Vacated=20
and Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, =
2007.
In The
Fourteenth Court=20
of Appeals
____________
NO. 14-06-01023-CV
____________
VIRGINIA=20
PIERSON, =
Appellant
V.
THERESA=20
REYNOLDS, =
Appellee
On Appeal from the =
County Court at Law No. 4
Harris County, =
Texas
Trial Court Cause =
No. 874973
M E M O R=20
A N D U M O P I N I O N
In this=20
forcible detainer action, Virginia Pierson appeals from a judgment =
awarding possession of an apartment to Theresa Reynolds on several =
grounds. Because Pierson (1) has relinquished possession of =
the=20
apartment and (2) has not referenced any evidence on which to base =
a claim=20
that she is entitled to current immediate possession of the =
apartment, we=20
vacate the trial court=3Ds judgment=20
and dismiss this case as moot.
I. =20
Factual and Procedural=20
Background
Appellant=20
Virginia Pierson occupied an apartment rent-free in return for =
collecting=20
rent payments from the other tenants in a building owned by =
Theresa=20
Reynolds. On August 1, 2006, Reynolds advised Pierson in =
writing=20
that Pierson should no longer collect any rent from =
Reynolds=3D =
tenants=20
and Astart=20
planning on moving elsewhere in the very near future.@ On=20
August 2, 2006, Reynolds provided written notice to Pierson that =
their=20
oral agreement Amade in=20
2002 in which it was agreed [Pierson] would act as manager for=20
[Reynolds=3D =
four]=20
apartment complex@ =
was=20
terminated. Pierson was given thirty days to vacate the =
apartment on=20
August 3, 2006. On September 6, 2006, Reynolds filed an =
eviction=20
petition in the Harris County Precinct 2 Justice Court. =
After the=20
justice court awarded possession to Reynolds, Pierson appealed to =
county=20
court. =20
Pierson=20
filed an answer in county court, alleging Reynolds had violated an =
oral=20
agreement to provide a permanent place for Pierson to live in =
return for=20
Pierson=3Ds=20
assistance in managing and rehabilitating Reynolds=3D =
property. Pierson also contended that Reynolds violated her =
oral=20
promise to repair damage to Pierson=3Ds=20
apartment, and that Reynolds=3D =
decision=20
to evict Pierson was in response to Pierson=3Ds demands=20
that Reynolds honor her promise to rehabilitate =
Pierson=3Ds=20
apartment. Pierson further alleged that Reynolds sought to =
evict her=20
because Pierson=3Ds husband,=20
Robert Pierson, had reported an incident involving alleged =
insurance fraud=20
by Reynolds. Finally, Pierson asserted what she termed a =
counter=20
claim, requesting that the court:
quash this suit and =
. . .=20
make whole [Pierson] for [Reynolds=3D] breach of [their] =
legally=20
binding verbal contract, which [Reynolds] terminated in writing, =
without=20
explanation in a letter dated August 2, 2006, in order to =
fraudulently=20
breech [sic] an agreement voluntarily entered into by both =
parties.=20
The defendant cites the Texas Fair Trade Practices Act or =
any other=20
statutes the court may deem just and fair in this =
matter.
After a=20
trial de novo to the bench, the trial court awarded possession of =
the=20
premises to Reynolds on November 8, 2006, noting in its judgment =
that a=20
writ of possession could issue in thirty days. =20
This appeal timely followed.
II. =20
Mootness
A forcible=20
detainer action is intended to be a quick, simple, and inexpensive =
way to=20
obtain immediate possession of property. Marshall v. =
Hous. Auth.=20
of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). Because =
the=20
only issue in such an action is the right to actual possession of =
the=20
premises, it is not intended to be a final determination of =
whether an=20
eviction is wrongful. See id. at 785B87. =20
The Texas Supreme Court has held that when a tenant no longer =
lives in an=20
apartment and has no basis for claiming a current right to =
possession, a=20
forcible detainer action may be rendered moot. See =
id.=20
at 787. Although Reynolds does not contest our jurisdiction =
over=20
this matter, we have a duty to consider if we have jurisdiction =
over a=20
matter before us. See Kennedy v. Andover Place =
Apartments,=20
203 S.W.3d 496, 497 (Tex. App.CHouston=20
[14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Pierson has notified this court =
that=20
she has moved out of the apartment upon which the forcible =
detainer action=20
was based. Thus, based on the Texas Supreme Court authority =
cited=20
above, we must first consider whether Pierson has asserted any =
basis for a=20
current right to possession so that her appeal has not been =
rendered=20
moot. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at =
787.
