Opinion issued February = 21,=20 2008
The trial=20
court granted Wayne Duddlesten, Ltd. and BC Alliance, Inc.'s =
(collectively=20
"Duddlesten") motion for partial summary judgment on liability =
only and=20
held that Cypress Northwest Associates, Ltd. ("Cypress") breached =
its=20
contract with Duddlesten. A jury determined the consequential =
damages for=20
the breach to be $1,110,000. Cypress argues that (1) the trial =
court erred=20
in finding Cypress liable for breach of contract because there is =
no=20
evidence that Cypress failed to comply with the contract, (2) the =
trial=20
court improperly imposed two implied obligations upon Cypress, and =
(3) the=20
trial court erred in failing to find that Duddlesten's breach of =
contract=20
claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. We =
reverse and=20
render in part and reverse and remand in part.
Cypress and=20
Duddlesten are real estate developers who own adjoining property =
along=20
Barker Cypress Road near Highway 290 in northwest Harris County. =
Cypress=20
is the developer of Riata Ranch, a 1,000-home residential =
subdivision.=20
Duddlesten owns commercial property that lies between Riata Ranch =
and=20
Barker Cypress Road. In March 1996, the parties entered into a =
Residential=20
Development Agreement ("Development Agreement") related to the =
expansion=20
of Riata Ranch. In the Development Agreement, for $271,772, =
Duddlesten=20
conveyed a 21.9760-acre tract to Cypress. The north line of the =
tract was=20
determined to be the south line of "a certain tract owned by =
Duddlesten."=20
Duddlesten also agreed to dedicate a 100-foot easement across its=20
property. The second paragraph of the Development Agreement =
concerns the=20
dedication of the easement and states the following: 2.=20
Additional Road Right of Way. Riata Ranch subdivision is to be =
accessed by=20
three roads originating at Barker Cypress Road. The northernmost =
such=20
entry road wholly traverses property owned by Duddlesten. =
Duddlesten has=20
agreed, and by this Agreement further confirms and agrees to =
dedicate=20
a one hundred foot (100') wide easement, sixty feet (60') =
of=20
which shall be at no expense to Cypress, and the remaining portion =
of=20
which shall be at a cost to Cypress of an amount equal to $12,000 =
per acre=20
for the acreage, as determined by a surveyor, in excess of the =
easement property located within the sixty foot (60') portion =
dedicated at no cost to Cypress. The parties agree that Duddlesten =
shall=20
have authority to make the final determination as to the location =
of the=20
right of way, subject to approval by the City of Houston Planning=20
Commission. This purchase shall be accomplished within a four year =
period=20
of the date hereof. All costs of this purchase and/or dedication =
shall be=20
borne by Cypress provided, however, that the exact location of =
said=20
easement shall be fixed by Cypress within two years from the =
date=20
hereof. Duddlesten retains the right to approve the final =
geometric design=20
of this easement as well as the easement for =
Riata Ranch=20
Drive as shown on Exhibit "A", prior to recording any plat =
covering either=20
the easement or roadway. (Emphasis=20
added.) Three months later, rather than dedicate an easement as=20
contemplated by the Development Agreement, Duddlesten executed a =
deed=20
("the Duddlesten Deed") conveying 1.0265 acres ("the Deeded =
Strip") to=20
Cypress. The Duddlesten Deed conveyed all right, title and =
interest, if=20
any, in and to (d) any=20
easements, rights-of-way, rights of ingress and egress or other =
interests=20
in, on, or to any land, highway, street, road or avenue, open or =
proposed=20
in, on, across from, in front of, abutting, adjoining or otherwise =
appurtenant to [the Deeded Strip], as well as all rights, =
privileges and=20
appurtenances owned by [Duddlesten] and in any way related to [the =
Deeded=20
Strip] and other rights and interest of [Duddlesten] hereunder =
conveyed;=20
provided, however, that such conveyance is without prejudice to, =
and does=20
not transfer, any rights or benefits held by [Duddlesten], its =
successors=20
and assigns to the extent they benefit any other properties owned =
by=20
[Duddlesten] to which such rights are appurtenant . . . . =
The=20
Duddlesten Deed included a restrictive covenant ("the Restrictive=20
Covenant") limiting=20
the acceptable uses of the land. The Restrictive Covenant=20
