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Reversed=20 and Remanded and = Opinion=20 filed March 13, 2008.

 

In The

 

Fourteenth=20 Court of Appeals

____________

 

NO. 14-07-00196-CV

____________

 

ALICE S.=20 GRIMES, = Appellant

 

V.

 

RONALD E.=20 REYNOLDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND BROWN, BROWN & REYNOLDS,=20 P.C.,=20 Appellees

 

 

On Appeal from the = 113th District Court

Harris County, = Texas

Trial Court Cause = No. 2005-27437

 

 

O P I N I=20 O N

This is an=20 appeal from the granting of a summary judgment in favor of the = defendants=20 in a legal malpractice case.  Finding appellees, Ronald E. = Reynolds=20 and Brown, Brown & Reynolds, P.C., failed to meet their = summary=20 judgment burden, we reverse and remand to the trial court for = further=20 proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Factual=20 and procedural background

As this is=20 a legal malpractice case arising out of appellees=3D = representation of appellant in a federal lawsuit, our factual = background=20 begins with a review of that underlying lawsuit.

A.     =20 The Underlying Federal Lawsuit

For much=20 of the time period relevant to the underlying lawsuit, appellant = was=20 employed as a nurse in the cardiac catherization lab (Acath=20 lab@) at The=20 Methodist Hospital (AMethodist@). =20 Appellant consistently received good evaluations of her = performance as a=20 cath lab nurse.

According=20 to appellant, beginning in September 1995, she was subjected to = continuing=20 episodes of sexual harassment by Methodist employees as well as by = doctors=20 working in the Methodist cath lab.  The initial episode of = harassment=20 involved a Methodist employee.  Appellant reported the = harassment and=20 the employee was subsequently disciplined.

In 1996 or=20 1997, some of the doctors who performed procedures in the = Methodist cath=20 lab began to sexually harass appellant.  When appellant = reported the=20 harassment to Methodist management, she was told she Awas a=20 pretty girl and . . . should  expect these things and just = ignore=20 him.@ =20 This harassment continued into the spring of 2000 despite=20 appellant=3Ds repeated=20 complaints about the behavior.

In January=20 2000, fellow Methodist cath lab employees began to sexually harass = appellant.  In one of the incidents, the employee grabbed=20 appellant=3Ds=20 shoulders from behind and pushed his hips against = appellant=3Ds=20 buttocks.  In the second incident, a Methodist  employee = placed=20 a model of a penis in appellant=3Ds=20 chair.  Appellant reported the incidents to her = supervisor. =20 Methodist informed appellant that an investigation had been = conducted and=20 the results were Anone of=20 her business.@ = In late=20 August 2000, appellant took a medical leave of absence from=20 Methodist.  She did not return to work until November = 2000. =20 Upon her return, appellant met with her supervisors, and she was = told the=20 best way to handle the problem in the cath lab was to transfer = appellant=20 out of the cath lab to a position as a floor nurse.  When = appellant=20 rejected the proposed transfer, she was informed that if she = refused to=20 accept the transfer, it would be considered a voluntary = termination. =20 Appellant was told to leave her hospital badge when she left the=20 meeting.  Appellant left the meeting and went = home.  =20 Approximately a week later, a Methodist manager contacted = appellant and=20 asked to her come to the hospital for a meeting.  At the = meeting, the=20 manager told appellant Methodist had rethought the situation and = had=20 decided not to terminate her and wanted to attempt to work = something=20 out.  About a week after that conversation, Methodist offered = appellant a position in the hospital=3Ds blood=20 bank, which she accepted even though it was not the position she=20 wanted.

In May=20 2000, appellant filed a complaint of sexual discrimination and = retaliation=20 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (AEEOC@) and the=20 Texas Commission on Human Rights.  In January 2002, the EEOC = issued a=20 determination letter in which it found  the testimonial = evidence did=20 not support appellant=3Ds=20 allegation of a hostile work environment.  However, the EEOC = did find=20 the evidence supported appellant=3Ds=20 allegation that Methodist retaliated against her for filing her = EEOC=20 complaint.  EEOC efforts to resolve the issue through = conciliation=20 failed.

In March=20 2002, appellant was terminated, ostensibly for excessive=20 absences.

