IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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No. 05-0126

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City of=20 Rockwall, Texas, = Petitioner,

Vester T. Hughes, as = Sole=20 Independent Executor of the Estate of W. W. Caruth,=20 Deceased, Respondent

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On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth = District of=20 Texas

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Argued January 25,=20 2006

Justice Johnson delivered the = opinion of=20 the Court, in which Chief = Justice=20 Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina, and Justice Green joined.

Justice Willett filed a = dissenting=20 opinion, in which Justice = Hecht, Justice=20 O=92Neill, and Justice=20 Brister joined.

A=20 municipality generally must annex land pursuant to a plan giving three = years=92=20 notice of its intent to annex. If an area is exempt from the three-year = notice=20 requirement, then annexation can take place by use of abbreviated = procedures=20 with less notice of a city=92s intent to annex.

=20 In this case, a landowner sought inclusion in the City of = Rockwall=92s=20 three-year annexation plan. The City denied the request, claimed the = proposed=20 annexation was statutorily exempt from the three-year requirement, and = gave=20 notice of intent to annex the landowner=92s territory under abbreviated=20 procedures. The landowner requested that the City arbitrate the dispute. = When=20 the City refused, the landowner sought a court order compelling = arbitration. The=20 trial court refused to compel arbitration and dismissed the = landowner=92s case for=20 lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that the City must = arbitrate. We=20 reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial = court=92s=20 judgment dismissing the suit.

I. Background

A. Annexation Law

=20 The Texas Constitution confers on cities the power to annex land. = Tex. Const. art. XI, =A7=20 5. The Legislature prescribes procedures to be used by cities in=20 conducting annexations. See Tex.=20 Loc. Gov=92t Code ch. 43;[1] Alexander Oil Co. v. City of = Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex.=20 1991). Statutory annexation procedures require=20 municipalities to prepare annexation plans specifically identifying = areas which=20 may be annexed beginning on the third anniversary of the date the plan = is=20 adopted or amended (a =93three-year plan=94). See Tex. Loc. = Gov=92t Code =A7 43.052(c). = Subchapter 43C=20 sets out annexation procedures for areas included in such three-year = plans.=20 See id. =A7=A7 43.051-.057.

=20 Section 43.052(h) lists several types of exemptions from = three-year=20 plans. One type of area exempted is a =93sparsely-populated=94 area. = Id. = =A7=20 43.052(h)(l). If an area is exempt from = inclusion in a=20 three-year plan, annexation occurs according to procedures set out in = subchapter=20 43C-1. See id. =A7 43.061 (=93This subchapter applies to = an area=20 proposed for annexation that is not required to be included in a = municipal=20 annexation plan under Section 43.052.=94). Annexations of section = 43.052(h)(l) sparsely-populated areas may be initiated = subject to 30=20 days=92 notice of the first hearing on the proposed annexation. = Id. =A7=20 43.062(b). Annexations under subchapter 43C-1 procedures = generally must=20 be completed within ninety days of the time proceedings are begun. = Id. =A7=20 43.064. Cities are prohibited from using the section = 43.052(h)(1) =93sparsely populated=94 exemption to = circumvent=20 requirements that annexations be pursuant to a three-year plan. = Id. =A7=20 43.052(i).

=20 The controversy before us primarily involves subsections = 43.052(c), (h),=20 and (i) which in pertinent part provide as=20 follows:

=20 (c) A municipality shall prepare an annexation plan that = specifically=20 identifies annexations that may occur = beginning on the=20 third anniversary of the date the annexation plan is adopted. The = municipality=20 may amend the plan to specifically identify annexations that may occur beginning on the third anniversary of the = date the plan=20 is amended.

. . .=20 .

=20 (h) This section [43.052] does not apply to an area proposed for=20 annexation if: (1) the area contains fewer than 100 separate tracts of = land on=20 which one or more residential dwellings are located on each tract . . . = .