states: The use of=20
[the Deeded Strip] is hereby restricted to use as a roadway or =
road of=20
[sic] right-of-way to provide vehicular access, ingress and egress =
to and=20
from Barker Cypress Road to and from adjacent real property =
currently=20
owned by [Cypress], for landscaping and other similar uses =
incidental to=20
and associated with use as a roadway or road right-of-way, and for =
the=20
additional purpose of the construction, installation, use, =
operation,=20
maintenance, repair and replacement of underground public utility =
lines,=20
including, but not limited to water, sanitary sewer, storm sewer,=20
electricity and telephone. At the time=20
the parties entered into the Development Agreement, Cypress was =
planning=20
for the construction of a school near the intersection of Barker =
Cypress=20
Road and Cypress-North Houston Road. It sought an additional =
access road=20
in order to facilitate traffic around the proposed school. =
Duddlesten=20
agreed because it believed the property would be more valuable if =
it was=20
divided into two corner commercial lots by a road leading into the =
neighborhood. The plans to build the school later were abandoned.=20
Cypress has=20
not built a road across the Deeded Strip, claiming that neither =
the=20
Development Agreement nor the Restrictive Covenant impose any =
obligation=20
upon it to construct such a road. On March 12, 2001, Cypress =
executed a=20
final plat of the Riata Ranch subdivision that did not include an =
access=20
road across the Deeded Strip. Instead, the tract was platted as=20
"Restricted Reserve 'C' Restricted to U.E. STM. S.E. & =
Landscaping."=20
The plat also showed a cul-de-sac abutting the Deeded Strip, which =
would=20
prevent a roadway on the Deeded Strip from accessing the Riata =
Ranch=20
subdivision. Duddlesten=20
filed suit on February 13, 2004, claiming that Cypress breached =
the=20
express terms and implied obligations contained in the Development =
Agreement and the Restrictive Covenant by failing to construct a =
road=20
across the Deeded Strip. Both parties moved for summary judgment =
on the=20
issue of liability. The trial court granted Duddlesten's motion =
and denied=20
Cypress's motion. The case=20
proceeded to trial solely on the issue of damages. The trial court =
instructed the jury that Duddlesten "was entitled to have an =
entry=20
road cross the commercial property in question into Riata =
Ranch" and=20
asked that the jury determine "the difference between the market =
value of=20
the commercial property having an entry road into Riata =
Ranch=20
Subdivision that crosses the property owned by [Duddlesten] and =
the market=20
value of that commercial property without an entry road." =
(Emphasis=20
added.) The jury awarded Duddlesten $1,110,000 in damages. Cypress =
appeals=20
the trial court's order granting Duddlesten's motion for summary =
judgment.=20
Our review=20
of a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is de novo.=20
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 =
(Tex.=20
2005). In a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant must =
show that=20
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled =
to=20
judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); =
Pustejovsky v.=20
Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 645-46 (Tex. 2000). In =
deciding=20
whether a disputed material fact issue precludes summary judgment, =
we take=20
evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, and indulge every =
reasonable=20
inference and resolve any doubts in favor of the nonmovant. =
Provident=20
Life & Accid. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 =
(Tex. 2003).=20
When, as here, the trial court does not specify the grounds upon =
which it=20
ruled, the summary judgment may be affirmed if any of the grounds =
stated=20
in the motion is meritorious. W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, =
162 S.W.3d=20
547, 550 (Tex. 2005); Mayes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber =
Co.,=20
144 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). =
When, as=20
here, competing motions for summary judgment are filed, and one is =
granted=20
and the other denied, the reviewing court must review the summary =
judgment=20
evidence presented by both sides and determine all questions =
presented.=20
Comm'rs Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 =
(Tex.=20
1997).