Following=20 her termination, appellant retained Reynolds and his firm to = handle her=20 claims against Methodist.  On January 15, 2003, appellees = filed suit=20 on appellant=3Ds=20 behalf  against Methodist in federal court.  Appellant = alleged=20 Methodist subjected her to sexual harassment and retaliation under = Title=20 VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 USC = ' = 2000e=20 et seq., as well as common law causes of action.[1]

<= SPAN=20 style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 13pt; LINE-HEIGHT: 150%; FONT-FAMILY: = Shruti">

During the=20 course of the litigation, Methodist propounded eight requests for=20 admission on appellant.  The first request for admission = asked=20 appellant to admit she filed her EEOC complaint too late.  = The second=20 request for admission asked appellant to admit the incidents of = sexual=20 harassment were not severe or pervasive.  The third request = for=20 admission asked appellant to admit she did not report the sexual=20 harassment to Methodist=3Ds=20 management.  The fourth request for admission asked appellant = to=20 admit Methodist took prompt remedial action in response to=20 appellant=3Ds=20 complaints of discrimination.  The fifth request for = admission asked=20 appellant to admit she did not timely file her federal = lawsuit.  The=20 sixth request for admission asked appellant to admit that, with = respect to=20 her retaliation claim, she did not sustain an adverse employment=20 action.  The seventh request for admission asked appellant to = admit=20 Methodist=3Ds conduct=20 was not extreme and outrageous.  The eighth and final request = for=20 admission asked appellant to admit she was terminated for = excessive=20 absences.  Reynolds did not file answers to any of the = requests,=20 thus, under federal practice, the requests for admission were = deemed=20 admitted without any formal action by the trial court.  Fed. = R. Civ.=20 P. 36(a).

Methodist=20 then filed a motion for summary judgment.  The primary basis=20 supporting the motion was appellant=3Ds deemed=20 admissions.  Reynolds never filed a response to the motion = for=20 summary judgment.  The federal court, emphasizing=20 appellant=3Ds deemed=20 admissions, granted the motion.  In its memorandum opinion, = the trial=20 court stated A[i]n the=20 absence of a written response to the defendant=3Ds motion=20 for summary judgment, and the absence of a genuine issue of = material fact=20 that would bar summary judgment, the Court finds that summary = judgment is=20 appropriate.@ =20 Following the entry of the take nothing final judgment by the = trial court,=20 Reynolds did not file a motion for new trial or an appeal of the = final=20 judgment.  In addition, Reynolds did not tell appellant that = he=20 failed to file a response to the motion for summary = judgment. =20 Finally, Reynolds did not tell appellant the trial court had = entered a=20 take nothing judgment against her until appellant contacted him = inquiring=20 as to the status of her case several months after the summary = judgment had=20 been granted.  This conversation, initiated by appellant, did = not=20 occur until long after the appellate deadlines had = passed.

B.     =20 The Malpractice Lawsuit

Once she=20 learned the fate of her Title VII suit against Methodist, = appellant filed=20 the current malpractice lawsuit against appellees.  Appellees = eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they were = entitled=20 to judgment as a matter of law because, even if Reynolds had filed = a=20 summary judgment response, appellant was unable to prove any = damages in=20 the underlying discrimination lawsuit.  The trial court = granted=20 appellees=3D = motion=20 and this appeal followed.

Discussion

In a=20 single issue on appeal, appellant challenges the trial = court=3Ds final=20 summary judgment.  In this issue, appellant contends the = trial court=20 erred when it granted appellees=3D = motion=20 for summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material = fact=20 precluding the granting of appellees=3D = motion.

A.     =20 The Standard of Review

In their=20 motion for summary judgment, appellees did not specify whether = they were=20 making a traditional motion for summary judgment or a no-evidence=20 motion.  Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), with = Tex. R.=20 Civ. P. = 166a(i). =20 Because the two forms of summary judgment are distinct and invoke=20 different standards of review, before we can reach the merits of = this=20 appeal, we must make the initial determination as to which type of = summary=20 judgment is at issue.  Since a motion that does not clearly = and=20 unambiguously state that it is being filed under Rule 166a(i) does = not=20 give the nonmovant notice that the movant is seeking a no-evidence = summary=20 judgment, we will construe it as a traditional motion under Rule=20 166a(c).  Adams v. Reynolds Tile and Flooring, Inc., = 120=20 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Tex. App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see Michael v. Dyke, 41 S.W.3d = 746,=20 750 (Tex. App.CCorpus=20 Christi 2001, no pet.) (holding when a motion for summary judgment = fails=20 to unambiguously state it is filed under Rule 166a(i), and does = not=20 strictly comply with the requirements of that rule, it will be = construed=20 as a traditional motion for summary judgment).

