IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

═══════ = 552;════

No. 03-1066

════════λ= 2;═══

Arkoma Basin = Exploration=20 Company, Inc., et al., Petitioners,

FMF Associates = 1990-A, Ltd.,=20 et al., Respondents

════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══════════ = 552;═

On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth = District of=20 Texas

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Argued December 1,=20 2005

Justice Brister delivered the = opinion of=20 the Court in which Chief = Justice=20 Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, Justice = Medina, Justice = Johnson, and Justice=20 Willett = joined.

Justice O=92Neill filed a concurring and = dissenting=20 opinion.

Eight=20 Virginia limited partnerships hired = Arkoma=20 Basin Exploration Company [1] to estimate production from = mineral=20 properties in the Arkoma = Basin in southeastern Oklahoma. When the properties failed = to=20 produce as predicted, they sued.

=20 Based on Virginia law, a = Texas jury = found clear=20 and convincing evidence of fraud and awarded $5.5 million in damages. = The trial=20 court signed a judgment reducing the verdict to $4.7 million, and later = reduced=20 that further by remittitur to about $2.9 = million.=20 When Arkoma appealed the judgment and the = partnerships=20 cross-appealed the remittitur, the court of = appeals=20 affirmed in all respects but one, holding part of the remittitur improper and restoring about $1.5 = million of the=20 jury=92s verdict.[2]

=20 We granted Arkoma=92s petition to consider whether there was = legally=20 sufficient evidence of fraud under Virginia=20 law, or of damages under Texas law. = Finding that=20 only two of the eight limited partnerships met these standards, we = affirm the=20 court of appeals=92 judgment as to FMF Associates 1988-B, Ltd. and FMF = Lazare, Ltd., and reverse the remainder.

I. Evidence of Fraud: Statement of Fact or = Opinion?

=20 Arkoma argues that its reserve estimates are immune from any = fraud claim=20 under Virginia=20 law. The parties agree that Virginia law governs this issue, and = requires=20 clear and convincing evidence to establish liability.[3] As this heightened standard is = more=20 substantive than procedural, we apply it in our legal sufficiency = review.[4]

=20 The parties agree that reserve estimates do not attempt to = calculate the=20 volume of gas underground, but the volume that can be economically = produced from=20 a reservoir in the future.[5] As a result, reserve estimates = inherently=20 include analysis and assumptions about future events.

=20 Virginia law draws a line between = statements=20 of opinion and of fact: =93[t]he mere = expression of an=20 opinion, however strong and positive the language may be, is no = fraud.=94[6] Additionally, Virginia law=20 distinguishes between statements of existing and future facts: =93fraud = must=20 relate to a present or a pre-existing fact, and cannot ordinarily be = predicated=20 on unfulfilled promises or statements as to future events.=94[7]

=20 But the line between these categories is not as clear as one = might expect=20 from these statements. Virginia specifically eschews a = bright-line=20 test, judging each case on its facts, and considering the nature of the=20 representation, the relative knowledge of the parties, their intentions, = and all=20 of the surrounding circumstances before deciding whether a statement = could=20 constitute fraud:

We have=20 not, however, established a bright line test to ascertain whether false=20 representations constitute matters of opinion or statements of fact. = Rather,=20 each case must in a large measure be adjudged upon its own facts, taking = into=20 consideration the nature of the representation and the meaning of the = language=20 used as applied to the subject matter and as interpreted by the = surrounding=20 circumstances. . . . It is not always an easy matter to determine = whether a=20 given statement is one of fact or opinion. The relative knowledge of the = parties=92 dealing, their intentions and all of the surrounding = circumstances,=20 which can only be gathered from the evidence, affect the interpretation = which=20 the courts put upon the representations in determining whether they be = of fact=20 or opinion.[8]

