Affirmed in Part, and Reversed in Part, =
and=20
Remanded, and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed July 3,=20
2008.
In The
Fourteenth Court=20
of Appeals
____________
NO.=20
14-07-00270-CV
____________
DAN KELLY AND LAURA =
HOFSTATTER, Appellants
V.
GENERAL INTERIOR=20
CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the =
125th=20
District Court
Harris County,=20
Texas
Trial Court Cause =
No.=20
2005-46388
M A J O R=20
I T Y O P I N I O N
In this accelerated =
appeal,=20
appellants, Dan Kelly and Laura Hofstatter, challenge the denial =
of their=20
special appearance, asserting that the trial court did not have =
personal=20
jurisdiction over them with respect to appellee=3Ds, General Interior=20
Construction, Inc. (AGeneral@), breach of contract =
and fraud=20
claims and alleged violations under chapter 162 of the Texas =
Property=20
Code. We affirm the trial court=3Ds order denying the =
special=20
appearance as to General=3Ds chapter 162 and =
fraud claims,=20
and reverse as to General=3Ds breach of contract=20
claim.
BACKGROUND
Appellants Dan Kelly =
and Laura=20
Hofstatter (collectively the AOfficers@) are the sole =
shareholders and=20
officers of DIVA Consulting, Inc. (ADIVA@), an Arizona-based =
company=20
regularly acting as a general contractor on construction=20
projects. Hofstatter is the President of DIVA, =
while=20
Kelly is the Vice-President. Hofstatter and Kelly are both =
Arizona=20
residents.
In 2004, DIVA entered =
into a=20
construction contract for improvements to be performed on a hotel =
located=20
in Texas (the AHilton =
project@). DIVA then =
entered into=20
numerous subcontract agreements with various Texas contractors, =
including=20
General, a Texas company, to provide labor and materials on the =
Hilton=20
project. After executing these agreements, General and the =
other=20
Texas subcontractors began work on the project. During =
construction,=20
Kelly made site trips to Texas to oversee the project. DIVA =
sent=20
change orders to and received invoices from General and other =
Texas=20
subcontractors for materials and work performed. The =
Officers=20
frequently corresponded with General via email, facsimile, and=20
telephone. Throughout the duration of the project, DIVA =
received=20
funds from the property owner, Meristar Hospitality Corporation=20
(AMeristar@), to pay for =
expenses related=20
to the Hilton project. Initially, the Officers, on behalf of =
DIVA,=20
sent payments to General; payments stopped when DIVA disputed the =
amounts=20
owed to General and alleged that General=3Ds performance was=20
substandard.
Meristar initiated =
litigation=20
against both DIVA and General for various contract and tort =
claims. =20
General counterclaimed against Meristar and filed a cross-claim =
against=20
DIVA and third-party petition against the Officers for breach of =
contract,=20
fraud, and violations under chapter 162 of the Texas Property Code =
(the=20
ATexas Trust Fund=20
Act@). The Officers filed =
a joint=20
special appearance contesting the trial court=3Ds personal =
jurisdiction over=20
them as to General=3Ds third-party =
claims. The=20
trial court denied the special appearance, and this appeal =
ensued. =20
The Officers =
challenge the=20
denial of their special appearance on three grounds. First, =
the=20
Officers argue that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction =
as to=20
General=3Ds breach of contract =
claim=20
because they were not parties to the contract and were acting in =
their=20
corporate capacity. In their second issue, the Officers =
contend that=20
no jurisdiction exists as to General=3Ds chapter 162 claim =
because=20
they are nonresidents of Texas and were acting in their corporate=20
capacity. In their last issue, the Officers argue that no=20
jurisdiction exists as to General=3Ds fraud claim because =
there is=20
no evidence that the Officers engaged in fraudulent conduct. =
STANDARD=20
OF REVIEW
Whether a trial court =
has=20
personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law we =
review de=20
novo. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d =
569,=20
574 (Tex. 2007). When the trial court does not issue =
findings of=20
fact and conclusions of law with its special appearance ruling, as =
in this=20
case, all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by =
the=20
evidence are implied. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. =
Marchand,=20
83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002).
