Opinion issued=20
March 27, 2008
In=20
The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of =
Texas
NOS. =
01-06-00896-CV
01-07-0=
0165-CV
__________
RUSSELL SCOTT=20
CLARK, JERRY ANN CLARK, LEVI CLIFFORD CLARK, CAYLEIGH RENE, A =
MINOR CHILD=20
BY AND THROUGH RUSSELL SCOTT CLARK, CHANCE PARKER, A MINOR CHILD =
BY AND=20
THROUGH RUSSELL SCOTT CLARK, WHITNEY BLAIR CLARK, A MINOR CHILD BY =
AND=20
THROUGH RUSSELL SCOTT CLARK, BRETT ALLEN METCALF, ROBIN RENEE =
METCALF=20
SAXON, BRANDEN DEAN METCALF, A MINOR CHILD BY AND THROUGH ROBIN =
RENEE=20
METCALF SAXON, SHANON KAY SMALL, JORDAN DANE SMALL, A MINOR CHILD =
BY AND=20
THROUGH SHANON KAY SMALL, MADISON SHAE SMALL, A MINOR CHILD BY AND =
THROUGH=20
SHANON KAY SMALL Appellants
V.
WELLS =
FARGO BANK,=20
N.A., SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO FIRST COMMUNITY BANK, N.A., AND THE =
PERMANENT ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF PARKER WILLIAMS=20
Appellees
On =
Appeal from=20
Probate Court No. 1
Harris =
County,=20
Texas
Trial =
Court Cause=20
Nos. 350,072-402 & =
350,072-404
MEMORANDUM=20
OPINION
<=
/SPAN>In=20
this dispute over survivorship rights to several certificates of =
deposit=20
(=E2=80=9CCDs=E2=80=9D), appellants, Russell Scott Clark, Jerry =
Ann Clark, Levi Clifford=20
Clark, Cayleigh Rene, a minor child by and through Russell Scott =
Clark,=20
Chance Parker, a minor child by and through Russell Scott Clark, =
Whitney=20
Blair Clark, a minor child by and through Russell Scott Clark, =
Brett Allen=20
Metcalf, Robin Renee Metcalf Saxon, Bramden Dean Metcalf, a minor =
child by=20
and through Robin Renee Metcalf Saxon, Shanon Kay Small, Jordan =
Dane=20
Small, a minor child by and through Shanon Kay Small, Madison Shae =
Small,=20
a minor child by and through Shanon Kay Small (collectively =
=E2=80=9CClaimants=E2=80=9D), contend that the=20
trial court erred in granting summary judgments in favor of =
appellees,=20
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor-in-interest to First Community =
Bank,=20
N.A., (=E2=80=9CWells Fargo=E2=80=9D) ![3DFootnote](3D"")
and the Estate of Parker Williams =
(=E2=80=9Cthe=20
Estate=E2=80=9D).
<=
/SPAN>In=20
three issues, the Claimants contend that (1) the trial court erred =
in=20
granting Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s motion for summary judgment because =
Wells Fargo did=20
not move for summary judgment on their tort claims and is not =
protected=20
from claims by the Texas Probate Code; (2) alternatively, the =
trial court=20
erred in granting Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s motion for summary =
judgment because there=20
were fact issues relating to the Claimants=E2=80=99 tort claims; =
and (3) if Wells=20
Fargo is protected from the Claimants=E2=80=99 tort claims by the =
Texas Probate=20
Code, the trial court erred in granting the Estate=E2=80=99s =
motion for summary=20
judgment because they have a statutory right to dispute ownership =
of the=20
funds paid from the new certificates of deposit =
(=E2=80=9CCDs=E2=80=9D) if Wells Fargo is=20
protected from claims and the Claimants presented sufficient =
evidence to=20
raise a fact issue regarding mistake and ownership. We dismiss the =
appeal=20
of Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s motion for summary judgment for want of =
jurisdiction and=20
affirm the Estate=E2=80=99s summary judgment.
Background
<=
/SPAN>In=20
the early 1990s, Parker Williams opened six CDs with First =
Community Bank=20
Houston.
