Texas Judiciary Online - HTML Opinion

This civil=20 action has been on a fourteen-year journey bouncing between = federal and=20 state courts only to remain unresolved. The City removed the = case to=20 the United States District Court for the Southern District of = Texas. =20 Subsequently, the federal district court determined it did not = have=20 subject matter jurisdiction and it was remanded. Following = remand to=20 the 55th District Court of Harris County, the court granted the=20 City=3Ds motion=20 for summary judgment. Maguire appealed to the Houston courts of=20 appeals. Pursuant to a docket-equalization order, appellate = review=20 was assigned to the Texarkana Court of Appeals. That court = upheld=20 the trial court=3Ds summary=20 judgment in favor of the City relative to Maguire=3Ds=20 negligent misrepresentation claim, but reversed and remanded the = remaining=20 claims for further proceedings in the 55th District Court. =20 Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 69 S.W.3d 350, 372 = (Tex.=20 App.CTexarkana=20 2002, pet. denied). Notably, the Texarkana Court of Appeals=20 concluded that section 23-102 did not apply to Maguire=3Ds drill=20 site.^{^[1]}=20

In the=20 interim, this court issued Taub v. Aquila Southwest Pipeline = Corp.,=20 wherein we held that the county civil courts at law have exclusive = jurisdiction over condemnation and eminent domain cases. 93 = S.W.3d=20 451, 456 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Following Taub,=20 Maguire=3Ds inverse=20 condemnation claim was dismissed from district court and re-filed = in=20 County Civil Court at Law Number Four (Atrial=20 court@). =20 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Among its grounds = for=20 summary judgment, the City urged that Maguire=3Ds takings=20 claim was not ripe. The trial court requested that the = City =20 restyle its ripeness challenge as a plea to the jurisdiction, and=20 requested briefs. On November 29, 2005, the trial court = granted the=20 City=3Ds plea to=20 the jurisdiction and dismissed Maguire=3Ds entire=20 case. On appeal, this court will answer the limited question = whether=20 Maguire=3Ds claims=20 are ripe for adjudication.

II. Ripeness

In its=20 first issue, Maguire contends the trial court erred by determining = its=20 suit was not ripe for adjudication. It is well settled that = a=20 dispute must be ripe for adjudication before a court may exercise = subject=20 matter jurisdiction. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, = 964=20 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). We review a ripeness = determination de=20 novo. Id. In context of an inverse condemnation = case,=20 the matter is not ripe unless the governmental entity charged with = implementing the regulation that allegedly caused the taking has = reached a=20 final decision. See Williamson County = Reg=3Dl Planning=20 Comm=3Dn = v.=20 Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985); = see=20 also Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928B29=20 (stating that we look to federal jurisprudence to guide our review = of=20 these disputes).

A final=20 decision is prerequisite to ripeness in the context of regulatory = takings=20 and related constitutional claims. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d = at=20 929. That final and authoritative decision must be = Aof the=20 type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject = property [because a] court cannot determine whether a regulation = has gone=20 >too=20 far=3D = unless it=20 knows how far the regulation goes.@ =20 Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Stated = differently, we=20 must have sufficient evidence in the record to compare prohibited = uses=20 with any permissible uses that may be made with the affected=20 property. Id. The final decision requirement = ordinarily=20 includes both a rejected proposed use and denial of a variance = from=20 controlling regulations. See id. However, = futile=20 variance requests or re-applications are not necessary. =20 Id.

It is also=20 important to note the difference between the Afinal=20 decision@ = requirement and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The = finality=20 requirement concerns whether the initial decision maker has = arrived at a=20 definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete = injury=20 whereas the exhaustion requirement generally refers to = administrative=20 procedures available for review of an adverse decision. = Hamilton=20 Bank, 473 U.S. at 193. Thus, it is important not to confuse=20 availability of administrative remedies with the necessity of a = final=20 decision. Further, as the Hamilton Bank opinion = highlights,=20 our focus for purposes of determining whether the governmental = entity has=20 reached a final decision is on the procedure and regulations = implemented=20 by the entity . See id. at 186.

The City=20 contends Maguire did not receive a final decision because it did = not=20 pursue an appeal to the City Council. Maguire counters that = it=20 received a final decision, and if further administrative appeals = were=20 possible, they would have been futile.