Pierson=20
presents the following issues for our review: (1) the trial court =
erred by=20
acting as both judge and attorney for Reynolds; (2) the trial =
court=20
intentionally destroyed evidence produced at trial; (3) the trial =
court=20
refused to allow a party to the suit (Robert Pierson) to defend =
himself or=20
cross-examine Reynolds; (4) the trial court allowed Reynolds to =
slander=20
Robert Pierson; (5) the trial court=3Ds decision=20
was contrary to the law; and (6) the trial court failed to rule on =
Pierson=3Ds motion=20
for relief presented without objection. =20
None of these complaints have any bearing on Pierson=3Ds right to=20
actual possession of the premises, nor does appellant=3Ds briefing=20
to this court shed further light on this issue.
Moreover,=20
Pierson=3Ds claim=20
that Reynolds violated their Alegally=20
binding verbal contract@ =
is not=20
supported by our record. Instead, the record reflects that =
Reynolds=20
provided written notice to Pierson terminating their oral =
management=20
agreement and provided Pierson thirty days in which to vacate the=20
apartment prior to filing her eviction petition. Pierson has =
not=20
claimed or offered any evidence that she occupied this apartment =
under any=20
sort of lease, written or oral, requiring more than thirty=20
days=3D =
notice to=20
terminate. Under these circumstances, we discern no legal =
basis=20
under which Pierson may successfully assert a current right to =
possession=20
of the apartment, and she has raised none. Thus, because =
Pierson has=20
vacated the premises and has no bases on which to assert a current =
right=20
to possession, this appeal of the forcible detainer action has =
been=20
rendered moot. See id. at 787B90. =20
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court=3Ds judgment=20
and dismiss this appeal as moot. See id. at=20
787.
III. =20
Conclusion
Pierson=3Ds appeal=20
is moot as to the issue of possession and no exception applies to =
warrant=20
consideration of this appeal on its merits. We vacate the =
trial=20
court=3Ds=20
judgment, and dismiss this appeal as moot.
/s/ =20
Wanda McKee Fowler
Justice
Judgment=20
rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed August 30, 2007.
Panel=20
consists of Justices Anderson, Fowler, and Frost.
An appeal bond was =
set at=20
$720.00, but Pierson filed an uncontested Affidavit of Inability =
to Pay=20
Costs for Appeal.
Although Robert =
Pierson=3Ds name appears on the notice of appeal, =
the=20
judgment of the county civil court at law was against Virginia =
Pierson=20
only.
Contrary to the first, third, and =
fourth issues,=20
which we construe as complaints regarding the overall fairness of =
the=20
trial court proceedings, our review of the record indicates the =
trial=20
judge attempted to craft an equitable solution in the face of the=20
parties=3D open animosity and hostility towards =
each other=20
and their seemingly limited understanding of the judicial =
process. =20
Those items that Pierson asserts were intentionally destroyed or =
are=20
missing from the recordCi.e., her answer, her =
pauper=3Ds affidavit, and her motion for =
reliefCare all actually included in our =
record. =20
Additionally, Pierson=3Ds motion for relief was presented to the =
trial=20
court at the conclusion of the bench trial. Nothing =
indicates that=20
this motion was properly filed with the trial court, and it was =
instead=20
entered into evidence as an exhibit without objection by either=20
party. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we =
are=20
satisfied that these complaints are without merit. Moreover, =
Pierson=20
cites no legal authority in support of any of these issues, nor =
has she=20
provided any citations to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. =
38.1(f),=20
(h). Under these circumstances, none of these issues suffice =
to=20
breathe life into an appeal that has been otherwise rendered =
moot. =20
Cf. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at787B90. |