Texas Judiciary = Online

=20 In this medical malpractice suit, appellant, Chris Uche, = M.D.,=20 brings an accelerated interlocutory appeal challenging the trial = court=92s=20 order denying his motion for special appearance. In one issue on appeal, = Dr. Uche=20 argues that the trial court erred in denying his special = appearance in=20 favor of appellee, Melody Allison, individually and as = representative of=20 the estate of Dorothy Mueller (collectively=20 =93Allison=94).

=20 We reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

=20 The facts of this dispute can be found in a prior opinion = from this=20 Court.¹ Dorothy Mueller boarded = a Carnival=20 Cruise Ship that departed from Galveston on February 21, = 2002. Because Mrs. Mueller has = a feeding=20 tube, her son-in-law and her daughter, Melody, went along with=20 her.² During the voyage, Mrs. = Mueller=92s=20 feeding tube became dislodged. =20 According to Allison=92s third amended petition, Mrs. = Mueller=20 attempted to get care from the ship=92s infirmary, where one = doctor, Dr.=20 Uche, and three nurses were stationed. It is undisputed that = Mrs. Mueller=20 did not get her feeding tube reinserted on the cruise ship. A couple of weeks after = the=20 cruise, Mrs. Mueller had a stroke that is alleged to have been the = result=20 of the negligent care given aboard the ship. Allison filed suit = against various=20 parties, including Dr. Uche, the head nurse, and Carnival Cruise=20 Lines. In our prior = opinion,=20 we held that while Dr. Uche worked aboard the ship, the=20 Celebration, he served as an independent contractor and = that Mrs.=20 Mueller=92s injury occurred in international waters.³ =

=20 Dr. Uche filed a special appearance arguing that the trial = court=20 lacked both general and specific jurisdiction over him. The trial court denied = Dr. Uche=92s=20 motion for special appearance on May 15, 2006. =

=20 On December 27, 2006, while this appeal was pending, Dr. = Uche moved=20 for sanctions, alleging that Allison made =93gross misstatements = of fact and=20 concocted arguments [that] lack even a scintilla of merit or = credibility=20 independently, or collectively, in addition to Appellees=92 brief = containing=20 such an inordinate amount of falsehoods, inventions and deceptions = . . .=20 .=94 On January 30, = 2007, we=20 ordered that the motion for sanctions be carried with the = case. Dr. Uche moved to stay = the trial=20 proceedings, and, on December 8, 2006, we ordered that the = commencement of=20 trial be stayed pending resolution of this appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code = Ann.=20 51.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).

PERSONAL=20 JURISDICTION

=20 In his sole issue on appeal, Dr. Uche argues that the trial = court=20 erred when it denied his special appearance.

=20 Standard of Review

=20 Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant = is a=20 question of law subject to de novo review. BMC Software Belgium, = N.V. v.=20 Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); Glattly v. CMS = Viron=20 Corp., 177 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] = 2005, no=20 pet.). The trial = court,=20 however, must frequently resolve questions of fact before deciding = the=20 jurisdictional question. =20 BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. If the trial court = enters an order=20 denying a special appearance and issues findings of fact and = conclusions=20 of law, we may review the findings of fact on legal and factual=20 sufficiency grounds and review the conclusions of law de novo as a = legal=20 question. = Silbaugh v.=20 Ramirez, 126 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Tex. App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] = 2002, no=20 pet.) (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794).

=20 If the trial court does not issue findings of fact and = conclusions=20 of law, as here, =93all facts necessary to support the judgment = and=20 supported by the evidence are implied.=94 BMC Software, 83 = S.W.3d at=20 795. In other = words, if the=20 trial court does not issue findings of fact, a reviewing court = should=20 presume that the trial court resolved all factual disputes in = favor of its=20 judgment. = Tri-State Bldg.=20 Specialties, Inc. v. NCI Bldg. Sys., L.P., 184 S.W.3d 242, 246 = (Tex.=20 App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing American Type = Culture=20 Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. = 2002)). These findings are not = conclusive=20 when the appellate record includes both the reporter=92s and = clerk=92s=20 records, and they may be challenged for legal and factual = sufficiency on=20 appeal. = Id. To the extent that the = underlying=20 facts are undisputed, however, we conduct a de novo review. Glattly, 177 = S.W.3d at=20 445.

