In=20 The
Appellant,=20
Walter F. Crowder, trustee of the Ann L. Crowder Estate Trust, =
appeals=20
from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees, the Ann L. =
Crowder=20
Estate Trust, John C. Crowder, Ronald Lee Crowder, and James C. =
Crowder,=20
Jr. (collectively, the Trust), on Crowder's claims against the =
Trust=20
arising from his service as trustee. In two issues, Crowder =
contends that=20
the trial court erred by granting the Trust's motion for summary =
judgment=20
and failing to grant Crowder's motion for partial summary =
judgment. We=20
affirm. Ann L.=20
Crowder died in 1986. Her last will and testament created the Ann =
L.=20
Crowder Estate Trust and named James C. Crowder, Sr. the original =
trustee.=20
Appellant, Walter F. Crowder (Crowder) became the trustee in 2003 =
after=20
three beneficiaries, John, Ronald, and James Jr., accused James C. =
Crowder, Sr. and his wife, Betty Payne Crowder, of financial=20
improprieties. In June 2005, the Trust sued Crowder, James C. =
Crowder Sr.,=20
Betty Payne Crowder, and James Crowder Funeral Homes, Inc. to =
recover=20
funds they claimed that James Sr. and his wife had =
misappropriated. The=20
parties reached a mediated settlement agreement, by which all =
parties=20
released any and all claims that in any way arose from, connected =
with, or=20
related to facts giving rise to the agreement, including any that =
were=20
statutory or contractual in nature. Crowder signed the agreement =
as=20
follows: "Walter F. Crowder, Individually and as Trustee of the =
Ann L.=20
Crowder Estate Trust." Several=20
months later, Crowder sued the Trust, seeking reimbursement of =
costs spent=20
investigating the financial improprieties. His live pleadings =
assert the=20
following claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum meruit, (3)=20
promissory estoppel, (4) right of reimbursement pursuant to =
section=20
114.063(a) of the Property Code, (5) statutory lien pursuant to =
section=20
114.063(b) of the Property Code, (6) constructive trust, (7) a =
temporary=20
restraining order and temporary injunction, (8) the appointment of =
a=20
receiver, and (9) attorney's fees. In January=20
2006, the Trust filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, =
claiming=20
that it was entitled to prevail as a matter of law on all of =
Crowder's=20
claims. Crowder filed a motion for partial summary judgment with =
respect=20
to his claims for reimbursement, breach of contract, and =
attorney's fees.=20
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(a), (b). The trial court signed =
an order=20
denying Crowder's motion and then signed an order granting the =
Trust's=20
motion. Neither order stated the grounds on which the trial court =
relied.=20
We review=20
summary judgments de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. =
Dorsett, 164=20
S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). In conducting our review, we must =
indulge=20
every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, take all =
evidence=20
favorable to the nonmovant as true, and resolve any doubts in =
favor of the=20
nonmovant. Id. A defendant who moves for summary judgment =
on the=20
plaintiff's claims must conclusively disprove at least one element =
of each=20
of the plaintiff's causes of action. Little v. Tex. Dep't of =
Criminal=20
Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004). A defendant who =
moves for=20
summary judgment on an affirmative defense must establish the =
defense as a=20
matter of law. Long Distance Int'l, Inc. v. Telefonos =
de=20
Mex., 49 S.W.3d 347, 350-51 (Tex. 2001). When, as=20
here, a summary judgment does not specify the grounds on which it =
was=20
granted, the appealing party must demonstrate that none of the =
proposed=20
grounds is sufficient to support the judgment. To be=20
afforded the protection of a release, the releasing instrument =
must=20
specifically name or identify the party seeking protection. =
McMillen=20
v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1971). A party may =
properly assert the affirmative defense of release provided the =
releasing=20
instrument refers to that party by name or with such descriptive=20
particularity that his or her identity or connection with the =
event giving=20
rise to the release is not in doubt. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft =
Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984). Because Texas law =
treats=20
releases like contracts, we interpret releases like any other =
contract.=20
See Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990);=20
Stroop v. N. County Mut. Ins. Co., 133 S.W.3d 844, 851 =
