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Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January = 15,=20 2008.

In The

Fourteenth=20 Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-06-01099-CV

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KATY ENGINEER, Appellant

MIKE ENGINEER, Appellee

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On Appeal from the = 387th District=20 Court

Fort Bend County, = Texas

Trial Court Cause No.=20 99-CV-109487

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M E M O R A N D = U M =20 O P I N I O N

In this divorce = action, Katy=20 Engineer appeals the amended divorce decree on the grounds that = the decree=20 does not accurately reflect the mediated settlement agreement and = the=20 arbitration award. Our disposition is based on clearly = settled law.=20 Accordingly, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. = See=20 Tex. R. App. P.=20 47.4.

I. =20 Background

Katy and Mike = Engineer were=20 divorced on September 16, 2002. Katy appealed the final = divorce=20 decree on the grounds that the decree did not incorporate all of = the=20 provisions of the mediated settlement agreement and arbitration=20 award. In an opinion issued January 31, 2006, this court = found the=20 alimony provision in the decree differed from language in the = agreement=20 and the December 4, 2001 arbitration award that was incorporated = into the=20 decree did not address the alimony provision. Engineer v. = Engineer, 187 S.W.3d 625, 626 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2006, no=20 pet.). This court sustained Katy=3Ds challenge to the = alimony=20 provision in the decree and further determined that it did not = need to=20 address her other challenges. Id. at 627. The = case was=20 remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. = Id.=20

On remand, the trial = court=20 signed a document entitled, AFinal Decree of = Divorce After=20 Remand.@ In that = document, the=20 trial court amended the parties=3D divorce decree to = conform to=20 the December 4, 2001 arbitration award as it pertained to = contractual=20 taxable alimony. In this appeal, Katy contends the trial = court erred=20 in failing to further amend the divorce decree to address other = portions=20 of the arbitration award, specifically provisions relating to gold = coins,=20 savings bonds, and the place where alimony payments should be = sent. =20

II. =20 Scope of Remand

Initially, Katy = argues the=20 trial court failed to follow this court=3Ds mandate because the = trial=20 court corrected only the alimony provision in the decree. = Mike=20 responds that the trial court did not err in failing to address = the=20 provisions, which are the subject of Katy=3Ds complaints, because = this=20 court remanded the case only to permit the trial court to amend = the decree=20 with regard to the contractual alimony. In our first = opinion, we=20 reversed and remanded Afor proceedings in = accordance=20 with the court=3Ds = opinion.@ When an = appellate court=20 reverses and remands a case for further proceedings, and the = mandate is=20 not limited by special instructions, the effect is to remand the = case to=20 the lower court on all issues of fact, and the case is re-opened = in its=20 entirety. Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 = (Tex.=20 1986); Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d = 460, 465=20 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2005, pet.=20 denied). Neither our opinion nor mandate, provide special=20 instructions to the trial court upon remand; therefore, the case = was=20 re-opened in its entirety. See Manon v. Solis, 142 = S.W.3d=20 380, 386 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2004, pet.=20 denied). The issue before us, therefore, is whether the = decree of=20 divorce after remand accurately incorporates the arbitration=20 award.

III. =20 Arbitration Award

Katy argues that the = final=20 arbitration award is the proposed AFinal Decree of=20 Divorce@ submitted to the = trial court=20 by the arbitrator on July 23, 2002. Mike argues that the = final=20 arbitration award is a document entitled, AFinal Arbitration=20 Award@ signed by the = arbitrator on=20 December 4, 2001. In its conclusions of law, the trial court = found=20 that the arbitrator=3Ds Aproposed final decree = of=20 divorce submitted on July 23, 2002 was not considered an = arbitration=20 award, implicating the procedures of Chapter 171 of the Texas = Civil=20 Practice and Remedies Code.@^{^[1]} In remanding = the case to=20 the trial court, this court referred to the December 4, 2001 = arbitration=20 award as the operative document. Therefore, in order to = address=20 Katy=3Ds issues, we will = determine=20 whether the final divorce decree incorporates the provisions of = the=20 December 4, 2001 arbitration award.

