IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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No. 05-0270

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AIC Management,=20 Petitioner,

Rhonda S. Crews, = Curtis=20 Caldwell Crews, Annette Crews, Denise = Claudeen Crews, and Claude Crews, Jr., the Heirs = of Emma=20 Crews, Valda Crews, and Eva Fay Gross, and = Aldine = Independent School=20 District, Respondents

════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══════════ = 552;═

On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the First = District of=20 Texas

════════&#= 9552;═════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══

Argued January 23,=20 2007

Justice O=92Neill delivered = the opinion of=20 the Court.

Justice Willett filed a = concurring=20 opinion.

In = this=20 condemnation proceeding, we must decide whether property descriptions in = a=20 series of quitclaim deeds transferred through constable=92s = sales were insufficient as a matter of law = to=20 identify the lands to be conveyed, and whether the trial court, a county = civil=20 court at law in Harris County, had jurisdiction to = decide the=20 issue. We hold that, pursuant to section 25.1032(c)(1) of the Texas = Government=20 Code, the county court had jurisdiction to decide issues of title = arising out of=20 the condemnation suit irrespective of the amount in controversy. We = further hold=20 that the property descriptions=92 adequacy to permit location of the = land conveyed=20 cannot be conclusively determined on this record, and therefore summary = judgment=20 voiding the conveyances was improper. Accordingly, we reverse the court = of=20 appeals=92 judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further = proceedings=20 consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

=20 The parcel of land at the center of this dispute was originally = part of a=20 single, jointly owned, 24.36-acre tract described by metes and bounds = and=20 located in =93the T.S. Roberts Survey,=20 Abstract No. 659, Harris County, Texas.=94 In 1984, the tract was = partitioned into=20 two smaller tracts. Tract One, the 8.51-acre tract at issue in this = case, was=20 conveyed to Emma Crews, Valda Crews, and Eva = Fay Gross=20 (collectively =93the Crewses=94). Tract Two, = comprising=20 the remaining 15.85 acres, was conveyed to Andrew C. Brown.[1] An exhibit to the partition = deed=20 described the Crewses=92 property by metes = and bounds=20 within =93the T.S. Roberts = Survey,=20 Abstract No. 659, Harris County, Texas.=94 =

=20 In March 1989, the City of Houston sued the Crewses for unpaid ad valorem taxes for the years = 1960 to=20 1989 on what the City described as a six-acre portion of the 8.51-acre = tract.[2] Harris County=20 was joined as a party to the tax suit, but Aldine Independent School=20 District, the other local taxing authority, = was not.=20 The tax-suit petition described the assessed property as follows:

Tract 12=20 being 6.0 acres out of T.S. Roberts=20 Survey Abstract 659 situated in Harris County, Texas, as shown in file = number=20 J659372 of the deed and plat records of Harris County, Texas.

The file=20 number corresponded to the Harris County clerk=92s file number for = the=20 partition deed. The final judgment in the tax suit does not reference = the=20 partition deed, but orders the City and County to recover against the = Crewses for taxes and other fees levied on =93TR = 12 AB 659=20 T.S. Roberts situated in = Harris=20 County,=94 and further orders the constable to seize and sell the = property to=20 satisfy the judgment.

=20 Following the tax judgment, the constable attempted to sell the = property=20 at public auction. When there were no bidders, the City acquired the = property=20 through a constable=92s deed in 1991. The constable=92s deed references = the tax suit=20 and resulting judgment by cause number, and describes the property being = conveyed as follows:

all of the=20 estate, right, title and interest which the said Emma Crews, Valda Crews, and Eva Fay Gross had on the 5th day = of=20 February, 1991, or at any time afterwards, in and to the following land = and=20 premises, as described in said order of sale, viz:

TR 12 AB 659=20 T S Roberts * situated in = Harris=20 County, Texas

=20 AIC Management purchased the land from the City at a subsequent = public=20 sale in 1997. The 1997 constable=92s deed also references the tax suit = and=20 judgment and describes the property being conveyed to AIC as =93all of = the state=20 [sic], right, title and interest=94 in =93TR 12 AB 659 T S = Roberts * situated in Harris County=94 that = the City=20 had acquired under the 1991 constable=92s deed.