The plaintiff bears =
the initial=20
burden of pleading sufficient allegations to invoke jurisdiction =
under the=20
Texas long-arm statute. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. =
v.=20
Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002). The nonresident =
defendant then assumes the burden of negating all bases of =
jurisdiction in=20
those allegations. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at =
793. In=20
considering the denial of a special appearance, we determine only =
the=20
issue of jurisdiction, not liability. Barnhill v. =
Automated=20
Shrimp Corp., 222 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. App.CWaco 2007, no =
pet.). A=20
Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident=20
defendant if (1) the defendant has minimum contacts with Texas, =
and (2)=20
the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of =
fair=20
play and substantial justice. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d =
at=20
795. Minimum contacts are sufficient for personal =
jurisdiction when=20
the nonresident defendant purposefully avails himself of the =
privilege of=20
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the =
benefits=20
and protections of its laws. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at=20
575. There must be either minimum contacts sufficient to =
confer=20
specific jurisdiction or continuous and systematic contacts =
sufficient to=20
confer general jurisdiction. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d at=20
806-07.
When specific =
jurisdiction is=20
asserted, as in this case, the following requirements must be met: =
(1) the=20
defendant=3Ds contacts must be =
purposeful;=20
and (2) the cause of action must arise from or relate to those =
contacts.=20
Id. at 806. In analyzing specific jurisdiction, =
we must=20
focus on the relationship among the defendant, Texas, and the =
cause of=20
action. See Guardian Royal Exch. Assur., Ltd. v. English =
China=20
Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex. 1991); =
Barnhill, 222=20
S.W.3d at 762. Furthermore, foreseeability is an =
important=20
consideration, although not determinative, in deciding whether the =
nonresident defendant has purposefully established Aminimum =
contacts@ with the =
forum. BMC=20
Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795; Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d =
608,=20
616 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] =
2005, no=20
pet.).
MINIMUM=20
CONTACTS=20
ANALYSIS
Breach=20
of Contract Claim
In the =
Officers=3D first issue, they =
contend that=20
they are not subject to personal jurisdiction as to =
General=3Ds breach of contract =
claim=20
because they were not parties to the contract and were acting in =
their=20
corporate capacity. We agree. A corporate officer who =
signs a=20
contract on behalf of his corporation is not a party to the =
contract, but=20
acting in his corporate capacity. Such act does not =
constitute a=20
contact for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Wolf v.=20
Summers-Wood, L.P., 214 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex. App.CDallas 2007, no pet.) =
(concluding that no specific jurisdiction existed where officer =
contracted=20
in corporate capacity); Cerbone v. Farb, 225 S.W.3d 764, =
771-72=20
(Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] =
2007, no=20
pet.) (holding that the appellant did not make a purposeful =
contact with=20
forum because he was not a party to the settlement =
agreement). =20
Because Hofstatter signed the contract in her corporate capacity, =
her act=20
was not a contact or purposeful act to impose personal =
jurisdiction. =20
See Wolf, 214 S.W.3d at 792; Cerbone, 225 S.W.3d at=20
771-72. The=20
trial court does not have jurisdiction over her with respect to=20
General=3Ds breach of contract =
claim. =20
Likewise, Kelly is not subject to personal jurisdiction on the =
basis of=20
the corporate contract. See Wolf, 214 S.W.3d at =
792;=20
Cerbone, 225 S.W.3d at 771-72. Accordingly, the trial =
court=20
lacked personal jurisdiction over the Officers with respect to the =
breach=20
of contract claim alleged by General. We sustain=20
appellants=3D first issue.
