IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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No. 04-0838

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C.L. Westbrook, = Jr.,=20 Petitioner,

Peggy Lee Penley, Respondent

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On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the Second = District of=20 Texas

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Argued September=20 26, 2006

Justice O=92Neill delivered the opinion of the = Court.

In = this case,=20 we must decide the constitutionally appropriate role of civil courts in=20 resolving tort actions that arise from acts of church discipline. The = defendant=20 pastor in this case, C.L. =93Buddy=94 Westbrook, who is also a licensed = professional=20 counselor, directed his congregation to shun Peggy Lee Penley, a former parishioner, for engaging in a = =93biblically=20 inappropriate=94 relationship, which the ecclesiastical disciplinary = process=20 outlined in the church=92s constitution required him to do. Claiming = Westbrook had=20 learned the disclosed information in a secular counseling session, Penley filed this suit against him for = professional=20 negligence.

=20 For purposes of our review, we presume the counseling at issue = was purely=20 secular in nature as Penley claims. Even so, = we cannot=20 ignore Westbrook=92s role as Penley=92s = pastor. In his=20 dual capacity, Westbrook owed Penley = conflicting=20 duties; as Penley=92s counselor he owed her = a duty of=20 confidentiality, and as her pastor he owed Penley and=20 the church an obligation to disclose her conduct. We conclude that = parsing those=20 roles for purposes of determining civil liability in this case, where = health or=20 safety are not at issue, would unconstitutionally entangle the court in = matters=20 of church governance and impinge on the core religious function of = church=20 discipline. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals=92 judgment and = dismiss=20 the case for want of jurisdiction.

I. Background

=20 Penley experienced marital = difficulties with=20 her husband, Benjamin Stone, and in August 1998 obtained counseling = services=20 from Westbrook, a licensed professional marriage counselor and her = fellow=20 parishioner at McKinney Memorial Bible Church. This counseling took = place in=20 three sessions at Westbrook=92s office and Penley paid=20 for two or three of these sessions. Westbrook also conducted two = counseling=20 sessions with Stone in August 1998.

=20 In October 1999, Westbrook and others, including Penley and Stone, broke from their church and = formed=20 CrossLand Community Bible Church (=93CrossLand=94). Westbrook was elected CrossLand=92s pastor and also served as a church = elder. CrossLand, a =93Christ-centered church,=94 = operated according to=20 biblical principles and practices described in the church=92s = constitution and=20 statement of faith. CrossLand requires all = membership=20 applicants to affirm their willingness to abide by the church=92s = constitution,=20 which contains the following disciplinary policy:

We believe=20 that one of the primary responsibilities of the church is to maintain = the purity=20 of the Body. We are directed by God to be holy. In recognition of the = importance=20 of this obligation, the elders will biblically and lovingly utilize = every=20 appropriate means to restore members who find themselves in patterns of = serious=20 misconduct. When efforts at restoration fail, the elders will apply the = Biblical=20 teaching on church discipline, which could include revocation of = membership,=20 along with an appropriate announcement made to the membership (Matt = 18:15-17; I=20 Cor 5:1-5; Gal 6:1, 2; 2 Thes 3:6).

=20 The church=92s constitution provides that, if a member engages in = conduct=20 that =93violates Biblical standards, or which is detrimental to the = ministry,=20 unity, peace or purity of the church,=94 and the member is unrepentant, = =93the=20 elders will follow our Lord=92s instructions from Matthew = 18:15-20.=94[1] If the member remains = unrepentant=20 and chooses not to resign, the constitution instructs the church = authority to=20 revoke the parishioner=92s membership and announce the member=92s = removal to the=20 congregation. The church=92s stated goal is =93to encourage repentance = and=20 restoration of fellowship with the Lord and His people.=94

=20 Penley became a CrossLand member the same month the church was = formed in=20 October 1999. In applying for membership, Penley=20 answered various inquiries contained in a document titled =93CrossLand Community Bible Church Questions for = Membership.=94=20 Her answers confirmed Penley=92s agreement = with a=20 statement of the church=92s beliefs. In response to a request to = =93[a]ffirm your willingness to abide by the = constitution of this=20 church,=94 Penley responded, =93[s]ure, I can abide by the church constitution . . .=20 willingly.=94

=20 In July 2000, Penley separated from = her=20 husband. Thereafter, Penley and Stone = participated in=20 a series of weekly counseling sessions at Westbrook=92s home where = couples from=20 the church discussed how to improve their marriages. According to Penley, the Bible was not discussed in these = sessions and=20 she considered them to be an extension of her prior professional = counseling=20 relationship with Westbrook. Westbrook did not charge for these = sessions, and=20 all of the couples who participated were CrossLand=20 members.

=20 The marital counseling sessions proved to be unsuccessful, and = Penley decided that she would seek a divorce from = Stone.=20 Around October 2000, Penley and Stone went = to=20 Westbrook=92s home for what they thought would be another group session, = but=20 Westbrook and his wife were the only ones there. During a break, Penley spoke separately with Westbrook and = informed him that=20 she had decided to divorce Stone. She also confided that she had engaged = in an=20 extramarital sexual relationship. According to Penley=92s pleadings, Westbrook counseled her and = recommended=20 a family law attorney she could consult. When Westbrook broached the = topic of=20 church discipline that her extramarital relationship would require, = Penley informed him that she was resigning from = CrossLand.