=20 About three years after AIC acquired the land, the City decided = to expand=20 George = Bush Intercontinental Airport and filed a condemnation = suit on=20 the entire 24.36-acre tract. In the multi-party condemnation proceedings = that=20 followed, both the Crewses and AIC claimed = ownership=20 of the 8.51-acre tract. The Crewses moved = for summary=20 judgment, contending they still held title under the 1984 partition deed = because=20 the property descriptions in both subsequent constable=92s deeds were = too vague to=20 allow the property to be located on the ground and were thus = insufficient to=20 convey title. Aldine intervened to collect delinquent taxes on the = property out=20 of the condemnation proceeds, claiming it still held a superior tax lien = because=20 it was not made a party to the City=92s 1989 tax suit. AIC cross-claimed = against=20 Aldine, contending it had no liability for taxes that accrued prior to = its=20 acquisition of the property and that Aldine=92s lien was extinguished = when it=20 failed to join the 1989 suit.

=20 The trial court granted the Crewses=92 motion for=20 summary judgment, voided the constable=92s deeds for insufficient = property=20 descriptions, and declared the Crewses the = property=92s=20 sole owners. The court also granted summary judgment in Aldine=92s favor = and=20 dismissed AIC=92s cross-claim because AIC = had no=20 interest in the property. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that = the Crewses held superior title under the 1984 = partition deed=20 because the constable=92s deeds contained insufficient descriptions to = allow=20 location of the property with reasonable certainty and therefore failed = to=20 convey title. ___ S.W.3d ___. We granted AIC=92s=20 petition for review to consider the sufficiency of the property = descriptions=20 contained in the constable=92s deeds and the county court=92s = jurisdiction to decide=20 the issue.

II. Jurisdiction

=20 AIC contests the jurisdiction of the trial court, a county civil = court at=20 law in Harris=20 County, to = resolve what it=20 characterizes as a title dispute. We consider this point first.

=20 AIC=92s argument concerns the = interplay between=20 the amount-in-controversy limitations of the general jurisdictional = grant to=20 statutory county courts,[3] Tex. Gov=92t Code =A7 = 25.0003, the=20 exclusive jurisdictional grant to district courts for disputes involving = title=20 issues, Tex. Prop. Code = =A7 21.002,=20 and a more specific jurisdictional grant to statutory county courts in = Harris=20 County, Tex. Gov=92t = Code =A7=20 25.1032. Generally, the subject-matter jurisdiction of statutory county = courts=20 is limited to =93cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 = but does=20 not exceed $100,000.=94 Id. =A7 25.0003(c)(1). = Without reference=20 to amounts in controversy, the Texas Property Code requires a county = court at=20 law before which an eminent-domain proceeding is pending to transfer the = case to=20 the district court upon determining that the controversy involves =93an = issue of=20 title.=94 Tex. Prop. Code = =A7 21.002.=20 Finally, section 25.1032 of the Government Code contains, in pertinent = part, the=20 following specific jurisdictional grant to Harris County civil courts at law:

(a) A=20 county civil court at law in Harris County has jurisdiction over all = civil=20 matters and causes, original and appellate, prescribed by law for county = courts=20 . . .

(c) A=20 county civil court at law has exclusive jurisdiction in Harris = County of eminent domain = proceedings, both=20 statutory and inverse, regardless of the amount in controversy. In = addition to=20 other jurisdiction provided by law, a county civil court at law has = jurisdiction=20 to:

=20 (1) decide the issue of title to real or personal property

* * * =

Tex. Gov=92t Code =A7 = 25.1032.

=20 Under section 25.1032=92s plain language, the county civil courts = at law in=20 Harris = County have = exclusive=20 jurisdiction over eminent-domain proceedings and may decide issues of = title to=20 real property. AIC contends, however, that this specific jurisdictional = grant=20 does not extend to title disputes which exceed the maximum $100,000=20 jurisdictional limit for statutory county courts. Because the property = at issue=20 in this case exceeds $100,000 in value, AIC contends, section 21.002 of = the=20 Property Code divested the county court of jurisdiction and required = transfer of=20 the case to the district court. We disagree.

