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Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 24,=20 2008.

 

In The

 

Fourteenth=20 Court of Appeals

_______________

 

NO. 14-06-01022-CV

_______________

 

TARRIS WOODS, Appellant

 

V.

 

CITY OF GALVESTON, TEXAS and CITY OF = GALVESTON=20 FIRE FIGHTERS=3D AND POLICE OFFICERS=3D CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,=20 Appellees

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On Appeal from the 56th = District=20 Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No.=20 05CV0638

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M E M O R=20 A N D U M   O P I N I O N

In this employment=20 discrimination suit, a former fire fighter appeals a summary = judgment in=20 favor of the City of Galveston and its civil service = commission. =20 Specifically, the fire fighter asserts that the trial court erred = in=20 granting summary judgment because the city and the city civil = service=20 commission did not establish as a matter of law that (a) res = judicata=20 barred his claims, (b) his claims of substantive and procedural = due=20 process violations were barred because he sought only monetary=20 relief,  and (c) he did not establish a prima facie case of = racial=20 discrimination.  We affirm.

I. =20 Factual and Procedural Background

Tarris Woods was = employed as a=20 firefighter by the City of Galveston (the ACity@) in February = 1980.  In=20 March 1988, Woods wrote to the City=3Ds fire chief, Willie = Wisko,=20 requesting disability retirement due to a work-related = disability. =20 Wisko responded that Woods=3Ds Aresignation@ had been accepted = and referred=20 Woods to the Civil Service and Finance Directors regarding any=20 compensation, insurance benefits, or retirement options.  = Woods=20 subsequently received disability retirement benefits from the=20 Fireman=3Ds Relief and = Retirement Fund=20 (the AFRRF@).

Several years later, = in=20 November 1996, the FRRF received a physician report stating that = Woods was=20 no longer disabled, and it terminated his disability retirement=20 benefits.  Woods appealed this decision to an administrative = law=20 judge, who upheld it.  After receiving a right-to-sue letter = from the=20 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the AEEOC@), Woods sued the = City and the=20 FRRF in federal district court, alleging racial discrimination in = the=20 City=3Ds failure to = reinstate his=20 employment and in the FRRF=3Ds termination of his = disability=20 benefits.  Woods v. City of Galveston, 5 F. Supp. 2d = 494, 494=20 (S.D. Tex. 1998).  Both the City and the FRRF moved for  = summary=20 judgment.  As is relevant to this appeal, the trial court = granted the=20 motion on the ground that Woods failed to establish a prima facie = case of=20 discrimination.  Id. at 501.  The federal court = reached=20 this conclusion in part because Woods had not sought, and = therefore did=20 not receive, a hearing before the City=3Ds Civil Service = Commission (the=20 ACommission@) as required by the = Texas=20 Local Government Code.  Id.  The court reasoned = that=20 Woods was not  Aqualified@ for the position he=20 sought.  Id.  The federal court further noted = that Woods=20 and Kenneth Coleman, the individual Woods had identified as = similarly=20 situated, were not comparable because Coleman had followed the = proper=20 procedure for reinstatement.  Id. at n.7.[1]   =20

Two years after the = federal=20 court dismissed Woods=3Ds discrimination = claims with=20 prejudice, Woods requested reappointment to the classified = position he had=20 held with the Galveston Fire Department (the ADepartment@) before his = disability=20 retirement.  In a letter dated April 13, 2000, the = City=3Ds Civil = Service/Personnel=20 Director, Carolyn Cox, informed Woods that she had received his = request=20 for reappointment to active duty with the Department.  Cox = informed=20 Woods that, for the Commission to consider his request, he needed = to apply=20 for recertification with the Texas Commission for Fire Protection = (the=20 ATCFP@).[2] =20 Over two years later, in August 2002, Woods sent a similar letter=20 requesting reappointment to active duty with the Department; Cox = again=20 responded that Woods needed to apply for recertification with the = TCFP to=20 have his request considered.  On March 8, 2004, Woods = requested a=20 hearing before the Commission for appointment to the classified = position=20 he held with the Department before his disability.  Cox = responded to=20 this letter on March 19 by reiterating that Woods needed to apply = for=20 recertification with the TCFP before his request could be=20 considered. 