=20 (i) A municipality may not circumvent = the=20 requirements of this section by proposing to separately annex two or = more areas=20 described by Subsection (h)(1) if no reason exists under generally = accepted=20 municipal planning principles and practices for separately annexing the = areas.=20 If a municipality proposes to separately annex areas in violation of = this=20 section, a person residing or owning land in the area may petition the=20 municipality to include the area in the municipality=92s annexation = plan. If the=20 municipality fails to take action on the petition, the petitioner may = request=20 arbitration of the dispute. The petitioner must request the appointment = of an=20 arbitrator in writing to the municipality. Sections 43.0564(b), (c), and = (e)=20 apply to the appointment of an arbitrator and the conduct of an = arbitration=20 proceeding under this subsection.

B. The Controversy

=20 The estate of W. W. Caruth (the = Estate) owns=20 405 acres of land (the Caruth property) = within a part=20 of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City, a home-rule city. In = August=20 2004, the Estate applied to the City for initial approval of a = residential=20 development plan for the Caruth property. = After the=20 Estate filed its application, the City initiated annexation procedures = pursuant=20 to section 43.052(h)(l) in regard to two = areas: one=20 included the Caruth property and another = included land=20 not contiguous to the Caruth property. The = City sent=20 notices of annexation to affected persons [2] pursuant to subchapter 43C-1 = procedures=20 for areas exempted from three-year annexation plans. The Estate objected = to the=20 City=92s attempt to annex using subchapter 43C-1 procedures and = petitioned the=20 City to include the Caruth property in the = City=92s=20 three-year annexation plan. The Rockwall City Council adopted a = resolution=20 rejecting the Estate=92s request. The Estate then asserted that the City = was=20 circumventing section 43.052(c)=92s requirement that annexations be = carried out=20 pursuant to a three-year plan and requested arbitration pursuant to = section=20 43.052(i). The City responded by advising = the Estate=20 that the proposed annexations were exempt from inclusion in a three-year = plan=20 and the Estate=92s =93request for arbitration [was] not = appropriate.=94

=20 The Estate filed suit in district court seeking an order = compelling=20 arbitration pursuant to section 43.052(i) = and a=20 temporary restraining order and temporary injunction preventing the City = from=20 proceeding with annexation pending completion of arbitration, including = related=20 appeals, if any. The City responded, in part, by filing a plea to the=20 jurisdiction asserting that the Estate did not have standing because the = dispute=20 concerned annexation procedures, the suit was a collateral attack on the = annexation ordinances and proceedings and the only way to challenge = alleged=20 annexation procedural irregularities was through quo warranto proceedings. In support of its plea to = the=20 jurisdiction, the City argued, in part, that section 43.052(i) authorized the Estate to request arbitration if = the City=20 did not take action on the Estate=92s petition to be included in a = three-year plan=20 but that the City took action on the petition by denying it. The trial = court=20 denied the Estate=92s applications, granted the City=92s plea to the = jurisdiction=20 and dismissed the action.

=20 The Estate appealed. The court of appeals agreed with the = Estate=92s=20 interpretation of section 43.052(i):

[W]e read=20 the plain language of the statute to provide that, if Rockwall fails to = take=20 action on the petition to include the area in the [three-year] = annexation=20 plan, the landowner may request arbitration of the dispute.

153 S.W.3d=20 709, 713-14 (emphasis added). The court of appeals reversed and remanded = with=20 instructions that the trial court compel arbitration and enjoin the City = from=20 proceeding with annexation pending the outcome of arbitration. = Id. at=20 714.

=20 In this Court, the City, supported by amicus curiae,[3] maintains that the court of = appeals erred=20 in concluding that section 43.052(i) grants = a private=20 right to the Estate to elect, and thereby require, arbitration of the = Estate=92s=20 claim even though the City took action on the Estate=92s petition by = denying it.[4] The Estate, also supported by = amicus=20 curiae,[5] claims it has standing because = section=20 43.052(i) grants it a substantive, private = right to=20 require the City to arbitrate the Estate=92s claim.

