Texas = Judiciary Online

Opinion issued = December 13,=20 2007

In The

Court of=20 Appeals

For The

First District=20 of Texas

NO. = 01-05-01022-CV

WASIM AHMED = SHEIKH,=20 Appellant

SHAMA SHEIKH, Appellee

On Appeal from 311th District = Court

Harris County,=20 Texas

Trial Court Cause No. = 2004-02532

O P I N I O = N

Appellant,=20 Wasim Ahmed Sheikh (AWasim@), appeals=20 from a turnover-and-receivership order entered after a decree of = divorce=20 dissolving the marriage between himself and appellee, Shama Sheikh (AShama@). =20 We determine whether the trial court had subject-matter = jurisdiction to=20 enter, or alternatively abused its discretion by entering, a=20 turnover-and-receivership order that had the effect of enforcing = the=20 decree=3Ds property=20 division while Wasim=3Ds appeal=20 of the underlying divorce decree was pending. We also = determine=20 whether we have jurisdiction, in this appeal, to consider Wasim=3Ds=20 challenges to the portion of the order appointing the receiver as = master=20 in chancery. We reverse turnover-and-receivership portions = of the=20 order and remand the cause.

Background

Wasim = and Shama married in March 1985. A final divorce = decree=20 was rendered in December 2004, but on = March 9,=20 2005, the trial court vacated the December 2004 decree and = rendered a new=20 final decree. In its March 2005 final decree, the trial = court, among=20 other things, (1) divided the marital estate disproportionately; = (2)=20 awarded Shama an owelty judgment of $632,000 to equalize the = property=20 division; and (3) awarded Shama = $330,000 in=20 actual damages against Wasim on her = claims of=20 assault and actual fraud against her personally. Because = Wasim had filed his notice of appeal on = March 1, 2005,=20 it was deemed filed on March 9, 2005, = the date of=20 the new final decree. See Tex. R. = App. P. = 27.1(a). Wasim did not supersede the final = decree.

On March=20 4, 2005Cbefore the=20 March 9 decree was rendered and while = the=20 December 4 decree was still in effectCShama=20 filed a motion to enforce the property division. On March = 10, 2005,=20 Wasim moved the trial court to abate = the=20 enforcement proceeding because he had perfected his appeal. = See=20 Tex. Fam. Code = Ann.=20 ' 9.007(c)=20 (Vernon 2006) (AThe = power of=20 the court to render further orders to assist in the implementation = of or=20 to clarify the property division is abated while an appellate = proceeding=20 is pending.@). =20 Wasim asserts in his brief, Shama does not contest in her brief, and a=20 docket-sheet entry indicates that the trial court verbally granted = Wasim=3Ds plea in=20 abatement on April 26, 2005.

On May 9,=20 2005, during the pendency of the divorce appeal, Shama filed an application for post-judgment = turnover=20 and appointment of receiver. The application also requested = that the=20 receiver be appointed as master in = chancery under=20 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 171. See Tex. R. Civ. P. = 171. The=20 turnover application identified Wasim=3Ds property=20 only in broad categories, not specifically. Wasim specially excepted and=20 filed an opposition to the turnover application. His special = exception asserted that the application was defective for failing = to=20 identify property or the basis for relief sufficiently for him to = defend=20 against or to respond to the application. His=20 opposition alleged, among other things, that (1) Family Code = section=20 9.007(c) prohibited the requested relief because he held no = non-exempt=20 assets except for those awarded to Shama in the=20 decree; (2) Athe=20 proposed [turnover-and-receivership] order exceeds the Application = and=20 authorizes the receiver to take actions which are not authorized = by the=20 turnover procedure, which are not supported by any other legal = authority=20 . . . , and which are unconstitutional@;=20 and (3) the request to appoint the same person as receiver and = master in=20 chancery was inappropriate because Ait=20 would allow the party seeking the information to rule on his right = to=20 obtain that information.@

On July=20 18, 2005, after an evidentiary hearing at which the only evidence=20 presented was Shama=3Ds=20 testimony, the trial court granted the application for turnover = and=20 receivership. The receiver was = given broad=20 powers to take possession of and to sell all non-exempt property = held by=20 Wasim. The order further=20 provided:

3. =20 . . . Receiver is authorized = to take=20 all actions necessary to order [Wasim] = to=20 exhaust all lines of credit, including credit cards, to satisfy = any amount=20 due in this matter. Receiver is further=20 authorized to hire, at his discretion, independent counsel = for any=20 purpose receiver deems necessary to aid in collection of the = judgment and=20 related costs. All expenses incurred by receiver for = independent=20 counsel shall be taxed as costs against = [Wasim].

4. =20 Receiver is hereby authorized to take = all action=20 necessary to gain access to all real property, leased premises, = storage=20 facilities, and safety deposit boxes wherein any real and/or = personal=20 property of [Wasim] may be = situated.