=20 Thereafter, Westbrook and the church elders composed a letter to = the=20 CrossLand congregation concerning Penley=92s actions, which they published to the = membership on=20 November 7, 2000. The letter described the three-step disciplinary = process by=20 which CrossLand members were bound as = follows:

The=20 process first involves one individual going to the brother or sister in = sin. If=20 the one caught in sin =93listens,=94 meaning listens to the Lord and = repents=20 (changes direction), then the process is complete =96 =93you have won = your brother=20 or sister.=94

However,=20 if the one in sin chooses not to =93listen,=94 and continues in this = pattern, the=20 instructions are clear. A small group of two or three or more are to go = back=20 with you to the one in sin. We believe this group should be comprised of = individuals who are mature and godly believers and who know and love the = one in=20 sin. If the one in sin =93listens,=94 then the process is complete =96 = again, =93you=20 have won your brother or sister.=94

If the one=20 in sin =93refuses to listen=94 to this group of two or three, then the = instructions=20 are to =93tell it to the church.=94 If the one in sin now =93listens,=94 = the process is=20 complete =96 and we have =93won our brother or sister.=94

Notice,=20 however, =93if he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to = you as a=20 Gentile and a tax-gatherer.=92=94 As somewhat of an oversimplification, = this means=20 to treat the one in sin as an outsider. Through their continuing sin, = they=20 forfeit their membership in the church, and the members of the church = are to=20 break fellowship with them.

The letter=20 explained to the congregation that Penley = intended to=20 divorce her husband, there was no biblical basis for the divorce, she = had=20 engaged in a =93biblically inappropriate=94 relationship with another = man, and she=20 had rejected efforts to bring her to repentance and reconciliation. = Describing=20 the disciplinary process as one of =93tough love,=94 the letter = encouraged the=20 congregation to =93break fellowship=94 with Penley in=20 order to obtain her repentance and restoration to the church body. The = letter=20 admonished the congregation to treat the matter as a =93members-only = issue, not to=20 be shared with those outside [the congregation].=94

=20 In November 2001, Penley sued = Westbrook, CrossLand and the church elders alleging causes of = action=20 for defamation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional = infliction=20 of emotional distress. In response to her claims, Westbrook filed a plea = challenging the court=92s jurisdiction, contending the suit involved an=20 =93ecclesiastical dispute=94 concerning a church disciplinary matter, = which the=20 First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution = precluded the=20 trial court from adjudicating. The church and the elders filed a similar = motion=20 to dismiss. The trial court granted the defendants=92 motions and = dismissed the=20 case. Penley appealed the trial court=92s = order, but=20 subsequently dismissed her appeal as to all defendants except Westbrook. = The=20 court of appeals affirmed the trial court=92s dismissal of all claims = against=20 Westbrook except for professional negligence, which it held concerned=20 Westbrook=92s role as Penley=92s secular = professional=20 counselor and did not invoke First Amendment concerns. 146 S.W.3d 220, = 233. We=20 granted Westbrook=92s petition for review to examine the trial court=92s = jurisdiction over Penley=92s = professional-negligence=20 claim in light of the First Amendment=92s religion clauses.[2]

II. Review Standard

=20 A plea questioning the trial court=92s subject-matter = jurisdiction=20 raises a question of law that we review de novo. See = Tex. Dep=92t of Parks and Wildlife v. = Miranda, 133=20 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Lack of jurisdiction may = be raised=20 by a plea to the jurisdiction when religious-liberty grounds form the = basis for=20 the jurisdictional challenge.[3] See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d = 682;=20 Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int=92l, 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 = (Tex.=20 App.=97Austin 1995, writ denied). We focus first on the plaintiff=92s = petition to=20 determine whether the facts pled affirmatively demonstrate that = subject-matter=20 jurisdiction exists. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If the pleadings = are=20 insufficient to establish jurisdiction but do not affirmatively = demonstrate an=20 incurable defect, the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to = replead. Id. at 226-27. A plea should = not be=20 granted if a fact issue is presented as to the court=92s jurisdiction, = but if the=20 pleadings affirmatively demonstrate an incurable jurisdictional defect, = then the=20 plea to the jurisdiction must be granted. Id., = at=20 227-28.

III. Discussion

A. The First Amendment Religion Clauses

=20 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable = to the=20 states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut, = 310=20 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that =93Congress shall make no law = respecting an=20 establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . = . .=94=20 U.S. Const. amend. I. This = seemingly=20 straightforward pronouncement has generated volumes of interpretational=20 jurisprudence. At its core, the First Amendment recognizes two spheres = of=20 sovereignty when deciding matters of government and religion. The = religion=20 clauses are designed to =93prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of = either=20 [religion or government] into the precincts of the other,=94 Lemon v. = Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), and are = premised on=20 the notion that =93=91both religion and government can best work to = achieve their=20 lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective = sphere.=92=94=20 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985) (quoting = McCollum v. Bd.=20 of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)). The = First=20 Amendment=92s limitations on government extend to its judicial as well = as its=20 legislative branch. See Kreshik v. St. = Nicholas=20 Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 363 U.S. 190, = 191=20 (1960).

=20 Government action may burden the free exercise of religion in two = quite=20 different ways: by interfering with an individual=92s observance or = practice of a=20 particular faith, see, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, = Inc. v. City of=20 Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993), and by encroaching on the = church=92s=20 ability to manage its internal affairs, see, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. = 94, 116=20 (1952). See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. = Cir.=20 1996). Westbrook and Penley appear to agree = that the=20 church-autonomy cases govern the analysis in this case, but they = disagree over=20 their effect.