In issue=20
one, Cypress contends that the trial court erred in finding =
Cypress liable=20
for breach of contract because there is no evidence that it failed =
to=20
comply with any express provision of the Development Agreement. =
Cypress=20
further complains that the Duddlesten Deed's restrictive covenant =
imposes=20
no affirmative obligation on Cypress, and there is no evidence =
that=20
Cypress violated the Deed's restrictive covenant. In issue two, =
Cypress=20
asserts that the trial court erred by "improperly imposing two =
'implied'=20
obligations on Cypress that are not contained in or supported by =
the=20
language of the Development Agreement." The two "implied" =
obligations are=20
that (1) Cypress must construct a road on the Deeded Strip and (2) =
Cypress=20
must grant an easement across its land and construct a road on it =
as an=20
extension of the Deeded Strip roadway. Cypress contends that the =
trial=20
court erred in concluding that the Development Agreement requires =
Cypress=20
to construct a roadway on the Deeded Strip. The law=20
concerning contract interpretation is well-settled. Id. =
When=20
construing a written contract, our primary concern is to give =
effect to=20
the true intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument. =
Forbau=20
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994). If a =
written=20
contract is worded in such a way that it can be given a definite =
legal=20
meaning, then the contract is not ambiguous. Nat'l Union Fire =
Ins. Co.=20
v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995). If the =
contract=20
is unambiguous, the court must enforce the contract as written.=20
Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 35 S.W.3d =
658, 665=20
(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). To prevail=20
on a breach of contract claim, Duddlesten was required to prove =
(1) a=20
valid enforceable contract, (2) Duddlesten and Cypress signed the =
contract=20
or were in privity with a contract signatory, (3) Duddlesten =
performed its=20
contractual obligations, Deed v.=20
Easement The Development =
Agreement:=20
Additional Right of Way provision, by its express terms, =
contemplates the=20
creation and existence of an easement on property owned by=20
Duddlesten. However, Duddlesten, extra-contractually, opted =
to deed=20
the property instead of dedicating an easement. Consequently, =
Duddlesten=20
no longer owns the property and, pursuant to the express language =
of the=20
deed, has no "right, title [or] interest" to the property beyond =
what is=20
found in the Restrictive Covenant. Simply put, the Additional =
Right of Way=20
provision does not create any obligations with respect to =
property=20
owned by Cypress--including the Deeded Strip. It only creates =
obligations with respect to property owned by Duddlesten. =
Therefore, the=20
provision in the Development Agreement relied upon by Duddlesten =
for its=20
breach of contract claim does not apply to the use of the deeded =
property=20
at issue in this lawsuit. Duddlesten =
nevertheless=20
argues that we should read the language of the Right of Way =
provision=20
piecemeal, ignoring the language referencing the creation and =
existence of=20
an easement on Duddlesten's property, to find an obligation on the =
part of=20
Cypress to allow access across the Deeded Strip. Specifically, =
Duddlesten=20
argues that the first two sentences in the provision, along with =
the=20
provision's reference to a "right of way," creates this obligation =
to=20
provide access. We disagree. To read the provision piecemeal as =
Duddlesten=20
suggests would require us to ignore that the provision =
contemplates the=20
creation and existence of an easement. Here, Duddlesten chose to =
deed the=20
property instead of grant an easement. Duddlesten deeded =
the=20
property contemplated by the easement to Cypress within months of =
creating=20
the Development Agreement, and Duddlesten does not complain that =
Cypress=20
failed to comply with its corresponding financial obligations =
under the=20
contract. As mentioned above, instead of dedicating the roadway =
easement=20
as required by the contract, Duddlesten deeded land according to =
its own=20
specifications as to the size and shape of the tract. =
Consequently, we=20
hold that, contrary to the trial court's finding, Cypress did not =
breach=20
the Development Agreement, and the trial court erred in concluding =
that=20
the Development Agreement required Cypress to construct a roadway =
