=
For=20 The
NANCY =
VASQUEZ,=20
Appellant BRENDA =
HILDENBRAND,=20
Appellee
On =
Appeal from=20
County Civil Court at Law No. 1 Harris =
County,=20
Texas Trial =
Court Cause=20
No. 838563
MEMORANDUM=20
OPINION In this =
suit for=20
negligence, appellant, Nancy Vasquez, appeals the jury verdict =
rendered in=20
favor of appellee, Brenda Hildenbrand. In eight issues on appeal, =
Vasquez=20
argues that (1) the jury's finding of zero damages for a) medical =
expenses=20
in the past and future, b) physical pain and mental anguish in the =
past,=20
c) loss of wages in the past, d) physical impairment in the past, =
and e)=20
disfigurement in the past is so against the great weight and =
preponderance=20
of evidence as to be clearly wrong, manifestly unjust, and =
blatantly=20
inadequate; (2) the trial court committed judicial misconduct and =
coerced=20
the jury to render a verdict based on passion and prejudice; and =
(3) the=20
trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to=20
recuse. We affirm.
On July 1, 2005, Hildenbrand, =
who was on=20
her way home from work, exited from the Bay Area Boulevard and =
stopped=20
behind Vasquez's car. Vasquez, who was waiting at a yield sign for =
traffic=20
to pass, started to go, but then stopped. Hildenbrand, seeing that =
Vasquez=20
moved forward, also starting moving forward and collided with =
Vasquez's=20
car. Vasquez sued Hildenbrand for negligence for injuries =
sustained in the=20
accident. A jury found that Hildenbrand =
was 100%=20
negligent but did not award Vasquez any damages. Vasquez filed a =
motion=20
for new trial and subsequently filed a motion to recuse the trial =
court=20
from considering the motion for new trial and from any further=20
participation in the case. The trial court declined to recuse =
himself, and=20
the matter was referred to the Presiding Judge of the Second=20
Administrative Judicial Region. The Presiding Judge denied the =
motion to=20
recuse and the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of =
law.=20
Vasquez appeals the trial court's verdict and the presiding =
judge's order=20
denying the motion to recuse.
In her first six issues, =
Vasquez contends=20
that the jury's failure to award any money damages for (1) medical =
expenses in the past, (2) medical expenses in the future, (3) =
physical=20
pain and mental anguish in the past, (4) lost wages in the past, =
(5)=20
physical impairment in the past, and (6) disfigurement in the past =
is=20
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is =
clearly=20
wrong and unjust. When we review a factual =
sufficiency=20
point of error, we consider, weigh, and examine all of the =
evidence that=20
supports or undermines the jury's finding. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. =
United=20
States Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989). We =
review the=20
evidence keeping in mind that it is the jury's role, not ours, to =
judge=20
the credibility of the evidence, to assign the weight to be given =
to=20
testimony, and to resolve inconsistencies within or conflicts =
among the=20
witnesses' testimony. Reyna v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 =
S.W.3d 58, 73=20
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). We set aside the =
verdict only=20
when we find that the evidence, standing alone, is too weak to =
support the=20
finding or that the finding is so against the overwhelming weight =
of the=20
evidence that it is manifestly unjust and clearly wrong. Ortiz =
v.=20
Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Garza v. =
Alviar, 395=20
S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). At trial, Vasquez testified =
that=20
Hildenbrand hit her car "very hard." She testified that she was =
hit in the=20
back and that the light was smashed along with the metal around =
the light=20
and that there was damage to the bumper. She testified that there =
was $700=20
in damages to her car. Vasquez testified that the collision with=20
Hildenbrand's truck "wasn't that bad, that hard--she come very =
hard,=20
around maybe 20, 30 miles per hour." After the collision, her =
children in=20
the car were scared and so was Vasquez. Vasquez answered "yes" =
when she=20
was asked if she was injured in the accident. She testified that =
"my back,=20
my neck. Because when I'm--I was--when I tried to look like that, =
she come=20
and hit me, and then this start to hurt like right around my =
neck."=20
Vasquez testified that she was =
in therapy=20
for three months and that, during this time, she was not working =
as a=20
