual=20 release.

 

(emphasis = added)  Although=20 Henderson represented Harry subsequent to this date, he had no = involvement=20 with any of Bruce=3Ds corporate entities=20 thereafter. 

In the meantime, = JIMCO=20 continued pumping operations at Lexco=3Ds wells under a = pre-existing=20 oral agreement for several months and Harry and Bruce continued to = work=20 together on other oil and gas activities. Bruce located a drilling = operator, Kerns Oil & Gas Co. (Kerns), to develop some new = wells on=20 Lexco=3Ds property.  = Bruce turned=20 over final negotiations between Kerns and Lexco to Lexco.  At = the=20 same time, Bruce was negotiating his own pumping agreement between = JIMCO=20 and Kerns for some of Kerns=3D existing wells on=20 Lexco=3Ds property.  = Henderson had=20 no involvement in any of these transactions on Bruce=3Ds behalf. =20

Before Kerns and = JIMCO reached=20 an agreement, however, Kerns bypassed JIMCO and hired = JIMCO=3Ds pumper directly to = pump its=20 wells on Lexco=3Ds property.  On = November=20 15, 1999, Henderson, on behalf of Lexco, notified Bruce, as = president of=20 JIMCO, that Aall services, = including but not=20 limited to pumping and consulting performed by JIMCO@ were terminated = effective=20 December 1, 1999.  This letter indicated that Kerns would be = taking=20 over the services previously performed by JIMCO.

Bruce filed suit = against=20 Henderson on November 6, 2003, alleging breach of the release and = breach=20 of fiduciary duty because of Henderson=3Ds representation of = Harry in=20 terminating the Lexco/JIMCO pumping agreement.  After filing = a=20 general denial, Henderson responded with a traditional and = no-evidence=20 summary judgment motion.  In this motion, Henderson contended = he was=20 entitled to a traditional summary judgment because Bruce lacked = standing=20 to assert damages, the release negated Bruce=3Ds claims, and there = was no=20 fiduciary relationship between Henderson and Bruce at the time of = the=20 alleged breach.  Henderson also asserted there was no = evidence of a=20 breach of the release or any damage to Bruce individually.  = Finally,=20 Henderson alleged there was no evidence of (1) any fiduciary duty = between=20 Henderson and Bruce after July 1999, (2) breach of any fiduciary = duty, or=20 (3) any damage to Bruce, individually, resulting from any = breach. =20 After various other filings by both parties, the trial court = entered final=20 summary judgment in favor of Henderson on September 6, 2005.  = This=20 appeal timely followed.

II.=20 Standard of Review

We review the = granting of=20 summary judgment de novo.  Cruikshank v. Consumer = Direct=20 Mortg., Inc., 138 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2004, pet.=20 denied).  We may affirm a summary judgment only on grounds=20 specifically stated in the motion.  Id.  Where, = as here,=20 the trial court=3Ds order granting = summary=20 judgment does not specify on what grounds it was granted, it must = be=20 affirmed if any of the grounds asserted are meritorious.  = Western=20 Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).=20

A defendant moving = for a=20 traditional summary judgment under rule 166a must conclusively = disprove an=20 essential element of the plaintiff=3Ds cause of action or=20 conclusively prove all the elements of an affirmative defense that = would=20 overcome plaintiff=3Ds cause of = action. =20 Cruikshank, 138 S.W.3d at 500.  A party may also move = for=20 summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or = more=20 essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party = would=20 have the burden of proof at trial.  See  Tex. R. Civ. P. = 166a(i);=20 Western Invs., Inc., 162 S.W.3d at 550.   Once a=20 no‑evidence summary judgment has been filed, the = non‑movant must bring=20 forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on = the=20 challenged elements.  Cruikshank, 138 S.W.3d at = 500.  In=20 reviewing a summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the = light most=20 favorable to the non‑movant and resolve any doubt in the=20 non‑movant=3Ds favor.  = Western=20 Invs., Inc., 162 S.W.3d at 550.

III.=20 Analysis

A.       =20 Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment on = Bruce=3Ds = Claims

In his first issue, = Bruce=20 contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment = because=20 Henderson failed, as a matter of law, to establish that (1) Bruce = lacked=20 standing to assert damages on behalf of JIMCO or RWR, (2) the = release=20 negated Bruce=3Ds claims, (3) = Henderson owed no=20 fiduciary duty to Bruce, and (4) Henderson was entitled to a = no-evidence=20 summary judgment.  Because we conclude that the clear wording = of the=20 release negates Bruce=3Ds breach of contract = claim and=20 there was no evidence of at least one element of Bruce=3Ds breach of fiduciary = duty=20 claim, we overrule his first issue.