on the=20
Deeded Strip. We next turn to =
examine=20
whether Cypress' conduct breached the Deed's restrictive covenant. =
Restrictive=20
Covenant Cypress asserts =
that there=20
is no evidence that it violated the Duddlesten Deed's restrictive=20
covenant, which imposes no affirmative obligation on Cypress. The =
parties=20
dispute the meaning of the Restrictive Covenant imposed by =
Duddlesten upon=20
the Deeded Strip when it conveyed the land to Cypress. Duddlesten =
contends=20
that Cypress violated the Restrictive Covenant when it caused the =
final=20
plat for Section 10 of Riata Ranch to be recorded in May 2001.=20
The plat showed a cul-de-sac at the end of Riata =
Ranch=20
Road, blocking access to the subdivision through the Deeded Strip. =
Duddlesten argues that, in violation of the Restrictive Covenant, =
the=20
cul-de-sac has prevented the future use of the Deeded Strip as a =
roadway.=20
In addition, the =
subdivision=20
plat shows an arrow pointed at the Deeded Strip, next to which is =
written,=20
"RESTRICTED RESERVE "C" RESTRICTED TO U.E., STM. S.E. & =
LANDSCAPING."=20
This language provides that Cypress plans utility and storm =
easements=20
across the Deeded Strip, as well as landscaping. Duddlesten =
contends that=20
these uses violate the Restrictive Covenant. Cypress has argued =
that the=20
Restrictive Covenant does not bar this activity because Cypress is =
not=20
using the property, which has been left as open space. Restrictive =
covenants are=20
subject to the same general rules of construction as contracts.=20
Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998). Like =
a=20
contract, a restrictive covenant is unambiguous if it can be given =
a=20
certain or definite legal meaning. Id. Whether =
restrictive=20
covenants are ambiguous is a matter of law for the court to =
decide.=20
City of Pasadena v. Gennedy, 125 S.W.3d 687, 692 (Tex.=20
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). At common law, =
covenants=20
restricting the free use of land are not favored, but will still =
be=20
enforced when they are confined to a lawful purpose and are =
clearly=20
worded. Id. at 693. All doubts concerning a restrictive=20
covenant's terms are resolved in favor of the free and =
unrestricted use of=20
the land, and any ambiguity must be strictly construed against the =
party=20
seeking to enforce the covenant. Id. The Texas Property =
Code=20
states that "[a] restrictive covenant shall be liberally construed =
to give=20
effect to its purposes and intent." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. =A7 =
202.003(a)=20
(Vernon 2007). In Gennedy, we noted the potential =
conflict in the=20
common law and statutory law, but do not intend to resolve this =
potential=20
conflict in this case for the same reasons that we did not do so =
in=20
Gennedy. See Gennedy, 125 S.W.3d at =
695.=20
Regardless of =
whether we=20
subject the Restrictive Covenant to a liberal or strict =
construction, the=20
outcome remains the same. The plain language reveals that the =
parties=20
intended that Cypress would not use the property for any other =
purpose=20
than as "a roadway or road of [sic] right-of-way to provide =
vehicular=20
access, . . . landscaping and other similar uses incidental to and =
associated with uses as a roadway or road right-of-way . . . =
." We agree with =
Cypress that=20
the Restrictive Covenant does not obligate Cypress to do anything =
with its=20
own land. A lease provision that says the premises are only to be =
used for=20
a particular purpose does not obligate "the lessee to use or =
continue to=20
use the premises for that purpose; such a provision is a covenant =
against=20
a noncomplying use, not a covenant to use." Universal Health =
Servs.,=20
Inc. v. Renaissance Women's Group, P.A., 121 S.W.3d 742, 747 =
(Tex.=20
2003). Similarly, the =
Restrictive=20
Covenant limits use of the Deeded Strip. Cypress indicated on the=20
subdivision plat that the Strip could be used for landscaping, =
utility,=20
and storm easements. Cypress has thus allowed for the possibility =
that=20
these easements could be used in ways which could potentially =
interfere=20
with the restrictive covenant, but it is unclear from the summary =
judgment=20
record whether Cypress actually has used the land for any =
noncomplying=20
purpose in violation of the covenant. The filing of the plat, in =
and of=20
itself, does not constitute a breach of the Restrictive Covenant, =
as the=20