=20 Thus, in some circumstances Virginia law allows fraud claims = based on what=20 might otherwise appear to be opinions. For example, the Virginia Supreme = Court=20 has held that a consultant who reported =93nothing to indicate that = wetlands are=20 present,=94 but also warned that this was a matter of opinion, could = nevertheless=20 be liable for fraud when 80% of a property was later designated as = wetlands.[9] The same court held a fraud = claim could=20 be based on a realtor=92s opinion that there was no termite damage, when = in fact=20 he had in hand a report suggesting the opposite.[10] And a builder=92s opinion that = a house was=20 =93free from structural defects=94 could support a fraud claim, but his = opinion that=20 =93no significant work would be required=94 could not.[11] In each of these cases, the = nature of=20 the statement, the relative knowledge of the parties, and all the = surrounding=20 circumstances were taken into account in deciding whether a statement = that=20 appeared to be an =93opinion=94 was nevertheless actionable as = fraud.

=20 Similarly, statements about future events may constitute fraud = under=20 Virginia law=20 in some circumstances. Thus, for example, a sales agent=92s assurance that the woods = behind a=20 condominium would never be cleared constituted fraud when she knew about = plans=20 to build a playground there in the future.[12] And the Fourth Circuit has = held that a=20 doctor stated a fraud claim under Virginia law by alleging his = malpractice=20 insurer falsely assured him that a settlement would not affect his = future=20 ability to obtain coverage.[13] Here again, in each case the = nature of=20 the statement, the parties=92 relative knowledge, and all the = surrounding=20 circumstances were considered before deciding whether a statement about = future=20 events was nevertheless actionable.

=20 Applying these principles to this case, there is no question = Arkoma had=20 superior knowledge about likely reserves, as it was hired for precisely = that=20 reason. Arkoma represented that its database was =93without equal=94 and = =93unique=94 in=20 its ability to combine geologic, engineering, and economic data to = assess the=20 potential value of mineral properties.

=20 But Arkoma=92s reserve estimates cannot all be treated alike = because their=20 nature and the circumstances surrounding them were very different. The = reserves=20 prepared for two partnerships =97 1988-B and Lazare =97=20 concerned mineral interests in the Wilburton field, a mature field where = scores=20 of wells had been producing natural gas since 1960. Here, Arkoma = estimated=20 production from anticipated =93infill=94 wells drilled between existing = wells for=20 which there was a long track record of production. Experts testified = that these=20 wells could reasonably be expected to produce from the same strata at = similar=20 historical rates, and that reserve estimates in this area could not = reasonably=20 vary by more than 10 or 15 percent. Yet there was clear and convincing = evidence=20 that Arkoma=92s estimates assumed that infill wells would last far = longer, be much=20 more productive, and yield 200 to 300 percent more than nearby existing = wells=20 had ever produced.

=20 By contrast, Arkoma=92s reserve estimates for the remaining six=20 partnerships concerned mineral interests in the South Panola field, a = new field=20 in which there had been little drilling or production. Interests here = were=20 purchased =93ahead of the play=94 =97 in areas where minerals had not = yet been found,=20 but might be. The plaintiffs=92 own expert conceded there was less than = a year of=20 production history anywhere in this field, and that an entirely = different method=20 of calculating reserves had to be used because no one knew how much = wells in=20 this area might eventually produce. Further, while he characterized = drilling in=20 the Wilburton field as =93low risk,=94 he characterized that in = South Panola as =93definitely high=94 risk, = which can only=20 mean that reserve estimates in the latter were much more speculative. = There was=20 also undisputed evidence that in the decade after Arkoma=92s estimates, = major oil=20 companies had drilled very expensive wells (at $4 million or more each)=20 unsuccessfully looking for the same reserves in the same places that = Arkoma had=20 predicted. Viewing all the surrounding circumstances, there was no clear = and=20 convincing evidence that Arkoma=92s estimates in South=20 Panola should be treated as statements of fact rather than = of=20 opinion.

