IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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No. 05-0476

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Thomas Eugene = Norris, Sr. and=20 Karen Lynn Norris, Appellants,

Johnny W. Thomas, = Trustee,=20 Appellee

═════════_= 52;══════════= ══════════ = 552;══════════= ;══════════&#= 9552;

On Certified Question from the = United=20 States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth=20 circuit

═════════_= 52;══════════= ══════════ = 552;══════════= ;══════════&#= 9552;

Argued November=20 15, 2005

Justice Willett delivered the = opinion=20 of the Court, joined by Chief = Justice=20 Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson.

Justice O=92Neill delivered a = dissenting=20 opinion, joined by Justice = Wainwright,=20 Justice Brister, and Justice=20 Medina.

We = confront=20 today a question of first impression: whether a boat qualifies as a = homestead=20 under article XVI, sections 50 and 51 of the Texas Constitution. = Since=20 1845, our state constitution has protected a homestead from forced sale = to=20 satisfy the claims of creditors.[1] Thomas Norris = claimed his=20 68-foot yacht as a homestead to shield it from bankruptcy creditors, = prompting=20 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to certify this = question to us: =93Does a motorized waterborne vessel, used as a primary = residence=20 and otherwise fulfilling all of the requirements of a homestead except=20 attachment to land, qualify for the homestead exemption under Article = 16,=20 =A7=A7 50 and 51 of the Texas Constitution?=94[2] Under the facts = presented=20 in this case, and given the Constitution=92s explicit realty-based = language, we=20 answer the question, =93No.=94

I. Background

In = September=20 2003, Norris filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of = the United=20 States Bankruptcy Code.[3] Under the Code a = debtor may=20 claim a homestead exemption as allowed by state law.[4] Norris claimed = his 68-foot=20 yacht as exempt property under the Texas homestead exemption. The boat, = which=20 Norris valued at $399,000 in his bankruptcy schedules, has four = bedrooms, three=20 bathrooms, a galley, and an upper and lower salon. Although his petition = indicated that his street address was 13909 Nacogdoches Road, San = Antonio,=20 Texas, Norris testified at a January 2004 bankruptcy court hearing that = the=20 address is a business postal center where the Norrises receive mail. = Norris=20 further stated that he took up permanent residence on the boat after the = Norrises sold their previous home in Lake McQueeny, Texas, in 2000, and = that the=20 boat is his only home. Norris=92s attorney stated at the hearing that = =93primarily,=20 [Norris] lives on that boat while it=92s dry-docked=94 at Corpus = Christi, and that=20 the boat received water, phone service, and electricity through = connections to a=20 dock. Norris also testified at the hearing that since purchasing the = boat in=20 1997 he had cruised extensively to places such as New Orleans, Florida, = and=20 Alabama. At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed in September = 2003, the=20 boat was docked in Port Aransas, Texas. Norris testified at the January = 2004=20 hearing that he had moved the boat to a marina in Corpus Christi, Texas, = where=20 he had a month-to-month lease. Although the boat is described in the = record as=20 =93dry-docked,=94 there is no indication that Norris ever permanently = affixed the=20 boat to real estate or intended to do so.

The = bankruptcy court held that the Texas homestead exemption, even broadly=20 construed, does not include boats. The federal district court agreed, = concluding=20 that the boat was a movable chattel =93by virtue of its self-powered = mobility=94 and=20 not entitled to homestead protection.[5] Norris appealed = to the=20 Fifth Circuit, which certified the question to this Court.

II. Discussion

We = construe=20 homestead laws generously;[6] however, courts = cannot=20 unduly stretch the homestead laws beyond their constitutional and = statutory=20 moorings and protect that which is not a homestead.[7]

A. Texas Constitutional and Statutory = Provisions

Neither the=20 Texas Constitution nor the Property Code defines =93homestead=94 with = specificity.=20 Section 50 of article XVI shields homesteads from forced sale, providing = generally that =93[t]he homestead of a family, or of a single adult = person, shall=20 be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all = debts . . .=20 .=94[8] Section 51, in = turn,=20 restricts the maximum size of a protected homestead, limiting rural and = urban=20 homesteads by acres of land and including any land-based improvements.[9] The Texas = Property Code=20 resembles section 51 and likewise describes a homestead as a home or a = home and=20 business with certain acreage limitations with any =93improvements = thereon.=94[10] Though neither = of these=20 provisions expressly exclude boats from homestead protection, they both = discuss=20 homesteads in terms of land and any improvements that sit atop the = land.[11] More = specifically, when=20 describing the scope of the protection, section 51 and the Property Code = state=20 the acreage limitation and then variably say, when describing any = attached=20 structures, =93with the improvements thereon=94 or =93with any = improvements on the=20 land=94 or =93with any improvements thereon.=94

