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Lastly, we=20 address Tan=3Ds=20 assertion that the manner of notice violated her constitutional = rights to=20 due process. We recognize that A[a]n=20 elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any = proceeding=20 which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, = under=20 the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency = of the=20 action and afford them the opportunity to present their=20 objections.@ =20 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. = 306, 314=20 (1950). However, we do not believe that this general = statement of=20 legal principles applies to this notice of an arbitration hearing; = the=20 parties agreed to be bound by a particular set of rules, and = notice was=20 effected according to those rules. See = Brozo, 865 S.W.2d at = 511. =20 Tan does not make any specific arguments regarding whether the = notice in=20 this case was reasonably calculated to apprise her of the = suit. =20 Instead, she appears to rely on her contention that because the = notice did=20 not satisfy the requirements of the TAA and the NASD Code, her due = process=20 rights were violated.^{^[9]} =20 Because we hold above that the TAA does not apply to this case and = notice=20 was sufficient under the NASD Code, we find Tan=3Ds due=20 process arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, we = overrule=20 Tan=3Ds sole=20 issue.^{^[10]}

We affirm=20 the trial court=3Ds=20 judgment.

/s/ =20 Adele Hedges

Chief = Justice

Judgment=20 rendered and Memorandum Opinion/Opinion filed February 27,=20 2007.

Panel=20 consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Fowler and=20 Edelman.

^{^[1]} The arbitration award reflects = that these=20 conferences occurred on March 20, 2002, October 10, 2002, and = April 16,=20 2003.

^{^[2]} Tan made these statements in an = affidavit=20 attached to her Motion for New Trial.

^{^[3]} The arbitration co-defendant, who = was also=20 held liable, also answered in the trial court but is not a party = to this=20 appeal.

^{^[4]} In the motion, Tan argued that = under NASD=20 rules, plaintiff=3Ds counsel is responsible for notifying = the=20 defendants of the continuation of a hearing. Tan does not = make this=20 argument on appeal.

^{^[5]} The majority of the sections of = the TAA=20 governing arbitration proceduresCas opposed to governance of trial court=20 proceedings to compel or stay arbitration or to confirm, modify, = or vacate=20 an arbitration awardCcontain similar language deferring to = the=20 parties=3D agreement in the event that it = references=20 different procedures. See Tex.=20 Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 171.041, .042, = .043, .045,=20 .046, .047, .053, .055. The=20 remaining sections governing arbitration procedure primarily = either grant=20 certain power to the arbitrators (see sections 171.049 = (arbitrators may=20 administer witness oaths), 171.050 (arbitrators may authorize=20 depositions), 171.051 (arbitrators may issue subpoenas), and = 171.054=20 (arbitrators may modify or correct an award)); or protect certain = rights=20 (see sections 171.048 (ensuring a party=3Ds right to be represented by an = attorney) and=20 171.052 (requiring fees for third-party witnesses)). This = statutory=20 scheme evidences a clear legislative intention to defer to the=20 parties=3D agreement in matters of arbitration = procedure,=20 with parties free to choose the TAA as controlling, to choose = other law as=20 controlling, or to not choose and allow the TAA (or other law) to = control=20 by default.

^{^[6]} Lee suggests that because this = case=20 involves securities transactions, the arbitration was governed by = the=20 Federal Arbitration Act (AFAA@) instead of the TAA. 9 U.S.C.A. ' 1-16 (West 1999). However, = federal courts=20 are consistent in holding that FAA procedures do not apply when = the=20 parties have agreed to arbitrate under other rules. See, = e.g.,=20 Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford = Junior=20 Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (A[P]arties are generally free to = structure their=20 arbitration agreements as they see fit. . . . [They may] specify = by=20 contract the rules under which that arbitration will be=20 conducted.@); Gingiss Intern=3Dl, Inc., v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1995) = (holding=20 that notice of hearing sent via regular mail was sufficient under = American=20 Arbitration Association=3Ds Commercial Arbitration Rules, which = the parties=20 had agreed to be bound by, despite the fact that state law = required notice=20 by registered mail or personal service).

^{^[7]} The NASD Code expressly permits = pre-hearing=20 conferences to be conducted by conference call. See=20 NASD=20 Code of Arbitration Procedure ' 10321(d)(1).

^{^[8]} Tan argues that Gingiss is = distinguishable from the present case because, according to Tan, = the=20 appellants in Gingiss argued that they did not receive = proper=20 notice while Tan asserts that she did not receive any notice = at=20 all. However, the court in Gingiss clearly points out = that=20 the appellants claimed to have not received Aactual notice@; thus, Tan is incorrect about the facts = of the=20 case. 58 F.3d at 332. Tan further asserts that = Gingiss=20 is distinguishable because four mailings were sent to the = appellants in=20 that case and Tan asserts here that only one mailing was = attempted. =20 We are unpersuaded by this distinction. First, the record = reflects=20 that two letters were sent to Tan regarding the hearing = date. =20 Second, the court in Gingiss does not rely on the number of = attempts in holding that sufficient notice was=20 undertaken.

^{^[9]} None of the due process cases = cited by Tan=20 are particularly relevant to the issues in the present case. = See=20 Villareal v. San Antonio Truck and Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, = 630-33=20 (Tex. 1999) (reversing dismissal for want of prosecution where = notice of=20 hearing did not adequately apprise party of intent to dismiss); = LBL Oil=20 Co. v. Int=3Dl Power Serv., Inc., 777 S.W.3d 390, 390-91 (Tex. 1989) = (reversing=20 default judgment because party had no actual or constructive = notice of=20 trial setting); Hubert v. Ill. State Assistance = Comm=3Dn, 867=20 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) = (reversing=20 dismissal for want of prosecution where record did not reflect = notice and=20 party denied receipt of notice without = contradiction).

^{^[10]} Because of our holding on = Tan=3Ds substantive issue, we need not = consider=20 Lee=3Ds appellate contention that Tan failed = to timely=20 apply to vacate the arbitration=20 award.