=20 The $100,000 cap on county court jurisdiction appears in chapter = 25 of=20 the Government Code under subchapter A, entitled =93General = Provisions.=94=20 Id. =A7=20 25.0003(c). The first section of that subchapter states that, =93[i]f a provision of this subchapter conflicts with = a specific=20 provision for a particular court or county, the specific provision = controls.=94=20 Id. =A7=20 25.0001(a). Section 25.1032, which appears in subchapter C, defines the = specific=20 jurisdiction of county civil courts at law in Harris = County. Id. =A7 25.1032. That section = vests=20 exclusive jurisdiction over eminent-domain proceedings in Harris = County in the county civil = courts at law.=20 Id. =A7=20 25.1032(c). Subsection (1) also grants those courts jurisdiction to = decide the=20 issue of title to real property, which section 25.1032(c) provides is = =93in=20 addition to other jurisdiction provided by law.=94 Id. Section = 25.1032(c)(1) thus=20 bases the county civil courts=92 jurisdiction on the type of claim, not = the amount=20 of money in dispute. See Haas v. Ashford Hollow Cmty. Improvement Ass=92n, 209=20 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. App.=97Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see = also=20 Taub v. Aquila Sw. Pipeline Corp., 93 = S.W.3d 451,=20 458 (Tex. App.=97 Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); In re = Burlington N.=20 & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 12 S.W.3d 891, 899 (Tex. App.=97Houston = [14th Dist.]=20 2000, no pet.). We conclude that, in Harris County, the county civil = courts=92=20 jurisdiction to decide issues of title arising out of condemnation = proceedings=20 is in addition to their general concurrent jurisdiction described in = section=20 25.0003(c) and is not dependent upon the amount in controversy.

=20 AIC cites our decision in City of Houston v. West, = 520=20 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1975), to support its = contention that the=20 county court lacked jurisdiction to decide issues of title in this case. = In=20 West, which involved an eminent-domain proceeding, we held that = an issue=20 of title was involved that required transfer to the district court for=20 resolution. Id. at 754. Our decision, = though,=20 preceded the Legislature=92s specific jurisdictional grant to county = civil courts=20 at law in Harris=20 County over = eminent-domain=20 and title issues, Tex. Gov=92t = Code=20 =A7 25.1032(c). Accordingly, our decision in West has no = application=20 here.

=20 In interpreting statutes, we examine the language the Legislature = chose=20 and may also consider the object sought to be obtained. See id. = =A7=20 311.023(1). The legislative history indicates that section 25.1032, = which vested=20 exclusive jurisdiction over eminent-domain proceedings in Harris County=20 in the county civil courts, was originally enacted to alleviate a = caseload=20 imbalance between underutilized county courts and overburdened district = courts=20 in Harris=20 County. House = Comm. on=20 Judicial Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1110, 69th Leg., R.S. = (1985). The=20 statute was subsequently amended to =93raise the amount in controversy = limit . . .=20 and expand [county courts=92] jurisdiction with respect to other causes = of=20 action,=94 again due to the heavy pending caseload in the Harris = County district courts and the=20 availability of speedier resolution in the county courts. See Act = of May=20 15, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 445, =A7 1, = 1989 Tex.=20 Gen. Laws 1605, 1606; Tex. = Gov=92t Code=20 Ann. =A7 25.1032, Historical and Statutory Notes; Tex. Sen. Jurisprudence = Comm., Bill=20 Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1795, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989). The statutory language = vesting=20 jurisdiction in the county courts based on the type of claim rather than = the=20 amount in controversy is consistent with this purpose. We conclude that = the=20 county court at law had subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve any title = dispute=20 between AIC and the Crewses arising out of = the City=92s=20 eminent-domain proceeding, and now turn to the deeds themselves.

III. The Constable=92s Deeds

=20 Before examining the particular conveyances presented, we first = consider=20 the standard by which the sufficiency of their property descriptions = should be=20 measured. To be valid, a conveyance of real property must contain a = sufficient=20 description of the property to be conveyed. A property description is = sufficient=20 if the writing furnishes within itself, or by reference to some other = existing=20 writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed = may be=20 identified with reasonable certainty. See Broaddus v. Grout, 258 = S.W.2d=20 308, 309 (Tex. 1953); see also = Pickett v. Bishop, 223 S.W.2d 222, 224=9625 (Tex. 1949); Smith v. Sorelle, 87 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. 1935). = Like any=20 other conveyance of property, a judgment for foreclosure of a tax lien = upon real=20 estate which fails to describe a definite tract of land is void. See=20 Arnold v.=20 Crockett Indep. Sch. Dist., 404 S.W.2d = 27, 28=20 (Tex. 1966). A=20 tax judgment=92s property description must be sufficiently particular to = allow a=20 party to locate the specific land being identified. See Manges v. Freer Indep. = Sch.=20 Dist., 728 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. App.=97San Antonio 1987, writ ref=92d n.r.e.).