=20 Our conclusion that reserve estimates in these two fields must be = treated=20 differently is supported by DeJarnette v.=20 Thomas M. Brooks Lumber Co., in which a seller=92s estimate that = standing=20 timber would produce three million board feet of lumber was held to be a = statement of opinion rather than fact.[14] The opinion did not suggest = that=20 estimates of natural resources must always be one or the other; to the = contrary,=20 it turned on specific evidence in that case that the buyer knew the = seller=92s=20 estimate was not based on a detailed survey, and had made his own = inspection=20 with an experienced =93timber cruiser=94 before buying. By focusing on = how rough or=20 specific the parties thought the defendant=92s estimate was, Virginia law = would appear=20 to require different treatment for estimates in mature and immature gas = fields=20 like those here.

=20 We disagree with the dissent that Virginia law exonerates opinions = only if they=20 are =93good-faith opinions.=94 Because Virginia law requires proof of scienter in every fraud case,[15] honest statements are never = actionable=20 whether they are opinions or not. In affirming the fraud verdict as to = both=20 fields and all eight partnerships, the court of appeals pointed to = evidence=20 suggesting Arkoma=92s engineer was pressured to inflate some reserve = estimates,=20 and may have manipulated some spreadsheet calculations to reach a = predetermined=20 result. This is surely some evidence of scienter, but=20 the fact/opinion distinction focuses on reliance. If circumstances show = an=20 estimate should be treated as a mere opinion, it is unreasonable to rely = on the=20 estimate as a fact whether or not it was a lie.[16]

=20 Accordingly, we reject arguments that Virginia law would uniformly treat = all reserve=20 estimates =97 regardless of the circumstances =97 as mere opinions = (Arkoma=92s view)=20 or as statements of fact (the partnerships=92). Instead, viewing all the = surrounding circumstances in a light favorable to the verdict, and = keeping in=20 mind Virginia=92s clear and convincing evidence standard, we hold that = Arkoma=92s=20 reserve estimates in the mature Wilburton field were actionable as = statements of=20 fact, while those in the South Panola field were nonactionable statements of opinion. We affirm the = jury=92s=20 fraud verdict as to the 1988-B and Lazare=20 partnerships, and reverse the remainder.

II. = Evidence of=20 Damages: Preservation and Legal Sufficiency

=20 Arkoma also challenges the legal sufficiency of the damages = evidence. For=20 the reasons stated above, we restrict our review to the two partnerships = who proved fraud. They argue Arkoma failed to = preserve this=20 error in the trial court because Arkoma=92s no-evidence objection (1) = did not=20 specify why the evidence was legally insufficient, and (2) was not = raised before=20 or during trial. As these preservation points concern procedural = matters,=20 Texas law=20 governs.[17]

=20 To assert a no-evidence complaint in this Court, a party must = preserve=20 error in both the trial court and the court of appeals.[18]=20 The court of appeals held that Arkoma=92s objections in the trial = court=20 were not =93specific enough to call the trial court=92s attention to the = precise=20 lack of sufficiency asserted on appeal.=94 [19] We disagree, for two = reasons.

=20 First, Arkoma=92s post-trial motion explicitly asserted that = =93there is no=20 evidence . . . to support the jury=92s answers to each part of Question = 4,=94 the=20 damages question. Generally, a no-evidence objection directed to a = single jury=20 issue is sufficient to preserve error without further detail.[20] Thus, as Justice Calvert wrote = for this=20 Court 50 years ago, while a single such objection to all 79 jury answers = is too=20 general, the same objection addressed to each individual issue is = adequate.[21] Several commentators suggest = this is=20 precisely what careful practitioners should do.[22]

=20 Second, the cardinal rule for preserving error is that an = objection must=20 be clear enough to give the trial court an opportunity to correct it.[23] Here, the trial judge not only = had that=20 opportunity, he took it. The trial judge conducted a post-trial hearing = on the=20 sufficiency of the damages evidence, received letter briefs on the = issue, and=20 wrote a four-page single-spaced letter granting remittitur. Though damages were not reduced as = much as=20 Arkoma had hoped, there is no question the trial court was aware of its=20 objection.