Chapter 162=20
Claim
In their second =
issue, the=20
Officers challenge personal jurisdiction as to General=3Ds chapter 162 claim =
under the=20
Texas Trust Fund Act. In assessing personal jurisdiction, we =
must=20
focus on the relationship among the Officers, Texas, and the =
chapter 162=20
cause of action. See Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at =
228;=20
Barnhill, 222 S.W.3d at 762. The Trust Fund Act =
imposes=20
fiduciary responsibilities on contractors to ensure that Texas=20
subcontractors, mechanics, and materialmen are paid for work=20
completed. Taylor Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Directional =
Road=20
Boring, Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d 696, 714-15 (E.D. Tex. =
2006). Under=20
chapter 162, construction payments are trust funds if the payments =
were=20
made to a contractor or to an officer under a construction =
contract for=20
improvement of specific real estate in Texas. Tex. Prop. =
Code Ann.=20
' 162.001. The =
contractor=20
or officer who receives the trust funds is a trustee of the =
funds. =20
Id. ' 162.002. The =
artisan,=20
laborer, mechanic, contractor, subcontractor, or materialman who =
labors or=20
furnishes labor or material for the construction or repair of an=20
improvement on specific real property located in Texas is the =
beneficiary=20
of any trust funds paid or received in connection with the=20
improvement. Id. ' 162.003. A =
trustee who=20
intentionally or knowingly or with the intent to defraud directly =
or=20
indirectly retains, uses, disburses, or otherwise diverts the =
funds has=20
misapplied the trust funds. Id. ' 162.031. Thus, =
a trustee=20
who misapplies these trust funds is subject to personal civil =
liability if=20
(1) the party breaches the duty imposed by chapter 162 with the =
requisite=20
scienter, and (2) the claimants are within the class of people =
chapter 162=20
was designed to protect and have asserted the type of injury =
chapter 162=20
was intended to prohibit. C & G, Inc. v. Jones, =
165=20
S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. App.CDallas 2005, pet.=20
denied). Any officer or director who has control or =
direction over=20
the funds is also a trustee of the funds and is personally =
liable. =20
Id. at 453-54.
Under Texas law, the=20
construction payments from Meristar to DIVA were trust funds held =
for the=20
benefit of General, a subcontractor and materialman on the Hilton=20
project. Any officer or director who had control or =
direction over=20
such funds was also a trustee of the funds. It is undisputed =
that=20
the Officers had exclusive control and direction over these =
funds. =20
General pleads that the Officers were the sole owners and =
shareholders of=20
DIVA and that they controlled and directed all funds received by =
Meristar=20
for the Hilton project. Thus, they are charged by the Texas =
Trust=20
Fund Act with the fiduciary duties and responsibilities of a Texas =
trustee. The dissent reasons that no personal jurisdiction =
exists=20
because the Officers did not act in their individual capacities, =
but on=20
behalf of DIVA. This point is irrelevant in the instant case =
because=20
the cause of action made the basis of personal jurisdiction =
imputes=20
individual liability on the Officers for misappropriating Texas =
trust=20
funds. By controlling the trust funds, the Texas Trust Fund =
Act=20
imposes a fiduciary duty that extends beyond DIVA and reaches the =
Officers=20
individually. See Nuclear Corp. of Am. v. Hale, 355 =
F.Supp.=20
193, 197 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (stating that individual liability =
depends only=20
on whether officers controlled or directed funds). =20
Looking at the chapter 162 claim, we must focus only on whether =
General=20
has pleaded that the Officers, regardless on behalf of DIVA or in =
their=20
individual capacities, controlled and directed funds received for =
the=20
Hilton project. Clearly, General has done so. =20
General also relies =
on=20
Herbert v. Greater Gulf Coast Enterprises, Inc. in =
support=20
of its jurisdiction argument. 915 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. =
App.CHouston [1st Dist.] =
1995, no=20
writ). In Herbert, our sister court faced a similar =
issue in=20
which a Texas company sought to sue the president of a foreign =
company in=20
his individual capacity. Id. at 869. The Texas =
company=20
alleged that chapter 162 imposed individual liability upon the =
defendant=20
because he misdirected trust funds that were received by the =
foreign=20
company under a construction contract. Id. at =