B. Precedent

Texas=92s=20 strong pro-homestead tradition pre-dates statehood, and the Republic of = Texas=20 was determined to protect homesteads from creditors.[12] In 1886, roughly = a=20 half-century after Texas homestead laws originated,[13] we opined on = their reach=20 and limits. In Cullers v. James, we held that a house may be a = homestead=20 even if the owner has no proprietary interest in the land on which the = house=20 stands.[14] The James family = leased a=20 three- or four-acre tract of land from Robert Walker (though the = property was=20 actually Walker=92s wife=92s separate property).[15] The land = contained=20 improvements such as a house, a gin-house, gin machinery, and a mill = that were=20 =93so fixed as to make [them] part of the land.=94[16] But since James = had no=20 interest in the land,[17] the Court viewed = the=20 improvements as personal property instead of realty.[18] Nonetheless, the = Court=20 held that the house and gin-house qualified as a homestead.[19]

Cullers=20 established that a house can be a homestead even if the owner has no = ownership=20 interest in the land. It also made clear that the term = =93improvements=94 as=20 protected by article XVI, section 51 includes the residence itself. In = the 121=20 years since Cullers, we have defined improvements to real = property with=20 greater precision, distinguishing them from mere personalty, and holding = that=20 =93personalty does not constitute an improvement until it is annexed to = realty.=94[20] This Court put = it plainly=20 in Sonnier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co.: =93There can be no improvement = without=20 annexation to realty, and until personalty is annexed to realty, it by=20 definition cannot be an improvement.=94[21] Not only that, = but the=20 annexed object cannot be deemed an improvement to land unless it is = intended to=20 be =93a permanent addition to the realty.=94[22]

Since=20 Cullers, the courts of appeals have issued several = homestead-related=20 opinions that bear more directly on today=92s issue, and they share a = common=20 thread: homestead protection turns not on who owns the underlying land, = but on=20 the degree to which the residence =93thereon=94 or =93on the land=94 is = attached to it.=20 This Court reviewed four of these pertinent cases, refusing the writ in = the=20 first and finding no reversible error in the others. We continue to = believe that=20 their attachment-based analysis is correct.

In = Clark=20 v. Vitz, Vitz built a =93house-trailer=94 that his family used as = its primary=20 residence for two years.[23] He later = purchased a lot=20 with a brick house, placed the house trailer twenty-five feet from the = house,=20 and set the trailer on four wooden blocks.[24] Vitz ran = electrical=20 service to the house trailer from the residence and planned to connect = the=20 trailer to the residence=92s plumbing.[25] The court held = that Vitz=92s=20 attachment of the house-trailer to his residence made the trailer part = of the=20 homestead.[26]

In = Gann v.=20 Montgomery, the Ganns owned a =93house trailer, mounted on wheels, = of the type=20 usually pulled behind an automobile.=94[27] After a few = years, the=20 Ganns moved the trailer to Mr. Gann=92s parents=92 backyard.[28] Gann executed a = promissory=20 note secured by a chattel mortgage on the trailer.[29] Gann then = entered the=20 United States Army and was stationed at the Fort Worth Army Airfield.[30] His family still = lived in=20 the trailer, now parked at the airfield and still on wheels.[31] The mortgage = holder=20 brought suit to foreclose on the chattel mortgage lien.[32] The court, = citing=20 Cullers, noted the distinction between a chattel that is attached = to=20 realty and a chattel that is not.[33] After quoting = from=20 Cullers, the court said:

Taken=20 alone, this language might indicate a belief by the Supreme Court that = the=20 homestead exemption could attach to any chattel, such as a covered = wagon, or a=20 houseboat, or any other type of movable vehicle or conveyance, which for = the=20 time being might be occupied by the claimant and his family as living = quarters.=20 But when we examine the opinion in the light of the facts of the case, = and=20 consider the disposition made of the entire case, we come to a different = conclusion.[34]