The CDs, which totaled =
$1,253,907.50,=20
carried the name of Williams and the Claimants and were each =
marked as a=20
=E2=80=9CMultiple-Party Account with Right of =
Survivorship.=E2=80=9D The Original CDs=20
provided:
Multi-Party=20
Account with Right of Survivorship =E2=80=93 The parties to =
the account own=20
the account in proportion to the parties=E2=80=99 net =
contributions to the=20
account. We may pay any sum in the account to a party at any time. =
On the=20
death of a party, the party=E2=80=99s ownership of the account =
passes to the=20
surviving parties.
Withdrawals=20
=E2=80=93 Unless otherwise clearly indicated on the account =
records, any=20
one of you who signs this form including authorized signors, may =
withdraw=20
or transfer all or any part of the account balance at any time on =
forms=20
approved by us.
Williams was the only one who signed the =
account=20
agreements, and the Claimants were unaware that the CDs existed.=20
<=
/SPAN>In=20
July of 2004, Williams met with a Wells Fargo employee in Houston =
and was=20
told that the CDs were not fully covered by Federal Deposit =
Insurance=20
Corporation (=E2=80=9CFDIC=E2=80=9D) insurance. Williams was =
advised that the First=20
Community Bank San Antonio, N.A.
could provide her with the =
requisite excess=20
deposit insurance coverage. She opened six new, fully-insured, CDs =
at the=20
San Antonio location. The CDs were set up in Williams=E2=80=99s =
name, only, and=20
she initialed the =E2=80=9CSingle-Party Account Without =
=E2=80=98P.O.D.=E2=80=99 Designation=E2=80=9D on=20
each of the account agreements. The new accounts =
provided:
Single-Party=20
Account Without P.O.D. Designation - The party to the =
account owns=20
the account. On the death of the party, ownership of the account =
passes as=20
a part of the party=E2=80=99s estate under the party=E2=80=99s =
will or by intestacy.=20
One month later, on August 25, =
2004,Williams died=20
intestate. The Claimants are not Williams=E2=80=99s heirs or =
legatees under the=20
laws of intestate distribution.
<=
/SPAN>On=20
March 23, 2005, upon request from Williams=E2=80=99s =
administrator, Wells Fargo=20
wired the funds from the CDs to the Estate. One month later, on =
April 29,=20
2005, the Claimants filed a presentment of claim in the probate =
court=20
demanding payment of the CDs. The Estate denied the claim, and =
Wells Fargo=20
filed an original petition for declaratory judgment seeking (1) a=20
determination of the construction and validity of the CDs, (2) a=20
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations between =
Wells=20
Fargo, Williams=E2=80=99s estate, and the Claimants; (3) a =
declaration of rights,=20
if any, of the Claimants to the CDs at the time of =
Williams=E2=80=99s death; and=20
(4) a determination of any other questions as to any of the =
Claimants=E2=80=99=20
ownership of the CDs, other than as Williams=E2=80=99s heirs. The =
Claimants filed=20
an original third-party petition seeking resolution to the same=20
declarations presented by Wells Fargo.
<=
/SPAN>Three=20
months later, on May 17, 2006, Wells Fargo filed a traditional =
motion for=20
interlocutory summary judgment seeking resolution by the trial =
court of=20
(1) the validity and enforceability of the account documents =
underlying=20
the Original CDs, (2) whether Williams was a person with the right =
to=20
withdraw or transfer the funds represented by the Original CD, (3) =
whether=20
Williams had the right to withdraw or transfer at any time all or =
any part=20
of the funds represented by the Original CD, and (4) Wells =
Fargo=E2=80=99s=20
discharge from claims for amounts paid by or on behalf of Wells =
Fargo to=20
Williams as proceeds from the Original CDs. After moving for =
summary=20
judgment, Wells Fargo amended its petition for declaratory relief =
to=20
request that the court
a.determine that the account documents =
underlying=20
the Original CDs are valid and enforceable against Claimants. =
b.determine that MS. WILLIAMS was a =
person with=20
the right to withdraw or transfer the Original CD =
funds.
c.determine that MS. WILLIAMS had the =
right to=20
withdraw or transfer all or any part of such funds at any =
time.
d.determine that [Wells Fargo] is =
discharged from=20
claims for amounts paid by or on behalf of [Wells Fargo] to PARKER =
WILLIAMS as proceeds from the Original CDs.