II. Standard of Review

=20 Statutory construction is a legal question we review de novo. In=20 construing statutes, we ascertain and give effect to the Legislature=92s = intent as=20 expressed by the language of the statute. See=20 State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. = 2006). We use=20 definitions prescribed by the Legislature and any technical or = particular=20 meaning the words have acquired. Tex.=20 Gov=92t Code = =A7=20 311.011(b). Otherwise, we construe the statute=92s = words=20 according to their plain and common meaning, Texas Department of=20 Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. = 2004),=20 unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context, Taylor v. = Firemen=92s=20 and Policemen=92s Civil Service Commission of City of Lubbock, 616 = S.W.2d 187,=20 189 (Tex. 1981), or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. = Univ.=20 of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, = 140 S.W.3d=20 351, 356 (Tex. 2004); see also = Tex. Dep=92t = of Protective=20 and Regulatory Servs. v. = Mega=20 Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004) (noting that when = statutory text is=20 unambiguous, courts must adopt the interpretation supported by the = statute=92s=20 plain language unless that interpretation would lead to absurd results). = We=20 presume the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result by = enacting the=20 statute. Tex. Gov=92t=20 Code =A7 = 311.021(3).[6] When a statute=92s language is = clear and=20 unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to rules of construction or = extrinsic=20 aids to construe the language. See St. Luke=92s = Episcopal=20 Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 = (Tex. 1997); Ex parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. = 1974).

III. Analysis

=20 The statutory language on which the issue turns provides: =93If = the=20 municipality fails to take action on the petition, the petitioner may = request=20 arbitration of the dispute . . . .=94 Tex.=20 Loc. Gov=92t Code =A7=20 43.052(i). The Estate = urges that=20 the statute be read differently than the plain language reads. The = Estate says=20 that the statute =93expressly provides for arbitration between a = landowner and a=20 city when the city, upon the petition of a landowner, fails to act to = include=20 the landowner=92s property in a three year annexation plan.=94 = (Emphasis added).=20 The Estate asks that we affirm the court of appeals=92 construction to = that=20 effect. We decline to do so.

=20 We first address the City=92s standing argument. In challenging = the=20 Estate=92s standing, the City cites Alexander Oil Co. v. City of = Seguin,=20 825 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1991), for the proposition that the Estate does not = have=20 standing because the validity of the City=92s annexation can only be = challenged by=20 a quo warranto proceeding unless the = proposed=20 annexation is wholly void. See id. at = 436 (=93The=20 only proper method for attacking the validity of a city=92s annexation = of=20 territory is by quo warranto proceeding, = unless the=20 annexation is wholly void.=94). The City reasons that the trial court = lacked=20 jurisdiction to hear a suit to compel arbitration because the Estate = does not=20 allege that the City has no power to annex the areas in question or that = the=20 annexation proceedings are otherwise wholly void, but rather alleges = only that=20 the City must annex pursuant to the three-year plan procedures of = subchapter 43C=20 as opposed to using the more expedited procedures of subchapter = 43C-1.

=20 In Alexander Oil, the City of Seguin passed an ordinance annexing = land owned=20 by Alexander Oil Company. Id. at=20 435. Alexander Oil filed suit alleging that Seguin failed = to comply=20 with procedures required by the Municipal Annexation Act[7] such as providing proper notice = for=20 hearings, conducting the required hearings, and providing an annexation = plan.=20 Id. at=20 436. Seguin responded that because the = ordinance=20 annexing Alexander Oil=92s property was not void, a quo warranto [8] proceeding by the State was the = only=20 proper way to collaterally attack the ordinance and the case should be=20 dismissed. Id. The Court agreed with = Seguin that = procedural=20 irregularities render ordinances voidable, not void. Id. at=20 439. The Court also noted that the Legislature had not expressly = provided=20 a private action to set aside annexations where an annexation ordinance = is=20 merely voidable. Id. at=20 437. Thus, Alexander Oil affirmed the rule that unless an=20 annexation is wholly void or the Legislature has expressly granted a = private=20 right to challenge the annexation in some manner, a quo warranto proceeding brought by the State is the = only proper=20 means of attacking a municipality=92s annexation in court. Id.