The court then=20 noted the distinction between personal property=97such as the gin = machinery in=20 Cullers=97and a permanent fixture attached to realty that is = personal=20 property only because the owner of the fixture does not own the land.[35] The court cited=20 Clark as consistent with this dichotomy in that the house trailer = was=20 only a homestead because it had been attached to the realty and set = alongside=20 the house, essentially becoming an extra room.[36] The court held = that house=20 trailers without the characteristics of permanent fixtures attached to = realty=20 are not protected homesteads.[37]

In = Capitol=20 Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, the Walkers owned a =93mobile trailer = home=94=20 connected to the gas, water, and sewage systems of a trailer park.[38] They removed the = wheels=20 and set the house on cement blocks.[39] The court found = it=20 persuasive that the house was =93as physically attached to the land as = frame=20 houses=94 and held that the trailer house was a homestead.[40]

Finally, in=20 Minnehoma Financial Co. v. Ditto, Ditto purchased a =93mobile = home.=94[41] He attached the = mobile=20 home to his property by removing the wheels, placing it on concrete = blocks=20 secured by eight-foot buried anchors, and connecting it to electricity = and=20 water.[42] The court held = that the=20 mobile home was a homestead:

We agree=20 with Ditto that a mobile home may be deemed an improvement to the realty = when=20 attached to the realty in a manner indicating an intention that it be a=20 permanent part of the real estate. The nature of a mobile home does not = preclude=20 its being given homestead protection. If a mobile home is attached in = such a=20 manner to a homestead, it is entitled to homestead protection.[43]

Nonetheless,=20 the court held that the trailer home was not protected because a lien = attached=20 before the mobile home became part of Ditto=92s homestead.[44]

C. Application

Applying=20 these precedents to the instant facts, we agree that the proper test for = whether=20 a residence attains homestead status is whether the attachment to land = is=20 sufficient to make the personal property a permanent part of the realty. = Significantly, both the Constitution and the Property Code use the word=20 =93thereon=94 when describing any protected homestead improvements;[45] the Constitution = also=20 stipulates =93on the land,=94 which is plainly not the same as =93in the = water.=94

As = we said in=20 Cullers, =93The greater part of [the personal property] was = . . .=20 so fixed as to make it part of the land . . . .=94[46] Ninety-two years = later,=20 the Ditto court held =93a mobile home may be deemed an = improvement to the=20 realty when attached to the realty in a manner indicating an intention = that it=20 be a permanent part of the real estate.=94[47] The Gann = court=20 similarly reasoned =93the homestead right may attach to a chattel if it = has been=20 annexed to the freehold so as to have become a fixture and to have = acquired the=20 character of realty.=94[48] Movable chattels = do not=20 possess the characteristics of a fixture attached to real property and = do not=20 acquire the character of realty. As the Walker court put = it, =93[i]t=20 is their attachment to realty which gives them homestead character.=94[49]

In=20 Clark, setting a trailer home on four wooden blocks and = connecting it to=20 electrical service was sufficient to attach the trailer to real = property.[50] In Gann, = where the=20 house trailer remained on wheels, merely parking the movable trailer on = real=20 property was insufficient to attach the trailer to the property.[51] In = Walker, removing=20 the wheels of a mobile trailer home, setting it on cement blocks, and = connecting=20 it to water, sewer, and gas service was sufficient to attach the mobile = trailer=20 to real property.[52] And in = Ditto,=20 removing the wheels of a mobile home, setting it on concrete blocks with = eight-foot buried anchors, and connecting it to electrical and plumbing = service=20 was sufficient to give it homestead protection.[53]