1.        =20 Breach of Contract

Bruce sued Henderson = for breach=20 of contract alleging Henderson breached the release because he = represented=20 Harry in matters affecting Bruce, i.e., termination of the Lexco = pumping=20 contract with Bruce.  Henderson filed a motion for summary = judgment=20 claiming, among other things, that the plain language of the = release does=20 not prohibit Henderson from representing Harry in the = future. =20

To recover=20 under a breach of contract cause of action, a plaintiff must show: = (1) the=20 existence of a valid contract, (2) performance or tendered = performance by=20 the plaintiff, (3) breach of the contract by the defendant, and = (4)=20 damages sustained as a result of the breach.  Renteria v.=20 Trevino, 79 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).  Henderson, as movant for = summary=20 judgment, had the burden to establish by competent summary = judgment=20 evidence that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to = one or=20 more essential elements of Bruce=3Ds breach=20 of contract cause of action.  See Elliott-Williams Co. v.=20 Diaz, 9 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Tex. 1999). 

In construing a = written=20 contract, our primary goal is to ascertain the true intentions of = the=20 parties as expressed in the instrument. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v.=20 Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003).  To do so, we = must=20 examine and consider the entire contract to ensure no provisions = are=20 rendered meaningless.  Id.  Finally, A[c]ontract terms are = given=20 their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meanings unless the = contract=20 itself shows them to be used in a technical or different=20 sense.@  Valence = Operating Co.=20 v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. = 2005).

The release indicates = it was=20 entered into because Henderson had made a demand on Bruce for full = payment=20 for legal services rendered in connection with the JIMCO=20 acquisition.  Bruce objected to paying all of = Henderson=3Ds fees because some = of the fees=20 occurred when Henderson represented both Bruce and Harry.  = When Bruce=20 and Henderson settled their dispute, they executed the mutual = release, in=20 which Henderson released Bruce from all claims for payment of = legal=20 services rendered in connection with the JIMCO acquisition and = agreed to=20 refrain from representing Harry in any claims for reimbursement = relating=20 to the JIMCO acquisition.   In return, Bruce released = Henderson=20 from any claims arising out of Henderson=3Ds representation in = the JIMCO=20 acquisition and from any claims arising out of his representation = of Harry=20 in any matter prior to the date of the release.  = Bruce=3Ds release was, = Awithout waiver of any = conflict=20 of interest that may arise in the future from = Henderson=3Ds representation of = Harry B.=20 Lively, . . . in any matter affecting Bruce R. Lively from and = after the=20 date of this mutual release.@

Bruce alleges that = the language=20 in the release referencing non-waiver of future conflicts of = interest is a=20 contractual prohibition against any future conflict of = interest. =20 However, the plain language of the release reflects that Bruce has = not=20 waived his remedies for any future conflicts of interest.  = Thus,=20 rather than prohibiting future conflicts, the release instead = indicates=20 Bruce has not waived his remedies for any future conflicts of = interest=20 that could arise from Henderson=3Ds representation of = Harry or=20 Harry=3Ds corporate = entities. =20 Accordingly, because the wording of the release negates = Bruce=3Ds breach of contract = claim,=20 Henderson established no liability under the contract as a matter = of law.=20

2.        =20 Breach of Fiduciary Duty

In his second cause = of action,=20 Bruce alleged Henderson breached a fiduciary duty owed to him as a = result=20 of their former attorney-client relationship.  There are two = types of=20 fiduciary relationships: (1) a formal fiduciary relationship, = arising as a=20 matter of law such as that between an attorney and his client; and = (2) an=20 informal fiduciary relationship, based on a confidential = relationship that=20 may arise from other moral, social, domestic or personal=20 associations.  See Stephenson v. LeBoeuf, 16 = S.W.3d=20 829, 836 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2000, pet.=20 denied).  Bruce=3Ds allegation of = breach of=20 fiduciary duty is limited to breach of the attorney-client=20 relationship.  Thus, our discussion of the fiduciary = relationship=20 between the parties here is limited to those arising out of the=20 attorney-client association.

