Opinion issued June 26, = 2008=20
Appellant,=20
Karen McCright, challenges the trial court's final judgment, =
rendered=20
after a bench trial, in favor of appellees, Josh Rodriguez, =
Johnnie Lue=20
Fisk, individually and as executrix of the estate of Robert Allen =
Whorton,=20
and Emmett Huff, in McCright's suit to "stop interference" with a =
piece of=20
property over which she claimed ownership and possession rights, =
"to set=20
aside [a] deed" in lieu of foreclosure that she signed regarding =
that=20
property, and for civil conspiracy. In three issues, McCright =
contends=20
that the "statute of limitations expired on the acceleration of =
the note"=20
securing her rights to the property, the deed in lieu of =
foreclosure that=20
she signed was invalid, and the evidence is legally insufficient =
to=20
support certain findings of fact and conclusions of =
law. We affirm.=20
In 1995,=20
Karen McCright began renting a piece of property (the "property") =
in=20
Houston, Texas from Robert Allen Whorton, and thereafter began =
operating a=20
treatment center on that property. In April 1998, McCright =
purchased the=20
property from Whorton, signing both a promissory note in the =
amount of=20
$200,000 payable to Whorton and a deed of trust identifying =
Whorton as the=20
beneficiary. Whorton died in 1999, and William Fisk became the =
executor of=20
Whorton's estate and the trustee of a number of trusts which held =
the=20
property of the estate, including the note signed by McCright. In =
December=20
1999, McCright defaulted on payments under the note. On October 5, =
2001,=20
Emmett Huff, as the attorney and representative of William Fisk, =
sent=20
McCright a letter demanding that McCright "bring the note current=20
immediately." In the conclusion of the letter, Huff stated that he =
was=20
presenting McCright with an "opportunity for amicable =
resolution." In 2005, William =
Fisk died,=20
and his wife, Johnnie Lue Fisk, became successor trustee of the =
trusts=20
holding the property of the Whorton estate. On December 12, 2005, =
Johnnie=20
Lue Fisk and Huff, among others, met with McCright, and McCright =
signed a=20
deed in lieu of foreclosure for the property. The deed in lieu of=20
foreclosure identified McCright as the grantor and Whorton's =
estate as the=20
grantee, and Johnnie Lue Fisk signed the deed in lieu of =
foreclosure in=20
her capacity as trustee of Whorton's estate. The property was =
subsequently=20
put up for sale, and, on August 18, 2006, Johnnie Lue Fisk, who =
had by=20
that date become the executrix of Whorton's estate, signed a =
warranty deed=20
selling the property to Rodriguez. Despite the sale =
of the=20
property to Rodriguez, McCright contended that she was still the =
owner of=20
the property After=20
conducting a bench trial, the trial court entered its judgment, =
ordering=20
that McCright take nothing, Rodriguez recover possession of the =
property=20
and damages in the amount of $17,346 plus postjudgment interest =
and court=20
costs, and Johnnie Lue Fisk recover damages in the amount of =
$8,117.09 for=20
delinquent real estate taxes, $25,000 for her attorney's fees =
incurred in=20
pursuing breach of contract claims on behalf of Whorton's estate, =
and=20
postjudgment interest and court costs. The trial court =
subsequently=20
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. In her=20
first issue, McCright contends that the "statute of limitations =
expired on=20
the acceleration of the note on the deed in trust and[, thus,] the =
property belonged to her." Relying on the October 2001 letter and =
citing=20
section 16.035 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, =
McCright=20
asserts that "more than four years had passed since any attempt =
was made=20
to collect on the note." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. =
Code Ann.=20
=A7 16.035 (Vernon 2002). Although=20
McCright does not refer us to any specific subsection of section =
16.035 or=20
explain how any specific subsection applies in the instant case, =
section=20
16.035 provides, in relevant part, (a) A=20
person must bring suit for the recovery of real property under a =
real=20
property lien or the foreclosure of a real property lien not later =
than=20
four years after the day the cause of action =
accrues. (b) A sale=20
of real property under a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of =
trust that=20
creates a real property lien must be made not later than four =
years after=20
the day the cause of action accrues. . =
. . .=20
(d) On the=20
expiration of the four-year limitations period, the real property =
lien and=20
a power of sale to enforce the real property lien become=20
void. (e) If a=20