The Estate adopted Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s =
traditional=20
motion for summary judgment and also filed a no-evidence summary =
judgment.=20
<=
/SPAN>On=20
July 5, 2006, the Claimants amended their petition to assert, for =
the=20
first time, affirmative tort claims against the Estate and Wells =
Fargo.=20
Specifically, the Claimants allege that it was =
=E2=80=9Cunnecessary for Parker=20
Williams to modify the multi-party [CDs] and that Parker Williams =
intended=20
for Claimants to receive the funds contained within the [CDs] that =
were=20
transmitted to the [Estate].=E2=80=9D The Claimants alleged, in =
the=20
alternative, that, if the =
court=20
determined that the Estate is the rightful owner of the CDs, =
=E2=80=9CWells Fargo=20
tortiously interfered with Claimants=E2=80=99 inheritance =
rights.=E2=80=9D The Claimants=20
further alleged that =E2=80=9CWells Fargo was negligent with =
respect to banking,=20
investment, and FDIC coverage advice provided to Parker =
Williams.=E2=80=9D On=20
August 3, 2006, the trial court ordered as follows:
1.Judgment that the Account documents =
underlying=20
the Original CDs are valid and enforceable against =
Claimants.
2.Judgment that PARKER WILLIAMS was a =
person with=20
the right to withdraw or transfer the funds represented by the =
Original=20
CDs.
3.Judgment that PARKER WILLIAMS had the =
right to=20
withdraw or transfer at any time all or any party of the funds =
represented=20
by the Original CDs.
4.Judgment that WELLS FARGO is =
discharged from=20
claims for amounts paid by or on behalf of Plaintiff to PARKER =
WILLIAMS as=20
proceeds from the Original CDs.
5.An award of attorney=E2=80=99s fees in =
the amount of=20
$18,012.00.
6.Judgment for its costs of suit. =
Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s case was severed =
from the remaining=20
action. The trial court granted the Estate=E2=80=99s traditional =
and no-evidence=20
motions for summary judgment. The Claimants appeal the grant of =
summary=20
judgment.
Summary Judgment=20
Standard of Review
<=
/SPAN>A=20
party moving for summary judgment must conclusively prove all of =
the=20
elements of its cause of action or defense as a matter of law. =
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); =
Holy=20
Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 =
(Tex. 2001);=20
Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, =
222=E2=80=9323 (Tex. 1999).=20
When a summary judgment does not specify or state the grounds on =
which the=20
trial court relied, the non-movant on appeal must negate any =
grounds on=20
which the trial court could have relied, and we will affirm the =
summary=20
judgment on appeal if any of the grounds presented in the motion =
is=20
meritorious. See Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., =
896=20
S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1995); Mellon Serv. Co. v. Touche Ross =
&=20
Co., 17 S.W.3d 432, 435 (Tex. App.=E2=80=94Houston [1st Dist.] =
2000, no pet.).=20
A non-movant is required to show that each ground alleged in the =
motion=20
for summary judgment was insufficient to support summary judgment. =
Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.=20
1995).
<=
/SPAN>To=20
prevail on a no-evidence summary judgment motion, a movant must =
allege=20
that there is no evidence of an essential element of the adverse =
party=E2=80=99s=20
cause of action. Tex. R. =
Civ.=20
P. 166a(i); Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. =
Reese, 148=20
S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). We review a no-evidence summary =
judgment under=20
the same legal sufficiency standard used to review a directed =
verdict.=20
Gen. Mills Rests., Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, =
832=E2=80=9333=20
(Tex. App.=E2=80=94Dallas 2000, no pet.). Although the non-moving =
party is not=20
required to marshal its proof, it must present evidence that =
raises a=20
genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. =
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); =
Ford=20
Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A =
no-evidence=20
summary judgment motion may not properly be granted if the =
non-movant=20
brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine =
issue of=20
material fact on the challenged elements. Ridgway, 135 =
S.W.3d at=20
600. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence =
=E2=80=9Crises to=20
a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to =
differ in=20
their conclusions.=E2=80=9D Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. =
Havner, 953 S.W.2d=20
706, 711 (Tex. 1997).