=20 Two requirements must be met before a Texas court can = exercise=20 personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, the Texas = long-arm statute=20 must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction, and second, the = exercise of=20 jurisdiction must be consistent with the guarantees of due = process. Coleman, 83 = S.W.3d at=20 806; Tri-State, 184 S.W.3d at 248.

=20 The long-arm statute permits Texas courts to exercise = personal=20 jurisdiction over a nonresident⁴ defendant that = =93does business=94=20 in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. = Code Ann.=20 =A7 17.042 (Vernon 1997); BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at = 795. The statute lists three = activities=20 that constitute =93doing business=94: (1) contracting with a Texas = resident=20 when either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part = in Texas;=20 (2) committing a tort in whole or in part in Texas; and (3)=20 recruiting Texas residents for employment inside or outside of = Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. = Code Ann.=20 =A7 17.042. = This=20 list, however, is not exclusive,⁵ and the statute=92s = =93doing=20 business=94 requirement is limited only by the requirements of = federal due=20 process. Koll = Real Estate=20 Group, Inc. v. Purseley, 127 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tex. = App.=97Houston [1st=20 Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 = S.W.2d=20 355, 356 (Tex. 1990)).

=20 Because the language of the long-arm statute is broad, its=20 requirements are considered satisfied if the exercise of personal=20 jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations. CSR, Ltd. v. = Link, 925=20 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996). =20 In practice, the two conditions are combined into one = requirement=20 of due process. = Wright v.=20 Sage Eng=92g, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 238, 247 (Tex. App.=97Houston = [1st Dist.]=20 2004, pet. denied). = Thus, the=20 true determinative inquiry is one of federal constitutional due=20 process. See = id.;=20 see also Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China = Clays,=20 P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991).

=20 With respect to personal jurisdiction, federal due process = requires=20 two things. First, = the=20 nonresident defendant must have purposefully established such = minimum=20 contacts with the forum state that the defendant could reasonably=20 anticipate being sued there. =20 Glattly, 177 S.W.3d at 447 (citing Burger King = Corp. v.=20 Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475=9676, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183=9684=20 (1985)). Second, if = the=20 nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum = contacts with=20 the forum, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must also comport = with=20 traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. (citing = Burger=20 King, 471 U.S. at 475=9676, 105 S. Ct. at 2183=9684). As to fairness, the = defendant=20 bears the burden of presenting a =93compelling case=94 that = exercising=20 jurisdiction over him would not be fair and just. See id. at = 450. Only in rare cases, = however, will=20 a Texas court=92s exercise of personal jurisdiction not comport = with fair=20 play and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has=20 purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum = state. Guardian Royal Exch.=20 Assurance, 815 S.W.2d at 231.

=20 A nonresident establishes minimum contacts with Texas by=20 purposefully availing itself of the privileges and benefits = inherent in=20 conducting business in the state. Michiana Easy = Livin=92Country, Inc.=20 v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005); Koll, 127 = S.W.3d at=20 146. The touchstone = of=20 jurisdictional due process is =93purposeful availment,=94 i.e., = =93it is=20 essential in each case that there be some act by which the = defendant=20 purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting = activities=20 within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections = of its=20 laws.=94 Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 784 (quoting Hanson v.=20 Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958)) = (emphasis in=20 Michiana). = Three=20 aspects of the requirement are important in this case, as in=20 Michiana: (1) only the defendant=92s contacts with the = forum count,=20 not the unilateral activity of another party or person; (2) the = acts=20 relied on to establish jurisdiction must be =93purposeful=94 = rather than=20 fortuitous; and (3) the defendant must seek some benefit, = advantage, or=20 profit by =93availing=94 itself, or himself, of the jurisdiction. = Id. at 785. It is the quality and = nature of=20 the defendant=92s contacts, rather than their number, that is = important to=20 the minimum-contacts analysis. =20 Trigeant Holdings, Ltd. v. Jones, 183 S.W.3d 717, = 725 (Tex.=20 App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). Random, fortuitous, or = attenuated=20 acts, or the unilateral acts of a third party, are not sufficient = to=20 confer personal jurisdiction. =20 Id. = Although=20 not determinative, foreseeability is an important consideration in = deciding whether a nonresident defendant has purposefully = established=20 minimum contacts. =20 Glattly, 177 S.W.3d at = 446=9647.