plat alone does not indicate that Cypress has used the Deeded =
Strip in any=20
way that violates the covenant. The summary =
judgment record=20
reveals, however, that the land has been or is currently being =
landscaped,=20
though it is unclear what sort of alterations have been made. =
Landscaping=20
does not violate the Restrictive Covenant per se, but it =
may be=20
if the landscaping on the Deeded Strip interferes with the land's=20
potential use as a roadway. Without evidence regarding the nature =
and=20
scope of the landscaping on the Deeded Strip, it nevertheless =
cannot be=20
determined whether Cypress has violated the terms of the =
Restrictive=20
Covenant. Thus, whether Cypress has violated the Restrictive =
Covenant=20
presents a question of fact that we cannot resolve on the summary =
judgment=20
record before us. Because a fact =
question=20
exists regarding the nature and scope of use of the Deeded Strip, =
the=20
trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that Cypress =
breached=20
the restrictive covenant. We sustain issue=20
one. Implied=20
Obligations In issue=20
two, Cypress asserts that the trial court erred by "improperly =
imposing=20
two 'implied' obligations on Cypress that are not contained in or=20
supported by the language of the Development Agreement." The two =
"implied"=20
obligations are that (1) Cypress must construct a road on the =
Deeded Strip=20
and (2) Cypress must grant an easement across its land and =
construct a=20
road on it as an extension of the Deeded Strip roadway. =
The trial court =
instructed=20
the jury, and thus found as a matter of law, that Duddlesten "was =
entitled=20
to have an entry road cross the commercial property In moving=20
for summary judgment in the trial court, Duddlesten claimed that =
"there=20
was clearly an implied obligation on Cypress to construct the =
street." On=20
appeal, Duddlesten now concedes that "Cypress is correct that the=20
Residential Development Agreement does not require Cypress to =
actually=20
build a road . . . . In other words, Cypress was not obligated to=20
construct the road, but it was obligated to provide access to the=20
subdivision by a road." "For that reason, Duddlesten[, on appeal,=20
addressed] only Cypress's argument that it had no implied =
obligation to=20
grant an easement across its property." Though the Development =
Agreement=20
makes no mention of such an obligation, Duddlesten argues that =
access to=20
the Riata Ranch subdivision would be impossible without the =
construction=20
of a road traversing both Duddlesten's and Cypress's property and =
would=20
thus create a "road to nowhere." Duddlesten, however, has deeded =
the=20
property and retained no "right, title [or] interest" in =
it. Implied covenants =
are not=20
favored by law and will only be read into a contract when =
necessary to=20
give effect to the plain, unmistakable intent of the parties. =
In re=20
Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex. 2003). An implied covenant =
must=20
appear to be so clearly within the contemplation of the parties =
that they=20
deemed it unnecessary to express it in writing. Danciger Oil =
&=20
Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1941). It is =
not enough=20
to say that an implied covenant is necessary in order to make the =
contract=20
fair or that without such a covenant the contract would operate =
unjustly.=20
Id. An implied covenant must arise from the presumed =
intention of=20
the parties as gathered from the agreement as a whole.=20
Id. Duddlesten asks =
this Court=20
to impose an unwritten, "implied" obligation on Cypress that, if =
actually=20
agreed to by the parties, would have been barred by the statute of =
frauds.=20
An easement is an interest in land to which the statute of frauds =
applies,=20
and any grant of an easement must be in writing. Cummins v. =
Travis=20
County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 =
S.W.3d 34,=20
51 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, pet. denied). The easement which =
Duddlesten=20
promised to grant is one which attaches to the land itself and =
passes with=20
it, and thus, is an easement appurtenant to the land. See Drye =
v.=20
Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 203 (Tex. 1962). As =
such, it=20
is an interest in land which requires a writing to create or =
transfer.=20
See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. =A7 5.021 (Vernon 2004); =
Drye,=20
364 S.W.2d at 203. The Development =
Agreement=20