In = the=20 pending case, although Norris=92s dock-based connections to utilities = and plumbing=20 are like the land-based utility connections in Clark, = Walker, and=20 Ditto, a boat is sufficiently distinct from a mobile home or = house=20 trailer to justify a different outcome, particularly given the = Constitution=92s=20 unequivocal requirement that protected improvements be on the land. = Norris=92s=20 boat, unlike a dwelling that is permanently affixed to land, retains its = independent, mobile character even when attached to dock-based amenities = because=20 it has self-contained utility and plumbing systems and also boasts its = own=20 propulsion.[54] Norris, in fact, = admits to=20 traveling in the boat extensively throughout the Gulf of Mexico prior to = filing=20 for bankruptcy, and he moved the boat from Port Aransas to Corpus = Christi after=20 the bankruptcy filing. Gann was the only case where parties moved = their=20 home and still sought homestead protection, which the court denied.[55] Though Norris = took steps=20 to tether the boat to realty, these steps do not sufficiently alter the = boat=92s=20 mobile character or, apparently, prevent Norris from cruising. We hold = that=20 Norris=92s boat remains a movable chattel; it does not rest = =93thereon=94 or =93on the=20 land=94 as Texas homestead law clearly requires; it has not become a = permanent=20 part of the real estate; and it has not sufficiently attached to real = property=20 to merit homestead protection.[56] In our view, the = homestead=20 exemption from creditors found in the Constitution and the Property Code = contemplates a requisite degree of physical permanency and attachment to = fixed=20 realty=97=93thereon=94 and =93on the land=94 constitute the operative = language=97that is not=20 present in the pending case.

The = dissent=20 bemoans the Court=92s =93cramped interpretation=94 and urges a more = =93family-supportive=20 =91homestead=92 concept=94 that the Legislature and at least one = executive agency have=20 embraced in other areas of Texas law.[57] The Tax Code, = for example,=20 specifically includes mobile homes in its definition of =93residence = homestead=94=20 and more generally employs a looser definition that essentially focuses = on=20 whether the structure is owned and occupied as a principal residence.[58] In addition, = state=20 regulations that determine eligibility for certain welfare-related = programs=20 define =93homestead=94 expansively to include =93[a]ny structure, = including a=20 houseboat or motor home, that the household uses as its residence . . . = .=94[59] The dissent, = while=20 conceding that these context-specific provisions do not govern the = instant=20 dispute, argues these more protective provisions counsel a more = =93functional=20 approach.=94[60]

We = believe=20 these provisions cut the other way, demonstrating if anything that = policymakers=20 are adept at adopting different definitions for different purposes. The=20 Legislature is certainly free to put a proposed amendment before Texas = voters to=20 delete =93thereon=94 and =93on the land=94 and expand our = Constitution=92s current=20 land-based homestead exemption to cover boats explicitly.[61] Indeed, amending = the Texas=20 Constitution is no Sisyphean task, having been done 439 times since its = adoption=20 in 1876, making our Constitution one of the nation=92s longest.[62] But the = authority to=20 overhaul Texas homestead law and shield boats from bankruptcy creditors = is not=20 ours.[63] This is a = quintessential=20 policy judgment, and our confined role is determining what Texas law is, = not=20 what it should be. If houseboat-homesteads are in Texas=92s future, it = should be=20 because Texas voters have amended our laws to say so, not this Court.[64]

III. Conclusion

Unless and=20 until Texas law changes, a boat can be a home, but it cannot be a = homestead. Our=20 realty-focused constitution and laws frame a homestead in terms of = tracts,=20 parcels, acres, and lots together with any land-based improvements.

In = order to=20 qualify as a homestead, a residence must rest on the land and have a = requisite=20 degree of physical permanency, immobility, and attachment to fixed = realty. A=20 dock-based umbilical cord providing water, electricity, and phone = service may=20 help make a boat habitable, but the attachment to land is too slight to = warrant=20 homestead protection.

Accordingly,=20 Norris=92s yacht does not qualify as an exempt homestead under article = XVI,=20 sections 50 and 51 of the Texas Constitution, and we answer the = certified=20 question, =93No.=94

________________________________________

Don R. Willett

Justice

Opinion delivered: February 9, 2007

^{^[1]} Tex. Const.=20 of 1845, art. VII, =A7 22.

^{^[2]} 413 F.3d 526, 530.

^{^[3]} See 11 U.S.C. =A7=A7 301, = 701=9684.

^{^[4]} See id. at =A7 = 522.

^{^[5]} 316 B.R. 246, 251 (W.D. Tex. = 2004).

^{^[6]} Inwood N. Homeowners=92 Ass=92n, Inc. v. = Harris, 736=20 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987).

^{^[7]} Whiteman v. Burkey, 282 S.W. 788, 789 = (Tex.=20 1926).

^{^[8]} Tex.=20 Const. art. XVI, =A7 50.