=20 The minimum contacts element of due process is further = divided into=20 specific and general personal jurisdiction. Id. at 447. A court may exercise = specific=20 jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if his alleged liability = arises=20 from, or is related to, an activity conducted within the = forum. Id. (citing = CSR, 925=20 S.W.2d at 595). The = contacts=20 must be purposefully directed at the forum and have a = =93substantial=20 connection=94 that results in the alleged injuries. Shell Compa=F1ia = Argentina de=20 Petroleo, S.A. v. Reef Exploration, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 830, 837 = (Tex.=20 App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). We focus our analysis on = the=20 relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the = litigation. Id. =

=20 A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a = nonresident=20 defendant if the defendant=92s contacts with the forum state are = continuous=20 and systematic, even if the cause of action did not arise from or = relate=20 to the defendant=92s contacts with the forum. Glattly, 177 = S.W.3d at=20 447. In confining = one=92s=20 activities to another forum, =93a nonresident may purposefully = avoid a=20 particular jurisdiction by structuring its transactions so as = neither to=20 profit from the forum=92s laws nor be subject to its = jurisdiction.=94 Michiana, 168 = S.W.3d at=20 785. For the court = to have=20 specific jurisdiction, the nonresident defendant must have = established=20 minimum contacts by purposefully availing itself of the privilege = of=20 conducting activities in Texas and there must be a substantial = connection=20 between those contacts and the operative facts of the = litigation. Moki Mac River = Expeditions v.=20 Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 576, 585 (Tex. 2007).

=20 The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading = sufficient=20 allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions = of the=20 Texas long-arm statute. =20 BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793. A nonresident defendant=20 challenging the court=92s exercise of personal jurisdiction = through a=20 special appearance carries the burden of negating all grounds for = personal=20 jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Id.; = Glattly, 177=20 S.W.3d at 446.

=20 General Jurisdiction

=20 On appeal, Allison contends that Dr. Uche had continuous = and=20 systematic contacts with Texas because the ship on which he = practiced took=20 on 1,300 Texans every week for a four-month period. Under the section of the = petition=20 styled =93Long Arm Statute,=94 Allison alleges that Dr. Uche is=20

amenable to jurisdiction in Texas = because [he] has=20 purposefully established minimum contacts with Texas. Specifically, [he] = sought=20 employment with Carnival Corporation so as to be stationed in = Galveston,=20 Texas for months at a time. =20 For each week that Defendants worked out of the Galveston = port,=20 over 1,000 Texas residents and others coming to Texas boarded the=20 ship. The = individual=20 Defendants purposefully put themselves in the position of = providing=20 medical care to any Texas resident who needed care during the = cruise. When medical care = personnel=20 deliberately station themselves so as to be giving care to Texas = residents=20 for months at a time, Texas has a substantial interest in ensuring = the=20 quality of that care. =20 Additionally, since Defendants contract to work for = Carnival for=20 half a year at a time out of Galveston, Texas or other United = States=20 ports, it would not be unduly burdensome or otherwise unfair to = them to=20 defend this suit in Galveston, Texas.