. . .

7. =20 The Receiver is also appointed to Master in Chancery under Rule = 171 of the=20 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and shall have and exercise the = fullest and=20 broadest powers under Rule 171=20 . . . .

8. =20 [Wasim] shall make a full and complete = disclosure to Receiver of all of his non-exempt assets and to = neither=20 directly nor indirectly interfere or impede Receiver in his = performance of=20 his duties under this Order.

. . .

10. =20 It is further ORDERED that [Shama] = have and=20 recover of and against [Wasim] = judgment in the=20 sum of $500.00 for additional attorney=3Ds fees incurred in = the=20 preparation, filing, and processing of this turnover = order.

. . .

12. =20 [Wasim] is ORDERED to execute and turn = over and=20 deliver to Receiver . . . = Internal=20 Revenue Service Form 2848CPower of Attorney = and=20 Declaration of Representative. Receiver is specifically = authorized=20 to execute Form 2848 if [Wasim] fails = to deliver=20 Form 2848 as Ordered and Receiver is further authorized = . . . to=20 receive and endorse any tax refund checks to [Wasim] and request copies of [Wasim=3Ds] . . . = tax=20 returns.

13. =20 It is Ordered that Receiver is Directed and Authorized to pay = himself as=20 Receiver=3Ds fees, an amount = equal to=20 25% of all proceeds coming into his possession, the possession of = [Shama], and/or the registry of the court; = which the=20 Court finds is a fair, reasonable and necessary fee for the = Receiver; and=20 to distribute all remaining proceeds to the attorney for [Shama], as Trustee, without the requirement = of an=20 Order therefor. Receiver shall = have full and=20 final authority to tax as costs against [Wasim]=20 any expenses incurred by [R]eceiver = and/or Shama in furtherance of any purpose of the=20 receivership. All costs, including Receiver=3Ds fees, are hereby = taxed as=20 costs against [Wasim].

14. =20 All fees of Receiver shall, after application = for=20 advance is made by Receiver in writing with notice to all = parties=20 and an opportunity to respond, be taxed at regular intervals = established=20 by the Court, as costs owed by [Wasim].

15. =20 Receiver is Ordered to post bond in the amount of $100.00 . . . .

Wasim = moved for=20 a new trial on the turnover-and-receivership order, which motion = was overruled by operation of law. = Additionally,=20 Wasim timely requested findings of = fact and=20 conclusions of law and also timely = filed notice=20 of past-due findings and conclusions. He also appealed the=20 turnover-and-receivership order.^[1] On February 1, = 2006, this=20 Court abated the appeal and remanded the cause for the trial court = to=20 enter findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the=20 turnover-and-receivership order. On February 2, 2006, the = trial=20 court=3Ds findings=20 of fact and conclusions of law concerning the = turnover-and-receivership=20 order were filed in this Court, and the appeal was = reinstated. Wasim objected to those findings and = conclusions and=20 timely requested amended and additional findings and=20 conclusions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. = 298. The=20 trial court did not file amended or additional findings of fact or = conclusions of law.^[2]

Standards=20 of Review

A. =20 Standards of Review for Orders of Turnover and = Receivership

We review=20 a turnover order and an appointment of a receiver for an abuse of=20 discretion. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (providing that abuse of = discretion is=20 standard for turnover order); Moyer = v.=20 Moyer, 183 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Tex .App.CAustin=20 2005, no pet.) (providing that abuse of = discretion is standard for both turnover and receivership = orders). =20 We reverse a trial court for abusing its discretion only if we = find that=20 the court acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. = Buller, 806 = S.W.2d at=20 226. That is, an abuse of discretion occurs when a = trial=20 court acts A>without=20 reference to any guiding rules or principles.=3D@ =20 Id. (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., = 701=20 S.W.2d 238, 241B42=20 (Tex.=20 1985)). A trial court=3Ds issuance=20 of a turnover order, even if predicated on an erroneous conclusion = of law,=20 will not be reversed for an abuse of discretion if the judgment is = otherwise sustainable for any reason. Id. =20 Wasim phrases some of his challenges = to the=20 turnover-and-receivership order as legal- and factual-sufficiency=20 challenges. However, whether there is no evidence to support = a=20 turnover order is only Aa = relevant=20 consideration in determining if the trial court abused its = discretionary=20 authority in issuing the order.@ =20 Id.

