IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

════════&#= 9552;═══

No. 05-0272

════════λ= 2;═══

Entergy Gulf = States, Inc.,=20 Petitioner,

John Summers,=20 Respondent

════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══════════ = 552;═

On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth = District of=20 Texas

════════&#= 9552;═════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══

Argued January 24,=20 2007

Justice Willett delivered the = opinion of=20 the Court.

In = this=20 workers=92 compensation case we decide whether a premises owner can also = be a=20 =93general contractor=94 under the Labor Code and thus qualify for the=20 exclusive-remedy defense. We hold that a premises owner that = =93undertakes to=20 procure=94 work falls within the statute=92s definition of a general = contractor.

I. Background

=20 John Summers sued Entergy Gulf States, Inc. for injuries he = sustained=20 while working at Entergy=92s Sabine Station plant as an employee of = International=20 Maintenance Corp. (IMC). IMC had contracted with Entergy to perform = construction=20 and maintenance on Entergy=92s premises. This contract refers to IMC as = an=20 =93independent contractor=94 and =93contractor,=94 while referring to = Entergy and its=20 affiliates as =93Entergy Companies.=94 The portion of the contract = defining IMC as=20 an independent contractor specifies that this language should not be = construed=20 to bar Entergy from raising the =93Statutory Employee=94 defense. = Entergy later sent=20 IMC a letter, which included an addendum to the contract, providing that = the=20 parties would recognize Entergy as the statutory employer of the IMC = employees=20 (while IMC would remain the =93direct employer=94) in order to take = advantage of a=20 Louisiana law that shields statutory employers from tort liability.[1]

&nbs= p;=20 Entergy also agreed to provide workers=92 compensation insurance to = IMC=92s Sabine plant employees in exchange for a = lower=20 contract price. Entergy obtained an insurance policy and paid the = premiums.=20 While this policy was in effect, Summers was injured at the Sabine = plant. He=20 applied for and received benefits under the policy, then sued Entergy = for=20 negligence. Entergy moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was a = general=20 contractor, and thus a deemed employer shielded from Summers=92s suit under the Texas Workers=92 = Compensation Act, as=20 now codified in the Texas Labor Code.[2] The district court agreed and = granted=20 summary judgment in Entergy=92s favor. The court of appeals reversed.[3]

II. Discussion

=20 The Labor Code makes workers=92 compensation benefits an = employee=92s=20 =93exclusive remedy=94 against an employer for covered work-related = injuries.[4] It defines =93general = contractor=94 as =93a=20 person who undertakes to procure the performance of work or a service, = either=20 separately or through the use of subcontractors.=94[5] A general contractor =93may = enter into a=20 written agreement [with a subcontractor] under which the general = contractor=20 provides workers=92 compensation=94 coverage to the subcontractor and = the=20 subcontractor=92s employees,[6] and such an agreement =93makes = the general=20 contractor the employer of the subcontractor and the subcontractor=92s = employees=94=20 for purposes of the workers=92 compensation laws.[7]

A. Whether a =93Written Agreement=94 Exists Under the = Act

= As a threshold matter, Summers argues that Entergy failed to satisfy = section=20 406.123=92s requirement that the general contractor (Entergy) and = subcontractor=20 (IMC) execute a written agreement under which Entergy would provide = workers=92=20 compensation coverage. Entergy counters that a reference to =93O.P.I.P. = wage=20 rates=94 in a =93Blanket Contract Order=94 sent to IMC constitutes the = requisite=20 agreement because this acronym refers to =93owner provided insurance = program.=94

= Summers=92s =93no written agreement=94 = argument was not=20 raised in the trial court as a ground for denying summary judgment. = Thus, Summers has waived this argument.[8] The sole remaining question is = whether=20 Entergy is a =93general contractor=94 and thus a deemed employer under = the Labor=20 Code.

