IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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No. 05-0754

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Margarita Morales, = Individually and as Next Friend of Paulette Morales and Laura Morales, = Minor=20 Children of Guadalupe D. Morales, Deceased, Petitioner,

Liberty Mutual = Insurance=20 Company and Continental Casualty Company, Respondents

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On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth = District of=20 Texas

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Argued November=20 16, 2006

=20 Justice O=92Neill = delivered=20 the opinion of the Court.

=20 The Texas Workers=92 Compensation Act provides alternative = avenues for=20 judicial review of a Texas Workers=92 Compensation Commission appeals = panel decision depending upon whether the nature of the = dispute=20 regards =93compensability or eligibility for . . . benefits=94 or = something else.=20 See Tex. Lab. Code =A7=A7 410.252, 410.301, 410.255; = Tex.=20 Gov=92t Code =A7=A7=20 2001.171=96178. In this case, Margarita Morales = seeks review=20 of an appeals panel=92s decision that her deceased husband was an = independent=20 contractor rather than an employee of one of three companies, two of = which were=20 workers=92 compensation insurance subscribers and one of which was not. = We hold=20 that the question of a worker=92s employment status is one of = compensability=20 governed by section 410.301(a) of the Texas Labor Code, and reverse and = remand=20 the case to the El=20 Paso district court for further proceedings.

I. Background

=20 Guadalupe Morales sustained fatal head injuries when he fell from = a=20 ladder while repairing the roof of a motel. Contending Guadalupe=92s = injuries were=20 sustained while in the course and scope of his employment with Turnkey = Services,=20 Inc. (insured by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company), State National Bank = (insured=20 by Continental Casualty Company) and PGD, Inc. (a nonsubscriber), his wife, Margarita, filed a claim = for=20 workers=92 compensation insurance benefits. A benefit-review conference = was held=20 to attempt to mediate the dispute between Margarita and the insurance = carriers,=20 but the parties were unable to reach an agreement and proceeded to a=20 contested-case hearing. The hearing examiner determined that = Guadalupe=92s=20 employment status at the time of his injury was that of an independent=20 contractor rather than an employee of any of the three named companies, = and thus=20 he was not entitled to benefits. The Texas Workers=92 Compensation = Commission=20 (TWCC) appeals panel affirmed the hearing examiner=92s decision, holding = that=20 Guadalupe was an independent contractor, not an employee, and therefore = he had=20 not suffered a =93compensable injury.=94

=20 Margarita sought judicial review of the TWCC=92s=20 decision by filing two lawsuits, this one in El=20 Paso County = and another=20 in Travis=20 County. Among = other things,=20 Margarita sought review of the appeals panel=92s determination that her = husband=20 was not an employee under the Texas Workers=92 Compensation Act. Liberty = Mutual=20 filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the El Paso proceedings, which the trial = court=20 granted. Following dismissal of her suit in El=20 Paso County, = Margarita=20 voluntarily nonsuited the Travis = County suit. The court of = appeals affirmed=20 the trial court=92s dismissal of the El=20 Paso case for want of jurisdiction, holding that = =93the=20 status of being an employee of an insured for which a carrier is liable = is an=20 issue of =91coverage,=92 not compensability.=94 169 = S.W.3d 485,=20 488.[1] We granted Margarita=92s = petition for=20 review to consider the appropriate avenue for judicial review of a TWCC = appeals=20 panel=92s decision regarding a worker=92s employment status.

II. Discussion

A. Avenues of Judicial Review

=20 The Texas Workers=92 Compensation Act provides exclusive = compensation=20 benefits for the work-related injuries of a subscribing employer=92s = employees.=20 Tex. Lab. Code =A7=20 408.001(a). At the administrative level, disputed = claims=20 for benefits proceed through a three-step process: a benefit-review = conference,=20 a contested-case hearing, and an administrative appeal. Tex.=20 Workers=92 Comp. Comm=92n v. Garcia, 893 = S.W.2d 504,=20 514 (Tex.=20 1995); Tex. Lab. = Code =A7=A7 = 410.021=96034, 410.151=96169,=20 410.201=96209. A claimant may appeal a TWCC appeals = panel=92s=20 decision by filing suit in the district court. Id. =A7 410.251.