=20 Of course, stock objections may not always preserve error. If a = single=20 jury question involves many issues, it is possible that a general = objection may=20 not tell the trial court where to start.[24] But post-trial objections will = rarely be=20 as detailed as an appellate brief because time is short, the record may = not be=20 ready, and the trial court is already familiar with the case. In that = context,=20 an objection is not necessarily inadequate because it does not specify = every=20 reason the evidence was insufficient.[25] Like all other procedural = rules, those=20 regarding the specificity of post-trial objections should be construed = liberally=20 so that the right to appeal is not lost unnecessarily.[26] We hold the court of appeals = erred in=20 holding that Arkoma=92s objection was too general.

=20 It is a closer question whether Arkoma had to object to the = damages=20 evidence during trial. It was the partnerships=92 burden to prove = damages by=20 expert testimony, as the value of mineral reserves is not a matter of = common=20 knowledge.[27] Texas law requires an = objection to=20 expert testimony before or during trial if the objection =93requires the = court to=20 evaluate the underlying methodology, technique, or foundational data,=94 = but no=20 objection is required if the complaint =93is restricted to the face of = the=20 record,=94 as when the complaint is that an opinion was speculative or = conclusory on its face,[28] or assumed facts contrary to = those on=20 the face of the record.[29] Of course, some objections = will fall=20 close to the line between these categories. But we need not categorize = Arkoma=92s=20 objection, because even if no objection was necessary the expert = testimony here=20 was legally sufficient.

=20 The 1988-B and Lazare partnerships = called=20 Michael Harper, a petroleum engineer, to calculate the amount by which = reserves=20 were fraudulently inflated. Arkoma does not object to the volumes he = estimated=20 for the exaggerated reserves; its sole challenge is that when Harper = multiplied=20 those volumes by prices, he failed to discount the total.

=20 Arkoma=92s argument assumes Harper was using the income approach = to value=20 without saying so. In that approach, estimated future income is = discounted by a=20 capitalization rate (reflecting both risk and the time value of money) = to reach=20 a present value.[30] Arkoma argues that no = reasonable jury=20 could credit testimony that a risky return of $100 in the future had a = fair=20 value of $100 now.

=20 But Harper never purported to use the income approach. While his=20 testimony about his calculations was cursory, a demonstrative exhibit = shows that=20 he believed the price reasonable investors would pay for mineral = interests was=20 the total dollars they expected to receive in the next eight years=20 without any adjustment for risk, inflation, or interest rates. = Although=20 his calculations did not include an explicit discount rate, they = included an=20 implicit return for risk and interest because the wells here were = expected to=20 produce for substantially more than eight years. While failing to use an = explicit discount rate might undermine expert testimony in other cases, = we note=20 that =93payouts=94 in the oil and gas business are often calculated in = precisely=20 this manner.[31]

=20 Arkoma is certainly correct that Harper=92s testimony could have = been a lot=20 clearer; his references to =93up here=94 and =93right there=94 on slides = and posters=20 used at trial often make it hard to tell what he is talking about. But = we cannot=20 say on this record that his opinions were unreliable or speculative. Nor = were=20 they conclusory as a matter of law; Harper = did not=20 simply state a conclusion without any explanation,[32] or ask jurors to =93take my = word for=20 it.=94 [33] It is true that without the = foundational=20 data in the appellate record, we cannot confirm that =93cash off my runs = . . .=20 divided by mcf=94 yielded the $1.62, $1.41, = $1.43, and=20 $1.59 prices he calculated as the low range for damages. But experts are = not=20 required to introduce such foundational data at trial unless the = opposing party=20 or the court insists.[34]

=20 Accordingly, we reject Arkoma=92s claim that evidence of the = damages=20 suffered by the 1988-B and Lazare = partnerships was=20 legally insufficient.