870. The=20
First Court concluded that these allegations alone were sufficient =
to=20
confer personal jurisdiction. Id. Accepting as =
true=20
General=3Ds allegations that =
the Officers=20
misappropriated Texas trust funds, we hold that such allegations =
are=20
sufficient to establish minimum contacts with respect to its =
chapter 162=20
claim. See id. =
Fraud=20
Claim
In their third issue, =
the=20
Officers argue that there is no personal jurisdiction as to=20
General=3Ds fraud claim, which =
alleges=20
that the Officers continued to allow General to work on the Hilton =
project=20
under the false pretense that General would be paid, knowing all =
along=20
that the Officers had no intentions of paying General. The =
Officers=20
argue that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction on =
the fraud=20
claim because there is no evidence that any false statements were =
made to=20
General. This argument relates to the merits of whether the =
Officers=20
actually committed the alleged fraud. Ultimate tort =
liability is not=20
a jurisdictional fact; the merits are not at issue in a special=20
appearance. See Cerbone, 225 S.W.3d at 770; =
Glattly v. CMS=20
Viron Corp., 177 S.W.3d 438, 449 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] =
2005, no=20
pet.).
The Officers may be=20
individually liable for the alleged false statements because a =
corporate=20
officer can be held individually liable for fraudulent statements =
or=20
knowing misrepresentations even when they are made in the capacity =
of a=20
corporate representative. See Glattly, 177 S.W.3d at=20
448. It is not necessary that the corporate veil be pierced =
in order=20
to impose liability, as long as it is shown that the corporate =
officer=20
knowingly participated in the wrongdoing. Id. =
(quoting=20
Wright v. Sage Engineering, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. =
App.CHouston [1st Dist.] =
2004, pet.=20
denied)). The Officers=3D alleged fraud =
sufficiently=20
Arelates =
to@ conduct purposefully =
directed=20
toward Texas. We hold that General has made allegations of =
sufficient=20
minimum contacts with respect to its fraud claim.
FAIR PLAY=20
AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
Once it has been =
decided that a=20
defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the =
forum=20
State, these contacts may be considered, in light of other =
factors, to=20
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would =
comport=20
with fair play and substantial justice. Burger King =
Corp.=20
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d =
528=20
(1985). The other relevant factors are: (1) the burden on =
the=20
nonresident defendant; (2) the forum state=3Ds interest in =
adjudicating the=20
dispute; (3) the plaintiff=3Ds interest in =
obtaining=20
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial=20
system=3Ds interest in =
obtaining the=20
most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared =
interest of=20
the several states in furthering substantive social =
policies. =20
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, =
100=20
S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). After reviewing =
these=20
factors and the evidence, it is clear that jurisdiction would not =
offend=20
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. =
The=20
Officers have not made a showing of undue burden. The =
litigation=20
below involves numerous parties, counterclaims, and =
crossclaims. =20
Because the Officers, on behalf of DIVA, are defending against =
certain=20
claims in this Texas lawsuit, there will be no additional burden =
on them=20
to defend against General=3Ds chapter 162 and =
fraud=20
claims. It would be a waste of judicial resources to =
litigate all=20
the claims, including the counterclaims and cross claims, in =
Texas, and=20
litigate two related claims in another forum. Texas also has a =
legitimate=20
interest in asserting jurisdiction: (1) the litigation involves=20
misappropriated trust funds and fraudulent acts subject to Texas =
law; (2)=20
General is a Texas resident; and (3) the litigation involves work=20
performed on Texas real estate. See D.H. Blair Inv. =
Banking Corp.=20
v. Reardon, 97 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] =
2002, pet.=20
dism=3Dd w.o.j.). =20
General also has a =
heightened=20
interest in obtaining relief in this case. Subcontractors =
and=20
materialmen are at the bottom of the construction chain, leaving =
chapter=20
162, in most cases, their only remedy to recover for work =
performed on=20