Also on March 19, = Woods sent=20 another letter to Cox, in which he claimed that he had been = instructed to=20 return to Cox=3Ds office on two = occasions to=20 receive a reply to his March 8, 2004 request, but one had not been = ready.  Woods concluded this letter as = follows:

I have reach[ed] the conclusion that I = would allow=20 this letter to serve the City of Galveston notice that I have = exhausted=20 all the municipal administrative remedies for reappointment after = recovery=20 from a disability found under the Texas Local Government Code, = Chapter=20 143.  And, I will no longer pursue redress at this = level.

The record does not = contain a=20 response to Woods=3Ds final letter.  = Further,=20 the record is devoid of any indication that Woods applied for=20 recertification with the TCFP.

Subsequently, Woods = filed a=20 charge of racial discrimination against the City with the EEOC, = detailing=20 his complaint as follows:

I.         =20 I was employed by Respondent as a Firefighter.  Around 1988, = I went=20 out on disability retirement.  On or about 1999, a physician = working=20 for Respondent, determined that I was no longer disabled.  = Therefore=20 in April 2000, August 2002 and most recently on March 8, 2004, I = made a=20 formal request for a hearing before the Civil Service Commission = so that I=20 could get my job back.  On March 19, 2004, Ms. Carolyn Cox, = Civil=20 Service Director, denied my request for a hearing.

II.        =20 According to Ms. Cox, I need to apply for recertification with the = Texas=20 Commission for Fire Protection before the Civil Service Commission = will=20 consider my request.  However, I am aware of a similarly = situated=20 Caucasian employee who was granted a hearing in spite of the fact = that he=20 was not certified by the Texas Commission for Fire = Protection.

III.       = I believe=20 that I have been discriminated against because of my race, Black, = in=20 violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as=20 amended.

After being issued a=20 right-to-sue letter by the EEOC, Woods filed suit against the City = and the=20 Commission, alleging racial discrimination in violation of the = Texas=20 Commission on Human Rights Act (ATCHRA@) and denial of his = due process=20 rights.  He again identified Kenneth Coleman as his = comparator as=20 part of his prima facie case of = discrimination.

The City and the = Commission=20 filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, asserting that=20 Woods=3Ds claims should be = dismissed=20 because (1) there was no implied right of action for damages under = the=20 Texas Constitution; and (2) Woods was not similarly situated to=20 Coleman.  Further, the Commission argued that it was not=20 Woods=3Ds employer and would = therefore=20 have no liability under Woods=3Ds pleadings. On = October 6,=20 2006, the trial court granted the summary judgment and dismissed=20 Woods=3Ds claims with = prejudice. =20 This appeal timely followed.[3] =20

II. =20 Issue Presented

In a single issue, = Woods=20 asserts that summary judgment was not supported by the grounds = presented=20 in the summary judgment motion.  Specifically, he contends = that the=20 three asserted bases for summary judgmentCwhich Woods = identifies as res=20 judicata,[4] = dismissal=20 of due process violations because he sought monetary relief, and = failure=20 to establish his prima facie case of discriminationCcannot support = summary judgment=20 in this case.  The City and the Commission respond, inter=20 alia,  that summary judgment was appropriate because = Woods did=20 not establish his prima facie case of discrimination as he and = Coleman=20 were not Asimilarly = situated.@    =