=20 In this case, the court of appeals held that a heightened = standard=20 applies when gauging the sufficiency of property descriptions contained = in=20 constables=92 or sheriffs=92 deeds made by virtue of execution = sales. ___ S.W.3d ___. However, that = distinction has=20 not been the law in Texas for more than a century. = See Hermann=20 v. Likens, 39 S.W. 282, 284 (Tex. 1897) (stating =93there should be = no=20 distinction in this respect between voluntary and involuntary = conveyances=94);=20 Gallup v. Flood, 103 S.W. 426, 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ = ref=92d) (holding that a more definite description = of the=20 property is not required for the efficacy of a sheriff=92s deed as = compared to a=20 voluntary deed). Texas law does not require courts to scrutinize the = proceedings=20 of a judicial sale with a view to defeat them; instead, =93every = reasonable=20 intendment will be made in their favor, so as to secure, if it can be = done=20 consistent with legal rules, the object they were intended to = accomplish.=94=20 Hermann, 39 S.W. at 284 (quoting White v. Luning, 93 U.S. 514, 523 (1876)). Both = voluntary=20 and involuntary conveyances of land require a property description that = would=20 allow an individual to locate the conveyed property with reasonable = certainty.=20 We now turn to the property descriptions in issue.

=20 The property in dispute is identified as =93TR 12=94 in the 1991 = and 1997=20 constable=92s deeds, and as =93Tract 12 being 6.0 acres=94 in the = tax-suit petition.=20 The =93Tract 12=94 description is a reference to the numbered =93tax = tracts=94 the=20 Harris County Appraisal District (=93HCAD=94) uses to divide property = for tax=20 purposes. AIC contends this property description is adequate because, = under=20 Texas law,=20 deeds that convey all of a party=92s interest in a particular tract, = abstract,=20 survey, county, and state are sufficient as a matter of law. According = to AIC,=20 the constable=92s deeds contain only one unambiguous property = description=20 conveying all of the Crewses=92 ownership = interest in=20 the entire 8.51-acre tract, or at a minimum six acres of it. The Crewses, on the other hand, contend the tax = judgment and=20 subsequent deeds were insufficient to convey title because they lack = adequate=20 descriptors, such as metes and bounds, that would allow a person to = locate the=20 six-acre portion of the 8.51-acre tract upon which the City of Houston=20 foreclosed its tax lien. Although we agree with the Crewses that the constable=92s deeds are not a = model of=20 clarity, we cannot conclude based on the record presented that they are = void as=20 a matter of law.

=20 The confusion apparently stems from the HCAD=92s=20 subdivision of the original 24.36-acre tract for appraisal and taxing = purposes.=20 HCAD maps from 1973 show that the taxing authority treated the = 24.36-acre tract=20 as 24 acres and labeled it as Tract 12. At some point not ascertainable = from the=20 record, Tract 12 was divided into eight three-acre tax tracts. A 2001 = HCAD map=20 shows those eight tracts, moving from east to west, as tax Tracts 12A, = 12B, 12C,=20 12D, 12E, 12F, 12, and 12G, respectively. It appears from 2001 tax = statements=20 that, at some point, HCAD had assessed 12 and 12G as one six-acre = tract.[4]

=20 Another 2001 HCAD map shows the eight tax tracts with Tracts One = and Two=20 from the partition deed sketched overtop. The sketches were drawn from a = land=20 survey that was conducted in 2000 based on the metes-and-bounds = descriptions in=20 the 1984 partition deed. The map shows that Tract One spans portions of = tax=20 tracts 12, 12G, 12F, and 12E; none of the tax tracts seem to lie = entirely within=20 the 8.51-acre Tract One as sketched on the map. The record does not = contain a=20 map showing how Tract 12 was situated at the time of the tax judgment in = 1989.=20 It is possible that the maps produced in 2001 reflect what the tax = tracts looked=20 like in 1989. It is also possible that in 1989, HCAD still designated or = referred to the entire 24-acre portion of land as Tract 12. Or perhaps = Tract 12G=20 did not exist as a separate tract in 1989, so Tract 12 was the six acres = labeled=20 in 2001 as Tracts 12 and 12G. Without information from HCAD about how = the tax=20 tracts were drawn in 1989, we cannot determine whether the conveyance of = all the=20 Crewses=92 interest in =93Tract 12=94 was = sufficient to=20 allow identification of the property. In the past, we have considered = similar=20 descriptors to be sufficient or not depending upon additional available=20 information.