Allison argues that = the trial=20 court has general jurisdiction over Dr. Uche and that Dr. Uche had = continuous and systematic contacts with Texas because of the = number of=20 passengers who came aboard the Celebration and the number = of=20 passengers who visited the infirmary during the time that the=20 Celebration was stationed in Galveston. Dr. Uche argues = that he did=20 not have continuous and systematic contacts with the state to = subject him=20 to general jurisdiction. =20

=20 The head nurse on the Celebration, Constance = Jackson,=20 testified by deposition that she worked on the Celebration = for four=20 months. Jackson estimated that the Celebration=92s = infirmary would=20 see 20 passengers and 50 crew persons a week. She testified that there = were a=20 lot of Texans on board, but that people came from other states as=20 well.⁶ She said that the=20 Celebration would leave port once a week on average and = that=20 approximately 1,300 passengers would board the Celebration = every=20 week. Out of the = 2,000 person=20 capacity of the Celebration, there were three passengers to = every=20 crew member. The = ship would=20 stay in port for eight hours to unload passengers and pick up new=20 passengers, and it would then set out to = sea.

=20 In his deposition, Dr. Uche testified that he worked on the = Celebration for a four-month period. He testified that = Carnival assigns=20 the doctors to the ships and that he was on the ship 99% of the = time. He would fly into one of = the=20 Houston airports and then take a shuttle from the airport to the=20 Celebration. = He flew=20 at least twice to the two Houston airports. He stated that if a = nurse saw=20 something she cannot handle, she was supposed to contact the = doctor. Dr. Uche stated that = while aboard=20 the ship, he could not refuse medical help to a person, but that = in=20 certain circumstances he could refuse to see a patient. He clarified his answer = to say=20 that if someone came to see him, he would have to see them. If a passenger came to = see him in=20 the infirmary, he would never refuse to see them. The infirmary had a = morning=20 session and an afternoon session, and he was on call 24 hours a = day. Dr. Uche stated that if = a=20 passenger boarded the ship with a headache, the passenger could = come to=20 the infirmary and get some aspirin. =20 He clarified that most of the time while they were in port, = the=20 infirmary was closed. = If=20 someone became sick while at sea, the clinic would arrange for the = patient=20 to be transported to a facility on land once the ship docked.

=20 Dr. Uche is not licensed to practice medicine in Texas, and = he has=20 never practiced medicine in Texas. =20 He neither owns any property in Texas nor pays any taxes on = any=20 property in Texas. = Dr. Uche=20 testified that he conducts no business of any kind in Texas. He only handled patients = while on=20 board the Celebration, and he only saw patients after the = ship had=20 gone into international waters. =20

=20 General jurisdiction requires a showing that the defendant=20 conducted =93substantial activities=94 within the forum, which = requires a more=20 demanding minimum contacts analysis than specific = jurisdiction. Coleman, 83 = S.W.3d at 807;=20 Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, 815 S.W.2d at 228. Thus, general = jurisdiction=20 presents a =93more onerous=94 burden of proof. Marchand, 83 = S.W.3d at=20 797. In essence, = under=20 general jurisdiction, the contacts =93should be such as to justify = categorizing the defendant as a resident of this State.=94 Schexnayder, 187 = S.W.3d at=20 243. =93[O]ne = suggested method=20 of determining whether general jurisdiction over a defendant truly = lies in=20 Texas is by determining whether a citizen of another state, on a = claim for=20 wrongdoing in another state, could nevertheless properly sue the = defendant=20 in Texas courts.=94 =20 Schexnayder, 187 S.W.3d at 243 (citing Charles = Rhodes,=20 The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction = Doctrine: A Case Study on the = Effects of a=20 =93Generally=94 too Broad, but =93Specifically=94 too Narrow = Approach to Minimum=20 Contacts, 57 Baylor = L.=20 Rev. 135, 149=9655 (2005)).

=20 Dr. Uche contends that he does not have minimum contacts = with Texas=20 because any contact he had with Texas was not chosen by Dr. Uche, = but=20 rather by Carnival, and that the unilateral acts of a third party = do not=20 meet the requirements of a defendant who purposefully avails = himself of=20 the benefits and protections of Texas law. For instance, Dr. Uche = argues that=20 =93Carnival=92s voluntary choice to have Galveston be a port of = departure for=20 its cruise line, is a unilateral act of its own, for which Uche is = not=20 responsible.=94 Dr. = Uche also=20 argues that

the fact that Carnival happens to have = customers=20 (passengers), albeit Texas residents or residents of other states, = is=20 likewise a result of Carnival=92s (or arguably the = customer/passenger=92s)=20 unilateral acts . . . . Any monies paid to Uche by Carnival, on = account of=20 the Carnival/Uche contract, executed in Georgia, for work to be = performed=20 in international waters does not transform Uche into an entity = that is=20 purposefully availing itself of the privilege of doing business in = Texas.