The movant=20 for a traditional summary judgment has the burden to show there is = no=20 genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a = matter=20 of law.  Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, = 548=20 (Tex. 1985).  In determining whether there is a genuine fact = issue=20 precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant = is taken=20 as true and the reviewing court makes all reasonable inferences = and=20 resolves all doubts in the non-movant=3Ds favor.=20  Id. at 548B49. =20 We review a trial court=3Ds summary=20 judgment de novo.  Valence Operating Co. v. = Dorsett,=20 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).  In addition, when reviewing = a=20 summary judgment, we cannot read between the lines, infer or glean = from=20 the pleadings or proof any grounds for summary judgment other than = those=20 expressly set forth before the trial court in the motion = itself. =20 Johnson v. Felts, 140 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. = App.CHouston=20 [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).  A defendant who = conclusively=20 negates at least one of the essential elements of a = plaintiff=3Ds cause of=20 action is entitled to a summary judgment on that claim.  = IHS=20 Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 = S.W.3d 794,=20 798 (Tex. 2004).  Only when the defendant establishes its = right to=20 summary judgment, does the burden shift to the plaintiff to come = forward=20 with competent controverting evidence raising a genuine issue of = material=20 fact.  Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, = 197=20 (Tex. 1995).

B.     =20 Elements of a Legal Malpractice Cause of = Action

To prevail=20 on a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the = attorney=20 owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the attorney breached that duty, = (3) the=20 breach proximately caused the plaintiff=3Ds=20 injuries, and (4) damages occurred.  Alexander v. Turtur = &=20 Assoc., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2004).  When the=20 plaintiff=3Ds=20 allegation is that some failure on the attorney=3Ds part=20 caused an adverse result in prior litigation, the plaintiff must = produce=20 evidence from which a jury may reasonably infer that the=20 attorney=3Ds conduct=20 caused the damages alleged.  Id.  In a legal = malpractice=20 suit arising out of an attorney=3Ds handling=20 of prior litigation, the plaintiff=3Ds damages=20 in the malpractice suit are the damages the plaintiff would have = recovered=20 in the underlying lawsuit.  Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 = S.W.2d=20 662, 665B66 (Tex.=20 1989).

In this=20 appeal, the only basis for summary judgment asserted by appellees = in their=20 motion, and thus the only ground at issue here, was that = A[appellant]=20 cannot prove any damages, even if Reynolds had filed a [summary = judgment]=20 response.@ =20 See Shaun T. Mian Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 237 S.W.3d = 851, 855=20 (Tex. App.CDallas=20 2007, rule 53.7(f) motion granted) (stating an appellate court = cannot=20 affirm a summary judgment on grounds other than those specified in = the=20 motion).   Accordingly, in this appeal we must initially = determine whether appellees, as the summary judgment movants, met = their=20 burden and established there was no genuine issue of material fact = as to=20 the existence of appellant=3Ds damages,=20 thus entitling them to judgment as a matter of law.  Only if = we=20 decide the answer to that initial question is yes, must we then = decide=20 whether appellant came forward with competent controverting  = summary=20 judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material = fact.

C.     =20 Did Appellees Satisfy Their Summary Judgment = Burden?

1.      =20 What Damages are Recoverable in a Title VII Sexual Harassment and=20 Retaliation Suit?

Under=20 Title VII, a successful plaintiff may recover equitable relief, = primarily=20 back pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and = attorney=3Ds fees.[2] =20 42 U.S.C.A. ' = 1981a=20 (West 2003), 42 U.S.C.A.' = 2000e-5(g)& (k) (West 2003).

Compensatory=20 damages can be awarded to a successful Title VII plaintiff for = future=20 pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental = anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary=20 losses.   42 U.S.C.A. ' = 1981a(b)(3).  Emotional distress refers to an = individual=3Ds=20 emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of = enjoyment of=20 life.  Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 488 n. = 24 (5th=20 Cir. 2001).  To merit an award greater than nominal damages, = two=20 requirements must be met.  Id. at 488.  First, = the=20 plaintiff must provide specific evidence of the injury. =20 Id.  Second, the plaintiff must make more than vague=20 allegations to support the claim.  Id.