=20 The Act divides judicial review of workers=92 compensation = appeals by=20 drawing a distinction between issues that concern compensablitity and those that do not. Id. =A7=A7=20 410.301(a), =A7 = 410.255(a).=20 Section 410.301(a) of the Texas Labor Code provides that =93[j]udicial review of a final decision of the appeals = panel=20 regarding compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or = death=20 benefits shall be conducted as provided by this subchapter.=94 = Id. =A7=20 410.301(a). Appeals from decisions regarding compensability or = benefits=20 eligibility must generally be filed in the county where the employee = resided at=20 the time of the injury or death. Id. =A7 410.252(b)(1). In a section 410.301 appeal, the issues that = the TWCC=20 appeals panel decided are tried to the court or a jury, and the = appealing party=20 bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. =A7=20 410.304. The factfinder may consider, = but is=20 not bound by, the appeals panel=92s decision. Id.; see Garcia, 893 = S.W.2d at=20 515. The method of review that section 410.301 provides is known as = modified de=20 novo review. Id.

=20 Section 410.255 of the Texas Labor Code governs review of issues = that=20 section 410.301(a) does not cover, and provides for judicial review in = the=20 manner provided for a contested case under Subchapter G, Chapter 2001, = of the=20 Government Code. Tex. Lab. Code =A7 410.255(a). = Under Subchapter=20 G, the trial court sits without a jury and its review is generally = confined to=20 the agency record under a substantial-evidence standard. Id. =A7=20 410.255(b); Tex. Gov=92t = Code =A7 2001.175(e). An = appeal from=20 a decision that does not concern compensability must be filed in = Travis = County. Tex. Lab. = Code =A7 410.255(a);=20 Tex. Gov=92t Code =A7 2001.176(b)(1).

=20 Accordingly, the appropriate judicial review mechanism depends = upon the=20 nature of the issue in dispute. Margarita claims that the question of = who=20 Guadalupe was working for when he was injured falls under section = 410.301=20 because a worker=92s employment status is a necessary component of any=20 compensability inquiry.[2] The insurers, on the other = hand, contend=20 that when one or more potential employers of an injured worker is a = nonsubscriber to workers=92 compensation = insurance, a=20 threshold determination must be made as to who employed the worker and = whether=20 or not that employer was a subscriber. The insurers claim that only once = it is=20 determined that the employer for whom the employee worked was a = subscriber does=20 the compensability issue, i.e. whether the injury occurred in the = course=20 and scope of employment, arise. Thus, in the insurers=92 view, the = question=20 presented when a nonsubscriber is a = potential employer=20 is one of coverage, not compensability. Our analysis of the parties=92 = respective=20 positions turns on construction of sections 410.301 and 410.255 of the = Labor=20 Code. But first, we address a preliminary issue.

B. Preservation of Employment-Status Issue

=20 As a threshold matter, Liberty Mutual contends the compensability = issue=20 is not properly before us because Margarita failed to specifically = identify the=20 issue of Guadalupe=92s employment status in her original petition to the = district=20 court. See Tex. Lab. Code =A7 410.302(b). = Thus, according=20 to Liberty Mutual, the district court never had jurisdiction to decide = that=20 issue. Id. We disagree. In her First = Amended=20 Original Petition, Margarita alleged that her husband suffered a = compensable=20 injury and that she was aggrieved by each of the issues the hearing = officer=20 decided, which included his decision regarding Guadalupe=92s employment = status.=20 Liberally construing her allegations in favor of jurisdiction as we = must,=20 see Cont=92l Coffee Prods. = Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996), = the district=20 court properly exercised jurisdiction over all of the appeals panel=92s=20 determinations, including its decision regarding Guadalupe=92s = employment sta

C. Compensability

=20 Our objective in construing a statute is to determine and give = effect to=20 the Legislature=92s intent. See Cont=92l = Cas. Ins. Co. v. = Functional=20 Restoration Assoc., 19 S.W.3d 393, 398 (Tex. 1999) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison = Contractors,=20 Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.=20 1998)). In discerning that intent, we must give effect = to the=20 statute=92s plain meaning. See Tex. Dep=92t of Protective & = Regulatory=20 Servs. v. Mega = Child Care,=20 Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004). We also consider each = provision in=20 the context of the entire statute, not merely those portions that are in = dispute. See Cont=92l Cas.,19 S.W.3d at 398 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, = Inc. v.=20 Glyn-Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 = (Tex. 1994) = (stating=20 =93[o]nly in the context of the remainder of = the statute=20 can the true meaning of a single provision be made clear=94)).