III. Deadlines for Appeal: From Judgment or Remittitur?

=20 In its original judgment, the trial court reduced the jury=92s = damages=20 verdict for the 1988-B partnership to $2,090,000 and for Lazare to $930,000, a matter they never appealed. = But they=20 did challenge by cross-appeal the trial court=92s remittitur reducing damages further to $1,302,302 = for 1988-B=20 and $579,492.76 for Lazare. The court of = appeals=20 reversed the remittitur and reinstated the = former=20 amounts.[35] Arkoma asserts the court had = no=20 jurisdiction to reinstate anything because the partnerships=92 = cross-appeal was=20 two days late.

=20 The trial court=92s original judgment was signed January 29, = 2002. Arkoma=92s=20 motion for new trial extended the time for appeal to April 29th, 90 days = after=20 judgment.[36] When Arkoma filed its notice = of appeal=20 on the last possible day, the deadline for a cross-appeal was further = extended=20 an additional 14 days to May 13th.[37] The partnerships filed two = days later,=20 May 15th.

=20 But the partnerships argue their cross-appeal was timely because = the=20 original judgment was modified by remittitur. =93If a=20 judgment is modified in any respect,=94 appellate deadlines do not run = from the=20 original judgment but =93from the date when the modified judgment is = signed.=94[38] According to the partnerships, = the trial=20 court=92s order granting remittitur on April = 15, 2002=20 restarted the appellate timetables, rendering their cross-appeal filed = 30 days=20 later timely.[39]

=20 Technically, neither trial nor appellate courts can order remittitur; they can only suggest a remittitur on condition that a new trial will be = granted if=20 it is refused.[40] We have held that if a court = directly=20 orders a reduction in damages, that order necessarily modifies the = judgment even=20 if it is incorrectly called a remittitur.[41] By contrast, we have also held = that if a=20 party files a purely voluntary remittitur = (without any=20 order or suggestion from the court), the = judgment has=20 not been modified.[42] If the latter rule were = otherwise, a=20 party could extend appellate deadlines indefinitely by remitting a = dollar at a=20 time.

=20 We have never addressed whether an order that properly suggests = remittitur modifies a judgment =93in any = respect,=94 and thus=20 restarts appellate deadlines. But we have explained that the deadlines = are=20 restarted by =93any change, whether or not material or = substantial.=94[43] Thus, appellate deadlines are = restarted=20 by an order that does nothing more than change the docket number or deny = all=20 relief not expressly granted.[44]

=20 By this standard, we think a signed order suggesting remittitur must restart the appellate deadlines as = well. By=20 its very nature, such an order allows only two options: a smaller = judgment or a=20 new trial. While it may not be clear when the order is signed which = option a=20 claimant will select, it is immediately clear that the original judgment = will=20 change. In many cases, the order itself will immediately change which = party, if=20 any, should begin preparing for an appeal. Given the relative impacts of = an=20 order adding a docket number and an order suggesting remittitur, it would be anomalous if the former = restarted=20 appellate deadlines but the latter did not.

=20 It is conceivable, of course, that a judgment might be reinstated = after a=20 suggestion of remittitur because the trial = judge=20 withdraws the latter. But that does not mean the judgment was not = modified =93in=20 any respect=94 in the interim; a trial judge who modifies a judgment and = then=20 withdraws the modification has modified the judgment twice rather = than=20 never.

=20 Because appellate timetables restarted when the trial court = signed its=20 remittitur order, the court of appeals had=20 jurisdiction to consider the remittitur. = Because=20 Arkoma asserts no other objection to it, it is affirmed.