B. The Parties=92 Contentions

=20 Westbrook contends Penley=92s suit = encroaches=20 upon the autonomy of churches to decide matters of internal church = discipline=20 and governance. He acknowledges that there are exceptions to the concept = of=20 church autonomy, but claims they should be narrowly drawn by allowing = judicial=20 interference in church disciplinary matters only when a claim arises = from a=20 purely secular act. Westbrook describes actions that are purely secular = in=20 nature as those that are clearly nonreligious in motivation, like = intentional=20 torts or sexual misconduct. According to Westbrook, if there is any = doubt as to=20 the secular or religious nature of a particular action, courts should = proceed no=20 further. Any less deferential standard, Westbrook claims, would require = a=20 case-by-case analysis that would in itself excessively entangle the = courts with=20 religion and infringe upon the church=92s authority. In this case, = Westbrook=20 asserts, once Penley admitted that she = looked to him=20 as both a counselor and a pastor, the trial court was precluded from=20 adjudicating her claim. The rationale, Westbrook explains, is to avoid = courts=20 having to determine which acts are done in a secular role and which are = done in=20 an ecclesiastical capacity, particularly when there is such a blend of = roles, as=20 here, that makes it impossible to perceive where one ends and the other=20 begins.

=20 Penley, on the other hand, argues = that the=20 doctrine of church autonomy protects religious relationships by = preventing=20 judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes that turn on matters of = religious=20 doctrine or practice. This protection, she argues, does not shield a = licensed=20 professional counselor from liability that arises from a secular = counseling=20 relationship simply because scripture might occasionally be discussed. = According=20 to Penley, the First Amendment does not = preclude=20 judicial review of claims that do not derive from or depend upon = religious=20 doctrine. Penley contends that categorically = excluding=20 religious relationships from judicial scrutiny would necessarily extend=20 constitutional protection to the secular components of such = relationships and=20 place religious leaders in preferred positions in our society.

C. Civil Courts and Church Autonomy

=20 We agree that the First Amendment does not necessarily bar all = claims=20 that may touch upon religious conduct. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at = 677. But=20 in order to gauge the constitutional validity of a particular civil = action, we=20 must first identify the nature of the constitutional interest at stake. = When a=20 pastor who holds a professional counseling license engages in marital = counseling=20 with a parishioner, the line between the secular and the religious may = be=20 difficult to draw.[4] In that instance, secular rules = that=20 govern the professional relationship may conflict with or impinge upon = religious=20 tenets or standards of conduct to which the church and its members have=20 voluntarily bound themselves. Deciding which should yield requires a = careful=20 analysis of the respective interests sought to be protected.

=20 The interest that Penley asserts = concerns the=20 confidentiality that protects communications between a licensed = professional=20 counselor and a client. See 22 Tex. Admin. Code =A7 = 681.41(x). It is=20 Westbrook=92s breach of this secular duty to maintain confidentiality = that Penley contends caused her injury. Unlike = resolving Penley=92s originally asserted but later abandoned = defamation=20 claim, which would have required the court to delve into the religious = question=20 of whether Westbrook=92s statement about the biblical impropriety of = Penley=92s behavior was true or false, deciding = whether=20 Westbrook breached a secular duty of confidentiality as a licensed = professional=20 counselor would not, according to Penley, = require=20 resolution of a theological matter. Because her claim does not require = the court=20 to resolve a religious question, Penley = maintains her=20 professional negligence action does not run afoul of the First = Amendment.

=20 But Penley=92s argument goes to only = one area of=20 constitutional concern and ignores another. While it might be = theoretically true=20 that a court could decide whether Westbrook breached a secular duty of=20 confidentiality without having to resolve a theological question, that = doesn=92t=20 answer whether its doing so would unconstitutionally impede the = church=92s=20 authority to manage its own affairs. Churches have a fundamental right = =93to=20 decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church=20 government as well as those of faith and doctrine.=94 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; see Catholic Univ. of = Am., 83 F.3d at 462. It is a = core=20 tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence that, in resolving civil claims, = courts=20 must be careful not to intrude upon internal matters of church = governance:

The right=20 to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression = and=20 dissemination of any religious doctrine and to create tribunals for the = decision=20 of controverted questions of faith within = the=20 association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual = members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is=20 unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an = implied=20 consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would = be a=20 vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious = bodies, if=20 any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular = courts=20 and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, = and of=20 their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising = among=20 themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of=20 ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism = itself=20 provides for.

Watson v.=20 Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 = (1872).[5] Accordingly, the autonomy of a = church in=20 managing its affairs and deciding matters of =93church discipline . . . = or the=20 conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals = required of=20 them=94 has long been afforded broad constitutional protection. = Id. = at=20 733.[6]

=20 This Court, too, has long recognized a structural restraint on = the=20 constitutional power of civil courts to regulate matters of religion in = general,=20 Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 360, 363 (Tex. 1909), and of church = discipline=20 in particular, Minton v. Leavell, 297 = S.W. 615,=20 621-22 (Tex. Civ. App.=97Galveston 1927, = writ ref=92d). The Minton court cogently = explained why=20 courts must decline jurisdiction over disputes concerning church = membership:

It seems=20 to be settled law in this land of religious liberty that the civil = courts have=20 no power or jurisdiction to determine the regularity or validity of the = judgment=20 of a church tribunal expelling a member from further communion and = fellowship in=20 the church. Membership in a church creates a different relationship from = that=20 which exists in other voluntary societies formed for business, social, = literary,=20 or charitable purposes.

Church=20 relationship stands upon a different and higher plane, and the right of = a church=20 to decide for itself whom it may admit into fellowship or who shall be = expelled=20 or excluded from its fold cannot be questioned by the courts, when no = civil or=20 property rights are involved.

. . . If=20 the courts assume jurisdiction to question the validity of a judgment of = a=20 church court upon a question of this character, the churches would be = deprived=20 of the right of construing and administering their church laws . . . = .

Minton,=20 297 S.W. at 621-22; see also Brown, 116 S.W. at 363 (=93[W]henever the questions of discipline or of faith or = ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest of = these=20 church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal = tribunals=20 must accept as final, and as binding on them in their application to the = case=20 before them.=94) (quoting Watson, 80 U.S.=20 (13 Wall.) at 727).

