Texas Judiciary Online - HTML Opinion

^{^[1]} =20 See Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.1987); = Village=20 of Pheasant Run Homeowner Ass=3Dn, Inc. v. Kastor, 47 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. = App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); = see=20 also Tex Prop. Code Ann. ' 202.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007); = Luckel v.=20 White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991). =

^{^[2]} =20 See Cooksey v. Snider, 682 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. 1984) = (noting that=20 purchasers are charged with knowledge of the contents of recorded=20 instruments and the terms of deeds in their chain of title); = Westland=20 Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. = 1982)=20 (noting that a purchaser is bound by every recital, reference, and = reservation contained in, or fairly disclosed by, any instrument = which=20 forms an essential link in the chain of title under which he=20 claims).

^{^[3]} =20 See Evans v. Pollock, 796 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex. 1990); = Inwood=20 North Homeowners=3D Ass=3Dn, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987) (noting = that a=20 purchaser with constructive notice of restrictive covenants = becomes bound=20 by them); Burns v. Woods, 492 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1973); = see=20 generally Lehmann v. Wallace, 510 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. Civ.=20 App.BSan Antonio 1974, writ ref=3Dd n.r.e.) (noting that a general plan = may=20 Abe established in various ways, such as = by express=20 covenant, by implication from a filed map, or by parol = representations . .=20 . or the grantor pursuing a course of conduct indicating a = neighborhood=20 scheme . . . @); see also Collum v. Neuhoff, = 507 S.W.2d=20 920, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.BDallas 1974, no writ) (on motion for = rehearing:=20 indicating that the reservation of areas for parks or common = areas, along=20 with assessments for their maintenance, tends to prove intent for = a=20 general plan of development).

^{^[4]} =20 See Anderson, 495 S.W.2d at 359 (Tex. Civ. App.CTexarkana , 1973) (holding that when = evidence on=20 the recorded plat indicates intent, a referenced recreational area = becomes=20 incorporated by reference and lot purchasers can rely on that = dedication);=20 see generally Raman Chandler Props., L.C. v.=20 Caldwell=3Ds Creek Homeowners = Ass=3Dn, Inc.,=20 178 S.W.3d 384, 394 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2005, pet. denied) = (discussing the=20 reservation of common areas to be maintained for the benefit of = the=20 homeowners); Selected Lands Corp v. Speich, 702 S.W.2d 197, = 200=20 (Tex. App.BHouston [1^st Dist.] 1985, = writ=20 ref=3Dd n.r.e.) (discussing how common areas = are often=20 evidence of a general plan of development); see also McCart v.=20 Cain, 416 S.W.2d 463, 465B66 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1967, writ ref=3Dd n.r.e.) (discussing the right of = homeowners to=20 enforce restrictions on these common areas); Evans, 796 = S.W.2d at=20 466.

^{^[5]} =20 However, this is not to say that the restrictions could not be = modified in=20 accordance with applicable procedures to remove this = requirement. =20 See Tex. Prop. Code Ann.'' 210.004B.008 (Vernon Supp. = 2007).

^{^[6]} =20 Although the Committee pleaded other grounds for challenging the = sale of=20 the Park, this is its only contention on appeal regarding the = ownership=20 issue. Therefore, the other grounds are not before us for = any=20 purpose and do not bear on whether jurisdiction exists to decide = the sole=20 ground asserted in this appeal.

^{^[7]} =20 Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot = be=20 waived. McAllen Med. Ctr. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, = 238 (Tex.=20 2001). Without past or present ownership interest in title = to land,=20 a party does not have standing to challenge the transfer of the = title=20 pertaining to said land. See Marburger v. Seminole = Pipeline=20 Co., 957 S.W.2d 82, 89B90 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) = (deciding=20 husband who had no ownership interest in wife=3Ds real property did not have standing to = contest=20 validity of easement over land); Hollar v. Jowers, = 310=20 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.CEastland 1958, writ ref=3Dd n.r.e.) (deciding party who had no = ownership=20 interest in land was not entitled to bring suit to cancel=20 deeds).

^{^[8]} =20 Subsets of homeowners are valid parties to declaratory judgments = made for=20 or against homeowner=3Ds associations. See e.g., = Brooks v.=20 Northglen Ass=3Dn, 141=20 S.W.3d 158, 162B63 (Tex. 2004) (noting that in a = declaratory=20 judgment, individual homeowners, though not indispensable, are = valid=20 parties); Wilchester W. Concerned Homeowners LDEF, Inc. v. = Wilchester=20 W. Fund, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 552, 558B561 (Tex. App.BHouston [1^st Dist.] 2005, = pet. denied)=20 (discussing the right of a sub-group of homeowners to challenge a=20 homeowner=3Ds association action). In this = case, the=20 Committee members, though a subset of the total community, are all = owners=20 in Clear Creek Village. Such an organization may have = standing if:=20 (1) its members have standing to sue on their own behalf, (2) the=20 interests the organization seek to protect are germane to the=20 organization=3Ds purpose, and (3) neither the claim nor = the=20 relief requested requires the participation of individual members = in the=20 lawsuit. Tex. Ass=3Dn. of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control = Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 447B48 (Tex. 1993).

^{^[9]} =20 The dissenting opinion correctly recognizes that if the = Association=20 had title and ability to transfer the Park to Rakowski, then the = members=20 of the Committee would be personally aggrieved and have standing = to=20 contest the transfer. However, because the = Committee=3Ds sole contention on appeal is that the=20 Association does not have such title, the Committee is = necessarily=20 also thereby contending that it is not aggrieved so as to have=20 standing. Similarly, the dissenting opinion would reverse = the=20 summary judgment on grounds not asserted by the Committee on = appeal and=20 thus unassigned error.

^{^[10]} =20 The dissenting opinion contends that a determination of standing = can not=20 be based on a party=3Ds position on the merits. While it = is=20 correct that a party can not be required to prove their entire = case =20 to establish jurisdiction, a party=3Ds position on the merits is frequently = what=20 distinguishes between the party=3Ds standing and a lack of standing. = See,=20 e.g., S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, = 307B08 (Tex. 2007) (holding that taxpayer = lacked=20 standing to assert that the contract was misapplied, but would = have had=20 standing to allege that the contract was illegal); City of = Houston v.=20 Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828B29 (Tex. 2007) (holding that retired = firefighters=20 lacked standing to seek a statutory interpretation on behalf of=20 firefighters still employed, but would have had such standing if = they had=20 asserted a right to payments from the City in the future); = Allstate=20 Indem. Co. v. Forth, 204 S.W.3d 795, 795B96 (Tex. 2006) (holding that insured = lacked=20 standing to sue her insurer for settling her medical bills in an = allegedly=20 arbitrary and unreasonable manner, but would have had standing if = insured=20 had asserted that she had unreimbursed, out-of-pocket medical = expenses);=20 Bland Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, = 554B58 (Tex. 2000) (noting that a = party=3Ds allegation of amount in controversy is = jurisdictional, and holding that a taxpayer who has no distinct = injury=20 from the general public has standing to sue a governmental entity = to=20 enjoin an illegal expenditure of public funds, but lacks standing = to=20 enjoin the entity from paying for goods and services it has = already=20 received and placed into permanent use).

^* =20 Senior Justice Richard H. Edelman sitting by=20 = assignment.