^{^[9]} Tex.=20 Const. art. XVI, =A7 51. Section 51 states in pertinent=20 part:

The homestead, not in a town or city, shall = consist of=20 not more than two hundred acres of land, which may be in one or more = parcels,=20 with the improvements thereon; the homestead in a city, town or = village,=20 shall consist of lot or contiguous lots amounting to not more than 10 = acres of=20 land, together with any improvements on the land; provided, that = the=20 homestead in a city, town or village shall be used for the purposes of a = home,=20 or as both an urban home and a place to exercise a calling or business, = of the=20 homestead claimant . . . .

(Emphasis added).

^{^[10]} The Property Code recognizes a general = homestead=20 exemption from creditors, Tex. = Prop.=20 Code =A7 41.001(a), and defines homestead as follows:

(a) If used for the purposes of an urban home = or as both=20 an urban home and a place to exercise a calling or business, the = homestead of a=20 family or a single, adult person, not otherwise entitled to a homestead, = shall=20 consist of not more than 10 acres of land which may be in one or more = contiguous=20 lots, together with any improvements thereon.(b) If used for the = purposes=20 of a rural home, the homestead shall consist of:

(1) for a family, not more than 200 acres, = which may be=20 in one or more parcels, with the improvements thereon; or(2) for = a=20 single, adult person, not otherwise entitled to a homestead, not more = than 100=20 acres, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improvements=20 thereon.

(1) located within the limits of a = municipality or its=20 extraterritorial jurisdiction or a platted subdivision; and(2) served by = police=20 protection, paid or volunteer fire protection, and at least three of the = following services provided by a municipality or under contract to a=20 municipality:

(A) electric;(B) natural gas;(C) sewer;(D) = storm sewer;=20 and(E) water.

(d) The definition of a homestead as provided = in this=20 section applies to all homesteads in this state whenever=20 created. =20 &= nbsp; &n= bsp; &nb= sp; &nbs= p; = ; =20

Tex. Prop. = Code =A7 41.002 (emphasis = added).

^{^[11]} Two other constitutional provisions create = limited=20 exemptions from State taxes for =93residential homesteads=94 and = =93residence=20 homesteads,=94 see Tex. = Const. art. VIII, =A7=A7 1-a, 1-b, but neither provision defines = the=20 term.

^{^[12]} See Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 19 = S.W.2d 35,=20 36=9637 (Tex. 1929) (discussing history of the Texas homestead=20 exemption).

^{^[13]} Texas=92 first homestead law was an 1839 act = of the=20 Congress of the Republic of Texas. Id. at 36.

^{^[14]} 1 S.W. 314, 315 (Tex. 1886).

^{^[15]} Id. at 314=9615.

^{^[16]} Id. at 315.

^{^[17]} The Court was unsure if James had a valid = lease because=20 the owner of the land, Mrs. Walker, never expressly agreed to the lease. = Id. at 314=9615.

^{^[18]} Id. at 315.

^{^[19]} Id.

^{^[20]} Sonnier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co., 909 = S.W.2d 475,=20 479 (Tex. 1995).

^{^[21]} Id.

^{^[22]} Id. at 481 (emphasis=20 added).

^{^[23]} 190 S.W.2d 736, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.=97Dallas = 1945, writ=20 ref=92d).

^{^[24]} Id.

^{^[25]} Id.

^{^[26]} Id. at 738.

^{^[27]} 210 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.=97Fort = Worth 1948,=20 writ ref=92d n.r.e.).

^{^[28]} Id. at 257.

^{^[29]} Id.

^{^[30]} Id.

^{^[31]} Id.

^{^[32]} Id.

^{^[33]} Id. at 259.

^{^[34]} Id.

^{^[35]} Id. at 259=9660.

^{^[36]} Id. at 260.

^{^[37]} Id.

^{^[38]} 448 S.W.2d 830, 831=9632 (Tex. Civ. = App.=97Austin 1969,=20 writ ref=92d n.r.e.).

^{^[39]} Id. at 832.

^{^[40]} Id. at 833, 837.

^{^[41]} 566 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.=97Ft. = Worth 1978,=20 writ ref=92d n.r.e.).

^{^[42]} Id. at 356.

^{^[43]} Id. at 357 (citations = omitted).

^{^[44]} Id.

^{^[45]} Black=92s Law Dictionary defines = =93thereon=94 as =93On that or=20 them.=94 Black=92s Law = Dictionary=20 1517 (8th ed. 2004).

^{^[46]} 1 S.W. at 315.