construction projects. In re HLW Enterprises of Tex., =
Inc.,=20
157 B.R. 592, 597 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993). Because =
chapter 162=20
is a remedial statute, we must give it a broad construction to =
effectuate=20
its protective purposes. Jones, 165 S.W.3d at =
454. The=20
dissent ignores the statute=3Ds purpose. The =
Texas=20
Supreme Court has indicated that the Texas Trust Fund Act should =
be=20
construed liberally in favor of laborers and materialmen. =20
RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d =
605, 607=20
(Tex. 1985). This provision was specifically enacted to =
serve as a=20
special protection for subcontractors and materialmen in =
situations as the=20
instant one, where contractors refuse to pay the subcontractor or=20
materialman for labor and materials. Taylor Pipeline=20
Constr., 438 F.Supp.2d at 714-15; Herbert, 915 =
S.W.2d at=20
870-871. Additionally, states and the intrastate judicial =
system=20
both hold similar interests in resolving such conflicts =
efficiently in=20
order to protect residents from economic loss resulting from =
torts. =20
See Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 228. =20
The basic equities =
clearly=20
weigh in favor of in personam jurisdiction. We hold that=20
jurisdiction over the Officers is not offensive to the ideals of =
fair play=20
and substantial justice with respect to the chapter 162 and fraud=20
claims. We further hold that the trial court did not err by =
denying=20
the Officers=3D special appearance =
as to the=20
chapter 162 and fraud claims. We overrule =
appellants=3D second and third =
issues. =20
We affirm the trial court=3Ds order denying the Officers=3D special appearance with respect to=20
General=3Ds chapter 162 and fraud claims, and =
reverse the=20
trial court=3Ds order denying the Officers=3D special appearance as to =
General=3Ds breach of contract claim. We =
remand to the=20
trial court with instructions to dismiss General=3Ds breach of contract claim against the =
Officers=20
for want of personal jurisdiction.
/s/ =20
Adele Hedges
Chief Justice
Judgment rendered and =
Majority=20
and Dissenting Opinions July 3, 2008.
Panel consists of =
Chief Justice=20
Hedges and Justices Anderson and Frost (Frost, J. =
dissenting).
The dissent alleges that our =
analysis=20
conflicts with Cerbone. Cerbone, however, =
supports our=20
reasoning and conclusion that Hofstatter did not make a purposeful =
contact=20
by contracting in her corporate capacity. See Cerbone, =
225=20
S.W.3d at 771 (no purposeful availment where individual signed =
agreement=20
in corporate capacity). We also note that our decision does =
not=20
reach the merits of General=3Ds claim. There is a difference =
between the=20
issue of liability and imputing one entity=3Ds contacts to another for jurisdictional =
purposes.=20
PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, =
174 (Tex.=20
2007). Our decision today addresses the jurisdictional issue =
as to=20
whether DIVA=3Ds act can be imputed onto Hofstatter, =
who was=20
acting in her corporate capacity. See =
id.
The dissent contends that our =
analysis of=20
and reliance on Wolf is in conflict with two Texas Supreme =
Court=20
cases and two Fourteenth Court of Appeals cases. See=20
PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d 163; Michiana Easy =
Livin=3D Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005); =
Weldon-Francke v.=20
Fisher, 237 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.);=20
Cerbone, 225 S.W.3d 764. PHC-Minden involved a =
tort=20
claim and an assertion of only general jurisdiction. Our =
case=20
involves specific jurisdiction on a breach of contract =
claim. =20
Additionally, the Court in PHC-Minden reasoned that =
deciding=20
whether a business contact can be imputed on a corporate official =
is a=20
jurisdictional issue, not one of liability. 235 S.W.3d at =
174. =20
Our conclusion and Wolf follow this reasoning. =
Because=20
Hofstatter was acting in her corporate capacity, DIVA=3Ds act cannot be imputed to Hofstatter, =
depriving=20
the trial court of jurisdiction. See id. =20
PHC-Minden supports Wolf and our conclusion on =
personal=20
jurisdiction. Our decision is not also in conflict with=20
Michiana. Michiana reasons, as do we, that=20
jurisdiction turns on purposeful availment and contacts. 168 =
S.W.3d=20
at 791-92. Fisher is a tort case reasoning that =
liability is=20
irrelevant in a jurisdictional analysis. 237 S.W.3d at =
797-98. =20
Our decision today does not dispute this contention. =
Moreover, our=20
opinion in Cerbone supports our conclusion. See =
supra=20
note 1.