An attorney has a = fiduciary=20 duty to his client when an attorney‑client relationship is = created. =20 See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988);=20 Greene=3Ds Pressure Treating = &=20 Rentals, Inc. v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 178 S.W.3d 40, 43 = (Tex.=20 App.CHouston [1st Dist.] = 2005, no=20 pet.).  An attorney‑client relationship only arises = when an attorney=20 agrees to render professional services to a client. =20 Greene=3Ds Pressure Treating = &=20 Rentals, Inc.,=20 178 S.W.3d at 43.  This relationship may be expressly created = by=20 contract, or impliedly created through the parties=3D actions. = Id.  In=20 the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the attorney-client=20 relationship and the concomitant fiduciary relationship terminates = upon=20 completion of the purpose of employment.  Stephenson, = 16=20 S.W.3d at 836.

Here, the parties = agree=20 Henderson and Bruce had an attorney-client relationship for the = purposes=20 of acquiring JIMCO and that Henderson has not represented Bruce = since the=20 JIMCO acquisition.  Bruce contends that the fiduciary=20 attorney-client relationship extended beyond the JIMCO = acquisition. =20 The cases cited by Bruce in support of his argument that this = fiduciary=20 relationship continued ad infinitum are inapposite.  = See=20 Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) = (determining that=20 discovery rule applies to legal malpractice cases because of the = fiduciary=20 relationship between attorney and client); Maryland Am. Gen. = Ins. Co.=20 v. Blackmon, 639 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1982) (attorney-client=20 privilege continues after attorney-client relationship = ends);=20 Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1964) = (AThe [rule of = trusteeship] . . .=20 applies to a contract or other transaction relating to = compensation=20 provided the attorney‑client relationship was in existence = at the=20 time.@).             = Further, nothing in our record indicates that this relationship = continued=20 beyond the acquisition of JIMCO.  Indeed, the dispute leading = to the=20 parties=3D release arose out of = the JIMCO=20 acquisition, and the parties agree that their attorney-client = relationship=20 terminated at that time.  Moreover, Bruce=3Ds allegations of = breach of=20 fiduciary duty rest on Henderson=3Ds representation of = Lexco in=20 terminating a service agreement with JIMCO, which is a separate = legal=20 entity from Bruce.  See Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. = McKee,=20 943 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1997) (Corporate entities are separate = and=20 distinct from their shareholders, even when there is only one=20 shareholder.). As such, Henderson had no attorney-client = relationship with=20 JIMCO and thus owed JIMCO no fiduciary duty. =

Bruce has presented = no evidence=20 of a continuing attorney-client relationship between Henderson and = Bruce=20 after the date of the release.  He has likewise presented no = evidence=20 of any attorney-client relationship between Henderson and = JIMCO. =20 Because Bruce presented no evidence of a fiduciary relationship, = he has=20 failed to present evidence of one or more essential elements of = his=20 claim.  Accordingly, the trial court properly granted=20 Henderson=3Ds no-evidence summary = judgment=20 on Bruce=3Ds breach of fiduciary = duty=20 claim.  We overrule Bruce=3Ds first = issue.

B.       =20 Bruce=3Ds Amended=20 Petition

In his second issue, = Bruce=20 contends the trial court erroneously disposed of claims he alleged = in his=20 second amended original petition not addressed by = Henderson=3Ds summary judgment=20 motion.   However, Bruce did not bring any new claims in = his=20 amended petition; instead, he brought the same causes of action, = breach of=20 contract and fiduciary duty, both individually and in his capacity = as=20 president of JIMCO and RWR.  Bruce amended his petition in = response=20 to Henderson=3Ds motion for summary = judgment=20 alleging that any damages resulting from Henderson=3Ds alleged conflict of = interest=20 accrued to JIMCO, not Bruce.  Bruce contends that because he = is the=20 sole shareholder of JIMCO and RWR, he is entitled to bring an = action on=20 behalf of those corporations.

A = plaintiff=3Ds timely filed = amended pleading=20 supersedes all previous pleadings and becomes the controlling = petition in=20 the case regarding theories of recovery.  Tex. R. Civ. P. = 65. =20 Ordinarily, a defendant is required to amend his motion for = summary=20 judgment to address any additional claims.  Espeche v.=20 Ritzell, 123 S.W.3d 657, 663B64 (Tex. = App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2003, pet.=20 denied).  However, if a motion for summary judgment is = sufficiently=20 broad to encompass later-filed claims, the movant need not amend = his=20 motion.  Id. at 664.  Henderson conclusively = proved that=20 any breach of contract claim brought by either Bruce, = individually, or as=20 a representative of JIMCO and RWR was negated by the plain = language of the=20 contract.  Because the grounds asserted by Henderson in his = motion=20 for summary judgment also vitiate the corporations=3D claims, we overrule=20 Bruce=3Ds second issue.[1] =