=20 The Estate does not urge that the City=92s annexation proceeding = is void or=20 that the City lacks power to annex the area in question. Nor does the = Estate=20 challenge the authorities. The City cites various cases for its = contention that=20 the annexation process in general is procedural. See Werthmann v. City of Fort=20 Worth, 121 S.W.3d 803 (Tex.=20 App.=97Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); City of Balch Springs v. Lucas, = 101=20 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. App.=97Dallas 2002, = no pet.);=20 City of San Antonio v. Hardee, = 70 S.W.3d=20 207 (Tex.=20 App.=97San Antonio 2001, no pet.). The Estate says those authorities = simply are=20 not applicable because none of them interpret the language of section=20 43.052(i) which is the issue in this case. = The Estate=20 maintains that it has standing because subsequent to Alexander = Oil the=20 Legislature expressly granted landowners a substantive private right to=20 arbitration by enacting section 43.052(i). = It argues=20 that when the Legislature enacted comprehensive changes in 1999 to = impose order=20 in annexation law, the cornerstone of the changes was section = 43.052(c)=92s=20 requirement that municipalities must prepare annexation plans = specifically=20 identifying areas that may be annexed beginning on the third anniversary = of the=20 date the plan is adopted or amended. According to the Estate, the = exemptions of=20 section 43.052(h) have been used regularly by cities to circumvent the=20 three-year planning requirement. The Estate posits that by enacting = section=20 43.052(i), the Legislature must have = intended to=20 protect against such abuse by requiring arbitration if a municipality = fails to=20 take action on a landowner=92s petition to incorporate the land into the = city=92s=20 three-year plan and that any other interpretation of the statute would = lead to=20 absurd results. As part of its argument, the Estate references the = policy of the=20 State which favors arbitration of disputes and the short time frame = necessary to=20 complete arbitration if there are no appeals from the arbitration award. = See=20 Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842=20 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992). The Estate also argues = that it=20 would be illogical for the Legislature to have crafted a detailed = statutory=20 framework around the requirement that municipalities enact three-year = annexation=20 plans, provide for exemptions to the three-year plan requirement, allow=20 landowners to contest whether a city is circumventing the three-year = plan=20 requirement by requesting inclusion in a three-year plan, yet require a = city to=20 arbitrate the contest only if the city ignores, or =93pocket vetoes,=94 = the=20 petition.

=20 But we are not persuaded that the process and result called for = by the=20 plain language of the statute is illogical, much less absurd. = Subchapters 43C=20 and 43C-1 contain extensive provisions in regard to annexations. Section = 43.052(i) is detailed in specifying how and = when the=20 landowner may present a complaint to the city. It incorporates by = reference=20 part, but not all, of section 43.0564=92s arbitration procedures. And in = the midst=20 of the detailed language, we find that the Legislature specifically = addressed=20 when arbitration may be requested: =93If the municipality fails to take = action on=20 the petition . . . .=94 In regard to =93logic,=94 it seems to us that by = crafting=20 language specifying when arbitration of the dispute could be requested,=20 legislators logically would have considered that there are two instances = in=20 which a dispute would need to be resolved. The first instance is if the = city did=20 not bring the landowner=92s petition up for consideration, or, if it was = brought=20 up for consideration, the city failed to take action on it one way or = the other=20 (what the parties refer to in this case as a =93pocket veto=94). The = second instance=20 is if the city denied the petition and refused to put the land into a = three-year=20 plan. It follows, logically, that because the statutory language as = enacted=20 allows arbitration to be requested only in the first instance, the = Legislature=92s=20 intent was not to provide for arbitration in the second instance. See = Cameron=20 v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) = (=93It is a=20 rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute must be = presumed to=20 have been used for a purpose . . . [and] we believe every word excluded = from a=20 statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a = purpose.=94).