=20 Allison argues that Dr. Uche had ample contacts with Texas = to=20 justify jurisdiction. = Namely,=20 the trial court has general and specific jurisdiction over Dr. = Uche based=20 on the fact that =93Mrs. Mueller was one of approximately 1,300 = Texans that=20 boarded the Carnival Celebration every week before it left its = home port=20 of Galveston.=94 = Allison=20 further argues that =93the 1,300 Texans were the sole source of = patients for=20 the months he was based in Galveston=94 and that Dr. Uche =93made = himself=20 available to over 20,000 Texans for medical care as he set up shop = on the=20 Carnival cruise ship across a 30=92 gangplank from = Galveston.=94 Allison argues that = =93[t]he=20 incident giving rise to this suit was a result of Uche=92s = repeated weekly=20 contacts with Texas made in pursuit of his medical = practice.=94

=20 Allison has pleaded that

[He] sought employment with Carnival = Corporation=20 so as to be stationed in Galveston, Texas for months at a time . . = . The=20 individual defendants purposefully put themselves in the position = of=20 providing medical care to any Texas resident who needed care = during the=20 cruise. When = medical care=20 personnel deliberately station themselves so as to be giving care = to Texas=20 residents for months at a time, Texas has a substantial interest = in=20 ensuring the quality of that care.

=20 We limit our analysis to Dr. Uche=92s contacts with the = state, not=20 Carnival=92s contacts with the state.⁷ See Moki Mac, 221 = S.W.3d at=20 575 (stating that, for purposeful availment, =93only the = defendant=92s=20 contacts with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity = of=20 another party or a third person=94). =20 Here, while it may have been foreseeable that Dr. Uche = would commit=20 some act or fail to act and that his actions could lead to = litigation in=20 Texas, the record in this case does not reflect that Dr. Uche = himself,=20 purposefully directed any act toward Texas. See CSR Ltd., 925 = S.W.2d at=20 596 (=93Absent . . . a purposeful act, foreseeability alone cannot = create=20 minimum contacts between [the defendant] and Texas.=94).

=20 Allison=92s pleading that Dr. Uche purposefully =93sought = employment=20 with Carnival Corporation so as to be stationed in Galveston, = Texas for=20 months at a time=94 is refuted by Dr. Uche=92s statement that = Carnival=20 assigns him to a specific ship. =20 He stated that =93Carnival assigns you, but sometimes you = can=20 request.=94 He = clarified,=20 =93[W]ell, that=92s where I was assigned. I mean, see, working for = a company=20 you can=92t really say, well, I want to go here. That=92s where I was = assigned to=20 go.=94

=20 The record does not show that Dr. Uche asked Carnival that = he be=20 sent to Texas, that he intended to serve the Texas market, that he = communicated with patients living in Texas, or that he had any = substantial=20 contact with Texas residents before the ship reached international = waters. See Moki = Mac,=20 221 S.W.3d at 577 (=93Examples of additional conduct that may = indicate=20 whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of a particular = forum=20 include advertising and establishing channels of regular = communication to=20 customers in the forum state.=94); see also CSR, 925 S.W.2d = at 595=20 (stating that there must be some indication that defendant = intended to=20 serve Texas market). = Nor does=20 the record show that the alleged tortious medical treatment or = failure to=20 give medical treatment occurred in Texas. See Anderson v. = Bechtle,=20 2001 WL 930205, at *2 (Tex. App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, = 2001, no=20 pet) (not designated for publication) (=93Standing alone, it is = difficult to=20 see how a failure to act could meet the purposeful availment = requirement=20 needed to establish personal jurisdiction.=94). Thus, we conclude that = the record=20 does not support Allison=92s claims that Dr. Uche purposefully put = himself=20 in a position to treat Texas residents.⁸