=20 In Arnold v. Crockett Independent School District, = taxpayers=20 described separate tracts of land in rendering their property for tax = purposes,=20 but grouped several tracts together in schedules. 404 S.W.2d at 29. For = a number=20 of years, the taxing authority made assessments on the property in bulk = as to=20 all the tracts within each schedule, a method the trial court = incorporated into=20 its judgment of foreclosure. We held that the judgment for delinquent = taxes on=20 several schedules was void because, although some of the tracts within = each=20 schedule were adequately described, other tracts could not be located = with=20 sufficient certainty. Id. at 28. For example, some tracts of land = in the=20 same schedule were identified simply as portions of floating acreage = within an=20 abstract and survey, such as =93Abstract 926, Levi Speer Survey, 4.9 = acres,=94 and=20 =93Abstract 926, Levi Speer Survey, 58 acres.=94 Id. at 29 n.1. = Because the=20 schedule contained both sufficient and insufficient property = descriptions, the=20 tax judgment was reversed with respect to the entire schedule. = Id. at 29;=20 see Adams v. Duncan, 215 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Tex. 1948) (holding = conveyance=20 of =93four hundred eighty (480) acres of land [in Jasper County] out of = a 640-acre=20 survey patented to Wm. Duncan by the Republic of Texas, Feb. 26th, A.D. = 1842,=20 Abstract No. 136, Patent No. 173, Certificate No. 348, Vol. 1=94 void as = not=20 describing a definite tract of land). We remanded the case to the trial = court=20 with instructions that the court =93receive proof of the properties . . = . and=20 describe the properties with such certainty in the judgment that they = can be=20 located and identified.=94 Id. at 29.

=20 In Garza v. City of San Antonio, the court concluded that = a tax=20 judgment was void because it contained an insufficient property = description. 231=20 S.W. 697, 699 (Tex. Comm=92n App. 1921, holding approved). The tract of = land at=20 issue in Garza was assessed in the tax rolls for several years as = a=20 five-acre plot, but following a transfer in title the same tract of land = was=20 assessed in the tax rolls as a two-acre tract. Id. at 700. The = tax=20 petition, which covered delinquent taxes for both the five-acre and = two-acre=20 assessments, described the property simply as =93[o]ne tract of land = described as=20 old city block No. A-6, new city block No. A-6, situated on Trueheart Street, situated within the corporate = limits of=20 the city of San Antonio, Bexar County, State of Texas.=94 Id. at = 698. We=20 considered the property description in the petition sufficiently clear = to=20 identify the entire five-acre city block. But the tax judgment described = the=20 property foreclosed as =93that certain tract of land fronting on Trueheart Street, within the corporate limits of = the city of=20 San Antonio, Bexar County, Tex., and situated in city block A-6, = consisting of=20 two acres of land.=94 Id. Because the judgment was for only two = acres, and=20 nothing in the petition or tax assessment records or judgment indicated = which=20 two acres, we held that the exact property could only be identified = by=20 =93inference and conjecture=94; thus, the property description was = insufficient to=20 convey title. Id. at 700.

=20 In Willoughby v. Jones, we resolved a dispute similar to = the one=20 presented here. 251 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. 1952). The prior owners of = Willoughby=92s=20 land, which he purchased following a tax judgment, brought a=20 trespass-to-try-title suit claiming that the property description in the = tax=20 judgment was insufficient to convey title. Id. at 509. The tax = judgment=20 described the property as three separate tracts and included the total = acreage=20 for each tract; the judgment then listed the smaller units making up = each tract,=20 but with incomplete abstract, survey, certificate and block numbers. = Id.=20 at 510=9611. We noted that the incomplete descriptions were =93of = dubious validity.=94=20 Id. at 511. However, we considered the judgment=92s description = in light of=20 the description in the respondents=92 petition, which identified the = property by=20 referencing three deeds in the property=92s chain of title. Id. = Due to the=20 close correlation between the property descriptions in the three deeds = and the=20 description in the tax judgment, we held that the property the tax = judgment=20 intended to describe was ascertainable. Id. at 512. Accordingly, = we=20 affirmed summary judgment in Willoughby=92s favor. Id. at = 514.