housekeeper. She testified that she generally worked for 6 to 7 =
hours a=20
day and made $75 a day. During the time she was having treatments, =
she=20
felt pain in her neck and back. In the beginning, she had pain =
"all the=20
time." Before seeing the doctor, she took Tylenol for the pain and =
then=20
she got a Vioxx prescription. During the trial, Vasquez testified =
that=20
sometimes she is in pain. Vasquez testified that "when I get very =
sick,=20
all I do is sit in bed. Just in bed. And I can't play with my =
kids, and I=20
can't do a lot of things we used to do." After the collision, she=20
testified that she feels pain and that she "can't play and do =
anything."=20
Vasquez said she was not asking for any future damages. =
On cross-examination, Vasquez =
testified=20
that after the accident, her vehicle was not pushed into the =
intersection.=20
She volunteered that the impact "wasn't too hard," but she was =
scared=20
after the accident because she was worried about her children. =
Vasquez=20
testified that her children and her 50-year old passenger were =
okay. She=20
stated that at the accident, she did not feel pain immediately. =
Vasquez=20
changed her testimony after listening to her prior deposition =
testimony in=20
which she had said that her back started to hurt immediately. She =
then=20
clarified that she felt a little pain at the scene, but that she =
did not=20
need medical attention at the scene. Vasquez testified that after =
the=20
accident she went to work, but only for easy babysitter jobs. She =
could=20
not remember when she returned to work, but she recalled that she =
returned=20
to work a few times before seeing Dr. Bergeron. She thought she =
missed two=20
months of work, but her testimony was not clear. Since her =
deposition, she=20
had had neck and back pain, but she had not returned to the doctor =
to get=20
it evaluated. A few days after the accident,=20
Hildenbrand's mother and father came to Vasquez's residence to =
view the=20
property damage. At that time, Vasquez told them that the only =
damage to=20
her car was the broken taillight. She agreed that when =
Hildenbrand's=20
parents came, she told them that she did not have any injuries. =
She also=20
agreed that she told them that she was worried about having the =
car fixed=20
before her husband came home, even though she was not married at =
that=20
time. Vasquez then testified =
inconsistently=20
about whether she was working during the two months after the =
accident.=20
She said that sometimes she worked if she felt better. She agreed =
that=20
sometimes she did housekeeping during the two months following the =
accident. She stated that she did not bring evidence for the jury =
to=20
examine to support her lost wages claim. Dr. Bergeron testified that he =
owns two=20
clinics and sees about 60 to 80 patients a day and that Vasquez =
came to=20
the clinic, but saw Dr. Conti, one of his associates. He agreed =
that a=20
history was taken, but testified that Dr. Conti took the history. =
Dr.=20
Bergeron testified that Vasquez was in an accident and had =
developed "mid=20
and low back pain." The results of an examination showed "minimal=20
tenderness of the thoractic spine. However, examination of the =
lower back=20
showed severe muscle spasms in forward flexion with an antalgic =
curvature=20
of the spine and right-sided paravertebral muscle spasm." =
Appellant's=20
counsel asked, "After your examination of Nancy, were you able to =
make a=20
diagnosis?" Dr. Bergeron answered, "Cervical, thoracic and lumbar=20
sprain/strain." Dr. Bergeron testified that at the time of the =
diagnosis,=20
he believed Vasquez was in pain. Dr. Bergeron testified that, =
based on=20
reasonable medical probability, Vasquez suffered those injuries as =
a=20
result of the car accident. Dr. Bergeron further testified that =
Vasquez=20
was treated for about four weeks and that, during this time, she =
was given=20
anti-inflammatory medication, a muscle relaxer, and Vioxx for =
pain. In his=20
opinion, he believed she was suffering. On cross-examination, Dr. =
Bergeron agreed=20
that he did not treat Vasquez and that he never examined her. Dr. =
Bergeron=20
further agreed that daily lifting, bending, and stooping can cause =
a=20
soft-tissue injury if not done properly. He also agreed that =
vacuuming,=20
sweeping, mopping, lifting, and dusting are other activities that, =
if not=20
done properly, could result in a soft-tissue injury. Dr. Bergeron=20
testified that when Vasquez came into the clinic she was =
continuing to=20
work and that the medical records did not indicate a =