B. Whether Entergy Is a =93General Contractor=94 Under = the=20 Act

1. =20 The Act=92s Current Definitions of =93General Contractor=94 and = =93Subcontractor=94 Do=20 Not Preclude a Dual Role for Premises Owners

= =93Our primary objective=94 when construing statutes =93is to determine = the=20 Legislature=92s intent, which, when possible, we discern from the plain = meaning of=20 the words chosen.=94 [9] Where the statutory text is = unambiguous,=20 we adopt a construction supported by the statute=92s plain language, = unless that=20 construction would lead to an absurd result.[10] We presume that every word of = a statute=20 was used for a purpose,[11] and likewise, that every word = excluded=20 was excluded for a purpose.[12]

= The court of appeals determined that Entergy was not a general = contractor=20 because =93Entergy did not establish it had undertaken to perform work = or services=20 and then subcontracted part of that work to IMC, as a general contractor = would=20 have done.=94 [13] The court borrowed from the = decision in=20 Williams v. Brown & Root, Inc., stating that =93[a] general = contractor=20 is any person who contracts directly with the owner, the phrase not = being=20 limited to one undertaking to complete every part of the work.=94[14] The Williams court = noted that an=20 entity that =93did not contract with the owner, but instead was the = owner=94 was=20 arguably not protected by the exclusive-remedy provision.[15] Rather than adhering to the = Labor Code=92s=20 specific definition of =93general contractor,=94 [16] the Williams court = looked to a=20 secondary source, Corpus Juris Secundum.[17] But the Legislature has = instructed that=20 where words are statutorily defined, courts should construe the terms = according=20 to that particular meaning.[18] Contrary to the suggestion in=20 Williams that an owner cannot be a general contractor because it = cannot=20 contract with itself, the Labor Code=92s definition of =93general = contractor=94 does=20 not prohibit a premises owner who =93undertakes to procure the = performance of work=20 or a service=94 from also being a general contractor.[19]

= The Williams court and the court of appeals in this case also = relied on=20 Wilkerson v. Monsanto Co., in which a federal district court held = that a=20 premises owner was not a statutory employer.[20] Wilkerson=92s analysis, = however,=20 turned on the statute=92s then-applicable definition of a = =93subcontractor=94 as =93a=20 person who has contracted to perform all or any part of the work or = services=20 which a prime contractor has contracted with another party to = perform.=94[21] Wilkerson interpreted = the=20 reference to a prime contractor=92s having =93contracted with another = party=94 as=20 indicating that the prime contractor and premises owner could not be the = same=20 entity.[22] The currently applicable = definition of=20 =93subcontractor,=94 however, reads: =93a person who contracts with a = general=20 contractor to perform all or part of the work or services that the = general=20 contractor has undertaken to perform.=94 [23] This present-day definition = does not=20 preclude a premises owner from serving as its own general contractor and = undertaking to perform work on its premises by retaining subcontractors. = We=20 therefore disagree with the court of appeals in the pending case that = the=20 current definition of subcontractor is inconsistent with a premises = owner acting=20 as general contractor.

= In short, the governing Labor Code definitions of general contractor and = subcontractor do not forbid a premises owner from also being a general=20 contractor.

2. =20 A Generic Statement Disclaiming Substantive Changes Cannot Trump the = Statute=92s=20 Clear and Specific Wording

Summers=20 maintains that under Williams and Wilkerson the pre-1993 = statute=20 precluded this dual role. He further argues that the Labor Code=92s = statement that=20 1993 amendments were intended to revise the law =93without substantive = change=94[24] indicates that the Legislature = intended=20 to exclude premises owners from the definition of general contractor. = The=20 general statement that a recodification is = not=20 intended to effect substantive changes does not, however, override the = plain=20 wording of the statutory provisions directly in issue in this case. = =93While we=20 generally presume the Legislature accepts judicial interpretations of a = statute=20 by reenacting it without substantial change,=94 we recently made clear = that =93we do=20 not make that presumption when there have been substantial changes, or = when it=20 would contradict the statute=92s plain words.=94 [25] And even if the earlier = statutory=20 definition of subcontractor suggested that the prime contractor and = premises=20 owner must be separate entities, and the revised Code states that no = substantive=20 change was intended, =93prior law and legislative history cannot be used = to alter=20 or disregard the express terms of a code provision when its meaning is = clear=20 from the code when considered in its entirety, unless there is an error = such as=20 a typographical one.=94 [26] General statements that no = substantive=20 change is intended =93must be considered with the clear, specific = language used=94=20 in the substantive provisions of the revised code, and =93[t]o the = extent that=20 these latter sections of the [code] do change prior law, the specific = import of=20 their words as written must be given effect.=94 [27] In this case, the current = definitions of=20 general contractor and subcontractor contain no language mandating or = implying=20 that a premises owner cannot serve as its own general contractor.