=20 The Willoughby decision highlights the Court=92s = willingness to read=20 property descriptions in tax judgments alongside the property = descriptions in=20 related petitions and judgment rolls to identify the property conveyed, = thus=20 avoiding the inequity of erasing otherwise valid tax judgments at the = public=92s=20 expense. At the same time, we recognize the fundamental policy = underlying our=20 decision in Garza that a judgment=92s property description must = be=20 sufficient to allow location of the particular land conveyed. = Garza, 231=20 S.W. at 700.

=20 In this case, indulging all inferences in favor of the non-movant AIC, we simply cannot tell whether the = property=20 descriptions that appear in the 1991 and 1997 constable=92s deeds, read = in light=20 of the 1989 tax judgment and the underlying petition, are sufficient to = allow=20 location of the property on the ground. Throughout this litigation, the = record=20 reflects confusion arising from the HCAD=92s = division of=20 tax tracts, which do not correspond to the division of ownership in the = 1984=20 partition deed. The City=92s tax petition identifies the Crewses as defendants claiming interest in the = tax-burdened=20 land, and then describes the land upon which delinquent taxes are due as = =93Tract=20 12 being 6.0 acres out of T.S. Roberts survey situated in Harris County, = Texas, as=20 shown in file number J659377 of the deed and plat records of Harris = County,=20 Texas.=94 The tax judgment against the Crewses is for=20 taxes owed on =93TR 12 AB 659 T.S. Roberts situated in Harris County.=94 What = is clear is=20 that the court in 1989 intended to convey all of the Crewses=92 interest in the particular tract of = land identified=20 in HCAD tax records as =93Tract 12,=94 at least part of which lay within = the bounds=20 of the Crewses=92 property described in the = partition=20 deed.

=20 The Crewses, citing our decision in = Morrow=20 v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972), = contend=20 extrinsic or parol evidence may not be used = to furnish=20 the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified. = Id.=20 at 540=9641. There, the following property description was deemed = insufficient=20 because, despite the semblance of a metes-and-bounds description in the = deed, a=20 surveyor could not identify the following tract of land:

The North=20 acreage (to be determined by a survey) out of 145.8 acre tract of the = Jefferson=20 McGrew Survey No. 245, which acreage lies North of a line beginning at = the=20 Northeast corner of the First Tract above described and running North 75 = East to=20 a point in the West Boundary Line of Public Highway No. 277, commonly = known as=20 the Anson-Hawley-Abilene Highway, Jones County, Texas.

Id. at=20 539. Although the property could be identified with the aid of the = parties, the=20 deed itself did not refer to an existing writing but a nonexistent = survey to be=20 conducted in the future. The Morrow court affirmed that the = essential=20 elements of a property description may not be supplied by such extrinsic = evidence; the deed must furnish within itself or by reference to some = other=20 existing writing the means or data by which the land to be = conveyed may=20 be identified with reasonable certainty. Id. at 541.

=20 This case is easily distinguishable from Morrow, however, = as HCAD=20 records are not the type of extrinsic evidence we rejected in that case. = The =93TR=20 12=94 in the property descriptions is an explicit reference, within the = four=20 corners of the deed, to existing writings, such as tax tract maps, = within HCAD=20 records. The property description in the constable=92s deeds references = =93TR 12 AB=20 659 T.S. Roberts * situated = in Harris=20 County,=94 which is a division within the HCAD tax rolls that can be = used to=20 assist a surveyor in locating the land. While the maps produced in 2001 = could=20 not locate the boundaries of Tract 12 at the time of the conveyance, if = records=20 still in existence from 1989 could identify the tract and where it = overlapped=20 the Crewses=92 property, the description = would be=20 sufficient.