series of notes or obligations or a note or obligation payable in=20
installments is secured by a real property lien, the four-year =
limitations=20
period does not begin to run until the maturity date of the last =
note,=20
obligation, or installment. . =
. . .=20
In support=20
of her limitations argument, McCright also cites Holy Cross =
Church of=20
God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001). In=20
Wolf, the Texas Supreme Court explained that a default on =
a note=20
or deed that secures real property and that contains an optional=20
acceleration clause "does not ipso facto start limitations running =
on the=20
note," "the action accrues only when the holder actually exercises =
its=20
option to accelerate," effective acceleration requires both a =
notice of=20
intent to accelerate and a notice of acceleration, and "[b]oth =
notices=20
must be clear and unequivocal." Id. The court noted that, =
"[e]ven=20
when a noteholder has accelerated a note upon default, the holder =
can=20
abandon acceleration if the holder continues to accept payments =
without=20
exacting any remedies available to it upon declared maturity."=20
Id. at 566-67. Here, the=20
record contains no evidence that, at any time prior to the =
parties'=20
execution of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, appellees made any =
attempts=20
to accelerate the note or foreclose upon the property. Contrary to =
McCright's representations, the October 2001 letter did not demand =
"the=20
entire amount due," but instead amicably sought McCright's =
payments to=20
bring the note current. In fact, McCright continued to remain on =
the=20
property until 2005 without receiving any notices of intent to =
accelerate=20
or notices of acceleration. Accordingly, we hold that there is no =
evidence=20
that the "statute of limitations expired on the acceleration of =
the note"=20
or that McCright became the owner of the property. We overrule=20
McCright's first issue. In her=20
second issue, McCright argues that, because the deed in lieu of=20
foreclosure was never accepted by the executrix of Whorton's =
estate, it=20
was invalid. McCright cites Johnnie Lue Fisk's testimony =
establishing that=20
her husband, William Fisk, was the executor of Whorton's estate =
until his=20
death on July 17, 2005, the deed in lieu of foreclosure was signed =
by the=20
parties on December 12, 2005 (after William Fisk's death), Johnnie =
Lue=20
Fisk signed the deed in lieu of foreclosure in her capacity as =
trustee of=20
the Whorton trusts and not as executor of Whorton's estate, and =
Johnnie=20
Lue Fisk qualified to serve as executor of Whorton's estate on =
February 1,=20
2006 (after the execution of the deed in lieu of foreclosure). =
Based on=20
this testimony, McCright contends that "the evidence is clear and =
direct"=20
that "there was no executor or trustee in place . . . to accept =
the deed=20
in lieu of foreclosure." The record =
establishes that=20
the deed in lieu of foreclosure was signed and accepted by Johnnie =
Lue=20
Fisk in her capacity as successor trustee of Whorton's trusts. =
Moreover,=20
as stated in a finding of fact that is unchallenged on appeal, on =
July 18,=20
2006, Johnnie Lue Fisk, in her capacity as successor trustee of =
Whorton's=20
trusts, signed a warranty deed conveying the property to Johnnie =
Lue Fisk=20
as executor of Whorton's estate and, on August 18, 2006, Whorton's =
estate=20
sold the property to Rodriguez. See London v. London, 94 =
S.W.3d=20
139, 149 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) =
("Unchallenged=20
findings of fact are binding on the court of appeals 'unless the =
contrary=20
is established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to =
support=20
the finding.'" (quoting McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 =
S.W.2d 694,=20
696 (Tex. 1986))) We overrule=20
McCright's second issue. In her=20
third issue, McCright contends that the evidence is legally =
insufficient=20
to support the trial court's findings of fact 11, 24, 30, 31, 32, =
70, and=20
71, and conclusions of law 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, =
and=20
19. In an=20
appeal of a judgment rendered after a bench trial, the trial =
court's=20
findings of fact have the same weight as a jury's verdict, and we =
review=20
the legal sufficiency of the evidence used to support them, just =
as we=20
would review a jury's findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 =
S.W.2d=20
295, 297 (Tex. 1994); Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty =
Corp., 190=20
S.W.3d 177, 184 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In =
conducting a legal sufficiency review of the evidence, a court =
must=20
consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the =
verdict=20
and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. =
City of=20
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). In =
determining=20
whether legally sufficient evidence supports the finding under =
review, we=20
must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable =
fact=20
finder could consider it, and disregard evidence contrary to the =
finding=20
unless a reasonable fact-finder could not disregard it. =
Id. at=20
827; Brown v. Brown, 236 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex. =
App.--Houston [1st=20
Dist.] 2007, no pet.). In an=20
appeal from a judgment rendered after a bench trial, we review a =
trial=20
court's conclusions of law de novo, and we will uphold the =
conclusions if=20
the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the =
evidence. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 =
S.W.3d 789,=20
794 (Tex. 2002); In re Moers, 104 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tex.=20
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Although a trial court's =
conclusions of law may not be challenged for factual sufficiency, =
we may=20
review the legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine =
whether the=20
conclusions are correct. BMC Software Belgium, N.V., 83 =
S.W.3d at=20
794. If we determine that a conclusion of law is erroneous, but =
that the=20
trial court nevertheless rendered the proper judgment, the error =
does not=20
require reversal. Id.; Vaughn v. DAP Fin. =
Servs., 982=20
S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no =
pet.). Finally, we=20
note that the trial court acts as fact-finder in a bench trial and =
is the=20
sole judge of the credibility of witnesses. See Murff v. =
Murff,=20
615 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. 1981); HTS Servs., Inc. v. Hallwood =
Realty=20
Partners, L.P., 190 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st =
Dist.]=20
2005, no pet.). The=20
findings of fact challenged by McCright provide, 11. William=20
Fisk was the Trustee of eight (8) Whorton Family Decedent Trusts =
(the=20
"Trusts") at the time of the death of Robert A. =
Whorton. 24. On=20
November 12, 2001 Karen McCright and her attorney met with William =
Fisk,=20
Executor, his attorney Emmett S. Huff, and Norman Snapp, CPA, at =
the Law=20
Office of Emmett S. Huff. At the meeting, Karen McCright =
acknowledged that=20
she was delinquent in the Note payments and reached an agreement =
with=20
William Fisk, Executor of the Estate of Robert A. Whorton, that if =
she=20
paid the taxes, maintained the property, and made payments in an =
amount=20
equal to the Note payments when she was able to do so; then, she =
would be=20
allowed to remain as a tenant-at-will until the property was sold =
or she=20
found a place to relocate her business, whichever occurred first. =
Karen=20
McCright agreed to give the Estate a Deed in lieu of foreclosure =
of the=20
Note and Deed of Trust liens. 30. The=20
Deed in Lieu was presented to Karen McCright in Emmett S. Huff's =
office at=20
which time Huff told her she could consult an attorney. The deed =
was=20
explained to McCright and she was given the opportunity to consult =
with an=20
attorney. 31. Johnnie=20
L. Fisk, Trustee of the Trusts that held the Whorton Estate =
property,=20
signed and accepted the Deed in Lieu. 32. The=20
Deed in Lieu was delivered to an[d] accepted by authorized =
representatives=20
of the Trusts and the Estate of Robert A. Whorton. 70.=20
Intervenor Johnnie L. Fisk, individually and as Executrix of the =
Estate of=20
Robert A. Whorton has incurred reasonable and necessary attorney's =
fees=20
for representation in having to pursue the breach of contract =
claims in=20
this lawsuit in the amount of $25,000. 71.=20
Defendant Josh E. Rodriguez has incurred actual damages for loss =
of use of=20
the property in the amount of $19,906.60, being $82.60 per day for =
the 241=20
days from and including July 18, 2006, the date Johnnie L. Fisk as =
Executrix of the Estate of Robert A. Whorton signed the Warranty =
Deed=20
conveying the property to Josh E. Rodriguez, through and including =
March=20
15, 2007. Despite the=20
fact that McCright states that she is challenging the legal =
sufficiency of=20
all of the above findings, she specifically addresses only certain =
aspects=20
of some of the findings identified above, and she does not address =
the=20
majority of the fact-findings made within the above enumerated =
findings.=20
Additionally, much of her discussion in her briefing does not =
match the=20
identified, challenged findings. Nevertheless, we have attempted =
to=20
address McCright's specific complaints below. To the extent that =
