IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
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No. 06-0544
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In re Michelle=20
Moore
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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus =
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PER =
CURIAM
Michelle=20
Moore and Lisa Denise Santos have been opposing parties in a series of =
lawsuits=20
and original proceedings relating to custody of I.E.T., Santos=92s =
child. In all=20
three suits, Moore, the child=92s alleged paternal grandmother, was =
awarded=20
possession or joint conservatorship of the =
child at=20
the trial court level, although those decisions were later reversed by =
the court=20
of appeals. Ultimately, the court of appeals awarded custody to =
Santos and ordered Moore to=20
pay Santos=20
$47,178.50 for her attorney=92s fees and costs in the various =
proceedings as a=20
sanction. We hold that the court of appeals abused its discretion by =
imposing=20
sanctions against Moore under the facts presented, and=20
conditionally grant the writ of mandamus.
On =
December=20
12, 2004, Santos=20
gave birth to I.E.T. Although Santos =
was married=20
to another man, she had been living with Moore=92s son. Santos and I.E.T. initially moved in with =
Moore. Ten =
days after=20
I.E.T.=92s birth, Moore=20
filed a Suit Affecting Parent-Child Relationship (=93SAPCR1=94), in the =
94th=20
District=20
Court of Nueces=20
County, claiming =
to be=20
I.E.T.=92s paternal grandmother. The trial =
court issued=20
a temporary restraining order preventing Santos=20
from removing I.E.T. from Moore=92s =
possession and=20
on January 18, 2005, granted temporary custody of I.E.T. to Moore. =
Approximately two=20
and a half months after her birth, I.E.T. was diagnosed with a disorder =
that=20
required her to be fed through a nasogastric =
tube and=20
necessitated a complex medical regime, which Moore was trained to administer.
On =
May 26,=20
2005, Santos filed a petition for writ =
of=20
mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging Moore lacked standing to bring =
SAPCR1. On June=20
16th, the court granted the writ, holding that Moore lacked standing because she was =
not=20
listed in the Texas Family Code as a party who could initiate a SAPCR. =
The court=20
ordered the district court to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction. =
In its=20
memorandum opinion, the court denied Santos=92s=20
request to order a hearing in the trial court on Santos=92s motion for attorney=92s fees and =
sanctions, holding=20
that Moore was=20
entitled to a presumption of good faith and that there was no evidence =
of bad=20
faith or harassment. Despite the ruling, Moore refused to give up possession =
of=20
I.E.T.
The =
next day,=20
Santos filed suit (=93Santos=92s suit=94), requesting that the 214th =
District Court of=20
Nueces County grant a writ of habeas corpus for possession of I.E.T. =
Three days=20
later, Moore filed suit in the 319th District Court (=93SAPCR2=94), =
alleging=20
standing under the Texas Family Code as a person in possession of the =
child for=20
at least six months, a different basis than in SAPCR1. In Santos=92s suit, the trial court denied Santos habeas corpus relief and issued an interim =
order=20
transferring the proceedings to the 319th District Court, while in =
SAPCR2, the=20
trial court issued a temporary restraining order preventing Santos from removing I.E.T. from Moore=92s =
possession.
On =
July 8,=20
2005, Santos=20
again filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, =
this time=20
with regard to the orders issued in SAPCR2. A little more than a month =
later,=20
Santos filed another petition for writ =
of=20
mandamus in the court of appeals challenging the orders issued in =
Santos=92s =
suit. On August=20
29, 2005, the court of appeals granted both writs and ordered both trial =
courts=20
to vacate their orders. The court dismissed SAPCR2 for lack of =
jurisdiction and=20
granted the writ of habeas corpus in Santos=92s=20
suit, giving possession of I.E.T. to Santos. Moore surrendered custody.
The =
court of=20
appeals also ordered Moore to pay =
Santos=92s court costs and attorney=92s fees =
incurred in=20
SAPCR1, Santos=92s=20
suit, and SAPCR2. The court noted:
[G]iven that relator=92s =
expenses in=20
having to retain counsel and file pleadings in multiple courts have been =
solely=20
caused by Moore=92s intransigence and disregard for the previous =
judgment of this=20
Court, we order that Moore pay all of relator=92s court=20
costs and attorneys fees incurred for Cause Nos. 04-07301-C, 05-03094-G =
and=20
05-3089-F.
The court=20
cited Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.6 in support of its =
ruling.
On =
September=20
1, 2005, Moore=20
filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court requesting that we =
vacate=20
all of the orders entered by the court of appeals. We denied the =
petition=20
without issuing an opinion. On May 4, 2006, Santos filed in the court of appeals =
a Motion=20
Requesting Order for Payment of Attorney Fees as Sanctions against the =
Real=20
Party in Interest. The court granted the motion on June 22, 2006, =
issuing an=20
order for Moore to pay Santos =
$47,178.50 for her=20
attorney=92s fees and costs at both the trial and appellate level. In =
response,=20
Moore filed this=20
petition requesting that we order the court of appeals to withdraw its =
sanctions=20
order and award.
Moore argues =
that neither=20
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.6 nor any statute authorizes the =
imposition=20
of sanctions by a court of appeals. Moore further contends that only =
trial courts=20
have the inherent authority to issue sanctions in the form of =
attorney=92s fees,=20
arguing that courts of appeals lack that inherent authority due to their =
limited=20
original jurisdiction. Santos contends the sanctions order =
was issued=20
under the court of appeals=92 inherent authority, with further authority =
found in=20
Rule 43.6. In addition, Santos argues that there is no =
indication that=20
the court of appeals imposed the order as a sanction.
We =
disagree=20
with the latter contention. The order awarding the fees and costs =
specifically=20
granted Santos=92s=20
motion requesting their payment as a sanction. Moreover, the language in =
the=20
court of appeals=92 opinion leaves no doubt that the court imposed the =
fees and=20
costs to penalize Moore for filing SAPCR2 after it had found that she =
lacked=20
standing in SAPCR1. Assuming without deciding that the court of appeals =
had the=20
authority to issue the sanctions order, we conclude the court =
nonetheless abused=20
its discretion in doing so. In imposing the sanctions, the court failed =
to=20
acknowledge that Moore, by having constant physical =
custody of=20
I.E.T. for six months, alleged standing on a different ground in SAPCR2. =
Thus,=20
Moore did not=20
act inconsistently with the court of appeals=92 standing ruling in =
SAPCR1 in=20
filing SAPCR2. Moreover, the court of appeals=92 characterization of =
Moore=92s =
conduct as=20
=93intransigence=94 is unfounded given that she at all times subjected =
herself and=20
I.E.T. to the jurisdiction of the trial courts, sought their decisions, =
and=20
followed their rulings. The trial courts declined to remove I.E.T. from=20
Moore=92s custody.=20
Accordingly, there is no basis for the court of appeals=92 imposition of =
sanctions=20
on the record before us.
Without=20
hearing oral argument, we hold that the court of appeals abused its =
discretion=20
in issuing sanctions against Moore, and conditionally grant the writ of=20
mandamus. Tex. R. App. =
P. 52.8.=20
The writ will issue only if the court of appeals fails to vacate its =
orders of=20
August 29, 2005 and June 22, 2006 regarding Santos=92s court costs and =
attorney=92s fees.
Opinion Delivered: =
August=20
31, 2007