=20 Contrary to the Estate=92s position, we see benefits from reading = the=20 statute=92s language literally. One significant benefit is that by not = reading=20 language into the statute when the legislature did not put it there, we = do not=20 risk crossing the line between judicial and legislative powers of = government as=20 prescribed by article II of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. II, =A7=20 1. (=93[N]o person, or collection of persons, being of one of = these [three=20 governmental] departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to = either=20 of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.=94). = Another=20 benefit is that by interpreting statutes such as this in a = straightforward=20 manner, we build upon the principle that =93ordinary citizens [should = be] able =91to=20 rely on the plain language of a statute to mean what it says.=92=94 = Fitzgerald v.=20 Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. = Inc., 322 = U.S. = 607, 618=20 (1944)).

=20 As presented in this case, construing the statute=92s language to = mean what=20 it says results in a landowner having the right to request arbitration = only if a=20 city refuses to include the area in question in a three-year plan, fails = to deny=20 the petition, and fails to otherwise accommodate the landowner. The = statute as=20 written, in effect, provides a structured method for landowners to seek = redress=20 from cities if landowners believe cities are annexing in violation of = section=20 43.052(c). If a landowner petitions to be included in a three-year plan = and the=20 city acts on the petition in a way that is acceptable to the landowner, = there is=20 no dispute to be resolved. If the city denies the landowner=92s = petition, then the=20 landowner has notified the city of its specific complaint in writing and = pursued=20 and exhausted a legislatively-provided method for seeking redress before = asking=20 a State=92s attorney to disrupt the city=92s annexation process by = filing a quo=20 warranto action. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. = Code =A7=20 66.002(c) (quo warranto proceedings may be = brought by=20 the attorney general or county or district attorney on his or her own = motion or=20 at the request of an individual). And a city has the option of taking no = action=20 to either grant or deny the landowner=92s petition and, thereby, = effectively=20 agreeing to arbitration of the dispute if the landowner requests = arbitration.=20 Under this last scenario, the arbitration essentially is a dispute = resolution=20 process agreed to by the parties. In the event multiple landowners = submit=20 petitions, the city might delay acting on the petitions in an attempt to = have=20 all the petitioning landowners agree to join in one=20 arbitration to resolve the issue(s). If an agreement cannot be = reached to=20 join in one arbitration, the city might = choose to=20 either grant or deny each petition. The landowners whose petitions are = denied=20 have the option of seeking institution of a quo warranto action in which the claims of all = landowners will=20 be resolved, instead of the city and each landowner being involved in = individual=20 arbitration proceedings.

=20 The literal language of the statute can be viewed as a = legislative=20 attempt to encourage cities and landowners to resolve their conflicts = without=20 court action. First, if the statute is interpreted according to its = literal=20 language=97not mandating arbitration if a landowner=92s petition is = denied=97the=20 result is that neither landowners nor cities have lost protections which = they=20 had prior to the statute=92s amendment. Landowners will continue to have = the right=20 to seek a quo warranto action to challenge = the=20 annexation. Cities will continue to be protected because a disinterested = party=20 such as the attorney general or a county or district attorney will = review and=20 weigh the strength of landowner claims before cities are subjected to = litigation=20 and disruption of their annexation processes. By giving landowners the = right to=20 request arbitration if cities delay taking action on their petitions, = the=20 Legislature gave landowners leverage to push the processes to = conclusion,=20 prevent pocket vetoes of petitions to be included in three-year plans = and, if=20 necessary, bolster arguments to state=92s attorneys in support of quo = warranto actions to challenge proposed = annexations.