recommendation for=20
Vasquez to stop working. Dr. Bergeron testified that Vasquez saw =
Dr. Conti=20
on three visits and that the rest of the appointments were =
appointments=20
for physical therapy that was also part of the clinic. Dr. =
Bergeron agreed=20
that the patient is under a "letter of protection." He described =
the=20
letter of protection as something an attorney gives you which =
states that=20
if and when a case settles you will be paid for your medical =
treatments if=20
those treatments are not paid by insurance. Dr. Bergeron testified =
that,=20
on the last visit, Dr. Conti told Vasquez to come back as needed =
but that=20
she had not returned. Diane Ortiz, Hildenbrand's =
mother,=20
testified that she and her husband visited with Vasquez a few days =
after=20
the accident. Ortiz testified that the taillight and the rim of =
the light=20
were damaged in the accident. She testified that Vasquez told her =
that the=20
damage to the car was the broken taillight and that the only =
damage was=20
the "light and the little rim around the light." She testified =
that=20
Vasquez told her that everyone was fine. When asked about =
Vasquez's=20
condition, she stated that "she ran after her child," "[s]he was =
not=20
hurt," and "[Vasquez] said there was no injuries." Hildenbrand testified that they =
were both=20
stopped at a yield sign and when Vasquez started to go Hildenbrand =
started=20
to go too, but then Vasquez stopped and Hildenbrand could not stop =
in=20
time. Hildenbrand testified that she was driving approximately 5 =
to 10=20
miles per hour when she hit Vasquez's car. She testified that when =
they=20
got out of the car in a parking lot Vasquez did not complain of =
any neck=20
or back pain and that both cars were driven away from the scene.=20
At trial, Vasquez presented =
evidence that=20
her car was rear ended by Hildenbrand and that at the scene of the =
accident, Vasquez felt some pain. She eventually saw a doctor who=20
prescribed pain medication and physical therapy. Dr. Bergeron =
testified at=20
the trial that, based on medical probability, she had pain and =
that she=20
had received a diagnosis of "[c]ervical, thoracic and lumbar=20
sprain/strain." He produced evidence that her past medical =
expenses were=20
$2,791.00. Hildenbrand presented =
controverting=20
evidence, both through direct-examination of her own witnesses and =
cross-examination of Vasquez's witnesses, that (1) the damage to =
Vasquez's=20
car was very slight and that she hit Vasquez's car at =
approximately 5 to=20
10 miles per hour; (2) none of the other passengers in Vasquez's =
car was=20
hurt from the collision; (3) Vasquez said she was okay at the =
scene; (4)=20
both Vasquez and Hildenbrand were able to drive their cars away =
from the=20
accident; (5) no police or ambulance was called to the scene; (6)=20
Hildenbrand's mother saw Vasquez a few days after the accident, =
and=20
Vasquez said there were no injuries; (7) Hildenbrand's mother saw =
Vasquez=20
run after her young son; (8) Vasquez told Hildenbrand's mother =
that the=20
only damage to the vehicle was the taillight; (9) Vasquez =
testified=20
inconsistently as to whether she worked after the accident and how =
much=20
work she missed after the accident; (10) Dr. Bergeron testified =
that=20
Vasquez had a soft tissue injury, but he also testified that =
another=20
doctor was the doctor who treated Vasquez. The mental processes by which a =
jury=20
determines the amount of damages are ordinarily incognizable by an =
appellate court. See Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, =
359-60=20
(Tex. 1995). In assessing personal injury damages, the trier of =
fact has=20
great discretion in fixing the amount of the damage award. See =
McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986). =
Opinions and=20
judgments of expert witnesses are not conclusive on the jury.=20
Id.; see Callejo v. Brazos Elec. Coop., 755 =
S.W.2d 73,=20
75 (Tex. 1988). Jurors weighing evidence have a right to use their =
common=20
knowledge and experience, and, if the opinions of the experts as =
given in=20
the evidence do not comport with the jurors' sense of sound logic, =
they=20
have a right to say so. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hearks, 144 =
Tex.=20
317, 190 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1945). It is peculiarly within the =
jury's=20
discretion to determine the dollar amount of a plaintiff's pain =
and=20
suffering. Lege v. Jones, 919 S.W.2d 870, 877 (Tex. =
App.--Houston=20