IV. Conclusion

=20 For the reasons stated above, we hold that two of the eight = limited=20 partnerships presented legally sufficient evidence of fraud under = Virginia law and of damages under Texas law. = Accordingly,=20 we affirm the court of appeals=92 judgment as to FMF Associates 1988-B, = Ltd. and=20 FMF Lazare, Ltd. We reverse its judgment and = render a=20 take-nothing judgment against FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd., FMF HMY, = Ltd., FMF=20 Kahn, Ltd., FMF Friedman, Ltd., FMF Greenwald, Ltd., and FMF Smallwood, = Ltd.

=20 _______________________________

=20 Scott Brister

Justice

OPINION = DELIVERED: January=20 25, 2008

^[1]=20 Petitioners Arkoma Basin Exploration Company, Inc., Arkoma Basin = Minerals, Inc.,=20 and Mark S. Kelldorf are all referred to as = =93Arkoma=94=20 herein.

^[2] 118 S.W.3d = 445,=20 463.

^[3]=20 See Mortarino v. Consultant Eng=92g Servs., = Inc., 467 S.E.2d=20 778, 782 (Va. 1996); see also Amstutz v. = Everett=20 Jones Lumber Corp., 604 S.E.2d 437, 441 (Va. 2004) (noting that = =93clear and=20 convincing evidence is that degree of proof which produces in the mind = of the=20 trier of facts a firm belief or conviction = upon the=20 allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate proof, more = than a mere=20 preponderance but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not = mean=20 clear and unequivocal.=94).

^[4]=20 See Restatement = (Second) of=20 Conflict of Laws =A7 133 (1969) (=93The forum will apply its own = local law in=20 determining which party has the burden of persuading the trier of fact on a particular issue unless the = primary=20 purpose of the relevant rule of the state of the otherwise applicable = law is to=20 affect decision of the issue rather than to regulate the conduct of the = trial.=20 In that event, the rule of the state of the otherwise applicable law = will be=20 applied.=94).

^[5]=20 See 17 C.F.R. =A7 210.4-10(a)(2) (=93Proved oil and gas reserves = are the=20 estimated quantities of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids = which=20 geological and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to = be=20 recoverable in future years from known reservoirs under existing = economic and=20 operating conditions, i.e., prices and costs as of the date the estimate = is=20 made.=94); Howard R. Williams = &=20 Charles J. Meyers, Manual of Oil=20 and Gas Terms 931 (11th ed. 2000).

^[6]=20 Lambert v. Downtown Garage, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 714, 717 (Va. 2001) (quoting Saxby v. S. Land Co., = 63 S.E.=20 423, 424 (Va.=20 1909)); Mortarino, 467 S.E.2d at = 781.

^[7]=20 Mortarino, 467 S.E.2d at 781 (quoting = Patrick v. Summers, 369 S.E.2d 162, 164 (Va. 1988)).

^[8]=20 Id. at 781 (internal citations and quotations omitted); = accord, Cohn=20 v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 578, 582 (Va. 2003); = McMillion v. Dryvit=20 Sys., Inc., 552 S.E.2d 364, 369 (Va. 2001); Yuzefovsky v. St. John=92s Wood Apartments, = 540 S.E.2d=20 134, 142 (Va. 2001); Tate v. Colony House Builders, Inc., 508 = S.E.2d 597,=20 599 (Va. 1999).

^[9]=20 Mortarino, 467 = S.E.2d at=20 780.

^[10] Horner v. Ahern, 153 = S.E.2d 216, 220=20 (Va.=20 1967).

^[11] Tate, 508 S.E.2d=20 at 600=9601.

^[12] See Boykin v. Hermitage = Realty,=20 360 S.E.2d 177, 179 (Va. 1987).

^[13] See Merenstein=20 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 142 Fed. App=92x = 136, 140 (4th Cir.=20 2005).

^[14] 97 S.E.2d 750, 758 (Va. = 1957).

^[15] See Yuzefovsky=20 v. St. John=92s Wood Apartments, = 540 S.E.2d=20 134, 142 (Va.=20 2001).