Tort=20
Claims
<=
/SPAN>In=20
issue one, the Claimants contend that the trial court erred in =
granting=20
summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo because it did not move =
for=20
summary judgment on their tort claims, is not protected from =
claims by the=20
Texas Probate Code, and cannot exclude extrinsic evidence of =
Williams=E2=80=99s=20
intent.
<=
/SPAN>Wells=20
Fargo filed a traditional motion for interlocutory summary =
judgment=20
seeking resolution by the trial court of (1) the validity and=20
enforceability of the Account documents underlying the Original =
CDs, (2)=20
whether Williams was a person with the right to withdraw or =
transfer the=20
funds represented by the Original CD, (3) whether Williams had the =
right=20
to withdraw or transfer at any time all or any part of the funds=20
represented by the Original CD, and (4) Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s =
discharge from=20
claims for amounts paid by or on behalf of Wells Fargo to Williams =
as=20
proceeds from the Original CDs. In=20
its motion, Wells Fargo stated that it should be =
=E2=80=9Cdischarged from all=20
claims made or which could be made for amounts it paid under the =
Accounts=20
or based on the Original CDs.=E2=80=9D After=20
Wells Fargo filed its motion for summary judgment, the Claimants =
amended=20
their petition and asserted tort claims against Wells Fargo. =
Specifically,=20
the Claimants alleged that Wells Fargo tortiously interfered with =
their=20
inheritance rights and was negligent with respect to banking =
advice=20
provided to Williams.
<=
/SPAN>The=20
Claimants filed a response to the Estate=E2=80=99s and Wells =
Fargo=E2=80=99s motions for=20
summary judgment asserting that (1) a mistake was made when the =
new CDs=20
were opened or, in the alternative, Wells Fargo =
=E2=80=9Cfraudulently transferred=20
the CDs to San Antonio to atone for incorrect (or at a minimum,=20
inconsistent) insurance coverage advice previously provided to =
[Williams]=20
and to obtain lower insurance premiums for excess deposit =
insurance=20
coverage.=E2=80=9D The Claimants also instructed the trial court =
that =E2=80=9Cnone of the=20
dispositive motions address Claimants=E2=80=99 tort claims against =
Wells Fargo,=20
and that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to =
whether the=20
original CDs were valid and the funds properly released to =
[Williams].=E2=80=9D=20
&=
nbsp;Wells=20
Fargo filed a reply to the response, and, the next day, on August =
3, 2006,=20
the trial court granted Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s summary judgment. =
Two weeks later, the trial court granted =
Wells=20
Fargo=E2=80=99s motion for severance and to make the interlocutory =
judgment final=20
and stated that =E2=80=9Cthe Final Judgment in the severed action =
is a final=20
judgment disposing of all claims and all parties in the severed =
action.=E2=80=9D=20
&=
nbsp;The=20
Claimants contend that, because Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s motion for =
summary judgment=20
did not address the funds from the new CDs or the alleged =
acts and=20
omissions of Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s employees that occurred =
after the original=20
CDs were closed, as alleged in the amended petition, the trial =
court=20
erred in granting summary judgment on the tort claims. We=20
agree.
<=
/SPAN>A summary judgment cannot be granted on =
the=20
entirety of a case unless the motion addresses each cause of =
action or=20
affirmative defense. Clark v. Pruett, 820 S.W.2d 903, 907 =
(Tex.=20
App.=E2=80=94Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). If a plaintiff =
amends his=20
petition to add new theories of liability after being served with =
the=20
motion for summary judgment, the defendant usually must file an =
amended or=20
supplemental motion to address the newly pled causes of action. =
Yancy=20
v. City of Tyler, 836 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. App.=E2=80=94Tyler =
1992, no writ).=20
However, an amended or supplemental motion may not be required =
when the=20
original petition merely reiterates the same essential elements of =
that=20
party=E2=80=99s original claims in another fashion. See =
Fraud-Tech Inc. v.=20
Choicepoint Inc., 102 S.W.3d 366, 387 (Tex. App.=E2=80=94Fort =
Worth 2003, pet.=20
denied).