=20 AIC contends the property descriptions here, which convey =93all = of the=20 prior owner=92s interest=94 in =93TR 12 AB 659 T.S. Roberts * situated in Harris County,=94 are = sufficient=20 as a matter of law to convey all of the Crewses=92=20 interest in the entire 8.51-acre Tract One. We have held that deeds in = which the=20 property is described as simply =93my property=94 are sufficient when = extrinsic=20 evidence shows that the party owns only one tract of land answering the=20 description. See Pickett v. Bishop, 223 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. = 1949). In=20 such an instance, the stated ownership of the property is itself a = matter of=20 description. Id.; see also Sanderson v. Sanderson, 109 = S.W.2d 744,=20 746, 748 (Tex. 1937) (upholding as sufficient a contract that simply = described=20 property as =93Mrs. Kelton=92s farm in = Haskell County=94 so=20 long as that evidence established that Mrs. Kelton owned only one farm = in=20 Haskell County at the time). In this case, the Crewses=20 conveyed all of their interest in =93TR 12,=94 but the record does not = demonstrate=20 how Tract 12 was configured at the time. If the trial court were to find = that in=20 1989 HCAD designated the entire 24-acre tract as Tract 12, we agree with = AIC=20 that it would be entitled to all of the Crewses=92=20 interest in the 8.51-acre Tract One. But if HCAD identified Tract 12 at = the time=20 of the 1989 tax judgment as something less, be it three acres, six = acres, or=20 something else, then AIC would be entitled to the part of Tract 12 that=20 overlapped with the 8.51-acre Tract One, and the Crewses would retain whatever land remains.

=20 The Crewses contend the tax = petition=92s=20 description of Tract 12 as six acres, when compared with HCAD records = which have=20 identified Tract 12 as three and six acres at different points in time, = is a=20 source of ambiguity and invalidity. But we have held that the = specification of=20 acreage is the least reliable data point in descriptions of land =93and = will be=20 rejected if it is inconsistent with the actual land conveyed.=94 Tex. = Pac. Coal=20 & Oil Co. v. Masterson, 334 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Tex. 1960). = Here,=20 the constable=92s deeds broadly convey all of the Crewses=92 interest in Tract 12. If HCAD records = show the 1989=20 version of Tract 12 clearly drawn on a map or described by metes and = bounds, the=20 less reliable references to acreage in the tax-suit petition will not = render the=20 description ambiguous or insufficient.

IV. Other Issues Raised by AIC

=20 AIC argues that its cross-claims against Aldine should not have = been=20 dismissed. AIC=92s cross-claims contend that = Aldine=92s=20 tax liens were extinguished when it failed to join the 1989 tax suit, = and that=20 any taxes which accrued between 1980 and 1991 are the Crewses=92 responsibility. Because the trial court = awarded the=20 property to the Crewses, it dismissed AIC=92s cross-claims against Aldine without = reaching the=20 merits, reasoning that AIC did not have standing to bring such claims = because it=20 lacked any interest in the land. Because we reverse the summary judgment = granting title to the Crewses, we also = reverse the=20 dismissal of AIC=92s cross-claims against = Aldine and=20 remand those claims to the trial court.

V. Conclusion

=20 We hold that the trial court, a county civil court at law in = Harris=20 County, had jurisdiction to decide issues of title arising out of the = City=92s=20 condemnation proceedings, and that the record presented does not = conclusively=20 demonstrate that the property descriptions in the constable=92s deeds = were=20 inadequate to convey title as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse = the court=20 of appeals=92 judgment and remand the case to the trial court for = further=20 proceedings.

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 ___________________________________

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Harriet O=92Neill

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Justice

OPINION = DELIVERED: January=20 25, 2008

^[1]=20 Ownership of the 15.85-acre portion of the original tract was = adjudicated in a=20 separate suit and is not at issue in this appeal. See AIC Mgmt. v. = Baker,=20 ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.=97Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. = denied).

^[2]=20 The City based its tax suit on delinquent tax records that describe the = property=20 as =93TR 12 AB 659 T S Roberts=94 in the=20 amount of six acres (from 1968 to 1989) and three acres (from 1960 to=20 1967).

^[3]=20 A =93statutory county court=94 is defined as =93a county court created = by the=20 legislature under Article V, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, = including=20 county courts at law, county criminal courts, county criminal courts of = appeals,=20 and county civil courts at law, but does not include statutory probate = courts as=20 defined by Section 3, Texas Probate Code.=94 Tex. Gov=92t Code =A7 = 21.009(2).

^[4]=20 The 1990 tax statements refer to a six-acre portion as =93TR 12=94 from = 1968 forward=20 and make no reference to Tract 12G. From 1960 through 1967, =93TR 12=94 = is listed as=20 consisting of three acres. The 2001 statements refer to a six-acre = property as=20 =93TRS 12 & 12G=94 for all relevant years, and they reflect that the = value of=20 the property exactly doubled between 1967 and=20 1968.