^[16] See McMillion=20 v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 552 S.E.2d 364, = 369 (Va.=20 2001) (=93Statements which are vague and indefinite in their nature and = terms, or=20 are merely loose, conjectural or exaggerated, go for nothing, though = they may=20 not be true, for a [person] is not justified in placing reliance upon=20 them.=94); accord, Tate, 508 S.E.2d at 599; Mortarino v. Consultant Eng=92g Servs., = Inc., 467 S.E.2d=20 778, 781 (Va. 1996); Saxby v. S. Land Co., 63 S.E. 423, 424 (Va.=20 1909).

^[17] See Keeton v. Hustler = Magazine,=20 Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1984) (=93Under traditional choice of = law=20 principles, the law of the forum State governs on matters of = procedure.=94);=20 California v. Copus, 309 S.W.2d 227, = 230 (Tex.=20 1958); Restatement (Second) of = Conflict=20 of Laws =A7 122 (1971) (=93A court usually applies its own local = law rules=20 prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the = local law=20 rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.=94); see, = e.g.,=20 In re Lumbermens Mut.=20 Cas. Co., 184 = S.W.3d 718,=20 727 (Tex. 2006) (applying Texas appellate law in appeal concerning whether = Texas or Louisiana substantive law applied to = indemnity=20 claim).

^[18] See Tex. R. App. = P. 53.2(f).

^[19] 118 S.W.3d = 445,=20 457.

^[20] See, e.g., = Cropper v.=20 Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. 1988); Owens v. Rogers, 446 S.W.2d = 865, 866=20 (Tex. 1969); Rosas v. Shafer, = 415 S.W.2d=20 889, 889=9690 (Tex. 1967).

^[21] See Biggers v.=20 Cont=92l Bus Sys., Inc.,=20 303 S.W.2d 359, 368 (Tex. 1957).

^[22] See, e.g., 10 William V. Dorsaneo III, = Texas Litigation Guide =A7 = 140.100[2]=20 (2007); 10 Frank W. Elliott, = West=92s=20 Texas Forms: Civil Trial & Appellate Practice =A7 26.1 (3d = ed. 2000);=20 Michol O=92Connor, = O=92Connor=92s Texas Rules * Civil = Trials=20 630 (Michol O=92Connor & Byron P. Davis eds., 2005); 1 State Bar of Tex., Texas Appellate Practice Manual = =A7 6.12=20 (Roger Townsend et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).

^[23] See Tex. R. Civ. P. 321 = (providing that=20 motions for new trial must =93briefly refer to that part of the ruling = of the=20 court . . . to be complained of, in such a way that the objection can be = clearly=20 understood by the court=94); Barron v. James, 198 S.W.2d 256, 260 = (Tex.=20 1946) (=93The primary purpose of these rules is that the particular = point of=20 objection be presented to the court in such way that it may be clearly=20 understood.=94).

^[24] See Tex. R. Civ. P. 322 = (=93Grounds of=20 objections couched in general terms=97as that the court erred in its = charge, in=20 sustaining or overruling exceptions to the pleadings, and in excluding = or=20 admitting evidence, the verdict of the jury is contrary to law, and the=20 like=97shall not be considered by the court.=94); see, e.g., = Campbell v.=20 Texas, 85 S.W.3d 176, 185 (Tex. 2002) (holding inadequate an = objection that=20 unidentified statute prohibited trial court from compelling him to do=20 unidentified =93things=94).

^[25] See, e.g., Edward D. = Jones &=20 Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. 1998) (holding general=20 no-evidence point preserved objection that defendant had no duty to = ascertain=20 client=92s mental capacity); Biggers, = 303 S.W.2d=20 at 368; Clarendon Land Inv. & Agency Co. v. McClelland, 23 = S.W. 1100,=20 1103 (Tex. 1893) (=93Where an assignment of error is sufficiently = specific to=20 enable the court to see that a particular ruling is complained of, it = should be=20 held good, although it should fail to state the reason why such ruling = is=20 claimed to be erroneous.=94).