=20 More recently, in Williams v. Gleason, the court of = appeals=20 declined jurisdiction over parishioners=92 tort claims against church = members who=20 participated in the church disciplinary process, finding that =93each = claim=20 implicates an ecclesiastical matter, namely their subjection to the = church=92s=20 discipline.=94 26 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. App.=97Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. = denied),=20 cert. denied, 533 U.S. 902 (2001). Disgruntled parishioners = cannot=20 circumvent ecclesiastical immunity by suing church members rather than = the=20 religious body itself, the court stated, else such immunity =93would be = an empty=20 protection=94 and =93there would be an inappropriate chilling effect on = the ability=20 of churches to discipline their members.=94 Id.; see also Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, = 793 (Tex.=20 App.=97Waco 1997, no pet.); Tran v. Fiorenza, 934=20 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.).

D. The Neutral-Principles Exception

=20 The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the doctrine of = church=20 autonomy when neutral principles of law may be applied to resolve = disputes over=20 ownership of church property. These exceptions, though, have been = narrowly drawn=20 for reasons aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in Watson over a = century=20 ago, and more recently in Milivojevich, 426=20 U.S. at 709, and Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-05 (1979). If = civil=20 courts undertake to resolve essentially religious controversies, = =93=91the hazards=20 are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious = doctrine and of=20 implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical = concern . . .=20 .=92=94 Milivojevich, 426 = U.S. at 710 (quoting Presbyterian = Church in=20 the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem=92l=20 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).

=20 Milivojevich involved an = intra-church=20 dispute over control of the property and assets of the Serbian Eastern = Orthodox=20 Diocese for the United = States=20 and Canada. Milivojevich, 426 = U.S. = at 698-99.=20 The Supreme Court rejected the Illinois Supreme Court=92s purported = reliance on=20 neutral principles of law in its holding that the Diocesan = reorganization and=20 Milivojevich=92s removal as Bishop were = invalid, and=20 outlined the broad autonomy our Constitution affords churches in = deciding=20 matters that touch upon religious doctrine. See id. at 720-26.=20 Emphasizing that the First Amendment severely limits the role of civil = courts in=20 resolving =93religious controversies that incidentally affect civil = rights,=94=20 id. at 711, the Court mandated judicial deference to the church = if=20 ownership determinations involve underlying questions of religious = doctrine.=20 Id. at 709-10 (citing = Presbyterian=20 Church, 393 U.S. at 449). Importantly, = the Court=20 noted that the principle of judicial deference is not limited to = disputes over=20 church property, but =93applies with equal force to church disputes over = church=20 polity and church administration.=94 Id. at 710.

=20 The Supreme Court again addressed an intra-church dispute over = property=20 ownership in Jones, 443 U.S. 595. The Court held = that states=20 may adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating such = disputes=20 without running afoul of First Amendment concerns, so long as resolution = of=20 ownership entails no inquiry into religious doctrine. Jones, 443=20 U.S. at 602-05. Called upon = to decide=20 which faction of the formerly united church congregation was entitled to = possession of a specific parcel of land, the Court stated that civil = courts have=20 general authority to resolve such questions given the =93obvious and = legitimate=20 interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in = providing a=20 civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined=20 conclusively.=94 Id. at 602. Even so, = the Court=20 emphasized that the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role = civil courts=20 may play in resolving such disputes; if interpretation of the = instruments of=20 ownership would require the court=92s resolution of a religious = controversy, the=20 court must defer to ecclesiastical resolution of the doctrinal issue. = Id. at = 604.

=20 Penley urges us to apply the = neutral-principles=20 approach to her professional-negligence claim, contending her claim can = be=20 resolved under neutral tort principles without resorting to or = infringing upon=20 religious doctrine. But even if we were to expand the neutral-principles = approach beyond the property-ownership context as Penley requests, we disagree that free-exercise = concerns=20 would not be implicated. A church=92s decision to discipline members for = conduct=20 considered outside of the church=92s moral code is an inherently = religious=20 function with which civil courts should not generally interfere. See=20 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. = Courts have=20 no jurisdiction to =93revise or question ordinary acts of church = discipline=94 and=20 =93cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the=20 excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly = cut off=20 from the body of the church.=94 Id. at 730=20 (quoting Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 253, 258 (1842)). = This is=20 because =93the judicial eye cannot penetrate the veil of the church for = the=20 forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of excised members; = when=20 they became members they did so upon the condition of continuing or not = as they=20 and their churches might determine, and they thereby submit to the=20 ecclesiastical power and cannot now invoke the supervisory power of the = civil=20 tribunals.=94 Id. at 731 = (citing Ferraria v. Vasconcelles, 23 Ill.=20 456, 461 (1860) (quoting Frost, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) at 259)).

=20 Penley contends the primary focus of = her=20 complaint is not the letter disseminated to the congregation or CrossLand=92s disciplinary process, even though = the damages=20 she seeks clearly appear to have arisen from those events. Rather, Penley explains, her suit centers on Westbrook=92s = initial=20 disclosure to the church elders of confidential information obtained = during the=20 marital counseling sessions, which she claims constituted a breach of=20 professional counseling standards. Because =93her primary focus is on = Westbrook=92s=20 disclosure of her confidential information to others separate and apart = from the=20 publication of the November 7 letter,=94 Penley contends=20 her claims =93do not involve matters of religious doctrine, practice, or = church=20 governance.=94