she seeks=20
to challenge other portions of the findings, she has inadequately =
briefed=20
these challenges and has waived them for our review. See =
Tex. R.=20
App. P. 38.1. We now turn to McCright's specific =
complaints. In support=20
of her challenges to findings 11 and 24, McCright contends that =
she=20
testified that she did not have an attorney at the November 2001 =
meeting=20
and that she did not agree to give Whorton's estate the deed in =
lieu of=20
foreclosure in December 2005. A finding as to whether or not =
McCright had=20
an attorney at the November 2001 meeting is not necessary to =
support the=20
judgment. See Cooke County Tax Appraisal Dist. v. Teel, =
129=20
S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (stating =
that "an=20
immaterial finding of fact is harmless and not grounds for =
reversal").=20
Moreover, Norman Snapp, Whorton's certified public accountant, =
testified=20
that McCright had an attorney with her during this meeting. To the =
extent=20
that this presented a credibility dispute, the trial court, as the =
fact-finder in resolving this dispute, could have chosen to =
believe Snapp.=20
See Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 700. In regard to McCright's =
second=20
complaint, although neither finding 11 nor finding 24 directly =
related to=20
the deed in lieu of foreclosure, our review of the record reveals=20
sufficient evidence, through the testimony of Johnnie Lue Fisk and =
Norman=20
Snapp, among others, as well as a copy of the deed in lieu of =
foreclosure=20
itself, to support a finding that McCright freely and voluntarily =
agreed=20
to give Whorton's estate the deed in lieu of foreclosure. =
Accordingly, we=20
hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support findings =
11 and=20
24. In support=20
of her challenges to findings 30, 31, and 32, McCright contends =
that she=20
was not given the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to =
signing=20
the deed in lieu of foreclosure, there is insufficient evidence to =
support=20
the finding that the property of the Whorton estate was held by =
the=20
Whorton trusts, and Johnnie Lue Fisk never accepted the property =
as the=20
executor of the Whorton estate. However, appellees offered =
testimony that=20
McCright was given the opportunity to consult an attorney before =
signing=20
the deed in lieu of foreclosure, and the trial court was entitled =
to=20
resolve any credibility disputes on this issue against =
McCright. See=20
id. In regard to McCright's complaint about the sufficiency =
of the=20
evidence to support a finding that the property from Whorton's =
estate was=20
held in trusts to which William Fisk, and subsequently Johnnie Lue =
Fisk,=20
served as trustee, appellees introduced into evidence a copy of =
Robert A.=20
Whorton's will and the Whorton trust documents, indicating that =
property=20
from Whorton's estate was to be placed in these trusts. Johnnie =
Lue Fisk=20
further testified that, at the time the deed in lieu of =
foreclosure was=20
signed, she was serving as the successor trustee of the trusts =
that held=20
property from the Whorton estate and that she signed and accepted =
the deed=20
in lieu of foreclosure in her capacity as trustee. Although =
Johnnie Lue=20
Fisk conceded that she qualified to serve as executor only after =
the=20
signing of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the evidence =
established that=20
the deed in lieu of foreclosure was accepted by the trusts and =
that the=20
property was later conveyed to the Whorton estate and ultimately =
to=20
Rodriguez. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally =
sufficient to=20
support findings 30, 31, and 32. In support=20
of her challenge to the award of attorney's fees in finding 70, =
McCright=20
asserts that Huff, Whorton's estate's lawyer, did not testify. She =
further=20
asserts that "there was no proof that the legal work was done or =
that it=20
had the value of $25,000 or that it was reasonable and necessary." =
Appellees respond that the reasonable and necessary attorney's =
fees paid=20
in this suit by the Whorton estate on the breach of contract claim =
were=20
established by the testimony of Johnnie Lue Fisk at trial on =
January 8,=20
2007. Appellees further note that a "detailed, cumulative invoice =
for=20
legal services rendered" by Huff was admitted into evidence. =
First, we=20
note that McCright has not challenged finding 68, wherein the =
trial court=20
found that appellees, as defendants and counterclaimants, hired =
Huff to=20
represent them in the suit, and finding 69, wherein the trial =
court found=20
that Johnnie Lue Fisk, as executor of Whorton's estate, received a =