IV. =20 Provisions of the Decree

The trial court must = make a=20 just and right division of marital property in a divorce = proceeding. =20 Tex. Fam. Code = Ann. ' 7.001 (Vernon = 1998). To=20 promote the amicable settlement of disputes in a suit for divorce, = spouses=20 may enter into a written agreement concerning the division of the = property=20 and the liabilities of the spouses and maintenance of either = spouse. =20 Tex. Fam. Code = Ann. ' 7.006 (a)-(c) = (Vernon=20 1998). If the court finds that the terms of such an = agreement are=20 just and right, those terms are binding on the court. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 7.006(b). If = the trial=20 court approves the agreement, the court may set forth the = agreement in=20 full or incorporate it by reference in the final decree. =20 Id. Conversely, if the court finds that the terms of = the=20 agreement are not just and right, it may either request the = spouses to=20 submit a revised agreement or set the case for a contested = hearing. =20 Tex. Fam. Code = Ann. ' 7.006(c). = Therefore, a=20 court may either enter a property division agreement in its = entirety or=20 decline to enter it all, but has no discretion to change the = agreement=20 before entering it. See Engineer, 187 S.W.3d at = 626;=20 Reppert v. Beasley, 943 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. = App.CSan Antonio 1997, no=20 pet.).

In this case, the = agreement=20 provided that disputes concerning interpretation or performance of = the=20 agreement would be submitted to binding arbitration. In = unchallenged=20 conclusions of law, the trial court found that the decree = incorporates the=20 agreement as modified and clarified in arbitration and as = thereafter=20 corrected and/or modified by the court upon proper pleadings and=20 proof. Katy complains that the trial court erred in failing = to=20 accurately incorporate the agreement into the divorce = decree. =20 Specifically, Katy argues the provisions addressing allocation of = the gold=20 coins and savings bonds were inaccurately incorporated. = Further,=20 Katy complains that provisions in the decree regarding the place = for=20 alimony payments do not reflect the arbitration award. =

A. =20 Gold=20 Coins

Attached to the = arbitration=20 award are three exhibits listing the community property awarded to = each=20 spouse and the property awarded to Katy as custodian for the=20 parties=3D son. The gold = coins are=20 listed in the property awarded to Mike and are described as the=20 A[g]old coins = purchased and=20 stored in the family safety deposit box.@ The final = divorce decree=20 awards the following property to the husband: AAll household = furniture,=20 furnishings, fixtures, goods, art objects, collectibles, = appliances, and=20 equipment in the possession of the husband or subject to his sole = control,=20 including but not limited to any gold coins purchased and stored = in the=20 family safety deposit box . . . said coins to be delivered to Mike = Engineer by (6/5/03) to M. Carden=3Ds office.@

Katy first argues = that the=20 trial court erred in the divorce decree by not including a = provision that=20 she was to only relinquish the gold coins Ashould they be in=20 existence.@ Katy bases her = argument=20 on the arbitrator=3Ds proposed final = decree=20 submitted to the court on July 23, 2002. As stated earlier, = that=20 document was not recognized by the trial court as an arbitration=20 award. The arbitration award used by the trial court in = preparing=20 the final divorce decree did not establish a procedure or qualify = the=20 distribution of the gold coins.

Second, Katy = complains of the=20 trial court=3Ds inclusion of = specific terms=20 requiring her to deliver the gold coins to Mike, contending that = this=20 language improperly imposes an affirmative obligation that the = arbitrator=20 did not impose. The Family Code does not require parties to = agree to=20 all of the provisions to be contained in the divorce decree. = The law=20 only requires the parties to reach an agreement as to all material = terms=20 and prohibits the trial court from supplying additional = terms. =20 Haynes v. Haynes, 180 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. = App.CDallas 2006, no = pet.). =20 Terms necessary to effectuate and implement the = parties=3D agreement do not = affect the=20 agreed substantive division of property and may be left to future=20 articulation by the parties or consideration by the trial = court. =20 Id.

In this case, the = terms=20 requiring Katy to deliver the gold coins on a date certain to a = specific=20 location are properly denominated as essential to effectuate and = implement=20 the agreement that Mike will receive the gold coins. = Therefore, with=20 regard to the gold coins, the arbitration award was accurately=20 incorporated in the decree.