III.  Analysis

A.       =20 Standard of Review

We review summary = judgments de=20 novo.  Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d = 656, 661=20 (Tex. 2005).  Where, as here, the trial court grants the = judgment=20 without specifying the grounds, we affirm the summary judgment if = any of=20 the grounds presented are meritorious.  FM Props. = Operating Co. v.=20 City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872B73 (Tex. = 2000).   In=20 a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the = burden of=20 showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that = it is=20 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. = 166a(c); Am.=20 Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. = 1997).  To be=20 entitled to traditional summary judgment, a defendant must = conclusively=20 negate at least one essential element of each of the = plaintiff=3Ds causes of action or = conclusively establish each element of an affirmative = defense. =20 Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.=20 1997).  Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable people = could not=20 differ in their conclusions.  City of Keller v. = Wilson, 168=20 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).  Once the defendant establishes = its=20 right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to = the=20 plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material=20 fact.  City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 = S.W.2d=20 671, 678B79 (Tex. = 1979).

B.       =20 Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

As a preliminary = matter, we=20 note that Woods failed to respond in either the trial court or = this court=20 to the Commission=3Ds argument that it = had no=20 liability under Woods=3Ds pleadings for = racial=20 discrimination because it was not his employer.  Woods has = therefore=20 waived any argument that the trial court erred in granting summary = judgment to the Commission on this claim, and we only address his=20 discrimination contentions as they relate to the City.  = See,=20 e.g., Wortham v. Dow Chem. Co., 179 S.W.3d 189,=20 202B03 (Tex. = App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2005, no=20 pet.) (upholding summary judgment on unchallenged grounds).  = Although=20 alleged under Texas law,[5] = we may=20 look to federal precedent for guidance because the relevant parts = of our=20 state law Aare patterned after = Title VII=20 of the federal Civil Rights Act.@  Quantum = Chem. Corp.=20 v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 474 (Tex. 2001).   In = the=20 absence of direct evidence of discrimination, we review cases = brought=20 under the TCHRA by applying the burden‑shifting analysis = established by=20 the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.=20 Green.[6] =20 See Russo v. Smith Int=3Dl, = Inc., 93 S.W.3d 428, 434 = & n.5=20 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2002, no=20 pet.).  Under this standard, Woods must first establish a = prima facie=20 case of discrimination.  Id.  To establish a = prima facie=20 case of discrimination under the TCHRA, Woods must show that  = (1) he=20 is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse = employment=20 action, and (3) similarly-situated non-protected class members = were not=20 similarly treated.  See Winters v. Chubb & Son, = Inc., 132=20 S.W.3d 568, 574 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] = 2004, no=20 pet.).  As part of his prima facie case, Woods must = demonstrate by a=20 preponderance of the evidence that there were non-protected class = members=20 similarly situated in all material respects to him who were = treated=20 differently.  See Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. = Monarrez, 177=20 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see also = Gillmore v.=20 AT&T, 319 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2003).  = AEmployees are = similarly=20 situated if their circumstances are comparable in all material = respects,=20 including similar standards, supervisors, and conduct.@  = Monarrez, 177=20 S.W.3d at 917.

In its motion for = summary=20 judgment, the City argued that Woods could not establish a prima = facie=20 case because Kenneth Coleman=3Ds circumstances were = not=20 comparable in all material respects with Woods=3Ds = circumstances. =20 Specifically, the City asserted that Woods, unlike Coleman, never = sought=20 recertification from the TCFP.  Coleman, on the other hand, = had taken=20 steps to recertify: he had taken and passed both the written and = the=20 skills exams prior to seeking re-appointment.  This = distinction=20 between the circumstances of Woods and Coleman is highlighted by a = letter=20 from the TCFP to the City=3Ds former fire=20 chief:

Mr. Coleman was placed on disability = retirement on=20 or about October 2, 1989, at which time the notice of termination = was=20 filed with the TCFP by the Galveston Fire Department.  = Apparently, on=20 or about August 10, 1994, Mr. Coleman was released by his doctor . = . . to=20 return to work.  Mr. Coleman passed the proficiency = examination on=20 or about April 20, 1995, and sought reinstatement with the = Galveston Fire=20 Department within one year of his examination.  = Apparently, a=20 local civil service commission ordered Mr. Coleman=3Ds reinstatement effective June 20,=20 1996.

(emphasis = added). =20 Woods=3Ds response to the=20 City=3Ds summary-judgment = motion also=20 included the deposition testimony of Danny Weber,[7] = the=20 City=3Ds fire chief at the = time Woods=20 sought reinstatement.  In his deposition, Weber testified = that he had=20 explained the steps Woods needed to follow to be = reappointed:

He would have to receive and take from = the [TCFP]=20 the written exam and the skills exam. . . .  And in fact [I] = called=20 the [TCFP] while Mr. Woods was there in my office and explained to = them=20 that I had a prior fire fighter who had been off on disability for = a=20 number of years and was looking to be recertified and asked what = would he=20 have to do.  They told me he would have to take the tests and = they=20 would forward to him a packet of information, study materials, = what he=20 needed to do etcetera. . . .  I know that I = gave Mr.=20 Woods . . . the [TCFP]=3Ds phone number, address and what have = you.  I=20 don=3Dt know whether they spoke that day or = not. =20 And so that he would be in contact with whom he needed to get the = proper=20 B follow the proper procedures to be=20 recertified.

Weber highlighted the = distinctions between Woods=3Ds situation and=20 Coleman=3Ds situation as=20 follows:

Mr. Coleman, upon being released from = disability,=20 went through each step of the process that he needed to go through = to be=20 reinstated.  He first went to the fire chief, then he went to = the=20 Fire Commission.  He took the tests, he passed the tests, he = applied=20 for the hearings.

Mr. Woods, conversely, just came back to = the City=20 and said I=3Dm released and by law you have to put me = back to=20 work.

Woods ignores the = fact that=20 Coleman requested reinstatement only after he had taken and = passed=20 the examinations required by the TCFP for certification.  = Woods=20 provides no evidence that he took and passed the TCFP examinations = before=20 seeking reinstatement. Woods attempts to blur this vital = distinction=20 between himself and Coleman by repeatedly emphasizing that Coleman = was=20 given a hearing even though he was not certified by the TCFP, and = that=20 Woods was denied a hearing.  But the letters from the City do = not=20 indicate that Woods had to be certified prior to obtaining a = hearing;=20 instead, Cox stated that Woods needed to apply for=20 recertification. 

Although Coleman was = not=20 certified prior to his hearing before the Commission, Coleman and = Woods=20 were not similarly situated in all material respects because = Coleman had=20 become eligible for recertification as a fire fighter and Woods = had not.[8] =20 Accordingly, Woods failed to establish a prima facie case of=20 discrimination, and summary judgment was proper regarding his = claims of=20 racial discrimination.

C.       =20 Declaratory Relief and Constitutional = Claims

Woods further = contends that=20 summary judgment was inappropriate on his constitutional claims = regarding=20 violation of his due process rights.  He acknowledges that he = is=20 precluded from seeking monetary relief by City of Beaumont v.=20 Bouillion.  896 S.W.2d 143, 147 (Tex. 1995).  He = complains,=20 however, that he sought Adeclaratory and = equitable=20 relief for violations of his due process rights; specifically, = Woods=20 asserted that denial of his right to a hearing under the = applicable Texas=20 statutes was a violation of substantive and procedural due=20 process.@

Regarding = Woods=3Ds contention that = summary=20 judgment was inappropriate on his request for declaratory relief, = Woods=20 does not specify the declaratory relief sought in his briefing = before this=20 court.  But in his fourth amended petition, apparently his = live=20 pleading before the trial court, Woods requested that the trial = court=20 Adeclare the rights of = the=20 parties as a matter of law with respect to the question of the = hearing=20 and/or whether Woods is entitled to a hearing.@ 

The City and the = Commission=20 sought summary judgment on Woods=3Ds request for = declaratory=20 relief on the basis that a judicial declaration would add nothing = to the=20 causes of action and requests for relief Woods asserted under the=20 TCHRA.  We agree.  Generally, A[t]here is no basis = for=20 declaratory relief when a party is seeking in the same action a = different,=20 enforceable remedy, and a judicial declaration would add nothing = to what=20 would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the = enforceable=20 remedy.@ Universal = Printing Co. v.=20 Premier Victorian Homes, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 283, 296 (Tex.=20 App.CHouston [1st Dist.] = 2001, pet.=20 denied).  Thus, we hold the court did not err in granting = summary=20 judgment regarding Woods=3Ds request for = declaratory=20 relief.

Woods=3Ds due process = complaint is=20 premised on the alleged denial of a hearing.  But, as = previously=20 discussed, Woods was not denied a hearing; he was informed that he = needed=20 to follow a particular process to obtain a hearing.  Nothing = in our=20 record indicates that Woods followed this process.  Woods has = provided no argument or authority that denial of a hearing under = these=20 circumstances is a violation of his due process rights.[9]  We=20 therefore affirm the trial court=3Ds grant of summary = judgment on=20 Woods=3Ds constitutional=20 claims.

IV. =20 Conclusion

In sum, Woods has = failed to=20 establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  Thus, the = trial=20 court properly granted summary judgment on his discrimination=20 claims.  In addition, summary judgment was appropriate on his = constitutional claims and his claims for declaratory relief.  = We=20 therefore overrule his sole issue on appeal and affirm the = judgment of the=20 trial court.

 

 

/s/        Eva=20 M. Guzman

Justice

 

 

 

Judgment rendered and = Memorandum Opinion filed June 24, 2008.

Panel consists of = Justices=20 Yates, Guzman, and Brown.


[1] =20 In its entirety, this footnote=20 provides:

Mr. Coleman, on the other hand, followed = proper=20 procedure; therefore, Coleman and Plaintiff were not similarly=20 situated.  The Court is aware that at least part of=20 Plaintiff=3Ds complaint is that he was not informed = of the=20 proper procedures for reinstatement, while a white male was so=20 informed.  Even if the Court believed that this assertion = rises to=20 the level actionable under ' 1981, which it does not, after an = exhaustive=20 review of the summary judgment evidence, the Court finds = absolutely=20 nothing to support this contention.  Furthermore, the = comprehensive=20 knowledge of Texas law evidenced in his letter of retirement = induces this=20 Court to seriously question Plaintiff=3Ds claims of ignorance.

Id.  The federal court went on to determine = that, even=20 if Woods had established his prima facie case of discrimination, = the=20 City=3Ds proffered reasons for its failure to = rehire him=20 were legitimate and nondiscriminatory.  Id. at = 501. =20 Because the only evidence of pretext was Wood=3Ds assertion of racial discrimination, = with no=20 evidence to support these assertions except his personal belief, = the court=20 concluded that Woods failed to show pretext.  Id. at=20 501B02.

[2] =20 The TCFP is the state agency = charged with=20 establishing qualifications for fire fighters.  See = Tex. Gov=3Dt Code Ann.=20 ' 419.032 (Vernon 2005).  =

[3] =20 Woods filed both his notice of = appeal and a=20 motion to extend time for filing it on November 14, 2006.  = The motion=20 to extend time to file the notice of appeal was granted by this=20 court.

[4] =20 The City and the Commission = respond that=20 they did not assert res judicata as a basis for summary=20 judgment.

[5] =20 Section 21.051 of the Texas Labor = Code=20 provides:

An employer commits an unlawful = employment=20 practice if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, = national=20 origin, or age the employer:

(1)       =20 fails or refuses to hire an individual, discharges an individual, = or=20 discriminates in any other manner against an individual in = connection with=20 compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of = employment;=20 or

(2)       =20 limits, segregates, or classifies an employee or applicant for = employment=20 in a manner that would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of = any=20 employment opportunity or adversely affect in any other manner the = status=20 of an employee.

[6] =20 411 U.S. 792, 792B93 (1973).

[7] =20 The record reflects that the fire = chief at=20 the time Woods sought reappointment was Danny Weber.  On the = other=20 hand, when Coleman sought reappointment, the fire chief was Willie = Wisko.  This difference between Coleman=3Ds and Woods=3Ds circumstances is yet another reason = the two are=20 not comparable.  See Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d at=20 917.

[8] =20 Woods focuses on the following = sentence in=20 the federal court opinion to explain his continued claim of = discrimination=20 in light of that court=3Ds conclusion that he failed to establish = a prima=20 facie case of discrimination:

Prior to filing this suit in 1997, = Plaintiff did=20 not request, and therefore did not receive, a hearing before the=20 Commission.  Plaintiff therefore was not Aqualified@ for the position sought, and thus fails = even to=20 establish a prima facie case.

Woods, 5=20 F. Supp. 2d at 501.  But, as discussed above, in the footnote = to this=20 sentence, the federal court concluded that Woods and Coleman were = not=20 similarly situated.  Id. at n.7.

[9] =20 The City and the Commission = repeatedly=20 emphasized throughout their summary judgment  motion that = Woods did=20 not follow the proper process to obtain a hearing before the = Commission,=20 whereas Coleman did.=20

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FONT-SIZE: 9pt; COLOR: #000099; FONT-FAMILY: Arial = Narrow } .SiteMaster { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 14pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif; TEXT-DECORATION: underline } A.SiteMaster { LINE-HEIGHT: normal; TEXT-DECORATION: underline } A.SiteMaster:hover { COLOR: blue } .SiteMenu { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-DECORATION: none } A.SiteMenu { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; TEXT-DECORATION: none } A.SiteMenu:hover { COLOR: blue } .SiteBase { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 9pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-DECORATION: none } A.SiteBase { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; COLOR: maroon; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, = Helvetica, sans-serif; TEXT-DECORATION: none } A.SiteBase:hover { COLOR: blue } .ErrorNormal { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: red; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } .ErrorSmall { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: red; = FONT-FAMILY: Arial Narrow } .SystemMSG { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: white; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; BACKGROUND-COLOR: = navy } .SystemErrorMSG { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; COLOR: white; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; BACKGROUND-COLOR: red } .buttonUnused { PADDING-RIGHT: 1pt; PADDING-LEFT: 1pt; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: = 9pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 1pt; MARGIN: 1pt; COLOR: #fff5d7; PADDING-TOP: 1pt; = BACKGROUND-COLOR: #576a9d; font-face: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif } .buttonTanUnused { PADDING-RIGHT: 1pt; PADDING-LEFT: 1pt; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: = 9pt; PADDING-BOTTOM: 1pt; MARGIN: 1pt; COLOR: #576a9d; PADDING-TOP: 1pt; = BACKGROUND-COLOR: #fff5d7; font-face: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif } .TextLargeBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, = sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: left } .DocketHeaderTitle { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 14pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, ' Helvetica', sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: center } .TextLargeBlack { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-ALIGN: left } .TextLargeBlackcenter { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 11pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-ALIGN: center } .TextBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } A.TextBlue { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000099; LINE-HEIGHT: = normal; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; = TEXT-DECORATION: none } .TextRed { FONT-WEIGHT: normal; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; COLOR: red; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; = FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif } .TextHidenGray { FONT-SIZE: 0pt; COLOR: #ebebe1; LINE-HEIGHT: normal; FONT-FAMILY: = Tahoma, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: left } .Time { FONT-WEIGHT: bold; FONT-SIZE: 10px; COLOR: red; LINE-HEIGHT: 4em; = FONT-FAMILY: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; TEXT-ALIGN: center } ------=_NextPart_000_001B_01C8D5EC.701FCEB0--