=20 But in any event, our standard for construing statutes is not to = measure=20 them for logic. See Lee v. City of Houston, = 807 S.W.2d=20 290, 293 (Tex.=20 1991) (=93Our function is not to question the wisdom of the statute; = rather, we=20 must apply it as written.=94). As previously noted, our standard = is to=20 construe statutes to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, with the = language=20 of the statute as it was enacted to be our guide unless the context or = an absurd=20 result requires another construction. See Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d = at 866=20 (Tex. 1999) (=93[I]t is a fair assumption that the Legislature tries to = say what=20 it means, and therefore the words it chooses should be the surest guide = to=20 legislative intent.=94); Jones v. Del Andersen & Assocs., 539 = S.W.2d=20 348, 350 (Tex. 1976) (=93[The intention of the Legislature] is to be = found in the=20 language of the statute itself . . . we cannot give Section 28 the = limited=20 construction advocated by Andersen. To do so would require that we read = into the=20 statute words which are not there.=94). In = this instance,=20 the context does not indicate that the plain meaning of the language was = not=20 intended. The sentence in question addresses a separate subject from the = surrounding language: the circumstances under which a city can be = requested to=20 arbitrate. It would not have been inconsistent with the context of the = sentence=20 for the Legislature to have provided that a landowner could request = arbitration=20 if the municipality failed to act favorably upon the landowner=92s = petition or=20 failed to include the landowner=92s property in a three-year annexation = plan.=20 Clearly, though, there is a difference between the meaning of the = statute as it=20 is written and the statute as contended for by the Estate.

=20 The dissent agrees as to the standards for interpreting the = statute and=20 that =93words matter=94 and =93context matters.=94 The dissent, however, = says that =93the=20 most natural reading=94 of the statute results from adding words to make = it mean=20 something other than what the plain words mean. For the reasons we have = set out,=20 we disagree that the proper reading of the statute results from changing = the=20 language of the statute.

=20 The dissent also references section 43.056(l), the provision for=20 resolving disputes over whether a municipality has complied with the = service=20 plan adopted to provide full municipal services to the area to be = annexed, and=20 that section=92s use of the =93[i]f the = municipality fails=20 to take action=94 language. A municipality=92s service plan must be = adopted by the=20 municipality=92s governing body and is a contractual obligation of the=20 municipality by statute. See Tex.=20 Loc. Gov=92t Code =A7=20 43.056(j), (k). Whatever construction is eventually = given=20 to the language of section 43.056(l)=97and we venture none here because = there is=20 no controversy before us as to that section=97it will be according to = statutory=20 construction principles. And that construction, when and if it occurs, = must take=20 into consideration the context of the language: section 43.065 addresses = controversies regarding whether the municipality is fulfilling its = service plan=20 contractual commitment. The controversy presented by the present case = and the=20 statutory language of section 43.052(i) do = not involve=20 the question of whether a municipality is fulfilling a contractual = obligation.=20 The controversy involves a governmental decision of whether to annex = territory,=20 and if so, how.

=20 In this regard, we note that sections 43.052(i)=20 and 43.056(l) not only differ in the types of disputes they address, but = also in=20 how arbitrations of those disputes are to be conducted. Arbitration = under=20 section 43.056(l) must be in accordance with section 43.0565. Section = 43.0565(d)=20 specifies three options available to an arbitrator if the arbitrator = finds that=20 the municipality has not complied with its service plan requirements. = But that=20 same subsection provides that the municipality has the option of disannexing the area in lieu of complying with its = service=20 plan. In other words, even if an arbitration = occurs=20 pursuant to section 43.056(l), however it comes about, the municipality = retains=20 the right to make its own decision as to annexation or disannexation of the property. That prerogative is = expressly=20 not ceded to an arbitrator by the statute.