(Tex.=20
App.--Dallas 2004, pet. denied). A.=20
Whether the Settlement Agreement Sufficiently Identified=20
Crowder Crowder=20
contends that summary judgment was improper because the Trust did =
not=20
establish that the settlement agreement applied to him in his =
capacity as=20
trustee. An individual acting in an official or representative =
capacity=20
is, in law, a distinctly separate individual from the same person =
acting=20
as an individual. See Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, =
870=20
(Tex. 1995); Elizondo v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation =
Comm'n,=20
974 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.). =
The=20
settlement agreement does not differentiate between Crowder as an=20
individual and as a trustee except in a single paragraph in which =
James=20
Sr. agreed to indemnify the settling parties, including Crowder in =
his=20
capacity as trustee. Nonetheless, the signature block of the =
settlement=20
agreement identifies Crowder as "Walter F. Crowder, Individually =
and as=20
Trustee of the Ann L. Crowder Estate Trust." Thus, Crowder signed =
the=20
settlement agreement in both capacities. In compliance =
with=20
McMillen, the signature block of the agreement identified =
Crowder=20
and connected him to the released claims, both individually and in =
his=20
capacity as trustee. See Suttles v. Thomas Bearden Co., =
152=20
S.W.3d 607, 612 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) =
(concluding=20
that identifying company within signature block of promissory note =
was=20
sufficient to satisfy requirement of identification, despite lack =
of=20
reference to company within body of note). We=20
therefore hold that the settlement agreement sufficiently =
identified=20
appellant in his capacity as trustee. B.=20
Whether Crowder Released his Claims by the Settlement=20
Agreement Having=20
determined that the settlement agreement sufficiently identified =
Crowder=20
in his capacity as trustee, we address whether the agreement =
incorporated=20
appellant's claims. To release=20
a claim effectively, an instrument must refer to the claim. =
Victoria=20
Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. =
1991). By=20
the language of the settlement agreement, Crowder released any =
claims=20
arising from, or in any way connected to the previous lawsuit, =
including=20
statutory or contractual claims, injunctive relief, and attorney's =
fees. We hold=20
that Trust established, as a matter of law, its affirmative =
defense that=20
the release portion of the settlement agreement encompassed and =
thus=20
barred Crowder's claims. Accordingly, the Trust was entitled to =
prevail on=20
this contention. We overrule=20
Crowder's first point of error We affirm=20
the judgment of the trial court.
Panel=20
consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and=20
Bland.
Except as=20
otherwise specifically provided for herein, John, Ron, James Jr., =
James=20
Sr., Betty, Walt, and the Funeral Home, each on his, her, or its =
own=20
behalf and on behalf of all persons claiming by, through or under =
him,=20
her, or it, hereby release, acquit, forever discharge, and =
covenant not to=20
sue any of the others or their respective agents and attorneys, =
heirs,=20
legal representatives, successors, and assigns from and with =
respect to=20
any and all claims, demands, losses, damages, liabilities, =
actions, and=20
causes of action of any kind and nature whatsoever (whether at law =
or in=20
equity, whether known or unknown, whether asserted or not in any =
pending=20
or future litigation or whether fixed or contingent) that in any =
way arise=20
from, are or will be connected with, or relate to any dealings or =
stated=20
facts existing on or before the effective date of this Agreement =
including=20
without limitation those for specific performance, injunctive =
relief,=20
actual, punitive, special, statutory, or other damages regardless =
of=20
whether any entitlement to such damages is alleged to be =
contractual,=20
tortious, or statutory in nature, and those for other or further =
relief=20
connected in any manner with any claims, including without =
limitation=20
interest, attorney's fees, and costs of litigation.=20
2. In his second issue, Crowder argued that =
the trial=20
court erred by not rendering partial summary judgment in his favor =
on his=20
claims of reimbursement, breach of contract, and attorney's fees. =
Review=20
of this issue is precluded by our holding that the release portion =
of the=20
settlement agreement bars all of Crowder's claims as a matter of =
law.=20