=20 Section 410.301 of the Labor Code governs judicial review of = appeals=20 panel decisions =93regarding compensability or eligibility for or the = amount of=20 income or death benefits.=94 Tex. Lab. Code =A7 410.301(a). = While the Act=20 does not define =93compensability or eligibility=94 or enumerate which = issues these=20 concepts concern, it does define other terms that shed light on their = meaning.=20 =93Benefit=94 is defined as =93a medical benefit, an income benefit, a = death benefit,=20 or a burial benefit based on compensable injury.=94 Id. =A7=20 401.011(5). A =93compensable injury=94 is defined as one that = =93arises out of=20 and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is = payable=20 under [the Act].=94 Id. =A7=20 401.011(10). =93Course and scope of employment=94 is defined as = =93an activity=20 . . . that is performed by an employee while engaged in or about the = furtherance=20 of the affairs or business of the employer.=94 Id. =A7 401.011(12). An =93employee=94 is a =93person = in the service of=20 another under a contract of hire, whether express or implied, or oral or = written,=94 id. =A7401.012(a), and an =93employer=94 is =93a = person who . . .=20 employs one or more employees, and has workers=92 compensation insurance = coverage,=94 id. =A7 401.011(18). Thus, the concept of = =93compensability=94 has=20 several elements, any of which may be in dispute depending upon the = particular=20 circumstances presented.

=20 In this case, the TWCC hearing examiner determined that Guadalupe = Morales=20 was an independent contractor at the time he was injured and thus his = injury did=20 not occur in the course and scope of employment with any of the three = named=20 defendants. We have identified =93whether [the injury] occurred in the = course and=20 scope of employment=94 as an example of an issue that regards = compensability under=20 the statute. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at = 515.=20 Course-and-scope inquiries have traditionally been considered questions = within=20 the factfinder=92s realm, and the = Legislature appears to=20 have acknowledged as much in adopting the modified de novo standard of = review=20 for issues regarding compensability. See id. The carriers = do not=20 contend otherwise. They acknowledge that course-and-scope inquiries = generally=20 concern compensability, but only so long as all potential employers are=20 subscribers. When a potential employer is not a subscriber, they argue, = the=20 question of who was the employer at the time of injury becomes an issue = of=20 coverage because nonsubscribers are not = subject to the=20 Act and the TWCC has no jurisdiction over them.

=20 We do not disagree that assessing a potential employer=92s = subscriber=20 status concerns coverage under the Act, or that this issue must be = resolved=20 before an employer=92s liability for workers=92 compensation benefits = can be=20 determined. But the concepts of coverage and compensability are not = necessarily=20 mutually exclusive as the carriers presume. The Act=92s judicial-review = provisions=20 speak not in terms of =93coverage=94 but of (1) issues concerning = =93compensability or=20 eligibility for . . . benefits=94 under 410.301(a), and (2) =93all = issues other than=20 those covered under Section 410.301(a).=94 Id. =A7=A7 410.255(a), 410.301(a). Under the = statute=92s plain terms,=20 a dispute must regard something =93other than=94 compensability or = eligibility to=20 come within section 410.255(a). The issue in this case is whether = Guadalupe=20 Morales suffered a =93compensable injury=94 that entitles Margarita to = recover=20 workers=92 compensation death benefits. See id. =A7 408.181(a) = (providing=20 that benefits are payable to the legal beneficiary =93if a compensable = injury to=20 the employee results in death=94). It is true an element of that inquiry = may=20 concern a potential employer=92s subscriber status for purposes of = determining=20 coverage under a policy of workers=92 compensation insurance. But resolving that issue in this case will directly impact = whether=20 Guadalupe suffered a =93compensable injury=94 and determine = Margarita=92s eligibility=20 for workers=92 compensation benefits. Under these circumstances, = we cannot=20 conclude that something =93other than=94 compensability is in issue for = purposes of=20 judicial review.

=20 In Rodriguez v. Service Lloyds Insurance Co., we = considered the=20 scope of the =93compensability=94 inquiry in the context of a challenge = to the=20 finality of a TWCC impairment rating. 997 S.W.2d = 248, 252=9654=20 (Tex.=20 1999). The carrier contended substantial-evidence review applied = because=20 the issue of an impairment rating=92s finality is procedural and does = not directly=20 concern the substantive issue of benefits. Id. at 253. We disagreed, noting that any dispute = challenging=20 the finality of an impairment rating necessarily implicates the point of = maximum=20 medical improvement, which in turn may affect temporary income benefits, = eligibility for and calculation of impairment income benefits, and = supplemental=20 income benefits. Id. at=20 253=9654. Because impairment ratings affect benefits, we held = that=20 procedural disputes about impairment-rating finality implicate = compensability=20 and therefore modified de novo review applies. Id. On the other hand, we = have said=20 that disputes over collateral matters like attorney=92s fees and = administrative=20 sanctions presumably do not concern compensability and are subject to=20 substantial-evidence review under section 410.255. Garcia, 893 = S.W.2d at=20 530 n.27; see also Cont=92l Cas., 19 S.W.3d at 400 n.6.[3]