 C.      =20 Henderson=3Ds Cross Point = Requesting=20 Damages for Frivolous Appeal

Henderson requests an = award for=20 frivolous appeal damages.  Henderson contends that sanctions = are=20 appropriate because Bruce had no standing to assert the damages he = alleged, ignored well-settled Texas law regarding the distinction = between=20 corporations and shareholders, Ablatently = misread@ the release, and = failed to=20 present any evidence to support his theories of recovery. =20

This court is = authorized to=20 award a prevailing party damages if we determine an appeal is=20 frivolous.  See Tex.=20 R. App. P. 45.  Although the granting of sanctions is = within=20 our discretion, a sanction should be applied only with prudence, = caution,=20 and after careful deliberation.  See Azubuike v. Fiesta = Mart,=20 Inc., 970 S.W.2d 60, 66 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 1998, no=20 pet.).  In determining the propriety of sanctions, we must = view the=20 record from the appellant=3Ds point of view at = the time the=20 appeal was filed, and we may not consider any matter that is not = in the=20 record, briefs, or other papers filed in this court.  = See=20 Tex. R. App. P. = 45;=20 Azubuike, 970 S.W.2d at 66.  Furthermore, we must = focus on=20 whether appellant had a reasonable expectation of reversal or = whether he=20 merely pursued the appeal in bad faith.  Azubuike, 970 = S.W.2d=20 at 66.

Although the = imposition of=20 sanctions is within our discretion, we may do so only in = circumstances=20 that are truly egregious. Angelou v. African Overseas = Union, 33=20 S.W.3d 269, 282 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2000, no=20 pet.).  Factors to be considered in deciding whether to = impose=20 sanctions against an appellant include the failure to present a = complete=20 record, the raising of issues for the first time on appeal, the = failure to=20 file a response to a cross‑point requesting sanctions, and = the filing of=20 an inadequate appellate brief.  Tate v. E.I. Du Pont de = Nemours=20 & Co., Inc., 954 S.W.2d 872 875 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 1997, no=20 writ).

Although most of=20 Bruce=3Ds arguments on appeal = may be=20 without merit, we do not agree the record in this case evidences = egregious=20 circumstances warranting sanctions.  Accordingly, we decline=20 Henderson=3Ds request.

The judgment of the = trial court=20 is affirmed.

 

 

 

 

/s/        John=20 S. Anderson

Justice

 

 

 

Judgment rendered and = Memorandum Opinion filed November 13, 2007.

Panel consists of = Justices=20 Yates, Anderson, and Hudson.[2]

 


[1] =20 Moreover, Henderson points out = that=20 Bruce=3Ds notice of appeal gives no indication = that he is=20 appealing in a representative capacity on behalf of his corporate=20 entities.  Bruce, in his individual capacity, is not legally = the same=20 person as Bruce in his capacity as president of JIMCO and = RWR. =20 See Elizondo v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation = Comm=3Dn, 974=20 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. App.CAustin 1998, no pet.) (holding that = because=20 appellant did not perfect appeal in representative capacity, = appellant was=20 only before court in individual capacity).  Thus, Bruce is = only=20 before this court in his individual capacity, and we lack = jurisdiction to=20 consider any claims he may have as a representative of JIMCO or=20 RWR.

[2] =20 Senior Justice Hudson sitting by=20 = assignment.

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FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: white; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; BACKGROUND-COLOR: red } .buttonUnused { PADDING-RIGHT: 1pt; PADDING-LEFT: 1pt; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: = 9pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 1pt; MARGIN: 1pt; COLOR: #fff5d7; PADDING-TOP: 1pt; = BACKGROUND-COLOR: #576a9d; font-face: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif } .buttonTanUnused { PADDING-RIGHT: 1pt; PADDING-LEFT: 1pt; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: = 9pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 1pt; MARGIN: 1pt; COLOR: #576a9d; PADDING-TOP: 1pt; = BACKGROUND-COLOR: #fff5d7; font-face: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif } .TextLargeBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: left } .DocketHeaderTitle { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 14pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, ' Helvetica', sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: center } .TextLargeBlack { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-ALIGN: left } .TextLargeBlackcenter { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-ALIGN: center } .TextBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } A.TextBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-DECORATION: none } .TextRed { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: red; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } .TextHidenGray { FONT-SIZE: 0pt; COLOR: #ebebe1; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; FONT-FAMILY: = Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: left } .Time { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10px; COLOR: red; LINE-HEIGHT: 4em; = FONT-FAMILY: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: center } ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C826E6.B3C6E870--