^{^[47]} 566 S.W.2d at 357.

^{^[48]} 210 S.W.2d at 258.

^{^[49]} 448 S.W.2d at 835.

^{^[50]} 190 S.W.2d at 737=9638.

^{^[51]} 210 S.W.2d at 257, 260.

^{^[52]} 448 S.W.2d at 832, 837.

^{^[53]} 566 S.W.2d at 356=9657.

^{^[54]} See Gann, 210 S.W.2d at 259 = (indicating that=20 homestead protection should not attach to =93a covered wagon, or a = houseboat, or=20 any other type of movable vehicle or conveyance=94).

^{^[55]} Id.

^{^[56]} See Ditto, 566 S.W.2d at 357; = Gann, 210=20 S.W.2d at 260 (noting that a house is a homestead only if it is =93a = permanent=20 fixture attached to the realty=94).

^{^[57]} __ S.W.3d __, __.

^{^[58]} Tex. Tax=20 Code =A7 11.13(j)(1).

^{^[59]} 1 = Tex. Admin.=20 Code =A7 372.356(5).

^{^[60]} __ S.W.3d at __.

^{^[61]} See, e.g., Miller v. Keyser, 90 = S.W.3d=20 712, 719 (Tex. 2002).

^{^[62]} Legislative Reference Library of Texas, = Constitutional=20 Amendments (Feb. 2006),=20 http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/constAmends/lrlhome.cfm.

^{^[63]} See Whiteman v. Burkey, 282 S.W. 788, = 788 (Tex.=20 1926) (=93There are no exemptions except those provided by law.=94); = Gann,=20 210 S.W.2d at 260 (=93[T]he courts cannot protect that which is not a=20 homestead.=94).

^{^[64]} Texas law dictates today=92s = result, but=20 given the dearth of boat-as-homestead cases in Texas, it is illustrative = to=20 study court decisions applying other states=92 homestead laws. = Federal bankruptcy courts applying the laws of = other=20 states have extended homestead protection to houseboats, but these = decisions all=20 turn on distinct constitutional and statutory language that expressly = grants=20 homestead protection for =93personal property=94 or =93mobile homes=94 = or similar=20 dwellings. In In re Mead, a Florida bankruptcy court held that a=20 houseboat was a homestead under a Florida statute that defined a = homestead as=20 =93any dwelling house, including a mobile home used as a residence.=94 = 255 B.R. 80,=20 83, 85 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000). Not surprisingly, this issue has arisen=20 frequently under Florida law, and we refer the reader to Mead and = the=20 following cases but do not attempt to reconcile them with each other or = our own=20 case law, other than to note that Florida statutory law is different = from our=20 own. See In re Walter, 230 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) = (holding=20 that a houseboat was not a homestead under Florida law because it was = =93a=20 navigable vehicle=94 and was =93designed to serve as a recreational = vehicle rather=20 than a permanent dwelling=94); In re Major, 166 B.R. 457, 459 = (Bankr. M.D.=20 Fla. 1994) (holding that a houseboat was not a homestead under Florida = law=20 because the boat was not designed to serve as a permanent dwelling and = was=20 immobile only because owners lacked funds to repair the engine); = Miami=20 Country Day Sch. v. Bakst, 641 So.2d 467, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. = 1994)=20 (holding that a houseboat was a homestead under Florida law because it = =93cannot=20 be used as a vehicle: it has never been equipped with a motor and was = towed to=20 its present location=94). In In re Ross, an Illinois bankruptcy = court held=20 that a houseboat was a homestead under an Illinois statute that = expressly=20 includes personal property. 210 B.R. 320, 322, 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. = 1997). In=20 In re Scudder, an Alabama bankruptcy court held that a houseboat = was a=20 homestead under an Alabama statute that defines a homestead to include a = =93mobile=20 home or similar dwelling=94 because a boat used as a primary residence = is similar=20 to a mobile home. 97 B.R. 617, 618=9619 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1989). And in = In re=20 McMahon, a Kentucky bankruptcy court held that a houseboat was a = homestead=20 under a Kentucky statute that expressly includes personal property. 60 = B.R. 632,=20 633=9634 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986). In contrast, as discussed above, Texas=20 constitutional and statutory language contemplates a land-based inquiry, = which=20 explains the seamless case law holding that attachment to realty governs = whether=20 a dwelling is a homestead.