<=
/SPAN> In=20
this case, the amended petition does much more than merely =
reiterate the=20
same elements of the Claimants=E2=80=99 declaratory judgment =
claims. Here, after=20
filing the motion for summary judgment, the Claimants amended the =
petition=20
to add new tort claims based on additional facts: specifically, =
actions=20
that were taken after the original CDs were closed and the =
disbursement of=20
funds for the new CDs. Nevertheless, Wells Fargo argues that the =
motion=20
addresses these new claims as follows:
CLAIMANTS Response alleges that WELLS =
FARGO=E2=80=99S=20
Motion does not dispose of the tort claims against WELLS FARGO. . =
. . This=20
is incorrect. WELLS FARGO=E2=80=99S Motion . . . sets out the =
contentions of WELLS=20
FARGO that it is protected by the provisions of Probate Code =
Section 443=20
through 448, and . . . states in relevant part that =E2=80=9CWELLS =
FARGO is=20
discharged from all claims made or which could be made for =
amounts=20
it paid under the Accounts or based on the Original CDs.=E2=80=9D =
(emphasis=20
added.) Therefore, WELLS FARGO=E2=80=99S Motion clearly does =
request a summary=20
judgment in its favor as to CLAIMANTS=E2=80=99 tort claims, such =
being =E2=80=9Cclaims=E2=80=9D=20
from which WELLS FARGO is discharged pursuant to Probate Code =
Section 448=20
and Bandy v. First State Bank.
We disagree. The motion for summary =
judgment=20
specifically deals with the law and facts surrounding the conduct =
before=20
the original CDs were closed and does not show how and why the =
identified=20
provisions of the Probate Code would apply to the new CDs or =
actions taken=20
after the original CDs were closed. Furthermore, the motion does =
not=20
identify the relevant undisputed facts for the trial court to =
consider=20
regarding the application of these statutes to the =
Claimants=E2=80=99 tort=20
claims.
We may not affirm a =
summary=20
judgment on a ground not addressed in the summary judgment =
proceeding.=20
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, =
677=20
(Tex. 1979). We acknowledge that Wells Fargo asserts that it =
addressed the=20
tort claims in its reply to the Claimants=E2=80=99 response to the =
motions for=20
summary judgment. However, in the absence of the =
nonmovant=E2=80=99s consent, a=20
movant may not raise a new ground for summary judgment in a reply =
to the=20
nonmovant=E2=80=99s response. Sanders v. Capitol Area =
Council, 930 S.W.2d=20
905, 911 (Tex. App.=E2=80=94Austin 1996, no writ); RR =
Publ=E2=80=99n & Prod., Inc.=20
v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 917 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. =
App.=E2=80=94Fort=20
Worth 1996, no writ).
<=
/SPAN>Because=20
we hold that Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s motion for summary judgment did =
not dispose of=20
all the causes of action, we dismiss the Claimants=E2=80=99 appeal =
of the judgment=20
for want of jurisdiction.
Ownership=20
Dispute
<=
/SPAN>In=20
issue three, the =
Claimants=20
contend that, under the Parol Evidence Rule, extrinsic evidence is =
admissible to create a fact issue regarding mistake and to dispute =
ownership of the funds with the Estate.