=20 Moreover, although Dr. Uche traveled to the state, = occasional=20 travel to Texas is insufficient by itself to establish continuous = and=20 systematic contact. =20 Preussag Aktiengesellschaft v. Coleman, 16 S.W.3d = 110, 124=20 (Tex. App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism=92d w.o.j.); = Minucci v.=20 Sogevalor, S.A., 14 S.W.3d 790, 796 (Tex. App.=97Houston [1st = Dist.]=20 2000, no pet.). = While it is=20 true that the Celebration had its port in Galveston, Texas, = and=20 that Dr. Uche stayed on the ship during its time in port, port = calls are=20 not construed as substantial contacts of a quality sufficient to = establish=20 a court=92s general jurisdiction over a nonresident = defendant. See Asarco, Inc. v. = Glenara,=20 Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 786=9687 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding no = jurisdiction=20 and discounting quality of contacts regarding 20 port calls of = vessels to=20 Louisiana because company that managed vessels did not choose = where=20 vessels would make port); Nicolaisen v. Toei Shipping Co., = Ltd.,=20 722 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (D. N.J.1989) (finding that 17 port calls = to New=20 Jersey over a three-to-four year period and shipowner=92s dealing = with time=20 charterer in New Jersey did not establish general jurisdiction); = Am.=20 Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson, 632 So.2d 1124, 1126=9630 = (Fla. App.=20 1994) (finding no jurisdiction and discounting quality of contacts = relating to port calls in Florida because they were not made on = the orders=20 of defendants but instead were made at the direction of the United = States=20 military under contracts with the United States). Thus, the fact that the=20 Celebration operated out of Galveston does not support the = exercise=20 of general jurisdiction over Dr. Uche.

=20 Moreover, Carnival=92s decision to make Galveston a port of = call=20 diminishes the quality of Dr. Uche=92s contact=97living on a ship = that is=20 docked in the port of Galveston=97with the state. See Farwah v. = Prosperous=20 Maritime Corp., 220 S.W.3d =20 585, 594 (Tex. App.=97Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (concluding = that=20 because decision to make Texas a port of call was made by a third = party,=20 quality of defendant=92s contact diminished); see also Am. Type = Culture=20 Collection, 83 S.W.3d at 809 (discounting quality of contact = regarding=20 defendant=92s attendance at five conferences in Texas when = defendant did not=20 select conference locations); Reyes v. Marine Drilling = Cos., 944=20 S.W.2d 401, 402=9604 (Tex. App.=97Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no = writ)=20 (discounting quality of contact when defendant sent = representatives to=20 Texas at least 204 times to perform quality-assurance inspections = that=20 were necessitated under contractual obligations between defendant = and=20 United States government). =20 Thus, we also conclude that Dr. Uche=92s limited presence = in the=20 state is not enough to amount to substantial activities in the = state for a=20 court to exercise general jurisdiction.

=20 Because Dr. Uche=92s contacts were not purposefully = directed at Texas=20 and because the contacts he did have with the state were not = continuous=20 and systematic, we conclude that the trial court lacks general=20 jurisdiction over Dr. Uche.⁹ =

=20 Specific Jurisdiction

=20 We recognize that on one occasion the United States Supreme = Court=20 has found specific jurisdiction based on alleged wrongdoing = intentionally=20 directed at a resident of the forum. =20 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788=96789, 104 S. = Ct. 1482,=20 1486=9687 (1984). = However, the=20 Texas Supreme Court has held that the foreseeability of causing = injury in=20 another state is not a =93sufficient benchmark=94 for the exercise = of personal=20 jurisdiction over a defendant. =20 Michiana, 168 S.W.2d at 789. Rather, =93it is =91the = defendant=92s=20 conduct and connection with the forum=92 that are critical.=92=94 = Id.

