Opinion issued May 10, 2007
In=20
The
In this=20
interlocutory appeal, the district court granted a plea to the=20
jurisdiction and held that, in a disciplinary action against a =
lawyer, the=20
district court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over issues and =
parties=20
not contemplated by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.=20
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. =
=A7 51.014(a)(8)=20
(Vernon Supp. 2006) (allowing interlocutory appeal). The district =
court's=20
March 1, 2006 order dismissed all other parties to the =
disciplinary action=20
other than appellee, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, and =
appellant=20
Peter J. Riga. Appellants Michael Easton and Riga appeal. We=20
reverse.
The=20
Commission brought a disciplinary action against Riga, alleging =
that Riga=20
violated provisions of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of =
Professional=20
Conduct and that Riga assisted Easton, his legal assistant, in the =
unauthorized practice of law. Pursuant to Texas Rule of =
Disciplinary=20
Procedure 3.02, the supreme court appointed the Honorable Craig =
Fowler,=20
judge of the 255th District Court of Dallas County, to preside =
over the=20
disciplinary action. Easton filed a plea in intervention, bringing =
claims=20
against Pamela Halliburton, the Commission's lawyer, and Suzanne =
Ross, a=20
member of one of the State Bar's grievance committees. Riga filed=20
counterclaims against the State Bar of Texas, the Commission, and=20
Halliburton, seeking monetary damages under title 42, United =
States Code,=20
section 1983 and sanctions under state law. Easton later filed a =
motion to=20
recuse Judge Fowler. The State=20
Bar, the Commission, Halliburton, and Ross filed a plea to the=20
jurisdiction in which they argued (1) that Judge Fowler's =
appointment=20
order did not authorize him to preside over any parties or claims =
other=20
than the disciplinary action brought by the Commission against =
Riga and=20
(2) that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction =
over=20
parties and claims outside the disciplinary action. Before taking =
action=20
on the motion to recuse, Judge Fowler granted the plea to the =
jurisdiction=20
on May 25, 2005. That order was not appealed. In November=20
2005, Judge Fowler referred Easton's motion to recuse to the =
presiding=20
judge of the administrative judicial region, who later denied the =
motion.=20
Acting in "an abundance of caution" after the denial of the motion =
to=20
recuse, the State Bar, the Commission, Halliburton, and Ross asked =
the=20
district court to reconsider its plea to the jurisdiction. Before =
the=20
district court signed a second order on March 1, 2006 granting the =
plea to=20
the jurisdiction, Riga and Easton on February 20, 2006 filed =
another=20
motion to recuse Judge Fowler. The district court's March 1, 2006 =
order=20
does not mention the pending recusal motion, but in a separate =
order on=20
March 1, 2006, the district court referred the recusal motion to =
the=20
presiding judge of the administrative judicial region. The record =
does not=20
reflect the ultimate disposition of the recusal =
motion. Riga and=20
Easton bring two issues. The first challenges the district court's =
action=20
in ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction while the recusal motion =
was=20
pending. The second challenges the merits of the order, in which =
Riga and=20
Easton argue that the district court as a court of general =
jurisdiction=20
had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matters concerning the =
other=20
parties and claims. The record=20
establishes that Judge Fowler was aware that a second motion to =
recuse was=20
pending when he signed the March 1, 2006 order granting the plea =
to the=20
jurisdiction. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(c) requires a =
judge who=20
declines to recuse to forward the recusal motion to the presiding =
judge of=20
the administrative judicial region. The=20
Commission argues that, even if Judge Fowler erroneously signed =
the March=20
1, 2006 order, the dismissal was proper on the grounds of =
governmental=20
immunity. This argument was not raised in the plea to the =
jurisdiction,=20
and we decline to address it before this ground is presented to =
the trial=20
court. Accordingly, we sustain issue one. We do not reach issue =
two,=20
concerning the scope of the district court's jurisdiction over =
matters not=20
directly related to the Commission's disciplinary action against=20
Riga.
We reverse=20
the March 1, 2006 order granting the plea to the jurisdiction. We =
do not=20
render an order in its place because the trial court should not =
have taken=20
action until the forwarded recusal motion was heard pursuant to =
Texas Rule=20
of Civil Procedure 18a(d). The Clerk of this Court is directed to =
issue=20
the mandate immediately. See Tex. R. App. P. 18.6. This =
opinion=20
is to be published in the official reporter system pursuant to =
Texas Rule=20
of Disciplinary Procedure 6.06. Sam Nuchia=20
Panel=20
consists of Justices Nuchia, Keyes, and Higley.=20
1. Riga and Easton draw a distinction =
between whether=20
the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the =
matters=20
concerning the other parties and claims, as opposed to whether it =
would be=20
error for the district court to litigate those matters in a =
disciplinary=20
action.=20
2. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a refers =
to the=20
presiding judge of the administrative judicial district, =
rather=20
than the administrative judicial region. The legislature =
created=20
administrative judicial regions. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. =A7 74.042 =
(Vernon=20
2005). The term "administrative judicial region" is used in the =
Rules of=20
Judicial Administration, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 3a, and =
Texas=20
Parental Notification Rule 2.2(d). The term "administrative =
judicial=20
district" is used in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, Rule of=20
Disciplinary Procedure 3.02, and Standards and Rules for =
Certification of=20
Certified Shorthand Reporters section IV(O). The difference in =
terms is=20
immaterial.