With=20 regard to the first requirement, there must be a specific, = discernable=20 injury to the plaintiff=3Ds=20 emotional state, and it must be proven with evidence showing the = nature=20 and extent of the injury.  Id.  Damages for = emotional=20 distress can be awarded if a plaintiff suffers sleeplessness, = anxiety,=20 marital problems, stress, and humiliation.  Migis v. = Pearle=20 Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998).  Under = Title=20 VII, damages for emotional distress can be awarded based = exclusively on=20 the testimony of the plaintiff.  Id. at = 1046B47. =20 With regard to the second requirement, that the allegations not be = vague,=20 testimony that details anxiety, sleeplessness, loss of = self-esteem,=20 marital hardship, or stress is specific enough to support an award = of=20 compensatory damages for emotional distress under Title VII.  = Id.=20 at 1047; see Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 = F.3d=20 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the specificity requirement = was met=20 by the plaintiff=3Ds=20 testimony that she felt Avery=20 disgusted,@ = Ahopeless,@ = Avery=20 embarrassed,@ = Avery=20 belittled,@ = Aabout two=20 inches high,@ = and=20 Astarted to=20 feel pretty stupid@).

Punitive=20 damages may be recovered by a successful Title VII plaintiff if = that=20 person Ademonstrates=20 that the [defendant] engaged in a discriminatory practice or=20 discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference = to the=20 federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.@  42=20 U.S.C.A. ' = 1981a(b)(1).  Due to the nature of the injury that results = from=20 discrimination, a successful Title VII plaintiff may recover = punitive=20 damages even in the absence of an award of compensatory = damages. =20 Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. = 2008).

2.      =20 Appellees Did Not Meet Their Summary Judgment = Burden.

The only=20 ground asserted by appellees in their motion for summary judgment = was=20 appellant=3Ds lack of=20 damages in her underlying discrimination suit.  In their = brief in=20 this appeal, appellees admit they breached the duty of care they = owed=20 appellant in the underlying lawsuit.  While they admitted = liability,=20 appellees assert they were still entitled to summary judgment = because=20 appellant had no damages in the underlying suit.  Appellees = attached=20 little competent summary judgment evidence to their motion. =20 Appellees pointed out, both in their motion and in their appellate = brief,=20 the fact appellant had not designated any experts to testify as to = her=20 economic or mental distress damages. Appellees  attached the=20 memorandum opinion issued by the federal district court in the = underlying=20 lawsuit as well as Methodist=3Ds motion=20 for summary judgment along with its attached exhibits, including = excerpts=20 from appellant=3Ds=20 deposition.  Appellees contend these items establish, as a = matter of=20 law, appellant suffered no lost wages as a result of her = termination by=20 Methodist in March 2002.