= Construing the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning, = Entergy is a=20 general contractor because it =93[undertook] to procure the performance = of work=94=20 from IMC.[28] That Entergy took on the task = of=20 procuring [29] the performance of work from = IMC is=20 beyond dispute: Deposition testimony established that Entergy hired IMC = to=20 supply workers to perform maintenance, including =93water and = turbine-related,=20 generator-related work,=94 at its Sabine Plant. Thus, Entergy was a = general=20 contractor entitled to the Labor Code=92s exclusive-remedy defense. The = fact that=20 Entergy also owns the premises where the accident occurred is = immaterial.

III. Conclusion

&nbs= p;=20 Labor Code section 406.123 bars Summers=92s = tort claims.=20 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals=92 judgment and render = judgment in=20 favor of Entergy.

__________________________________ = =20 &= nbsp; &n= bsp; &nb= sp; =20 &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 =20

Don = R.=20 Willett

Justice

Opinion delivered: = August 31,=20 2007

^[1]=20 The letter refers to what is now La.=20 Rev. Stat. Ann. =A7 23:1061 (1998), which provides a defense to = tort=20 liability for a =93statutory employer=94 under Louisiana law. The addendum was = suggested by=20 IMC=92s attorney, was sent by IMC=92s president from his offices in Louisiana to an Entergy employee in Texas, and = was then=20 signed by Entergy and mailed back to IMC. Entergy=92s Sabine Station = plant is=20 located in Texas.

^[2]=20 Unless an employee waives workers=92 compensation coverage, the employee = forfeits=20 any common-law or statutory right of action to recover damages from an = employer=20 for personal injury or death sustained in the course and scope of = employment,=20 Tex. Lab. Code =A7 = 406.034, and the=20 employee=92s sole remedy against an employer is recovery of workers=92 = compensation=20 benefits, id. =A7 408.001(a).

^[3]=20 ___S.W.3d___.

^[4]=20 Tex. Lab. Code =A7=20 408.001(a).

^[5]=20 Id.=20 =A7 406.121(1) (=93The term includes a =91principal contractor,=92 = =91original=20 contractor,=92 =91prime contractor,=92 or other analogous = term.=94).

^[6]=20 Id.=20 =A7 406.123(a).

^[7]=20 Id.=20 =A7 406.123(e).

^[8]=20 See Tex. R. Civ. = P.=20 166a(c).

^[9]=20 State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 = (Tex.=20 2006).

^[10] Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6=20 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999).

^[11] Eddins-Walcher Butane Co. v. = Calvert, 298=20 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1957).

^[12] Cameron v. Terrell & = Garrett,=20 Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).

^[13] ___S.W.3d at ___.

^[14] Id. (alteration in original) = (internal=20 quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. Brown & Root, = Inc., 947=20 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.=97Texarkana 1997, no writ)).

^[15] Williams, 947=20 S.W.2d at 677.

^[16] The Williams court quoted = the=20 then-applicable statutory definition of general contractor, id. = at 676,=20 which is virtually identical to the current definition.

^[17] Id. at 677 (quoting 17 C.J.S. = Contracts =A7 11 (1963)).

^[18] Tex. Gov=92t Code =A7 = 311.011(b).

^[19] See Tex. Lab. Code =A7 = 406.121(1).

^[20] 782 F. Supp. 1187, 1188 (E.D. = Tex.=20 1991).

^[21] Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. = 8308-3.05=20 (Vernon 1991)=20 (emphasis added); Wilkerson, 782 F. Supp. at 1189.

^[22] See Wilkerson, 782 F. = Supp. at=20 1188-89.

^[23] Tex. Lab. Code =A7 = 406.121(5).

^[24] Id. =A7 = 1.001(a).

^[25] State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. = Martinez, 216 S.W.3d 799, 804 (Tex. 2007) = (footnotes=20 omitted).

^[26] Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6=20 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999).

^[27] Id.

^[28] Tex. Lab. Code =A7 = 406.121(1).

^[29] =93Procure=94 means =93to obtain = by care or=20 effort, to acquire.=94 Oxford = American=20 Dictionary 533 (Eugene Ehrlich et al. eds., 1980)=20 (1979).