bill=20
for attorney's fees from Huff for services rendered from September =
9, 2006=20
through December 31, 2006, Johnnie Lue Fisk paid Huff $25,000 in=20
attorney's fees for services rendered during this date range, and =
Johnnie=20
Lue Fisk still owed Huff the remaining balance reflected in the =
invoice.=20
See London, 94 S.W.3d at 149 (discussing legal effect of=20
unchallenged findings). Second, we=20
note that section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies =
Code=20
provides that "[a] person may recover reasonable attorney's fees =
from an=20
individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid =
claim and=20
costs, if the claim is for . . . an oral or written contract." =
Tex. Civ.=20
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. =A7 38.001 (Vernon 1997). Also, section =
38.004=20
specifically authorizes a trial court to take judicial notice of =
the usual=20
and customary attorney's fees and of the contents of the case file =
without=20
receiving further evidence in a proceeding before the court when =
those=20
attorney's fees are recovered pursuant to section 38.001. =
Id. =A7=20
38.004 (Vernon 1997); see also Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Chair =
King,=20
Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. 1990) ("The record of the =
trial=20
court proceedings reflected the complexity of the case. The trial =
court's=20
own proceedings together with the fact that it may take judicial =
notice of=20
usual and customary fees constitute some evidence to support the =
award of=20
appellate attorney's fees."); Superior Ironworks, Inc. v. Roll =
Form=20
Prods., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st =
Dist.]=20
1990, no writ) (stating that, in context of claim for services =
rendered=20
under section 38.001, "it was in the court's discretion to award=20
attorney's fees in the event of an appeal even though no evidence =
was=20
offered on this matter"). Here, the=20
trial court, in its final judgment, awarded Johnnie Lue Fisk, in =
her=20
capacity as executrix of the Whorton estate, damages in the amount =
of=20
$8,117.09 for delinquent real estate taxes for the years 2003 and =
2004.=20
The trial court's final judgment reflected that these damages were =
awarded=20
based on Johnnie Lue Fisk's breach of contract claim. The trial =
court also=20
stated that the attorney's fees that it awarded were incurred by =
Johnnie=20
Lue Fisk, as executrix of Whorton's estate, "in having to pursue =
the=20
breach of contract claims in this lawsuit." Under these =
circumstances, the=20
trial court would have been able to take judicial notice of =
Johnnie Lue=20
Fisk's attorney's fees expended in pursuing her breach of contract =
claim=20
against McCright. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code =
Ann. =A7=A7=20
38.001, 38.004. Additionally, the record reflects that the trial =
court did=20
not simply calculate its attorney's fees award based on its =
judicial=20
notice of its own case file and its determinations on the =
complexity of=20
the issues involved. Rather, Johnnie Lue Fisk introduced into =
evidence a=20
copy of a legal invoice from Huff for services rendered from =
September 9,=20
2006 until December 31, 2006. The invoice stated that Johnnie Lue =
Fisk had=20
expended fees and costs in the amount of $27,643, Huff had spent =
67.5=20
hours on the case at a rate of $400 per hour, and the legal work =
performed=20
included discovery responses, trial preparation, and court =
appearances.=20
This invoice was introduced during Johnnie Lue Fisk's testimony, =
wherein=20
she identified the invoice from Huff to her in her capacity as =
executor of=20
Whorton's estate. Based on this invoice, as well as the trial =
court's=20
ability to take judicial notice of its own file, we hold that =
there is=20
some evidence to support the award of attorney's fees and, thus, =
the=20
evidence is legally sufficient to support finding 70. In its original =
March 16,=20
2007 judgment, the trial court awarded Rodriguez damages in the =
amount of=20
$19,906.60, "being $82.60 per day for the 241 days from and =
including July=20
18, 2006, the date Johnnie L. Fisk as Executrix of the Estate of =
Robert A.=20
Whorton signed the Warranty Deed conveying the property to Josh E. =
Rodriguez, through and including March 15, 2007, the date before =
the date=20
this judgment is signed." In an amended final judgment, the trial =
court=20
reduced its award and awarded Rodriguez damages in the amount of=20
$17,346.00, "being $82.60 per day for the 210 days from and =
including=20
August 18, 2006, the date Johnnie L. Fisk as Executrix of the =
Estate of=20
Robert A. Whorton signed the Warranty Deed conveying the property =
