IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

════════&#= 9552;═══

No. 06-0055

════════λ= 2;═══

In re Edgar Geer = McKee,=20 M.D., Relator

════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══════════ = 552;═

On Petition for Writ of = Mandamus

════════&#= 9552;═════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══

PER = CURIAM

=20 This petition for writ of mandamus = concerns the=20 validity of an administrative action taken by a presiding judge of an=20 administrative judicial region after he had voluntarily recused from the case. Dr. Edgar Geer McKee sued = Kennedy=20 & Minshew, P.C. for legal malpractice in = state=20 district court. Judge Ray Grisham voluntarily recused=20 from the case. Judge John D. Ovard, Presiding Judge of the First = Administrative=20 Judicial Region, who would ordinarily appoint a judge to replace Judge = Grisham,=20 also voluntarily recused. See Tex. R. Civ. P. = 18a(c). Judge Ovard = requested=20 that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas assign a = replacement for=20 Judge Grisham. See Tex. = Gov=92t Code =A7=20 74.049(3). The Chief Justice appointed Judge Quay = F.=20 Parker. When Dr. McKee objected to Judge Parker, the Chief Justice = appointed=20 Judge John Delaney.

=20 Meanwhile, Judge Grisham retired, and Judge Laurine Blake was elected to replace him. Judge = Blake did=20 not recuse herself from this matter, and = Judge Delaney=20 therefore asked the Chief Justice to withdraw his assignment to the = case.=20 Kennedy & Minshew then moved to recuse Judge Blake, but Judge Blake declined to = recuse herself and referred the matter to = Presiding Judge=20 Ovard to assign a judge to hear the motion. Judge Ovard assigned Judge = Andrew=20 Kupper to hear the recusal=20 motion. See Tex. R. = Civ. P.=20 18a(d). Judge Kupper=20 granted the motion to recuse Judge Blake. = The next=20 day, Dr. McKee wrote to Presiding Judge Ovard reminding him that he had = once=20 recused himself and was therefore = unauthorized to=20 assign Judge Kupper. Judge Ovard refused to = vacate=20 that assignment and asked the Chief Justice to assign a judge to replace = Judge=20 Blake pursuant to Judge Kupper=92s ruling. = Dr. McKee=20 then filed this mandamus petition, arguing that Judge Ovard=92s assignment of Judge Kupper=20 was void, and as a result, Judge Kupper=92s = order recusing Judge Blake was invalid.

=20 We now decide whether Dr. McKee is entitled to mandamus relief in = this=20 case. We have held that mandamus is not available for the denial of a = motion to=20 recuse. In re Union Pac. Res. Co., = 969 S.W.2d=20 427, 428=9629 (Tex. 1998); but cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f) (=93If the [recusal] motion is=20 denied, it may be reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal from the = final=20 judgment.=94).

=20 A judge can either voluntarily recuse = himself=20 or, upon the filing of a verified motion for recusal,=20 request the assignment of another judge to hear the recusal motion. Tex.=20 R. Civ. P. 18a(a),(c). However, absent = extraordinary circumstances, a presiding judge=92s order appointing a = judge to=20 hear a recusal motion is administrative=97it = simply=20 transfers the power to decide the recusal = motion to=20 another judge. The question here is whether Judge Ovard could properly = proceed=20 with the assignment after his initial recusal. Texas=20 Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(c) provides authority for such an assignment = but=20 only if Judge Ovard=92s order states =93good = cause=94 for=20 that action.

=20 We see no meaningful distinction between our holding in In re Union Pacific Resources Co. and the = situation=20 presented here. In the former case, the judge was alleged to have acted = when he=20 was required to recuse; in this case, the = judge is=20 alleged to have acted after he voluntarily recused. In=20 either instance, the relator has an = appellate remedy.=20 Our mandamus standards have evolved since In re Union Pacific = Resources=20 Co. We now ask whether =93any benefits to mandamus review are = outweighed by=20 the detriments.=94 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of = Am., 148=20 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). Here, there is no = significant benefit to mandamus relief.

=20 The record does not present any reason=97much less an = extraordinary=20 one=97requiring Judge Ovard=92s initial = recusal; nor does it reflect a ground for = precluding his=20 administrative assignment to another judge. While we agree that Rule = 18a(c)=20 compels Judge Ovard, who recused initially, = to state=20 good cause for later assigning Judge Kupper, = =93good=20 cause=94 will ordinarily be inherent in the administrative nature of = that=20 assignment.[1] We decline to issue mandamus = because,=20 unless there are extraordinary circumstances otherwise requiring Judge = Ovard=92s recusal, he = need only=20 revise his order to state that his assignment of Judge Kupper is a purely administrative act.

=20 Accordingly, we deny Dr. McKee=92s petition for writ of = mandamus.

OPINION=20 DELIVERED: November 30, 2007

^[1]=20 See, e.g., Letter from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of = Texas to=20 Ronald Earle and Dick DeGuerin (Nov. 4, = 2005),=20 available at=20 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/advisories/Recusal_response.pdf = (noting=20 that interest in the preservation of judicial resources and in ensuring = the=20 efficient administration of the judicial process permits a judicial = officer to=20 decline a recusal motion and perform purely=20 administrative functions).