=20 It is true that Penley pins = Westbrook=92s=20 liability in this case, at least in part, on his breach of a secular = duty by=20 disclosing Penley=92s confidential = information to the=20 church elders in the first instance. However, this disclosure cannot be = isolated=20 from the church-disciplinary process in which it occurred, nor can = Westbrook=92s=20 free-exercise challenge be answered without examining what effect the = imposition=20 of damages would have on the inherently religious function of church = discipline.=20 Subjecting CrossLand=92s pastor to tort = liability for=20 engaging in the disciplinary process that the church requires would = clearly have=20 a =93chilling effect=94 on churches=92 ability to discipline members, = Williams,=20 26 S.W.3d at 59, and deprive churches of their right to construe and = administer=20 church laws, Minton, 297 S.W. at 622. See Paul v. = Watchtower=20 Bible & Tract Soc=92y of N.Y., Inc., = 819 F.2d=20 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that imposing tort liability for = shunning on a=20 church would =93in the long run have the same effect as prohibiting the = practice=20 and would compel the Church to abandon part of its religious = teachings=94). In=20 sum, while the elements of Penley=92s=20 professional-negligence claim can be defined by neutral = principles=20 without regard to religion, the application of those principles = to impose=20 civil tort liability on Westbrook would impinge upon CrossLand=92s ability to manage its internal = affairs and=20 hinder adherence to the church disciplinary process that its = constitution=20 requires. See Idleman, 75 Ind. L.J. at 254 n.96.

E. Discrimination and the Ministerial = Exception

=20 Cases involving claims of employment discrimination in = church-minister=20 relations are closely analogous, where the government=92s interest in = eradicating=20 discrimination collides with the church=92s constitutional right to = manage its=20 internal affairs free from government interference. See, e.g., EEOC = v.=20 Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 460. In these circumstances, = courts have=20 generally held that jurisdiction over a minister=92s Title VII claims of = sex- and=20 race-based discrimination must yield to First Amendment concerns when = necessary=20 to preserve the church=92s autonomy to manage its internal affairs.

=20 In Catholic University of America, for example, Sister = Elizabeth=20 McConough, a nun in the Dominican Order, = alleged that=20 the university had engaged in sex discrimination and retaliatory conduct = in=20 violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it denied = her tenure=20 in its Department of Canon Law. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 = F.32d at 457.=20 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued, as Penley does here, that the dispute could be = resolved by=20 applying neutral principles of law without entangling the government in=20 questions of religious doctrine. Id. at 465-66. The court = disagreed,=20 distinguishing the neutral trust- and property-law principles that were = employed=20 in Jones to determine ownership of land. Id. at 466. Acknowledging = that=20 generally an assessment of scholarship involves objective criteria = independent=20 of religious content, the court determined that those evaluating = McDonough=92s=20 publications were ultimately being asked to decide whether she was = qualified to=20 =93teach in the name of the Church.=94 Id. Consequently, there was = an=20 inevitable risk that those who assessed her scholarship would have to = consider=20 whether her conclusions were in accord with what they believed the = Church ought=20 to teach. Id. As the trial court noted = after=20 attempting to decide the case applying neutral principles, =93=91no = expert testimony=20 could effectively filter out the religious elements from the secular = ones=20 sufficiently to avoid unwholesome and impermissible entanglement with = religious=20 concerns.=92=94 Id. (quoting EEOC v. = Catholic Univ.=20 of Am., 856 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D. D. C. 1994)). Because resolving = McDonough=92s=20 Title VII claims could interfere with the church=92s ability to resolve = matters of=20 religion, the court held it lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 467.[7]

=20 In Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United=20 Methodist Church, Reverend Combs appealed the dismissal of her Title = VII=20 sex- and pregnancy-discrimination suit against the church. 173 F.3d 343 = (5th=20 Cir. 1999). The sole issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether the = district=20 court correctly determined that the First Amendment precluded it from=20 considering Combs=92s = employment-discrimination case,=20 even when the church=92s challenged actions were not based on religious = doctrine.=20 Id.=20 at 345. Combs argued that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction = because,=20 unlike in Catholic University where the = liability=20 determination would have required an evaluation of church doctrine, = there would=20 be no such need in her case. Id. at 350. The court = rejected this=20 argument, reiterating the First Amendment=92s two-fold concern: that = secular=20 courts should not interpret religious doctrine, nor should they intrude = into=20 church governance in a manner that would be inherently coercive, even = when the=20 alleged discrimination is purely nondoctrinal.=20 Id. Penley=92s contention implicates = the latter=20 concern, which the court in Combs found was enough to bar = jurisdiction=20 because the congressional mandate to eliminate discrimination in the = work place=20 must give way to the constitutional mandate to preserve church autonomy. = Id.

F. Penley=92s = Professional-Negligence=20 Claim

=20 We conclude that the secular confidentiality interest Penley=92s professional-negligence claim advances = fails to=20 override the strong constitutional presumption that favors preserving = the=20 church=92s interest in managing its affairs. Penley=20 voluntarily became a member of the church body and agreed to abide by = the church=20 constitution; indeed, she expressed that she did so =93willingly.=94 = That=20 constitution outlined the disciplinary process that would be followed if = a=20 member engaged in conduct that the church considered inappropriate. As = CrossLand=92s and Penley=92s pastor,=20 Westbrook assumed an obligation to Penley = and to the=20 congregation to follow the church=92s constitution. Although Penley contends pastoral counseling is not at = issue because=20 she did not receive marital counseling from Westbrook in his capacity as = a=20 member of the clergy, the publication about which Penley complains was made in the course of the = church=20 disciplinary process and communicated by Westbrook pursuant to the = requirements=20 of that process. And even though Penley=92s = suit is now=20 against Westbrook and no longer the church, it is well-settled that = =93[t]he=20 interaction between the church and its pastor is an integral part of = church=20 government,=94 Simpson, 494 F.2d at 493 , and =93[t]he = relationship between=20 an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood.=94 McClure, = 460=20 F.2d at 558.

