IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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No. 05-0270

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AIC Management,=20 Petitioner,

Rhonda S. Crews, = Curtis=20 Caldwell Crews, Annette Crews, Denise Clauden Crews,=20 and Claude Crews, jr., the Heirs of Emma Crews Valda=20 Crews, and Eva Fay Gross, and Aldine Independent School District,=20 Respondents

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On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the First = District of=20 Texas

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Argued January 23,=20 2007

=20 Justice = Willett,=20 concurring in the judgment.

=20 My only quibble with the Court's decision is that it peeks = unnecessarily=20 into the legislative history surrounding the 1985 enactment and 1989 = amendment=20 of section 25.1032. I agree with the Court that section 25.1032 = constitutes "the=20 Legislature's specific jurisdictional grant to county civil courts at = law in=20 Harris = County over = eminent-domain=20 and title issues."[1] But our analysis on = jurisdiction should=20 end with that declarative sentence. The statutory text is unequivocal, = which=20 makes it dispositive, which makes the tag-along paragraph examining the=20 legislative history unnecessary.

=20 True, in today's case, the cited history happens to be consonant = with=20 section 25.1032's unambiguous text, but it is not difficult to imagine = cases=20 where a shrewd snippet from a committee hearing or floor debate could = contradict=20 a result that the face of the statute plainly requires. Citing such = background=20 materials even to confirm the clear meaning of dispositive text suggests = that=20 the text alone is in fact not dispositive, but rather vulnerable to = challenge by=20 a stray floor-debate comment from an individual legislator or a witness=20 testifying at a post-midnight committee hearing or a bill analysis = drafted by a=20 legislative staffer (or, just as likely, ghost-drafted by a lobbyist). = The=20 statute itself is what constitutes the law; it alone represents the=20 Legislature's singular will, and it is perilous to equate an isolated = remark or=20 opinion with an authoritative, watertight index of the collective wishes = of 181=20 individual legislators, who may have 181 different motives and reasons = for=20 voting the way they do.[2]

=20 This Court recognizes that legislative intent is best embodied in = legislative language. We recently cautioned that "over-reliance on = secondary=20 materials should be avoided, particularly where a statute's language is = clear.=20 If the text is unambiguous, we must take the Legislature at its word and = not=20 rummage around in legislative minutiae."[3] Faced with clear statutory = language, "the=20 judge's inquiry is at an end."[4] It may be a widespread practice = to mine=20 the minutiae of legislative records to discern what lawmakers had in = mind, but=20 as we have held, relying on these materials is verboten where the = statutory text=20 is, as here, absolutely clear.[5]

=20 Accordingly, because the jurisdictional question can be decided = without=20 recourse to legislative history, we should decide the jurisdictional = question=20 without recourse to legislative history.

=20 ____________________________________

=20 Don R. Willett

=20 Justice

Opinion delivered: = January 25,=20 2008

^[1]=20 __ S.W.3d __.

^[2]=20 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory=20 Interpretation, 17 Harv. = J.L. & Pub. Pol=92y 61, 68 (1994) = (=93Intent is=20 elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective = body.=94).

^[3]=20 Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 652 n.4 (Tex. 2006).

^[4]=20 Id. at=20 652.

^[5]=20 Id.=20 at 651=9652. Justice Scalia, the foremost critic of supplementing = clear=20 statutory text with legislative history, has stated his position = plainly:

&nbs= p; =20 As today's opinion shows, the Court's = disposition is=20 required by the text of the statute. . . . That being so, it is not only = (as I=20 think) improper but also quite unnecessary to seek repeated support in = the words=20 of a Senate Committee Report=97which, as far as we know, not even the = full=20 committee, much less the full Senate, much much less=20 the House, and much much much less the President who signed the bill, = agreed with.=20 Since, moreover, I have not read the entire so-called legislative = history, and=20 have no need or desire to do so, so far as I know the statements of the = Senate=20 Report may be contradicted elsewhere.

&nbs= p; =20 Accordingly, because the statute=97the only = sure=20 expression of the will of Congress=97says what the Court says it says, I = join in=20 the judgment.

Intel Corp. v. Advanced = Micro=20 Devices, Inc., 542 = U.S. = 241, 267=20 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the=20 judgment).