The dissent believes that General =
failed to=20
allege a breach of contract claim against the Officers. =20
General=3Ds answer is divided into four parts: a =
general=20
denial, a counterclaim against Meristar, a cross-claim against =
DIVA, and a=20
third-party claim against the Officers. The cross-claim =
states a=20
breach of contract claim against DIVA, and the third-party =
petition states=20
a breach of contract claim against the Officers. =
General=3Ds third-party petition alleges that the =
Officers,=20
who exclusively owned and operated DIVA, are liable for breach of=20
contract. See Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 =
S.W.3d=20
864, 867 (Tex. 2002) (holding that in considering jurisdictional =
motions,=20
the reviewing court construes the pleadings in the =
plaintiff=3Ds favor). Accordingly, a breach of =
contract=20
claim was alleged against the Officers in the third-party =
petition.=20
The dissent relies on =
Commonwealth Gen.=20
Corp. v. York to support its contention that we consider only =
the=20
Officers=3D purposeful contacts with Texas and not =
the=20
contacts of DIVA in assessing personal jurisdiction. 177 =
S.W.3d 923=20
(Tex. 2005). Unlike York, the instant case involves =
liability=20
under chapter 162, which automatically imputes individual =
liability upon=20
an officer or shareholder who controls and directs the trust =
funds,=20
regardless of the capacity in which the individual is acting while =
handling the funds. Chapter 162 essentially pierces the =
corporate=20
veil for subcontractors. Because the statute explicitly =
creates a=20
fiduciary relationship and imposes individual liability regardless =
of=20
one=3Ds acting capacity, a piercing of the =
corporate=20
veil analysis is inappropriate for General=3Ds chapter 162 claims. See =
Jones, 165=20
S.W.3d at 453-54 (a party who misapplies trust funds under chapter =
162 is=20
subject to civil liability); Perry & Perry Builders v. =
Galvan,=20
No. 03-02-00091-CV, 2003 WL 21705248, at *4-5 (Tex. =
App.CAustin July 24, 2003, no pet.) (mem. =
op.) (jury=20
charge and findings were sufficient in chapter 162 suit =
instructing the=20
jury that individual liability exists where trustee diverts funds =
from=20
beneficiary); Lively v. Carpet Servs., Inc., 904 S.W.2d =
868, 873=20
(Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) =
(any=20
officer or director who has control or direction over the funds is =
also a=20
trustee, and is therefore personally liable).
The dissent also contends that =
the Officers=20
had no substantial connection with Texas. The record reveals =
that=20
performance under the construction contract was to be performed=20
exclusively in Texas. The Officers sent and directed =
payments to=20
General in Texas. Kelly made site visits to the Texas work =
site. The=20
Officers received numerous invoices from Texas regarding the =
Hilton=20
project. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, =
471 U.S.=20
462, 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (when a party =
reaches out=20
beyond one state and creates a continuing relationship and =
obligation with=20
a citizen of another state, he is subject to regulation and =
sanctions in=20
the other state for the consequences of his activities). =
The dissent rejects =
Herbert on=20
erroneous grounds. Herbert is directly on =
point. The=20
dissent cites to no authority overruling or disagreeing with=20
Herbert and provides no authority involving a chapter 162 =
claim=20
that supports is its contentions. =20
|