=20 Even if Westbrook=92s dual roles as Penley=92s=20 secular counselor and her pastor could be distinguished, which is = doubtful,=20 Westbrook could not adhere to the standards of one without violating the = requirements of the other. Any civil liability that might attach for = Westbrook=92s=20 violation of a secular duty of confidentiality in this context would in = effect=20 impose a fine for his decision to follow the religious disciplinary = procedures=20 that his role as pastor required and have a concomitant chilling effect = on=20 churches=92 autonomy to manage their own affairs. See, = e.g.,=20 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc=92y = ., 819 F.2d=20 at 881 (stating =93the burden of tort damages is direct . . . [w]ere we = to permit=20 recovery, =91the pressure to . . . forego that practice [would be] unmistakeable=92=94) (quoting Thomas v. Review = Bd., 450=20 U.S. 707, 717 (1981)). The = result=20 would be interference by the civil courts in the relationship among = CrossLand, its pastor, and the church members, = which the=20 First Amendment prohibits. See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S. = at 717=20 (stating =93questions of church discipline and composition of the church = hierarchy=20 are at the core of ecclesiastical concern=94).

=20 We do not doubt that preserving client confidences revealed in = the=20 context of a professional counseling relationship serves an important = public=20 interest, as the duty the Legislature has imposed on such professionals=20 reflects. See 22 Tex. = Admin. Code=20 =A7 681.41(x). Maintaining patient confidentiality ensures that = individuals=20 receive effective and competent counseling when they need it. See = Abrams v.=20 Jones, 35 S.W.3d 620, 626 (Tex. = 2000)=20 (citing R. K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. 1994) = (stating that=20 the basis for the privilege is twofold: to encourage the full = communication=20 necessary for effective treatment and to prevent unnecessary disclosure = of=20 highly personal information)). But however highly we might rate the = importance=20 of that interest, it is by no means absolute when impingement on = free-exercise=20 rights results. See Wisconsin v. = Yoder,=20 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). The = values that=20 underlie the constitutional interest in prohibiting judicial = encroachment upon a=20 church=92s ability to manage its affairs and discipline its members, who = have=20 voluntarily united themselves to the church body and impliedly consented = to be=20 bound by its standards, have been zealously protected. See Watson, = 80=20 U.S. (13 Wall.) at = 733-34;=20 see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. When presented = with=20 conflicting interests like these, courts have generally held that =93a = spirit of=20 freedom for religious organizations=94 prevails, Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, even if that = freedom=20 comes at the expense of other interests of high social importance. = See Yoder,=20 406 U.S. at 214; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc=92y, 819 F.2d at 883 (finding the practice = of shunning=20 =93not to constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or = morality of the=20 community as to warrant state intervention,=94 and stating =93[i]ntangible or = emotional harms=20 cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of = action=20 against a church for its practices =97 or against its members.=94); = Simpson,=20 494 F.2d at 493 (stating =93[o]nly on rare = occasions=20 where there existed a compelling governmental interest in the regulation = of=20 public health, safety, and general welfare have the courts ventured into = this=20 protected area.=94); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. = App.=96Fort=20 Worth 1999, no pet.) (stating =93the preservation of the free exercise = of religion=20 is deemed so important a principle it overshadows the inequities which = may=20 result from its liberal application=94).

=20 Penley, citing Casa View Baptist = Church,=20 134 F.3d 331, contends members of the clergy enjoy no constitutional = protection=20 for misconduct as professional marriage counselors simply because they = may=20 occasionally discuss scripture within the context of that relationship. = In=20 principle, we agree. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 677. But = Sanders=20 involved an intentional tort that formed no part of the pastor=92s or = his church=92s=20 religious beliefs or practices. 134 F.3d at 336-37. In that case, Robyn = Sanders=20 and Lisa Mullanix sued Shelby Baucum, a minister at Casa View=20 Baptist Church, for malpractice and = breach of=20 fiduciary duties as a marriage counselor by, among other things, = encouraging and=20 consummating a sexual relationship with each of them. Id. at = 333. Baucum argued that his secular misconduct was not = actionable=20 because it occurred within two inherently ecclesiastical, rather than = =93purely=20 secular,=94 counseling relationships. Id. at 335. The court noted = that the=20 First Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships = from=20 judicial scrutiny because to do so would impermissibly extend = constitutional=20 protection to the secular components of these relationships and place = religious=20 leaders in a preferred position in our society. Id. at 335-36. The court held = that the=20 First Amendment does not require a minister=92s relationship with a = parishioner to=20 be purely secular in order for a court to review the propriety of the = conduct=20 that occurs within that relationship; rather, the First Amendment = protects=20 religious relationships between a minister and parishioner primarily by=20 preventing the judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes that turn = on=20 matters of religious doctrine or practice. Id. at 336. The court stated = that to=20 invoke constitutional protection for conduct that occurred within the = counseling=20 relationship, =93Baucum must assert that the = specific=20 conduct allegedly constituting a breach of his professional and = fiduciary duties=20 was rooted in religious belief.=94 Id. at 338. Noting the = =93obvious truth=94=20 that Baucum=92s actions could not be rooted = in the=20 church=92s religious beliefs and practices, the court held that Baucum could not hide behind First Amendment = protections.=20 Id.