^[26] See Republic Underwriters Ins. = Co. v.=20 Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex. = 2004);=20 Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. 2004); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, = 844 (Tex.=20 2004); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616=9617 (Tex. 1997); = Clarendon=20 Land Inv., 23 S.W. at 1103 (=93What shall be a sufficiently special = assignment=20 of error is not susceptible of precise definition,=94 but =93remains to = be=20 determined upon the particular circumstances of each = case.=94).

^[27] See Tex. R. Evid. 702; = Kerr-McGee Corp.=20 v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. 2004); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Tex. = 2002).

^[28] Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown = Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 = S.W.3d 227,=20 233 (Tex.=20 2004).

^[29] See Roark v. Allen, 633 = S.W.2d 804,=20 809 (Tex. 1982) (holding opinion that physician should have warned of = possible=20 skull fracture was legally insufficient as it assumed physician was = aware of=20 fracture when there was no proof he was); see also City of Keller v.=20 Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005) (=93[I]f an expert=92s = opinion is based=20 on certain assumptions about the facts, we cannot disregard evidence = showing=20 those assumptions were unfounded.=94).

^[30] = See City of Harlingen v.=20 Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 183 = (Tex. 2001); Polk County v. Tenneco, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 918, = 921=20 (Tex.=20 1977).

^[31] See, e.g., Valence = Operating Co.=20 v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. 2005); 8 Howard R. Williams & Charles J.=20 Meyers, Oil & Gas = Law=20 769 (2005).

^[32] See Black=92s Law Dictionary 308 = (8th ed.=20 2004) (defining =93conclusory=94 as = =93[e]xpressing a factual inference without stating the = underlying=20 facts on which the inference is based.=94); see, e.g., Fid. = and Guar.=20 Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 = S.W.3d 571,=20 575 (Tex. 2006) (holding affidavits about lost suit papers not conclusory if =93supported by some explanation = from the person=20 most likely to have seen them=94); Bowie Mem=92l Hosp.=20 v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 53 (Tex. 2002) (finding expert report conclusory as it =93simply opines that Barbara = might have had=20 =91the possibility of a better outcome=92 without explaining how = Bowie=92s conduct=20 caused injury=94); Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. = 1999) (=93An=20 expert=92s simple ipse dixit is insufficient to establish a = matter; rather,=20 the expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his = conclusions to=20 the facts.=94); see also Black=92s=20 at 847 (=93ipse dixit. [Latin =93he himself said it=94] Something = asserted but=20 not proved.=94).

^[33] Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tex. = 1999).

^[34] See Tex. R. Evid. 705(a)=20 (=93The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the = expert=92s=20 reasons therefor without prior disclosure of = the=20 underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. = The expert=20 may in any event disclose on direct examination, or be required to = disclose on=20 cross-examination, the underlying facts or data.=94).

^[35] 118 S.W.3d = 445,=20 446.

^[36] See Tex. R. App. = P. 26.1(a).

^[37] See id. 26.1(d).

^[38] Id. 4.3(a); see also = Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(h).

^[39] See Tex. R. App. P. = 26.1.

^[40] See id. 46.1,=20 46.3; Snoke v. Republic = Underwriters Ins.=20 Co., 770 S.W.2d 777, 777 (Tex. = 1989) (per=20 curiam); Flanigan=20 v. Carswell, 324 S.W.2d 835, 839 = (Tex.=20 1959).

^[41] See Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. = Pulse=20 Ambulance Serv., Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497, 498=9699 (Tex. 1991) = (per curiam).

^[42] See Pope v. Wedgeworth, 221 S.W. 950, 951 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, holding approved).

^[43] Check v. Mitchell, 758 = S.W.2d 755,=20 756 (Tex.=20 1988) (per curiam) (emphasis = added).

^[44] See=20 id.