=
Texas=20
Probate Code Section 439 is the exclusive means for creating a =
right of=20
survivorship in joint accounts. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. =C2=A7 439 (Vernon =
2003);=20
Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 862=E2=80=9363 (Tex. =
1990). This=20
applies to accounts at financial institutions and includes =
checking=20
accounts, savings accounts, certificates of deposit, share =
accounts, and=20
other like arrangements. Tex. Prob.=20
Code Ann. =C2=A7 436(l) (Vernon 2003); see also =
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. =
=C2=A7 450 (Vernon=20
2003). Furthermore, a party who claims to own an account as the =
survivor=20
of a joint account (or P.O.D.) bears the burden of proving the =
claims.=20
See Pressler v. Lytle State Bank, 982 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. =
App.=E2=80=94San Antonio 1998, no pet.). The Claimants contend =
that they should be=20
permitted to produce evidence to raise a fact issue as to whether =
the=20
decedent intended to create a right of survivorship. =
<=
/SPAN>The=20
parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law. Hubacek v. =
Ennis=20
State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30, 31 (1958); Piper, =
Stiles=20
& Ladd v. Fid. & Dep. Co., 435 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Tex. =
Civ.=20
App.=E2=80=94Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref=E2=80=99d n.r.e.). =
When parties reduce an=20
agreement to writing, the law of parol evidence presumes, in the =
absence=20
of fraud, accident, or mistake, that any prior or contemporaneous =
oral or=20
written agreements are merged into the final, written agreement =
and,=20
therefore, that any provisions not set out in the writing were =
either=20
abandoned before execution of the agreement or, alternatively, =
were never=20
made and are thus excluded from consideration in interpreting the =
written=20
agreement. See Hubacek, 317 S.W.2d at 31; Muhm v. =
Davis, 580=20
S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.=E2=80=94Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, =
writ ref=E2=80=99d=20
n.r.e.).
<=
/SPAN>We=20
review parol evidence questions de novo, as questions of law. =
City of=20
Pasadena v. Gennedy, 125 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. =
App.=E2=80=94Houston [1st=20
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Evidence that violates the parol =
evidence rule=20
has no legal effect and =E2=80=9Cmerely constitutes proof of facts =
that are=20
immaterial and inoperative.=E2=80=9D Piper, Stiles & =
Ladd, 435 S.W.2d=20
at 940. Because all prior negotiations and agreements are presumed =
merged=20
into the final agreement, parol evidence is not admissible to =
vary, alter,=20
or supplement the terms of an otherwise unambiguous contract =
except to=20
show (1) that the contract was induced by fraud, accident, or =
mistake, (2)=20
that an agreement was to become effective only upon certain =
contingencies,=20
or (3) in the case of ambiguity, that the parties=E2=80=99 true =
intentions differ=20
from those expressed in the agreement. See Messer v. =
Johnson, 422=20
S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. 1968); Litton v. Hanley, 823 S.W.2d =
428, 430=20
(Tex. App.=E2=80=94Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
<=
/SPAN>In=20
their first amended petition, the Claimants alleged that, if the =
Estate is=20
the rightful owner of the CDs, Wells Fargo tortiously interfered =
with=20
their inheritance rights and =E2=80=9Cwas negligent with respect =
to banking,=20
investment, and FDIC coverage advice provided to Parker =
Williams.=E2=80=9D=20
Relying =
on Probate Code Section 439, the =
Deadman=E2=80=99s=20
Statute,
the Parol Evidence Rule, the =
=E2=80=9Cfour corners of the=20
document=E2=80=9D rule, hearsay,
and double hearsay, the Estate objected =
to the=20
Claimants=E2=80=99 use of extrinsic summary judgment evidence. =
Furthermore, the=20
Claimants did not allege any mistake or fraud against the Estate. =
The=20
trial court granted the Estate=E2=80=99s objection to the =
Claimants=E2=80=99 summary=20
judgment evidence, and the Claimants do not contest that ruling on =
appeal.=20
There is no fraud or mistake as to the Estate pled here, and the =
there is=20
no claim that the San Antonio CD agreements are incomplete or =
ambiguous.=20
The Estate argues that the =E2=80=9CClaimants cannot use extrinsic =
evidence in an=20
attempt to get around the four corner of the San Antonio First =
Community=20
Bank, N.A., CDs.=E2=80=9D We agree.
<=
/SPAN>We=20
overrule issue three.
Conclusion
<=
/SPAN>The=20
Claimants=E2=80=99 appeal of Wells Fargo=E2=80=99s summary =
judgment is dismissed for want=20
of jurisdiction. The Estate=E2=80=99s summary judgment is=20
affirmed.
&=
nbsp; &n=
bsp; &nb=
sp; &nbs=
p; =
; =
George=20
C. Hanks, Jr.
&=
nbsp; &n=
bsp; &nb=
sp; &nbs=
p; =
; =
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, =
Hanks, and=20
Higley.
|