B. =20 Standards of Review for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of=20 Law

Findings=20 of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and = dignity as a=20 jury=3Ds verdict=20 upon jury questions. See City of Clute v. = City of=20 Lake Jackson, 559 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref=3Dd=20 n.r.e.). The trial=20 court=3Ds findings=20 of fact are not conclusive when, as here, a complete = reporter=3Ds record=20 appears in the appellate record. See Middleton v. Kawasaki = Steel=20 Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] 1985), writ ref=3Dd n.r.e., 699=20 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985). The trial=20 court=3Ds findings=20 of fact are reviewable for legal- and factual-sufficiency of the = evidence=20 using the same standards that are applied in reviewing the = sufficiency of=20 the evidence underlying jury findings.^[3] Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659, 667 (Tex. = App.CHouston=20 [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). In contrast, we = review=20 conclusions of law de novo. See BMC=20 Software Belgium, N.V.=20 v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 = (Tex.=20 2002).

Wasim=3Ds Complaints = Concerning the=20 Trial Court=3Ds

Jurisdiction to = Enter the=20 Turnover-and-Receivership Order

In his=20 first issue, Wasim argues that the = trial court=20 lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the = turnover-and-receivership=20 order because Texas Family Code section 9.007(c) deprived the = court of=20 power to enter such an order during the pendency of his appeal = from the=20 divorce decree. See Tex. Fam. = Code=20 Ann. ' 9.007(c).

A. =20 The Law

A trial=20 court is generally authorized to enforce the property division of = its=20 divorce decree: AExcept = as=20 provided by this subchapter and by the Texas Rules of Civil = Procedure, the=20 court may render further orders to enforce the division of = property made=20 in the decree of divorce or annulment to assist in the = implementation of=20 or to clarify the prior order.@ =20 Tex.=20 Fam. Code Ann.=20 ' 9.006(a) (Vernon=20 2006). =20 This authority is not without limitation, however:

' 9.007. =20 Limitation of Power of Court to Enforce

. . .

(c) =20 The power of the court to render further orders to = assist in the=20 implementation of or to clarify the property division = is abated while an appellate proceeding is=20 pending.

Tex.=20 Fam. Code Ann. = ' 9.007(c)=20 (emphasis added). This section deprives the trial court of=20 subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the specified orders during = the=20 pendency of an appeal. See Gainous v. Gainous, = 219=20 S.W.3d 97, 107B08 (Tex.=20 App.CHouston=20 [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. filed) (stating that Family Code section=20 9.007(b)=3Ds=20 use of term Abeyond = the power=20 of the divorce court@ = indicated=20 that court lacked jurisdiction to enter referenced = order).

Section=20 9.007(c) Ais = directed=20 at the power of the court, not the obligations and = responsibilities of the=20 parties.@ =20 English v. English, 44 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Specifically, Athe = trial=20 court is prohibited from implementing and clarifying the property = division=20 by way of further order.@ =20 Id.; accord In re Fischer-Stoker, 174 S.W.3d 268, = 272 (Tex.=20 App.CHouston=20 [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding). Because it is directed = solely=20 at the court=3Ds power,=20 rather than at the parties=3D = obligations, acts, or responsibilities, section 9.007(c) = Adoes = not stay,=20 supersede or otherwise inhibit the finality of the [divorce] = decree,=20 absent a supersedeas bond.@ =20 English, 44 S.W.3d at 106. Put another way, = Aneither = the=20 parties[=3D]=20 [compliance] nor the ministerial act of execution of the judgment = are=20 proscribed.@ =20 Id.; accord In re Fischer-Stoker, 174 S.W.3d at 272; = see=20 Tex. R. Civ. = P. 621=20 (AThe = judgments=20 of the district, county, and justice courts shall be enforced by = execution=20 or other appropriate process.@);=20 Tex. R. Civ. P. = 622=20 (AAn = execution=20 is a process of the court from which it is issued.@). =20

Prohibited=20 orders Aassist[ing] in the implementation of@ = the=20 decree=3Ds property=20 division encompass orders to enforce the property division that go = beyond=20 the ministerial act of execution. See = In re=20 Fischer-Stoker, 174 S.W.3d at 272 (holding that post-decree = contempt=20 motion impermissibly sought kind of enforcement relief that = section=20 9.007(c) prohibited). A turnover order is a species = of=20 post-judgment enforcement order. See Ex parte = Johnson, 654=20 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1983) (noting that = predecessor to current turnover statute Ais = a=20 post‑judgment relief statute designed to assist judgment = creditors in=20 securing satisfaction of a final judgment.@);=20 Sloan v. Douglass, 713 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex. App.CFort=20 Worth 1986, writ ref=3Dd n.r.e.) (ATurnover = is=20 obviously an aid to judgment creditors in obtaining satisfaction = on=20 debts.@). =20 It is the type of enforcement order that goes = beyond the=20 ministerial act of execution.

B. =20 Pertinent Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Provisions of = the=20 Divorce Decree and the Turnover-and-Receivership = Order

The=20 divorce decree awarded to Shama, among = other=20 things, (1) eight specific checking, savings, and money-market = accounts;=20 (2) the businesses=20 and assets of Sheikh & Sheikh Investments, Inc. and Al-Karim International, Inc.;^[4] (3) two vehicles; and (4) = a house=20 and its contents. =20 The = turnover-and-receivership=20 order granted the receiver the authority to take possession of and = to sell=20 Aall non-exempt property = of [Wasim], that is in the actual or = constructive=20 possession or control of [Wasim],@ such as (1) = Aall property incidental = to or=20 associated with the daily business of [Wasim],@ including but not = limited to=20 cash, accounts and notes receivable, monies, financial accounts, = real=20 property, and vehicle titles; (2) all safety deposit boxes and = their=20 contents; and (3) Aany and all furniture, = fixtures,=20 equipment, supplies and inventory@ related to any = property=20 described in the order.

On the one=20 hand, the turnover-and-receivership order contained recitations = consistent=20 with its having been entered to enforce = the=20 $330,000 monetary award to Shama, = rather than=20 the property division. For example, the = order=20 recited that it was Afor=20 the satisfaction of the judgment@=20 rendered in Shama=3Ds=20 favor and authorized the receiver to pay the proceeds that he = received to=20 Shama Ato=20 the extent required to satisfy the judgment, but not to = exceed=20 the full amount awarded under the judgment, which amount = includes=20 principal, interest, attorney=3Ds=20 fees, court costs, post-judgment interest, post-judgment = attorney=3Ds=20 fees, court costs, and Receiver fees taxed as court costs.@ =20 (Emphasis added.) Likewise, the = court=3Ds=20 findings of fact recited that (1) A[t]he=20 Court found that [Wasim] owes [Shama] monetary damages of = $33,000.00@;=20 (2) A[Wasim] had not voluntarily paid any money = owed=20 [Shama] in satisfaction of the = Court=3Ds=20 Money Judgment@;=20 (3) A[a]t=20 the time the Court granted the Application for Turnover and = Appointment of=20 Receiver, [Wasim] owed [Shama] $330,000.00 in satisfaction of the = money=20 judgment@;=20 and (4) A[t]he=20 Receiver was appointed to assist . . . Shama . . . in the collection of = the=20 money judgment.@ =20 (Emphasis added.) In its conclusions of law, the = trial court=20 concluded that it could issue orders Ato = assist in=20 the collection or enforcement of its money judgments.@ =20 (Emphasis added.)

Nonetheless,=20 the court=3Ds findings=20 of fact also recited that A[a]t the=20 time that the Court granted Wife=3Ds=20 Application for Turnover and Appointment of Receiver, [Wasim] had not satisfied the division of=20 property contained in the Divorce Decree.@ =20 (Emphasis added.) And the=20 turnover-and-receivership order authorized the receiver to take = possession=20 and to dispose of every asset in Wasim=3Ds=20 possession, which would necessarily include any property in his = possession=20 that had been awarded to Shama in the = divorce=20 decree.

C. =20 Discussion

The final=20 decree of divorce was rendered on March = 9,=20 2005. Wasim=3Ds notice=20 of appeal of that decree, which had been filed on March 1, 2005, = became=20 effective the day that the final decree was rendered. See = Tex. R. App.=20 P. = 27.1(a). =20 That date preceded the date on which = the=20 turnover-and-receivership order was entered, which was July 18,=20 2005. Accordingly, if the only thing that the=20 turnover-and-receivership order assisted in implementing was the = divorce=20 decree=3Ds property=20 division, then the order would be void for having been rendered at = a time=20 when the trial court=3Ds=20 subject-matter jurisdiction to enter such an order was = abated. =20 See Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 439 = (Tex. = App.CHouston=20 [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) = (AAn = order is=20 void [if], among other things, = . . .=20 the trial court lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction to render=20 it.@).

But = the=20 turnover-and-receivership order did not assist in implementing = only the=20 decree=3Ds property=20 division. This is because the divorce decree itself not only = divided=20 property, but also awarded a money judgment of $330,000. = Because=20 Wasim failed to supersede the divorce = decree,=20 the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the=20 turnover-and-receivership order because that order enforced the=20 decree=3Ds monetary=20 award. Nonetheless, the = turnover-and-receivership=20 order was written so broadly that it also had the erroneous = effect=20 of authorizing the receiver to take possession and to dispose = of every=20 asset in Wasim=3Ds=20 possession, which, based on Shama=3Ds=20 pleadings and the evidence offered at the hearing, would = necessarily=20 include some of the property that the divorce decree awarded to = Shama that was still in Wasim=3Ds=20 possession.

For=20 example, in her response to Wasim=3Ds motion=20 for continuance concerning her turnover-and-receivership = application, and=20 in addition to reciting that the receivership was intended to = collect on=20 the decree=3Ds money=20 judgment, Shama recited that = A[t]he=20 Receivership is for purposes of obtaining possession of assets = which this=20 Court has already awarded [Shama]@ = and that=20 Wasim Ahas = made=20 statement to [Shama] that [he] will = never=20 . . . deliver the assets to [her] which were awarded by = this=20 Court@ = in the=20 divorce decree. = Likewise, in her supplemental brief submitted at the = trial=20 court=3Ds=20 request after the hearing on her application, Shama=3Ds=20 counsel asserted that Ashould=20 the court decide that a specific list of [Wasim=3Ds=20 non-exempt] property is required despite the recently amended = [turnover]=20 statute, attached is a list of known property owned by [Wasim].@ =20 The attached, verified list of property included much of the = property=20 awarded to Shama in the divorce = decree,=20 including the eight checking, savings, and money-market accounts; = the=20 house and its contents; the two vehicles; and stocks in, property=20 interests of, and assets of Sheikh & Sheikh Investments, Inc. = and=20 Al-Karim International, = Inc. In=20 that same pleading, Shama argued: =

Opposing counsel = may argue=20 that some of the listed property in Exhibit B may not be subject = to the=20 Receivership because the court awarded the property to Shama Sheikh, and therefore, the Receiver = cannot seize=20 [Shama=3Ds] own property to = satisfy=20 the judgment. However, until the property awarded to Shama Sheikh is actually = turned over by [Wasim] to her, = she does=20 not own the property. In Shama=20 Sheikh=3Ds opinion (and the = opinion of=20 the financial institutions holding [Wasim=3Ds] bank accounts), = the court=20 order [sic; should be Adecree@] does not confer = ownership,=20 just the right to ownership. Therefore, the property may be seized by the = Receiver.

Likewise,=20 at the hearing on the turnover-and-receivership application, Shama indicated that the = receivership=3Ds purpose=20 was to Aseize = the=20 property that=3Ds already=20 been specifically enumerated in the [divorce] Decree,@=20 as well as to collect on the $330,000 tort judgment. = Similarly,=20 Shama, whose testimony constituted the = sole=20 evidence presented at the hearing, testified as = follows:

Counsel: =20 Mrs. Sheikh, have you received any of the assets that have been awarded to you in the final Decree = of Divorce=20 in this matter?

Shama: =20 No.

Counsel: =20 Have you made any attempt to collect or = gather=20 those assets that were awarded to you in the Decree?

Shama: =20 Yes.

Counsel: =20 And there were financial accounts that were awarded to you that = were=20 separate and apart from [Wasim=3Ds] medical practice = and=20 financial accounts in the medical practice. You realize = that?

Shama: =20 Yes.

. . .

Counsel: =20 All right. Just the = financial=20 accounts that were awarded to you, did = you=20 attempt to present to the financial institutions a copy of the = Decree=20 showing that they were awarded to you?

Shama: =20 Yes.

Counsel: =20 And were they turned over to you as a = result of=20 that?

Shama: =20 No.

. . .

Counsel: =20 And to this day have you received any of the financial accounts = under=20 [Wasim=3Ds] control that = were awarded=20 to you that are not a part of his medical practice?

Shama: =20 No.

. . .

Counsel: =20 Have youCHas=20 [sic] any of the accounts that [Wasim] = is also a=20 signatory on that were not a part of this medical practice but = that were=20 awarded to you, has he voluntarily turned over any of those = accounts to=20 you?

Shama: =20 No.

Counsel: =20 Okay. Have you = asked him to=20 turn over those accounts to you?

Shama: =20 Yes.

Counsel: =20 As it relates to the real property that was=20 awarded to you, that is the homestead and the building, the = professional building, has he cooperated in turning those over to=20 you?

Shama: =20 No.

. . .

Counsel: =20 Are you asking the Court to appoint a receiver to take charge = of=20 non-exempt assets so that the transfer can be=20 made to you of those assets to give you some cash flow that = you=20 enjoyed and received during the pendency of the = divorce?

Shama: =20 Yes.

. . .

Counsel: =20 Was it your intent to rely on the assets and financial accounts = set aside=20 to you as a result of the Decree of=20 Divorce?

Shama: =20 Yes.

(Emphasis=20 added.) Shama then = testified generally=20 that Wasim was still conducting = emergency-room=20 work; that he still had his medical practice; that prior to the = divorce,=20 Wasim had generally been earning about = $25,000=20 gross per month from his emergency-room work; that she did not = know where=20 Wasim=3Ds=20 earnings were currently being spent; that he was living in the = building in=20 which his clinic was located; and that she did not know if he was = driving=20 a new car, buying a house, or Adoing=20 anything of that nature that=3Ds=20 visible@=20 to her.

It is=20 clear from Shama=3Ds=20 pleadings and the parties=3D = discussions at the turnover-and-receivership hearing, and from the = evidence adduced at that hearing, that at least part of what Shama sought by her application was the = turnover of=20 property that had been awarded to her in the divorce decree. = Likewise, although it did not list specific property that was = awarded to=20 Shama in the decree, the=20 turnover-and-receivership order was broad enough to encompass the = assets=20 awarded to Shama that were still in = Wasim=3Ds possession, and it did not expressly exclude = such=20 items. The only evidence from the hearing of Wasim=3Ds assets=20 other than those awarded to Shama in = the decree=20 was Shama=3Ds=20 testimony of his monthly earnings; she did not testify to any = other=20 property that was not also awarded to her in the decree. And = the=20 verified list of Wasim=3Ds assets=20 that Shama attached to her pleadings = before the=20 hearingCassuming=20 for purposes of argument that the court considered this list, = despite its=20 not so stating and despite the exhibit=3Ds not=20 having been admitted into evidenceCin=20 very large part overlapped with the assets awarded to Shama in the decree.

Based on=20 these circumstances, we hold as follows. Because it had = jurisdiction=20 to enforce the unsuperseded monetary = judgment=20 against Wasim, the trial court had=20 subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the turnover-and-receivership = order. However, to the extent that the = turnover-and-receivership=20 order allowed the receiver to take and to dispose of the property = awarded=20 to Shama and still in Wasim=3Ds=20 possession, the order violated section 9.007(c). See = Tex. Fam. = Code=20 Ann. ' 9.007(c). It=20 was thus an abuse of discretion, under the evidence and pleadings = in this=20 case, not to limit the receiver=3Ds=20 authority to prevent his implementing the appealed divorce=20 decree=3Ds property=20 division during the pendency of the appeal.^[5] See id.; = see also=20 English, 44 S.W.3d at 106; In re Fischer-Stoker, 174 = S.W.3d at=20 272.

We=20 overrule Wasim=3Ds issue=20 one to the extent that he argues that the trial court lacked=20 subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the turnover-and-receivership = order. However, at the heart of issue one is the complaint = that the=20 trial court erred in drafting a turnover-and-receivership order = that was=20 so broad as to allow implementation of the property division = pending an=20 appeal of the underlying divorce decree. We are required = liberally=20 to construe appellate briefing. See Tex. R. = App. P. 38.1(e), 38.9; Sterner v. = Marathon Oil=20 Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. = 1989). =20 Accordingly, we construe Wasim=3Ds issue=20 one also to encompass a complaint that the trial court abused its=20 discretion in rendering a turnover-and-receivership order that had = the=20 prohibited effect of allowing implementation of the appealed = divorce=20 decree=3Ds property=20 division. As so construed, issue one is = sustained.

Wasim=3Ds Remaining = Complaints=20 Concerning the

Turnover-and-Receivership=20 Provisions of the Order

Because=20 our sustaining issue one requires reversal of the order and remand = of the=20 cause, we decline to consider Wasim=3Ds issues=20 two, three, and four, in which he contends that (1) the trial=20 court=3Ds=20 turnover-and-receivership order violated the turnover statute and = was=20 unconstitutional for giving the receiver powers that were not = requested=20 and that are not authorized by law; (2) the turnover order failed = because=20 the court did not make findings that Wasim=20 possessed non-exempt property that could not be readily attached = or levied=20 by ordinary legal process, and such findings could not be deemed = because=20 Wasim requested additional findings on = these=20 elements, on which request the court did not rule; and (3) = alternatively,=20 the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order = because the=20 evidence did not support any such findings, if they could be=20 deemed. = The = trial court=20 may, upon remand, also revisit these challenges, which Wasim raised here and below. We=20 thus decline to exercise our discretion to consider them. We = also=20 decline = to reach=20 Wasim=3Ds issue six, which = challenges=20 the constitutionality (facial and as applied) of the turnover = statute=20 depending upon its statutory interpretation: courts generally do = not reach=20 issues of statutory constitutionality unless required for the=20 appeal=3Ds disposition. = See In=20 re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003) (AAs a rule, we only = decide=20 constitutional questions when we cannot resolve issues on nonconstitutional grounds.@). =

Wasim=3Ds Remaining = Complaints=20 Concerning the

Master-in-Chancery = Provision=20 of the Order

In issue=20 five, Wasim argues that the trial = court abused=20 its discretion by appointing a master in chancery within its=20 turnover-and-receivership order because (1) no extraordinary = circumstances=20 justified a master=3Ds=20 appointment and (2) an inherent conflict existed in appointing the = same=20 person to be both the receiver and the master in chancery. =20

Shama = argues=20 that we lack jurisdiction to consider this portion of the = order. At=20 least one court of appeals has held thatCunlike=20 a post-judgment turnover order, which is = generally=20 considered final and appealable ^[6]Ca=20 post-judgment order appointing a master in chancery is not final = and=20 appealable.

The only=20 court expressly considering whether appellate jurisdiction lies = over =20 a post-judgment order appointing a master in chancery has held = that it=20 does not, even when that order was embedded within a=20 turnover-and-receivership order. See Moyer, 183 S.W.3d at 58. The Moyer = court reasoned=20 that a post-judgment master-in-chancery order is not final and = appealable=20 because Rule of Civil Procedure 171, which authorizes the=20 order=3Ds entry,=20 requires further action by the court; a master-in-chancery order = is,=20 therefore, not final in the sense that it can be appealed. =20 Id.; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 171 = (requiring,=20 among other things, that master in chancery file = master=3Ds report=20 and that court then confirm, modify, correct, reject, reverse, or = recommit=20 master=3Ds=20 report). In contrast, other courts have assumed, without = discussion, that they had jurisdiction to = consider a=20 post-judgment order appointing a master in chancery that was = coupled with=20 a turnover-and-receivership order. See Roebuck v.=20 Horn, 74 S.W.3d 160, 165 = (Tex. = App.CBeaumont=20 2002, no pet.) (assuming that appellate jurisdiction lay over=20 master-in-chancery provision of post-judgment = turnover-and-receivership=20 order, though, in light of remand, declining to reach issues = concerning=20 master in chancery=3Ds=20 appointment); Lannie v. = Harvey,=20 No. 14-02‑01326‑CV, 2004 WL 1171720, at *2 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] May 27, 2004, no pet.) = (memo. op.) (assuming without discussion that = appellate=20 court had jurisdiction to consider whether post-judgment order = appointing=20 same person as receiver and master in chancery was void for having = been=20 entered during automatic bankruptcy stay); Christensen v.=20 Christensen, No. 04-03‑00095‑CV, 2003 WL 22897120, = at *1 (Tex. App.CSan=20 Antonio Dec. 10, 2003, pet. denied) (memo. op.) (considering = appeal of=20 post-judgment order appointing master in chancery for limited = purpose of=20 acting as applicant=3Ds=20 ex-husband=3Ds attorney=20 in fact to sign deed assigning his interest in property to = applicant);=20 Gore v. Scotland Golf, Inc., No. = 04-03‑00143‑CV, 2003 WL 22238916,=20 at *4 (Tex. App.CSan=20 Antonio Oct. 1, 2003, no pet.) (memo. = op.) (considering post-judgment turnover order = appointing=20 same person as both receiver and master in chancery).

This Court=20 recently issued mandamus relief from a post-judgment order = appointing a=20 master in chancery in a case in which a separate, previously = entered,=20 post-judgment turnover-and-receivership order had been=20 suspended before the appointment of the master in = chancery. =20 See In re Holt, 01‑06‑00290‑CV, 2006 WL = 1549968, at *2, 3 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [1 Dist.] June 8, 2006, orig. proceeding) (memo. op.). = Further, the=20 supreme court has held that a pre-trial master-in-chancery order = is=20 reviewable by mandamus because A[t]o=20 require the parties to reserve their complaint for appeal would be = to deny=20 them any effective relief from the trial court=3Ds=20 order.@ =20 Simpson v. Canales, 806 S.W.2d 802, 812 (Tex. = 1991). =20 Although the circumstances in Holt and = Simpson=20 differ from those hereCSimpson,=20 for the order=3Ds=20 being issued pretrial, and Holt, for the order=3Ds=20 not being coupled with a turnover-and-receivership orderCthese=20 decisions both indicate that an order appointing a master in = chancery,=20 whenever it is entered, is unappealable and that=20 having to wait until it is appealable leaves the complaining party = with no=20 adequate remedy. See Simpson, 806 S.W.2d at = 812; In=20 re Holt, 2006 WL 1549968, at *2, 3; = see=20 also Hardy v. Silva, No. 01-90-00135-CV, 1990 WL 98533, at *1 = (Tex.=20 App.CHouston=20 [1st Dist.] July 12, 1990, no writ) (not designated for = publication)=20 (holding, in appeal of order granting temporary injunction, = certifying=20 class, and appointing master in chancery, AWith = respect=20 to the order appointing a master in chancery, we are aware of no = authority=20 authorizing an interlocutory appeal from this order.@). =20 We see no reason to reach a different conclusion simply because = the=20 master-in-chancery order in the present case is imbedded within a=20 turnover-and-receivership order. This is the conclusion that = the=20 Moyer court reached, and we follow it here. See = Moyer,=20 183 S.W.3d at 58. The proper = vehicle to=20 challenge the master-in-chancery portion of the complained-of = order is by=20 mandamus.^[7] See Simpson, = 806=20 S.W.2d at 812; In re Holt, 2006 WL 1549968, at *2, 3.

We thus=20 hold that we lack jurisdiction to consider issue five.

Although=20 we lack jurisdiction in this appeal to consider Wasim=3Ds=20 challenges to the master-in-chancery portion of the order, we are = mindful=20 that the trial court will, on remand, have occasion to reconsider = its=20 interlocutory master-in-chancery ruling, in conjunction with its=20 reconsideration of Shama=3Ds=20 application for turnover and receivership, if Wasim so requests. Indeed, as the=20 master-in-chancery portion of the order recites, the = master=3Ds duties=20 and powers were related to the turnover and receivership because = the=20 master was given authority, among other things, to A[o]rder[] production before him of evidence = including=20 documents upon all matters pertaining to [Wasim=3Ds]=20 compliance with this Order [for turnover and = receivership] = . .=20 . .@ =20 (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Athe = Receiver@ = was=20 appointed master in chancery, and we today reverse the order = appointing=20 that person as receiver. As our sister=20 court of appeals has stated when considering a turnover order that = also=20 appointed the same person as receiver and master in = chancery:

Roebuck insists in = issue four=20 that the trial court erred by appointing the receiver as a master = in=20 chancery and by setting the receiver=3Ds bond in=20 the amount of $100. . . . Upon remand, when = considering a new turnover order in accordance with this opinion, = the=20 trial court may again consider whether the receiver should be appointed a master in = chancery. We=20 assume that in making such a determination the trial court will = consider=20 the principles stated in Simpson v. Canales, 806 S.W.2d = 802,=20 811B12 (Tex. 1991), = which=20 discusses the limited occasions that might justify the appointment = of such=20 a master. Further, the trial court should consider whether = the=20 receiver acting as a master would present a conflict of = interest. =20 Also upon remand, while the trial court may consider the=20 appellant=3Ds request that the = bond for=20 the receiver be increased, it should do so in light of the = principles=20 stated in Childre, 700 S.W.2d = at 289,=20 which discusses the appropriateness of no bond or a nominal bond = for=20 receivers in turnover orders. In view of the remand, we need not = decide=20 issue four.

Roebuck, 74 S.W.3d at 165.

Conclusion

We reverse=20 all portions of the trial court=3Ds order=20 except that portion appointing a master in chancery, which portion = we have=20 no jurisdiction to consider. We remand the cause.

Tim=20 Taft

Justice

Panel consists of = Justices=20 Taft, Hanks, and Higley.

^[1] =20 Turnover orders=20 like this one are final, appealable orders. Burns v. = Miller,=20 Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, = P.C., 909=20 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex. 1995).

^[2] =20 However, Wasim does not request on = appeal that=20 the cause be abated for the trial court = to file=20 additional or amended findings or conclusions.

^[3] =20 Sufficiency=20 challenges to findings of fact supporting a = turnover-and-receivership=20 order are distinct from the review of the order itself, for which = the=20 standard of review is abuse of discretion, rather than evidentiary = sufficiency. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. = v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.=20 1991).

^[4] Wasim represented, without contradiction = from Shama, in his brief in the divorce appeal = that these=20 companies owned the medical equipment used in his private practice = and the=20 real estate in which his practice was located. See Sheikh = v.=20 Sheikh, No. 01-05-00218-CV, 2007 WL 3227683, at = *1 n.1 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [1st Dist.] Nov. 1, 2007, no pet. h.) (memo. op.) (so=20 noting).

^[5] =20 Although this=20 Court has recently issued its opinion affirming the divorce = decree,=20 mandate has not issued in that cause, and the appeal thus remains=20 pending. See Sheikh v. Sheikh, No. 01-05-00218-CV, = 2007 WL=20 3227683 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [1st Dist.] Nov. 1, = 2007, no=20 pet. h.) (memo. op.). =

^[6] See=20 Burns, 909 S.W.2d at 506 = (citing=20 Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Dallas, = 810=20 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. 1991), = abrogated=20 on other grounds by In re Sheshtawy, 154=20 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. 2004)).

^[7] At oral=20 argument, when explaining his view that we have jurisdiction to = review the=20 master-in-chancery portion of the order, Wasim=20 noted that this Court has already denied two petitions for writ of = mandamus that he filed in this cause. However, the focus of = both of=20 Wasim=3Ds mandamus petitions was on the=20 turnover-and-receivership aspects of the complained-of orderCarguing that=20 they were void under Family Code section 9.007(c)Crather=20 than on the master-in-chancery provision of the same order. =20 Moreover, the failure to grant mandamus relief Ais not=20 an adjudication of, nor even a comment on, the merits of a case in = any=20 respect, including whether mandamus relief was = available.@ In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 = S.W.3d 109,=20 119 (Tex.=20 2004).