=20 In Destefano v. Grabrian, the Supreme Court of Colorado was = similarly=20 presented with conduct that occurred in the context of a counseling = relationship=20 between a member of the clergy and a congregant. 763 P.2d at 278. Robert = and=20 Edna Destefano sought marriage counseling = from Grabrian, a Catholic priest for their diocese. = Id. = During the=20 course of their counseling relationship, Grabrian=20 developed a sexual relationship with Edna. Id. When the Destefanos filed suit for damages resulting from = the sexual=20 relationship Grabrian allegedly induced Edna = into,=20 Grabrian and the diocese contended the = claims were=20 constitutionally barred because a priest=92s performance of pastoral = duties,=20 including sacramental counseling of parishioners, is a matter of = ecclesiastical=20 concern. Id. at 283. The court noted = that,=20 =93[i]f the alleged conduct of Grabrian was dictated by his sincerely held = religious=20 beliefs or was consistent with the practice of his religion, we would = have to=20 resolve a difficult first amendment issue.=94 Id. at 284. But the court = held that the=20 conduct in issue clearly fell outside of the beliefs and doctrine of = Grabrian=92s religion and was not entitled to = constitutional=20 protection. Id.

=20 In the present case, Penley does not = question=20 that Westbrook=92s decision to reveal what she considered confidential = information=20 to the church elders was mandated by church doctrine and motivated by=20 Westbrook=92s religious beliefs. Neither was his revelation an = intentional tort=20 that endangered Penley=92s or the public=92s = health or=20 safety. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc=92y,=20 819 F.2d at 883 (stating the =93intangible or emotional harms=94 that = plaintiff=20 suffered as a result of her shunning =93are clearly not of the type that = would=20 justify the imposition of tort liability for religious conduct. No = physical=20 assault or battery occurred=94). Accordingly, Penley=92s=20 claims are distinguishable from those asserted in Sanders and = other cases=20 that involve sexual assault of parishioners occurring in the context of = what=20 purports to be pastoral counseling. See also Strock v. Pressnell,=20 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ohio 1988) (plaintiff alleged his minister = engaged in=20 sexual relations with his wife in the course of providing the couple = with=20 marriage counseling); F.G. v. Macdonell, 696=20 A.2d 697, 699 (N.J. 1997) (parishioner sued for breach of fiduciary duty = arising=20 out of sexual contact in a pastoral-counseling relationship with her=20 rector).

=20 Penley=92s petition implies that her = resignation=20 from the church after she revealed confidences to Westbrook precludes = any=20 argument that Westbrook was performing a pastoral function in = disseminating=20 confidential information to the church. But clearly Westbrook=92s = actions were=20 grounded in religious doctrine. Westbrook=92s report to the church = elders was an=20 integral part of the church=92s three-step disciplinary process as = described in=20 CrossLand=92s letter to the congregation: = =93If the one in=20 sin =91refuses to listen=92 . . . then the instructions are to =91tell = it to the=20 church.=92=94 The letter itself was disseminated to the congregation as = the final=20 step in the process: =93Through their continuing sin, they forfeit their = membership in the church, and the members of the church are to break = fellowship=20 with them.=94 Penley=92s voluntary = forfeiture of her=20 membership did not, in CrossLand=92s or = Westbrook=92s=20 view, forestall the church=92s duty under its constitution to =93tell it = to the=20 church=94 and admonish church members to =93break fellowship with [Penley].=94 Their decision to so proceed was based = on their=20 interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical = matter.=20 We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of = tort=20 liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance = in=20 violation of the First Amendment. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713 (noting that an inquiry = into whether=20 the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by = the First=20 Amendment); see also United=20 Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference. v. = White, 571=20 F.2d at 794 (stating =93secular evaluation of the procedures that = ecclesiastical=20 or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of = inquiry the=20 First Amendment prohibits=94); Minker, 894 F.2d=20 at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret = provisions of=20 the United Methodist Church=92s Book of Discipline governing pastoral=20 appointments); Hafner, 616 F. Supp. = at 737-39=20 (dismissing pastor=92s suit for alleged denial of benefits based on = interpretation=20 of the church synod constitution).

G. Penley=92s = Pleadings

=20 Westbrook=92s plea to the jurisdiction challenges Penley=92s pleadings and not the existence of = jurisdictional=20 facts. Accordingly, we construe those pleadings in Penley=92s favor, taking as true the facts pled to = determine=20 whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists in this case. See = Miranda, 133=20 S.W.3d at 226. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of=20 jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction must be granted and repleading is not allowed. Id. at 227. In determining = whether=20 subject-matter jurisdiction exists, courts must look to the =93substance = and=20 effect of a plaintiff=92s complaint to determine its ecclesiastical = implication,=20 not its emblemata.=94 Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. = App.=96Houston [1st=20 Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (citing Green v. United Pentecostal Church = Int=92l,=20 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.=96Austin 1995, pet. = denied) and=20 Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1577 = (1st=20 Cir. 1989)). Here, it is clear from Penley=92s Second=20 Amended Original Petition that her professional-negligence claim against = Westbrook unconstitutionally impinges upon internal matters of church = governance=20 in violation of the First Amendment. Because Penley=92s=20 pleading affirmatively negates the court=92s subject-matter = jurisdiction, the=20 trial court properly dismissed the case.

*=20 * *

=20 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals=92 judgment and = dismiss the=20 case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 ___________________________________

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Harriet O=92Neill

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 29, 2007

^[1]=20 Matthew 18 states:

If your brother sins, go and show him his = fault in=20 private; if he listens to you, you have won your brother. But if he does = not=20 listen to you, take one or two more with you, so that by the mouth of = two or=20 three witnesses every fact may be confirmed. If he refuses to listen to = them,=20 tell it to the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, = let him=20 be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.

The Holy = Bible, Matthew 18:15-17 (New American = Standard=20 Bible).

^[2]=20 The National Association of Evangelicals, the Southwestern Baptist = Theological=20 Seminary, and Dallas Theological Seminary submitted amicus curiae = briefs=20 in support of Westbrook=92s petition.