[14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). There are no objective guidelines by =
which a=20
court may measure the money equivalent of mental pain, and much =
discretion=20
must be allowed to the jury in fixing this amount. Green v.=20
Meadows, 527 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st =
Dist.]=20
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The determination of the amount of money =
that=20
will compensate the plaintiff for physical injuries, impairment, =
and=20
mental anguish involves a consideration of elements for which no=20
mathematical standard exists except what an honest or impartial =
jury may=20
deem adequate. Dico Tire, Inc. v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d =
776, 792=20
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied). Lost wages or =
earnings=20
refers to the actual loss of income due to an inability to perform =
a=20
specific job from the time of injury to the time of trial. =
Strauss v.=20
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 67 S.W.3d 428, 435 (Tex. App.--Houston =
[14th=20
Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A claim for past medical expenses must be =
supported=20
by evidence that such expenses were reasonable and necessary as a =
result=20
of the injury. See Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. =
Murdock, 946=20
S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. 1997). Disfigurement has been defined as =
that which=20
impairs the appearance of a person, or that which renders =
unsightly,=20
misshapen or imperfect, or deforms in some manner. Goldman v.=20
Torres, 161 Tex. 437, 341 S.W.2d 154, 160 (1960); =
Sunbridge=20
Healthcare Corp. v. Penny, 160 S.W.3d 230, 252 (Tex. =
App.--Texarkana=20
2005, no pet.). The jurors were charged to =
observe the=20
witnesses, to evaluate their demeanor and the credibility of their =
testimony, and to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence. In =
determining=20
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings, =
the=20
appellate court accepts, and will not interfere with, the jury's=20
resolution of any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. =
Ortiz=20
v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 859 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. =
App.--Corpus=20
Christi 1993, writ denied) (citing Pool v. Ford Motor =
Co., 715=20
S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)). While the jury's determinations =
might be=20
different from those that a trial court or appellate court might =
have=20
made, our review of all the evidence leads us to conclude that the =
jury's=20
findings of zero damages for past medical expenses, medical =
expenses in=20
the future, physical impairment in the past, and disfigurement in =
the past=20
are not so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that =
they are=20
manifestly unjust and clearly wrong. See Ortiz, 917 =
S.W.2d at=20
772; Garza, 395 S.W.2d at 823. Although Vasquez presented =
evidence that she had past medical expenses, medical expenses in =
the=20
future, physical impairment in the past, and disfigurement in the =
past,=20
the jury reasonably could have determined that there was no damage =
or that=20
any damages were attributable to factors other than the collision. =
See=20
McDonald v. Dankworth, 212 S.W.3d 336, 348-49 (Tex. =
App.--Austin=20
2006, no pet.) (affirming jury's zero damages award for physical=20
impairment and physical pain and mental anguish); Walker v.=20
Ricks, 101 S.W.3d 740, 750 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2003, =
no pet.)=20
(affirming jury's zero damages award for past medical expenses, =
past=20
physical pain and suffering, past mental anguish, and past =
physical=20
impairment). Regarding Vasquez's claim for physical pain and =
mental=20
anguish in the past, the jury reasonably could have concluded that =
no=20
damages were warranted because of (1) the minor nature of the =
accident,=20
(2) Vasquez's condition at the scene of the accident, and (3) =
Vasquez's=20
condition at her home after the accident. See McDonald, =
212=20
S.W.3d at 348-49; Walker, 101 S.W.3d at 750. We also =
conclude=20
that the jury's determination of zero damages for lost wages is =
factually=20
sufficient because the jury heard testimony that she did work to =
varying=20
degrees during the time she was seeking lost wages. In addition, =
the jury=20
may have concluded that other factors caused her to miss time from =
work.=20
We overrule Vasquez's first, =
second,=20
third, fourth, fifth, and sixth issues on appeal.