contains no mention of Cypress's property, no requirement that a =
roadway=20
would even be built on the Deeded Strip, and no statement of =
Duddlesten's=20
alleged intent that its easement, and ultimately deeded property =
was "to=20
create two, more valuable corner commercial lots," a goal that =
could only=20
be accomplished with an additional easement across Cypress's land. =
Accordingly, there is no evidence to support the trial court's =
implied=20
finding that Cypress must create an easement over its property as =
a matter=20
of law, and the trial court erred in submitting an instruction =
containing=20
an implied finding to the jury based on a breach of the =
Development=20
Agreement. We sustain issue=20
two. Statute=20
of Limitations In issue=20
three, Cypress argues that Duddlesten's breach of contract claim =
was=20
barred by the four-year statute of limitations because either (1) =
the=20
discovery rule does not apply to Duddlesten's claim or, (2) if the =
discovery rule does apply, Duddlesten had actual notice of =
Cypress's=20
intentions more than four years before it filed suit. Standard =
of Review=20
The=20
determination of whether the statute of limitations has run on a=20
particular cause of action is a question of law that we also =
review de=20
novo. See Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 221. As a general rule, a =
cause of=20
action begins to run when facts come into existence that authorize =
a party=20
to seek a judicial remedy. Id. A breach =
of=20
contract claim accrues when the contract is breached. Stine v. =
Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. 2002). Cypress first =
argues that=20
Duddlesten should have been aware of the facts that led to its =
breach of=20
contract claim in September of 1999, when Cypress filed a =
development plat=20
with the City of Houston that did not include an access road =
through the=20
Deeded Strip. But, as Duddlesten points out, this plat was =
preliminary and=20
subject to change. Cypress further argues that, after a meeting on =
February 11, 2000, Duddlesten either knew or should have known =
about=20
Cypress's plans not to construct a road through the Deeded Strip. =
At the=20
meeting, Cypress showed Duddlesten documents from the City of =
Houston=20
Planning Commission, including a development plat that showed the =
Deeded=20
Strip not being used as an access road. Duddlesten contends that =
he did=20
not discuss the access road at the meeting in February because the =
meeting=20
centered on property west of Barker Cypress Road. He claims that =
Cypress=20
intentionally drew his attention away from the access road by =
displaying=20
the property west of Barker Cypress Road in color and the rest of =
the=20
property in black-and-white. Duddlesten asserts that "Cypress =
breached the=20
[Development] Agreement and the restrictive covenants in the =
[Duddlesten]=20
Deed on May 21, 2001, when it caused the final plat for Riata =
Ranch,=20
Section 10, to be recorded." Duddlesten filed =
suit on=20
February 13, 2004, within four years of the date that Cypress =
recorded the=20
final plat for the subdivision. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & =
Rem.=20
Code Ann. =A7 16.051 (Vernon 1997) (stating that every action for =
which=20
there is no statute of limitations must be brought within four =
years after=20
the cause of action accrues); see also Stine, 80 =
S.W.3d=20
at 592 (noting that the statute of limitations for breach of =
contract=20
claims is four years). We overrule issue =
three.
We reverse the =
trial court's=20
summary judgment on liability and render judgment that Cypress did =
not=20
breach the Development Agreement, and we remand the remaining =
claims for=20
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. George C. Hanks,=20
Jr. Justice Panel consists of =
Justices=20
Hanks, Bland, and Wilson. 1. 2. In its motion for summary judgment, =
Cypress=20
asserted that Duddlesten had breached its contract by failing to=20
dedicate a roadway easement. See Russell v. City of=20
Bryan, 919 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] =
1996,=20
writ denied) ("Dedication is defined as the appropriation of land, =
or an=20
easement therein, by the owner, for the use of the public, and =
accepted=20
for such use by or on behalf of the public."). Joe L. Thomas, =
attorney and=20
officer with the Duddlesten Companies, testified that, under the=20
Russell definition, Duddlesten has not so dedicated a =
roadway=20
easement.=20
3. 4. 5. 6.