=20 The operative fact of Allison=92s claim with respect to = specific=20 jurisdiction is Dr. Uche=92s alleged failure to give care aboard = the=20 Celebration. = In her=20 third amended petition, Allison states,

=20 There was apparently no qualified physician on board and = the nurses=20 on board did not have the medical training necessary to reinsert = and=20 retape the feeding tube, and refused to do so. Instead, Carnival = informed the=20 Allisons and Mrs. Mueller [that] they had to fend for = themselves. As a result of the = actions and=20 inactions of defendants, Mrs. Mueller suffered a stroke on March = 16, 2002,=20 which left her significantly impaired far beyond her pre-March = condition=20 so that her quality of life has been significantly = diminished.

=20 Allison alleges that Dr. Uche =93provided medical care, = advice and=20 treatment to Dorothy Mueller by assessing her condition, = determining her=20 need for care, and then abandoning her.=94 At the hearing on Dr. = Uche=92s=20 special appearance, however, counsel for Allison stated that a = nurse came=20 to Mrs. Mueller=92s cabin and escorted her to the infirmary but = that,=20 because Mrs. Mueller was in a wheelchair, it was difficult to get = around=20 in the infirmary. = Medical=20 personnel then came to Mrs. Mueller=92s cabin, but did not inform = anyone=20 that a medical doctor was on board. =20 In short, although Allison alleges that Dr. Uche committed = a tort=20 in whole or in part in this State and thus satisfies the = jurisdictional=20 requirements of the Texas Long-Arm Statute and federal due = process, there=20 is no evidence that he was even made aware of her=20 condition.

=20 Allison has not produced any evidence of any connection = between Dr.=20 Uche=92s conduct and contacts with Texas and Mrs. Mueller=92s = injuries, which=20 are alleged to have happened while she was on the Celebration = in=20 international waters. = See=20 Shell Compania Argentina de Petroleo, 84 S.W.3d at 837 = (holding that=20 to satisfy minimum contacts element of due process, contacts must = be=20 purposefully directed at forum and have substantial connection = that=20 results in alleged injuries). =20 Allison presented no evidence at the special appearance = hearing=20 that Dr. Uche was made aware of Dorothy=92s need for assistance, = assessed=20 her medical condition, determined her need for care, or abandoned = her, as=20 Allison alleges. = Contrary to=20 Allison=92s allegations, Dr. Uche=92s affidavit states that it was = never made=20 known to him, nor was he in any way aware, that Dorothy needed = medical=20 assistance. He also = states=20 that he never had a physician-patient relationship with = Dorothy. Allison did not rebut = this=20 evidence. = Therefore, we=20 cannot say that Dr. Uche=92s alleged failure to act on the high = seas to=20 treat a passenger from Texas, Dorothy, bears a substantial = connection with=20 Dr. Uche=92s contacts with Texas sufficient to subject him to the = specific=20 jurisdiction of the courts of this state. Stated another way, Dr. = Uche=92s=20 travel within the state and his temporary residence on board the=20 Celebration for the purpose of rendering medical services = are not=20 sufficiently related to the acts of medical negligence alleged to = have=20 taken place in international waters to satisfy the requirements of = federal=20 due process in subjecting him to personal jurisdiction in this = state.=20

=20 We hold that Dr. Uche has negated all grounds for personal=20 jurisdiction asserted by Allison. =20 We conclude that the trial court lacks general jurisdiction = over=20 Dr. Uche because he did not have continuous and systematic = contacts with=20 Texas. We also = conclude that=20 specific jurisdiction is lacking because his alleged liability to = Allison=20 does not arise from or relate to his contacts with Texas.=20

&nbs= p; =20 =20 Conclusion

=20 We reverse the order of the trial court and render judgment = dismissing Dr. Uche from the litigation. We deny Dr. Uche=92s = motion for=20 sanctions. We = withdraw our=20 December 8, 2006 order that stayed the commencement of=20 trial.

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; =20 Evelyn V. Keyes

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; =20 Justice

Panel consists of = Chief Justice=20 Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley.