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Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 3,
2009.

In The

Fourteenth Court
of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-07-00235-CV

____________

ZAHOOR
SIDDIQUI, Appellant

V.

MASOON
SIDDIQUI AND QUETA VERA, Appellees

On Appeal from the 257th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2004-55959

M E M O R
A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Appellant,
Zahoor Siddiqui, a pro se litigant, appeals from a final decree of divorce
dissolving his marriage to appellee Masoon Siddiqui.  In the decree,
the trial court awarded past due legal fees to appellant=s former
attorney, appellee Queta Vera, who had intervened in the divorce
action.  On appeal, appellant challenges the awards made to both
appellees.  We affirm.

Background

Masoon
filed a petition seeking dissolution of her marriage to appellant.
Appellant filed his own pleadings asserting, among other things, claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and
assault.  After the trial court entered temporary orders in the case,
appellant filed several motions for enforcement alleging violations of the
temporary orders by Masoon.  The final motion for enforcement was
heard at the same time as the final trial.  During the course of the
proceedings, appellant was represented by three attorneys but ultimately
represented himself at trial and represents himself on appeal.  One
of his former attorneys, Queta Vera, filed a petition in intervention
seeking past due attorney=s fees and
expenses.  In response, appellant filed pleadings against Vera for
professional negligence.  At the close of trial, the trial court
granted a directed verdict against appellant=s
professional negligence claims.  The court then granted the divorce,
denied the motion to enforce based on insufficient evidence of violations
of the temporary orders, found no evidence of intentional infliction of
emotional distress or defamation, and found insufficient evidence of
assault.  The trial court further found that appellant was
intentionally underemployed and assessed child support accordingly.
In its final decree, the court named both parents as joint managing
conservators of the one remaining minor child and gave primary custody to
Masoon and a standard possession order to appellant.  The trial court
further ordered appellant to pay $4,666.39 to Vera as past due fees and
expenses, and $10,350 to Masoon=s attorney
for her fees.  The trial court additionally divided the marital
assets and liabilities between the parties.

In his
first two issues on appeal, appellant complains that (1) he was not timely
served with the final decree prior to entry, and (2) Masoon submitted
various documents to the court  just one day before trial and never
served them on appellant.  In issues three through nine, appellant
contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for
enforcement; (2) refusing to award damages for assault, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation; (3) awarding Vera
$4,666.39; (4) dividing the marital estate; (5) ordering him to pay child
support on the basis of a job he had not had for four years; (6) ordering
him to pay $10,350 for Masoon=s
attorney=s fees;
and (7) refusing to find that appellee Vera negligently represented
him.

Discussion

While we
have compassion for the plight of the pro se litigant attempting to follow
the rules of legal procedure and substantive laws, and therefore construe
pro se pleadings and briefs liberally, we must still hold appellant to the
same standard as a licensed attorney, requiring that he follow those same
rules and laws.  Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181,
184‑85 (Tex. 1978); Cooper v. Circle Ten Council Boy Scouts of Am.,
254 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.CDallas
2008, no pet.).  To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an
unfair advantage over a litigant represented by counsel.
Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d at 185; Cooper, 254 S.W.3d
at 693.  Before a complaint can be raised on appeal, it first must be
made in the trial court in the form of a timely and sufficiently
specific  objection, request, or motion.  Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a).  If the appellant failed to make the complaint in the trial
court, it is not preserved for appellate review.  Cayan v.
Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.CHouston
[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).  Among other requirements, an
appellate brief must contain appropriate argument for the relief
sought.  See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).  The brief must
also contain appropriate citations to the record and to relevant
authority.  Id.  Failure to make appropriate argument or
provide relevant citations will result in the overruling of the issue
raised.  See, e.g., Sterling v. Alexander, 99 S.W.3d 793, 799
(Tex. App.CHouston
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

In his
first issue, appellant contends that he was not served with the final
decree, and thus was not able to review it, prior to entry.  Under
this issue, appellant complains not only that he was not timely served but
also that the decree is incorrect on several points, including that:
(1) the case was heard on a particular date, (2) the making of a record
was waived by the parties, and (3) the parties entered into a written
agreement.  In regards to the date the court heard the case, the
decree makes apparent reference to the date of entry, not the date of
trial, as appellant suggests.  Regarding the other points raised by
appellant, although he raised the issue of inability to review the decree
in his motion for new trial, and he makes numerous factual allegations in
his brief, he has not provided any proof in support of his
accusations.  The pleadings filed in the case, to which appellant
cites, are not evidence.  Grass v. Golden, 153 S.W.3d 659, 660
(Tex. App.CTyler
2004, orig. proceeding) (citing Laidlaw Waste Sys.  (Dallas), Inc.
v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995)).  The factual
statements made in appellant=s briefs
are not evidence.  See Calp v. Tau Kappa Epsilon
Fraternity, 75 S.W.3d 641, 647 (Tex. App.CAmarillo
2002, pet. denied) (disregarding factual statements not supported by
record references).  Because appellant has not supported his factual
allegations with evidence or citation to evidence, we overrule his first
issue.

In his
second issue, appellant complains that appellee Masoon submitted various
pleadings, exhibits, and orders to the court just one day before trial and
never served them on appellant.  Appellant, however, does not cite to
any place in the record where he made an objection, request, or motion on
this basis, and our review of the record has discovered no such objection,
request, or motion.  Consequently, this issue is not preserved for
review.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).  We overrule
appellant=s second
issue.

In
appellant=s third
issue, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
enforcement.  The court denied the motion based on a finding of
insufficient evidence of violations of the court=s
temporary orders as alleged in the motion.  See generally City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810-27 (Tex. 2005) (discussing
standards governing sufficiency of the evidence).  In his briefing,
appellant claims that Masoon violated the trial court=s
temporary orders by failing to timely attend a program for divorcing
parents and timely file verification of such attendance.  Appellant
further complains that Masoon committed perjury by telling the court that
she had properly complied with these portions of the temporary orders and
that since she lied in regards to that issue it means she also lied on
other statements, such as when she denied not surrendering the children to
appellant on his assigned visitation days.  Appellant additionally
asserts that Masoon talked to the children about the case, controlled
their daughter against him, and failed to timely register the children for
counseling, all in violation of the court=s
temporary orders.  The burden of proof on the motion for enforcement
was on appellant.  See In re M.M.S., 256 S.W.3d 470, 477-78
(Tex. App.CDallas
2008, no pet.).  In her testimony, Masoon generally denied the
allegations made by appellant.  In his testimony, appellant
complained generally that Masoon did not let him see the kids and had
turned the kids against him.  He did not offer any specifics.
As factfinder, the trial court was free to accept Masoon=s
generalized testimony and disregard appellant=s.
See, e.g., Graybar Elec. Co., v. LEM & Assocs., L.L.C., 252
S.W.3d 536, 544 (Tex. App.CHouston
[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).  The items appellant cites to in the
clerk=s record,
such as Masoon=s
certificate of completion of the parenting program, do not constitute
evidence because they were not admitted as exhibits at trial or judicially
noticed by the court.  See In re J.R.S., 232 S.W.3d 278,
280-81, 281 n.4 (Tex. App.CFort Worth
2007, no pet.).  Based on the evidence actually in the trial record,
we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying appellant=s motion
for enforcement.[1]
Accordingly, we overrule his third issue.

In the
fourth issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
award him damages on his claims for assault, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and defamation.  The trial court specifically
found that appellant presented no evidence of intentional infliction of
emotional distress or defamation and insufficient evidence of
assault.  In support of this issue, the only relevant record
citations appellant provides are to (1) Masoon=s
testimony that they had a fight, (2) a neighbor=s
testimony that he once saw appellant with scratch marks on his face, and
(3) appellant=s own
testimony wherein he accused Masoon of trying to poke his eye out.
The record further reveals that Masoon also testified that appellant was
the aggressor and the abuser in the relationship, and that the neighbor
did not testify as to how appellant received the scratches he
observed.  As factfinder, the court was free to believe
Masoon=s
testimony and disbelieve appellant=s
testimony.  See, e.g., Graybar Elec. Co., 252 S.W.3d 536 at
544.  Although the testimony appellant cites may have been relevant
to his assault claim, it does not establish that the trial court erred in
refusing to award damages on that claim.  See generally Morgan v.
City of Alvin, 175 S.W.3d 408, 418 (Tex. App.CHouston
[1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (AA person
commits an assault by (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing
bodily injury to another;  (2) intentionally or knowingly threatening
another with imminent bodily injury; or (3) intentionally or knowingly
causing physical contact with another when the person knows or should
reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or
provocative.@).
Furthermore, in his brief, appellant fails to provide any relevant
citations to authority.  See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).  Accordingly,
this issue is overruled.

In issue
number five, appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding his
former attorney, Queta Vera, $4,666.39 for her outstanding fees and
expenses.  During trial, Vera introduced her billing records into
evidence and testified regarding (1) the contract between her and
appellant, (2) a check from appellant that was returned for insufficient
funds, and (3) the reasonableness and necessity of the fees charged.
In his testimony, appellant alleged, with limited explanation, that Vera
overcharged him, produced unuseable discovery, and turned against him at
mediation.  In his appellate brief, appellant provides a further
litany of conclusory allegations against Vera (and Masoon) unsupported by
citation to trial evidence.  Appellant cites primarily to
Vera=s billing
records, which generally support her claims to fees and expenses due, and
to the clerk=s
record.  Nothing in the clerk=s record
constituted evidence at trial unless admitted as an exhibit at trial or
judicially noticed by the court.  See In re J.R.S., 232 S.W.3d
at 280-81, 281 n.4.  Appellant also does not assert any particular
legal argument as a basis for overturning the award.  Because
appellant fails to make proper legal arguments supported by proper
citations to the record, we overrule his fifth issue.  See
Sterling, 99 S.W.3d at 799.

In his
sixth issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in its division
of the marital estate.  Appellant specifically asserts that (1) the
assets and liabilities listed for him in one of Masoon=s exhibits
were four years old at the time of trial; (2) since that time, Masoon has
Aacquired
new loans and sold stocks,@ while
appellant Asold bonds
and . . . acquire more debt;@ and (3)
appellant began but was not allowed to complete repairs to the electrical
system of the house.  A trial court has broad discretion in dividing
the marital estate at divorce.  Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d
696, 698 (Tex. 1981); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 313
(Tex. App.CHouston
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).  On appeal, we will presume the
trial court properly exercised its discretion and reverse only where the
trial court clearly abused its discretion.  Murff, 615 S.W.2d
at 698; Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 313.  Apart from the
statements listed above, appellant offers no explanation of how the trial
court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property.
Appellant also does not cite any authority in support of his statements
and the only record cites he provides do not support his position.
Consequently, we find this issue improperly briefed.  See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(h);
Sterling, 99 S.W.3d at 799.   Issue six is
overruled.

In his
seventh issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering
him to pay child support on the basis of a job he had not held for four
years.  Appellant additionally asserts that the court erred in
ordering child support exceeding 20% of his disposable earnings for one
child and 50% of his disposable earnings over all.  Generally, a
trial court has broad discretion in setting child support payments, and
absent a clear abuse of discretion, the court=s order
will not be disturbed on appeal.  In re Davis, 30 S.W.3d 609,
616 (Tex. App.CTexarkana
2000, no pet.).  Here, at the conclusion of trial, the trial court
stated that it found appellant was intentionally underemployed and thus
based his child support obligation on a previous job.  See
Tex. Fam. Code ' 154.066
(AIf the
actual income of the obligor is significantly less than what the obligor
could earn because of intentional unemployment or underemployment, the
court may apply the support guidelines to the earning potential of the
obligor.@);
Schaban‑Maurer v. Maurer‑Schaban, 238 S.W.3d 815, 826 (Tex.
App.CFort Worth
2007, no pet.) (discussing section 154.066).  Beyond asserting that
child support should be based on current wages, appellant makes no
argument explaining why the court erred in holding that he was
intentionally underemployed.  In support of his argument that the
court erred in awarding over 50% of his disposable income, appellant cites
the wage withholding order, wherein it states: AThe
maximum amount to be withheld shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the
Obligor=s
disposable earnings.@  As
appellee Masoon points out in her brief, this statement prevents an
employer from withholding more than 50% of appellant=s
disposable earnings but does not prevent the court from ordering him to
pay over 50% of his earnings.  Because appellant has failed to make
an argument explaining why the trial court erred and has failed to cite
relevant authority for the points raised, we overrule
appellant=s seventh
issue.  See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); Sterling, 99
S.W.3d at 799.

In issue
eight, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to
pay $10,350 for Masoon=s
attorney=s
fees.  Appellant first suggests that Masoon should be responsible for
her own attorney=s fees
because she instituted the divorce proceedings.  Appellant, however,
does not cite any authority in support of this strict proposition, and we
are aware of none.  Appellant next asserts, without citation to the
record or authority, that Masoon did not plead for attorney=s
fees.  Masoon=s
pleadings, however, consistently contained a request that
attorney=s fees be
awarded against appellant.  Appellant additionally states that he was
charged with attorney=s fees
because he was allegedly responsible for eight delays in the trial
setting.  Appellant then goes through eleven continuances or
resettings and attempts to explain why he did not cause them.
Although Masoon=s counsel
testified regarding the reasonableness and necessity of her fees and
various delays in the proceedings, she stopped short of blaming appellant
for those delays.  Furthermore, the trial court said nothing in its
findings or in the decree about the award of attorney=s fees
being based on delays caused by appellant.  Thus,
appellant=s
arguments that he did not cause such delays do not demonstrate, without
more, that the trial court erred in awarding attorney=s
fees.  Appellant offers no further argument as to how the trial court
erred in ordering him to pay Masoon=s
attorney=s
fees.  Consequently, we overrule issue eight.

In issue
nine, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to find
that Vera negligently represented him.  To be successful on a
professional negligence, or malpractice, cause of action, a claimant must
demonstrate: (1) the professional owed a duty to the claimant, (2) the
professional breached that duty, (3) such breach proximately caused injury
to the claimant, and (4) compensable damages occurred.  Grimes v.
Reynolds, 252 S.W.3d 554, 558-59 (Tex. App.CHouston
[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).  At the close of appellant=s
case-in-chief, Vera=s attorney
moved for a directed verdict on appellant=s
negligence claims on the ground that appellant had failed to present any
evidence regarding duty, breach, or causation.  The trial court
granted the motion.  In his briefing on this issue, appellant does
not cite to any evidence in the record establishing any of the elements of
professional negligence.  Because appellant has not provided any
relevant record citations, we overrule appellant=s ninth
issue.  See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).

We affirm
the trial court=s
judgment.

/s/
Adele Hedges

Chief Justice

Panel
consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and
Seymore.

[1]  Appellant also complains under this issue
about various delays he says were occasioned by attorneys involved in the
case.  Appellant, however, does not explain how these delays support
his contention that the court erred in denying the motion for enforcement,
and such a link is not
obvious.