to Josh=20
E. Rodriguez, through and including March 15, 2007, the date =
before the=20
date this judgment is signed." Appellees=20
note that the trial court "corrected the erroneous calculation" =
for=20
Rodriguez's loss of use of the property by changing the time =
period for=20
the loss of use from beginning on July 18, 2006 to beginning on =
August 18,=20
2006, thereby reducing Rodriguez's damages "from $19,906.60 to =
$17,346."=20
In its conclusions of law, the trial court also stated that =
Rodriguez had=20
sustained actual damages of $17,346 based on a loss of use =
beginning on=20
August 18, 2006. At trial, Rodriguez offered testimony in support =
of two=20
measures of damages. First, Rodriguez testified to a loss of =
benefit=20
measure of damages, based on rental income he could have made from =
the=20
property had McCright timely vacated the property. Rodriguez =
testified=20
that this measure of damage amounted to $467.33 a day. Second, =
Rodriguez=20
testified to a loss of use measure of damages, which he calculated =
by=20
dividing his monthly mortgage payment, and he testified that this =
amounted=20
to $88.66 per day. The trial court awarded Rodriguez damages based =
on his=20
loss of use, but instead calculated his loss of use to be $82.60 =
per=20
day--less than the amount testified to by Rodriguez. Accordingly, =
we hold=20
that legally sufficient evidence supports the damages awarded to =
Rodriguez=20
in finding 71. Although=20
McCright identifies certain challenged conclusions of law, she =
does not=20
separately discuss or address these conclusions in any way in her=20
briefing, and she has inadequately briefed these challenges. =
See=20
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. Nevertheless, we set forth the =
identified=20
conclusions and address the sufficiency of the evidence to support =
those=20
conclusions. The identified conclusions provided, 7.=20
Plaintiff Karen McCright breached the contract and agreements with =
the=20
Estate of Robert A. Whorton. 8. Josh E.=20
Rodriguez is the lawful owner of the property and has the lawful =
right to=20
possession of the property. 9.=20
Plaintiffs have trespassed on the property of Josh E.=20
Rodriguez. 11. Josh E.=20
Rodriguez has suffered damages as a result of Plaintiffs'=20
conduct. 12. Josh E.=20
Rodriguez is entitled to recover actual damages from Plaintiffs =
for=20
trespass and the wrongful withholding of possession of the =
property in the=20
amount of $17,346.00, being $82.60 per day for the 210 days from =
and=20
including August 18, 2006, the date Johnnie L. Fisk as Executrix =
of the=20
Estate of Robert A. Whorton signed the Warranty Deed conveying the =
property to Josh E. Rodriguez through and including March 15, =
2007, the=20
date before the date the original judgment in this case was =
signed.=20
Defendants are entitled to a credit to the amounts awarded to Josh =
E.=20
Rodriguez from, after and including August 18, 2006 through the =
date the=20
judgment in this case is paid in full. 13. The=20
Estate of Robert A. Whorton has incurred actual damages for the =
failure of=20
Plaintiffs to pay delinquent real estate taxes for years 2003 and =
2004 in=20
the amount of $8,117.09. 14. Johnnie=20
L. Fisk as Executrix of the Estate of Robert A. Whorton has =
incurred=20
reasonable and necessary attorney's fees in the sum of $25,000 in =
having=20
to pursue the breach of contract claims in this lawsuit. =
16. Josh E.=20
Rodriguez and Johnnie L. Fisk as Executrix of the Estate of Robert =
A.=20
Whorton are entitled to recover from Plaintiffs their taxable =
court=20
costs. 17. Josh E.=20
Rodriguez is entitled to recover from Plaintiffs post-judgment =
interest on=20
the sum of $17,346 (less any credit for payments made by =
Plaintiffs from,=20
after and including August 18, 2006, through the date it is paid =
in full)=20
at the rate of 8.25% per annum, compounded annually, from and =
including=20
the date the judgment in this case is signed and until the said =
amount is=20
paid in full. 18. Johnnie=20
L. Fisk as Executrix of the Estate of Robert A. Whorton is =
entitled to=20
recover from Plaintiffs post-judgment interest on the sum of =
$25,000 (less=20
any credit for payments made by Plaintiffs from, after and =
including=20
August 18, 2006, through the date it is paid in full) at the rate =
of 8.25%=20
per annum, compounded annually, from and including the [date the] =
judgment=20
in this case is signed and until the said amount is paid in=20
full. We overrule=20
McCright's third issue. We affirm=20
the judgment of the trial court. Panel=20
consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and=20
Bland. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.