=20 The existence of a compensable injury is the threshold = requirement for=20 payment of benefits under the Act. See Tex. Lab. = Code =A7=A7 = 401.011(5),=20 406.031(a). And there are various elements that = affect=20 whether an injury is compensable, including the worker=92s employment = status as an=20 employee or independent contractor at the time of injury, whether the = worker was=20 injured in the course and scope of employment, who=20 controlled the employee=92s work when the injury occurred, and whether a = particular employer has an insurance policy in effect. See id. = =A7=A7 401.011(12), (18), 401.012(a). If Guadalupe = Morales was=20 not an =93employee=94 of an =93employer=94 when he was injured, or was = not injured in=20 =93the course and scope of employment,=94 he did not suffer a = =93compensable injury=94=20 and is not eligible for benefits under the Act. A dispute about any of = these=20 elements regards =93compensability or eligibility for . . . benefits=94 = and is=20 subject to judicial review under section 410.301.

III. Conclusion

=20 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court of appeals=92 = judgment and=20 remand this case to the district court for further proceedings = consistent with=20 this opinion.

=20 =20 =20 =20 =20 =20 ___________________________________

=20 =20 =20 =20 =20 =20 Harriet O=92Neill

=20 =20 =20 =20 =20 =20 Justice

OPINION=20 DELIVERED: December 7, 2007

^[1]=20 The court of appeals, the trial court, and the parties all treat the = issue as=20 one of subject-matter jurisdiction, but we have held that it is not. = See Fed.=20 Underwriters Exch. v. Pugh, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600=96101 (Tex. 1943) = (interpreting=20 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. article 8307a, = predecessor of =A7=20 410.252(c)). =93[F]iling suit in the wrong = county does=20 not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.=94 Univ. of = Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. 2004) (citing Brown v. Owens, 674 = S.W.2d 748,=20 751 (Tex.=20 1984)). The confusion here apparently stems from the Labor Code itself, = which=20 provides that when suit is filed in the wrong county, =93the court, on = determining=20 that it does not have jurisdiction to render judgment on the = merits of=20 the suit, shall transfer the case to a proper court.=94 Tex. Lab. = Code=20 =A7 410.252(c) (emphasis added). Of course, =93jurisdiction=94 has many = meanings, and=20 both courts and legislators often use it to mean something other than a = court=92s=20 power to adjudicate a case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better = Env=92t, 523 U.S. 83, 89=9690 (1998); see = also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 = (2006);=20 Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 = S.W.3d 71,=20 76=9677 (Tex. 2000). Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court = have=20 cautioned against assuming =93jurisdiction=94 means =93subject-matter = jurisdiction=94=20 due to the stark consequences that accompany the latter term. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 512=9615; Dubai, 12 = S.W.3d at=20 76. Here, it is clear the Legislature did not mean subject-matter = jurisdiction, as the remedy it provided was transfer rather than = dismissal.

^[2]=20 Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association for Paula = Insurance=20 Company, Impaired Insurer, and Texas Mutual Insurance Company submitted = amicus=20 curiae briefs in support of Margarita=92s petition.

^[3]=20 The parties cite a number of appellate court decisions in support of = their=20 respective positions in this case. See, e.g., = State=20 Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Herrera, 189 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex. = App.=97Amarillo=20 2006, no pet.) (holding that = identification of=20 the employer at the time of injury is an issue of compensability); = Tex. Prop.=20 & Cas. Guar. = Ass=92n v. Nat=92l Am. Ins. Co., 208 S.W.3d = 523, 539 (Tex.=20 App.=97Austin 2006, pet. filed) (holding that whether injured workers = were acting=20 within the scope of employment of a covered employer is a question of=20 compensability); In re Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 168 S.W.3d = 293,=20 296 (Tex. App.=97Eastland 2005, orig. proceeding) (holding that an = appeals panel=20 decision dealing only with attorney=92s fees did not present an issue of = compensability or eligibility); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ass=92n Cas. Ins.=20 Co., 977 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. = App.=97Tyler 1998,=20 no pet.) (holding that the = question=20 of which insurance carrier was responsible for the worker=92s injury is = not one of=20 compensability). However, none of these cases present the precise = circumstances=20 now before us and we express no opinion on those decisions.