^[3]=20 Most courts agree that the general prohibition on the adjudication of = religious=20 questions, once triggered, precludes further adjudication of the issue = in=20 question. Scott C. Idleman, Tort = Liability,=20 Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 = Ind. L.J. 219, 225 (2000). = However,=20 there is some disagreement as to the prohibition=92s precise legal = operation.=20 Id. A=20 few courts conceptualize the general prohibition as a question of justiciability. See, e.g., Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943, 949 = (7th Cir.=20 1997) (stating =93true belief is not readily justiciable=94); Nayak v.=20 MCA, Inc., 911 F.2d 1082, 1083 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating =93the = =91correct=92=20 interpretation of the life of Christ . . . is not a justiciable question before a federal court=94). = Some treat=20 the matter as an affirmative defense to liability. See In re: Roman = Catholic=20 Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, = 849, 853=20 (Bankr. Or. 2005) (granting summary judgment = on=20 affirmative defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese,=20 Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ind. 2003) (stating =93pleading an = affirmative=20 defense like the Free Exercise Clause may under certain facts entitle a = party to=20 summary judgment=94). But the majority of courts broadly conceptualize = the=20 prohibition as a subject-matter bar to jurisdiction. See, e.g., = Tilton v.=20 Marshall, 925 S.W.2d672, 682 (Tex. 1996) (holding trial court abused = its=20 discretion in refusing to dismiss plaintiffs=92 intentional infliction = of=20 emotional distress and related conspiracy claims and prohibiting court = from=20 exercising jurisdiction over them except to dismiss); Bell v.=20 Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 330-33 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming = dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under First = Amendment); Klagsbrun v. Va=92ad Harabonim of Greater Mosey, 53 F. Supp. 2d = 732, 736=20 (dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Establishment = Clause);=20 Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d = 184,=20 185-88 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding First Amendment precluded subject-matter = jurisdiction over Title VII suit challenging church hiring=20 procedures).

^[4]=20 See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 285 n.10 (Colo. 1988) = (=93=91Family=20 counseling and psychological counseling are two notable areas in which = there is=20 substantial overlap between the secular and religious aspects of a = spiritual=20 counselor=92s activities.=92=94) (quoting Note, Clergy Malpractice: = Taking=20 Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort Analysis, 19=20 Rutgers L.J. 419, 437 (1988), and = citing=20 Comment, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the = Clergy=20 Malpractice Concept, 19 Cal. W.L.=20 Rev. 507, 516 (1983) (noting that pastoral counseling is a = religious, not=20 secular, activity in which =93[i]t is = impossible to=20 separate the =91cure of the minds=92 from the =91cure of the = souls=92=94) (quoting S.=20 Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, = 16 Val. U.L. Rev. 163, 166 = (1981));=20 Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower = Power,=20 14 Pepperdine L. Rev. = 137, 139=20 (1986) (=93While some degree of overlap and similarity may exist, the = religious=20 counselor remains distinct and unique from his secular counterpart, = approaching=20 therapy from an entirely different perspective.=94).

^[5]=20 Although Watson was decided before application of the Fourteenth=20 Amendment to state action and thus turned on general federal law, it=20 nevertheless delineated the limited role civil courts may = constitutionally play=20 in resolving controversies that touch upon religion. See Serbian E. = Orthodox=20 Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 = U.S. = 696, 710=20 (1976).

^[6]=20 Courts have grounded the doctrine of church autonomy in different = aspects of the=20 First Amendment, some looking to the Free Exercise Clause, some to the=20 Establishment Clause, some to both, and others to neither in particular. = See Idleman, 75 Ind. L.J. at 223-25; see = also=20 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc=92y of = Jesus,=20 211 F.3d 1331, 1332 (9th Cir. 2000), denying reh=92g=20 en banc (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) = (=93Though the=20 concept originated through application of the Free Exercise Clause, the = Supreme=20 Court has held that the Establishment Clause also protects church = autonomy in=20 internal religious matters.=94); see generally Douglas Laycock, = Towards=20 a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor = Relations and=20 the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1981) = (positing=20 that Free Exercise Clause protections against burdens or restrictions on = religion more appropriately address church autonomy concerns than the=20 Establishment Clause, which prohibits government sponsorship of = religion).=20 Because this case does not raise the question of government-sponsored = religion,=20 we ground our analysis in the Free Exercise Clause.

^[7]=20 See also Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. = Synod,=20 991 F.2d 468, 470-71 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding minister=92s claim that = the Synod=20 violated its bylaws by removing his name from list of eligible ministers = not=20 justiciable by secular courts); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of = United=20 Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356-58 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding = the=20 application of age-discrimination law in the minister=92s lawsuit = against his=20 church violative of the Free Exercise = Clause);=20 Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493-95 (5th Cir. 1974) = (holding=20 application of Civil Rights Act to pastor=92s claim of racial = discrimination would=20 encroach upon the church=92s right to be free from secular interference = and to=20 decide for themselves matters of church government); McClure v. = Salvation=20 Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding = application of=20 Title VII to the employment relationship between the Salvation Army and = its=20 ordained minister would involve a review that would cause improper state = intrusion on matters of church governance); cf. Scotts African Union=20 Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union First Colored = Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 94-96 (3rd Cir. 1996) = (applying=20 neutral-principles approach because aspects of the ownership = determination that=20 might touch on the church-governance sphere were irrelevant to the = ultimate=20 ownership question); Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Graham, 54 = F.3d=20 522525-26 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying neutral legal principles to the = property=20 dispute because ecclesiastical affairs were not implicated); Sanders = v. Casa=20 View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998), = (acknowledging that=20 protecting relationships not purely secular in nature might foster = development=20 of important spiritual ties, but holding =93the constitutional guarantee = of=20 religious freedom cannot be construed to protect secular = beliefs=20 and behavior, even when they comprise part of an otherwise religious=20 relationship between a minister and a member of his or her = congregation.=94).