In her seventh issue, Vasquez =
argues that=20
the trial court exhibited judicial misconduct and that it coerced =
the jury=20
to render a verdict based on passion and prejudice. Within this =
issue,=20
Vasquez alleges 15 instances of judicial misconduct. atmosphere permeated the =
courtroom and,=20
consciously or subconsciously, swayed the attitude of the entire =
jury=20
against [her] and prevented her from receiving a fair trial. The =
Court's=20
admonitions, accusations, derogations, and theatrics couched in =
patriotic=20
and religious displays directed against [her] counsel throughout =
the=20
trial, influenced the jury to view [her] and her counsel as =
outsiders.=20
They were not to be trusted because the Court did not deem them =
worthy of=20
trust. The cumulative effect of such misconduct and the effect on =
the jury=20
was calculated to cause and in all probability did cause the =
rendition of=20
this improper, wrongful judgment. The discretion vested in the =
trial court=20
over the conduct of a trial is great. Dow Chem. Co. v. =
Francis,=20
46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2001). A trial court has the authority to =
express=20
itself in exercising this broad discretion. Id. at =
240-41.=20
Opinions the judge forms during a trial do not necessitate recusal =
unless=20
they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would =
make fair=20
judgment impossible. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. =
540, 555,=20
114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994). Judicial remarks during the course =
of a=20
trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, =
counsel,=20
the parties, or their cases ordinarily do not support a bias or =
partiality=20
challenge. Id. Expressions of impatience, =
dissatisfaction,=20
annoyance, or anger do not establish bias. Id. at 555-56, =
114 S.=20
Ct. at 1157. Such remarks may constitute bias if they reveal an =
opinion=20
deriving from an extrajudicial source; however, when no =
extrajudicial=20
source is alleged, such remarks will constitute bias only if they =
reveal=20
such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair =
judgment=20
impossible. See Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 271 =
(Tex.=20
App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). To reverse a judgment on the =
ground of=20
improper conduct or comments of the judge, we must find (1) that =
judicial=20
impropriety was in fact committed and (2) probable prejudice to =
the=20
complaining party. Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 39 =
(Tex.=20
App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). The record shows that most of =
the alleged=20
acts of misconduct concern events that happened outside the =
presence of=20
the jury. Thus, although Vasquez argues that the "[c]ourt's =
admonitions,=20
accusations, derogations, and theatrics couched in patriotic and =
religious=20
displays directed against [Vasquez's] counsel throughout the =
trial,=20
influenced the jury to view [Vasquez] and her counsel as =
outsiders," the=20
record shows that the jury could not have been influenced by the =
trial=20
court's actions because most of the actions happened outside the =
presence=20
of the jury. For the remaining allegations of misconduct, the =
record shows=20
that Vasquez did not assert any objections to what she now =
complains of on=20
appeal. Thus, her complaints are waived. See Tex. R. App. =
P.=20
33.1. Moreover, we have examined the entire record and conclude =
that=20
Vasquez has failed to demonstrate judicial impropriety that =
resulted in=20
harmful error. And, as in Metzger, we decline to =
unnecessarily=20
lengthen this opinion with a review of each exchange Vasquez =
identifies in=20
her brief, because no useful purpose would be served by doing so. =
See=20
Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 39. We overrule Vasquez's seventh =
issue on=20
appeal.
In her eighth issue, Vasquez =
argues that=20
the trial court erred in denying her motion to recuse. After =
filing the=20
motion to recuse, the trial court declined to recuse himself. The =
matter=20
was referred to the Presiding Judge of the Second Administrative =
Judicial=20
Region who held a hearing on the motion and denied the motion to =
recuse.=20
We review the denial of a =
motion to=20
recuse under an abuse of discretion standard. Tex. R. Civ. P. =
18a(f);=20
McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. =
App.--Houston [1st=20
Dist.] 1995, writ denied). The test for an abuse of discretion is =
whether=20
the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or=20
principles, or acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. See Downer =
v.=20
Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985).=20
In her motion to recuse, =
Vasquez alleged=20
that the trial court showed a "pattern of behavior [that] shows a =
personal=20
bias and prejudice toward [Vasquez] and the subject matter of this =
case to=20
such an extent that the trial court's impartiality may be =
reasonably=20
questioned in any further hearings or proceedings." At the recusal hearing, =
Vasquez's counsel=20
testified that the trial court made inappropriate comments like =
"you=20
Italians stick together" and that "he was sorry that the jury =
would not=20
get to see two Sicilians go at it." However, the evidence also =
showed that=20
the trial court made these remarks out of the presence of the =
jury.=20
Vasquez's attorney also presented evidence that while his jury was =
in the=20
waiting room the trial court took pictures with a district court =
judge and=20
spoke with another jury. Vasquez's attorney testified that the =
trial court=20
gave the jury a speech about patriotism, stated that the bailiff =
was a=20
real war hero, and made the jury take a pledge of allegiance to =
the flag.=20
He testified that the trial court put the Bible on top of the =
rules of=20
procedure and kept it on display. He testified that the trial =
court told=20
him to make his objection in two words or less. He then described =
an=20
exchange he had had with the trial court about insurance, during =
which=20
opposing counsel "opened the door" to insurance, and he stated =
that the=20
trial court had made the jurors swear that they would not make a =
decision=20
based on the availability or lack of insurance. Vasquez's counsel =
said he=20
felt pressured to agree to the trial court's question to the =
lawyers about=20
waiving the reading of the charge. He testified that he made a =
comment=20
during closing arguments that "he had something to do with the =
charge,"=20
which caused the trial court to reprimand him in front of the jury =
because=20
it was the trial court's charge. He also discussed how the trial =
court=20
left the courtroom with another judge to do something in the other =
judge's=20
courtroom, but when he went to the other courtroom, it was locked. =
Vasquez's counsel testified that Hildenbrand had filed a motion =
for=20
sanctions prior to trial and that, during the trial, the trial =
court said,=20
"I'll be taking care of you with the Motion for Sanctions later." =
He=20
testified that during a bench conference to settle a dispute, the =
trial=20
court said that it would take both of the lawyers outside and work =
them=20
over, but counsel agreed that this comment was not on the record. =
He=20
testified that he was "astounded" when the trial court asked the =
lawyers,=20
"Which one of you is going to bring the donuts tomorrow?" He also=20
testified that at approximately 5 p.m. during the trial, the trial =
court=20
slammed a time clock down and said "I'm putting you on the time =
clock to=20
make sure you finish in ten minutes." Vasquez's counsel summarized =
his=20
grounds for recusal, "So I think that his pattern of misconduct =
was so=20
high with such antagonism and showing such favoritism that it was=20
impossible for my client to get a fair trial." Generally, judicial remarks =
during a=20
proceeding that are critical or even hostile to counsel, parties, =
or their=20
cases, do not support recusal. Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 =
S.W.2d 265,=20
271 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). "Such remarks =
may=20
[support recusal] if they reveal an opinion deriving from an =
extrajudicial=20
source and such remarks will do so if they reveal such a high =
degree of=20
favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible."=20
Id. Having reviewed the recusal =
hearing=20
record, we do not find that the administrative judge acted =
arbitrarily or=20
unreasonably, or without any reference to guiding rules and =
principles, in=20
denying Vasquez's motion to recuse. The evidence does not show =
that the=20
trial court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned or that =
the=20
trial court had a personal bias or prejudice concerning the =
subject matter=20
or a party. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a)(b). We overrule Vasquez's eighth=20
issue. We affirm the judgment of the =
trial=20
court. Evelyn V. Keyes Justice Panel consists of Justices =
Taft, Keyes,=20
and Alcala. 1. Vasquez=20
complains about (1) ethnic remarks; (2) patriotic sermon and =
pledge of=20
allegiance; (3) Bible display; (4) restricting objections; (5) =
requiring=20
second jury oath; (6) singular oral charge; (7) making a personal =
attack=20
during closing argument; (8) being absent from the courtroom; =
(9)=20
refusing to rule on a frivolous motion; (10) threatening =
assault;=20
(11) asking counsel to bring donuts for the jury; (12) placing =
counsel on=20
a time clock; (13) denying rebuttal; (14) visiting with another =
panel; and=20
(15) forbidding juror interviews.=20