We=20 disagree that, under the appropriate standard of review, this = evidence=20 establishes as a matter of law appellant suffered no damages as a = result=20 of appellees admitted malpractice.  Since mental distress = damages can=20 be awarded in a Title VII suit based exclusively on the testimony = of the=20 plaintiff, the lack of medical records or a testifying medical = expert does=20 not preclude appellant from recovering mental distress = damages. =20 Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047.  Appellant=3Ds deposition excerpts = also do=20 not disprove the existence of economic and emotional distress = damages as=20 they do not=20 address appellant=3Ds damages=20 in the underlying lawsuit, but instead focus on the allegedly=20 discriminatory acts underlying her federal lawsuit.  The = other=20 exhibits attached to Methodist=3Ds motion=20 do not prove appellant did not suffer economic damages as a result = of=20 Methodist=3Ds alleged=20 discrimination.  Instead, the exhibits establish, at most, = that=20 appellant was paid the same once she was transferred to the blood=20 bank.  The exhibits do not address how long appellant was = unemployed=20 following her termination by Methodist or how long it took = appellant to=20 find new employment.  In addition, the mere fact that, at the = time=20 appellees filed their motion for summary judgment, appellant had = not=20 designated an expert to testify on the existence and the amount of = her=20 economic damages does not, standing alone, prove appellant did not = have=20 any economic damages.  Title VII plaintiffs, due to the = nature of=20 discrimination injuries, can still recover punitive damages even = in the=20 absence of economic or emotional distress damages.  See = Abner,=20 2008 WL 40106 at *6 (stating A[i]ndeed,=20 there is some unseemliness for a defendant who engages in = malicious or=20 reckless violations of legal duty to escape either the punitive or = deterrent goal of punitive damages merely because either good = fortune or a=20 plaintiff=3Ds unusual=20 strength or resilience protected the plaintiff from suffering=20 harm@). =20 Because appellees only attacked the existence of = appellant=3Ds economic=20 and emotional distress damages in the underlying lawsuit, and did = not=20 attempt to prove appellant was not the victim of discriminatory = conduct=20 motivated by malice or reckless disregard of appellant=3Ds=20 federally protected rights, they have not established, as a matter = of law,=20 appellant could not recover punitive damages.  Finally,=20 appellees=3D = reliance=20 on the memorandum opinion issued by the federal district court in = the=20 underlying discrimination suit is misplaced.  By attempting = to use=20 this opinion, which was based on appellant=3Ds deemed=20 admissions and lack of response to Methodist=3Ds motion=20 for summary judgment, as evidence against appellant, appellees, = who have=20 admitted they breached the duty of care they owed appellant in the = handling of appellant=3Ds=20 discrimination lawsuit, seek to benefit from their own admitted=20 malpractice.  Because this memorandum opinion was based on = deemed=20 admissions resulting from appellees=3D = failure=20 to answer Methodist=3Ds requests=20 for admissions and appellees=3D = failure=20 to file a response to Methodist=3Ds motion=20 for summary judgment, we hold this memorandum opinion does not = constitute=20 competent summary judgment evidence which can support the granting = of a=20 motion for summary judgment.

We hold=20 appellees did not conclusively negate the existence of=20 appellant=3Ds damages=20 in the underlying lawsuit, thus the burden never shifted to = appellant to=20 produce summary judgment evidence in response.  Because = appellees=20 failed to carry their summary judgment burden, the trial court = erred when=20 it granted appellees=3D = motion=20 for summary judgment.  Accordingly, we sustain = appellant=3Ds single=20 issue on appeal.

Conclusion

Because we=20 have sustained appellant=3Ds single=20 issue on appeal, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and = remand=20 this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent = with this=20 opinion.

 

 

/s/     =20 John S. Anderson

Justice

 

 

Judgment rendered = and Opinion=20 filed March 13, 2008.

Panel consists of = Chief=20 Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson, and Boyce.


[1]  Appellant admits her common law = causes of=20 action are barred by limitations and thus they are not at issue in = this=20 appeal.

[2]  In addition to back pay, under = Title VII, a=20 successful plaintiff may also recover front pay, in lieu of = reinstatement,=20 as compensation for lost future wages and benefits.  Green = v.=20 Adm=3Dr of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 658 (5th Cir. 2002) = abrogated=20 on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. = White,=20 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345=20 = (2006).

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COLOR: red; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } .ErrorSmall { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: red; = FONT-FAMILY: Arial Narrow } .SystemMSG { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: white; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; BACKGROUND-COLOR: = navy } .SystemErrorMSG { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: white; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; BACKGROUND-COLOR: red } .buttonUnused { PADDING-RIGHT: 1pt; PADDING-LEFT: 1pt; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: = 9pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 1pt; MARGIN: 1pt; COLOR: #fff5d7; PADDING-TOP: 1pt; = BACKGROUND-COLOR: #576a9d; font-face: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif } .buttonTanUnused { PADDING-RIGHT: 1pt; PADDING-LEFT: 1pt; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: = 9pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 1pt; MARGIN: 1pt; COLOR: #576a9d; PADDING-TOP: 1pt; = BACKGROUND-COLOR: #fff5d7; font-face: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif } .TextLargeBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: left } .DocketHeaderTitle { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 14pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, ' Helvetica', sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: center } .TextLargeBlack { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-ALIGN: left } .TextLargeBlackcenter { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-ALIGN: center } .TextBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } A.TextBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-DECORATION: none } .TextRed { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: red; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } .TextHidenGray { FONT-SIZE: 0pt; COLOR: #ebebe1; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; FONT-FAMILY: = Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: left } .Time { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10px; COLOR: red; LINE-HEIGHT: 4em; = FONT-FAMILY: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: center } ------=_NextPart_000_0024_01C88562.F5A0E270--