=20 Section 43.052(i), on the other hand, = provides=20 only that sections 43.0564(b), (c), and (e) apply to the arbitration = referenced=20 in 43.052(i). Those sections address = procedures for=20 selecting an arbitrator, setting a hearing, giving notice of the = hearing, and=20 powers of the arbitrator in regard to conducting the arbitration. = Section=20 43.052(i) does not prescribe or incorporate = any=20 provisions as to issues to be decided by the arbitrator, how long the=20 arbitration is to take, when the arbitrator is to issue a decision, or = whether=20 the parties have a right to appeal the arbitrator=92s decision=97all of = which are=20 provided by subsections of 43.0564 but not incorporated by 43.052(i). Nor does section 43.052(i)=20 specify what remedies an arbitrator may impose, as does section = 43.0565(d).

=20 In sum, subchapter 43C provides different methodologies for = arbitration=20 in three different situations: (1) disputes under section 43.052(i), (2) disputes during negotiations for services = to be=20 provided by the municipality, see section 43.0564, and (3) = disputes about=20 whether the service plan has been fulfilled. Disputes arising under each = different section and its dispute resolution provision must be construed = in its=20 own context. That is what we do as to the controversy presented by this = case: we=20 construe the language of section 43.052(i) = in its=20 context.

=20 The dissent also states that under our construction of the = statute, if a=20 city rejects the landowner=92s petition, the landowner has no further = recourse.=20 That is incorrect. The statute does not deprive the landowner of the = right to a=20 quo warranto action, which is the recourse = long=20 available to landowners.

=20 If the Legislature desires to amend the statute to add words so = that the=20 statute will then say what is contended for by the Estate, we are = confident it=20 will do so. However, changing the meaning of the statute by adding words = to it,=20 we believe, is a legislative function, not a judicial function. = See 67=20 Tex. Jur. 3d Statutes =A7 85 (2003) = (noting that it is=20 for the Legislature, not the courts, to remedy deficiencies, if any, in=20 laws).

V. Conclusion

=20 We decline to read additional language into the statute as the = Estate=20 urges us to do. We go no further than the unambiguous language of the = statute to=20 interpret it. Section 43.052(i) does not = create a=20 substantive private right for a landowner to compel arbitration if a=20 municipality takes action on the landowner=92s petition by denying it, = as the City=20 did. Accordingly, the Estate lacks standing to pursue the suit it = filed.

=20 We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render = judgment=20 dismissing the Estate=92s suit.

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 ________________________________________

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Phil Johnson

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: January 25, 2008

^[1]=20 Further references to Local Government Code provisions will generally be = by=20 reference to the chapter, section, or subsection number.

^[2]=20 Section 43.052(i) refers to =93persons = residing or=20 owning land in the area.=94 We will refer to such persons as = =93landowners=94 for ease=20 of reference.

^[3]=20 This Court has recieved briefs in support of = the=20 City=92s position from the Texas Municipal League and the Texas cities of Fate, Fort = Worth, Denton, and Pearland.

^[4]=20 The City also maintains that even if section 43.052(i)=20 grants a right to arbitration, the Estate still lacks standing because = section=20 43.052(i) comprises a procedural part of the = annexation process and violations of procedural requirements can only be = challenged through quo warranto proceedings. = We do not=20 reach the argument and express no opinion on it.

^[5]=20 This Court has received briefs in support of the Estate from Brian = Shannon,=20 Associate Dean and Charles =93Tex=94 = Thornton=20 Professor of Law at Texas Tech=20 University and by = the Texas=20 Association of Builders.

^[6]=20 We may also consider legislative history in construing a statute that is = not=20 ambiguous. See Tex. = Gov=92t Code =A7=20 311.023(3). In this instance we are at a = disadvantage=20 because the language in question was crafted by a conference committee, = and=20 legislative history does not provide illumination as to how it was=20 formulated.

^[7]=20 Tex. Rev. = Civ.=20 Stat. art 970a =A7=A7 6, 10, = repealed by=20 Act of May 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. = 149, =A7 49,=20 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1306, now codified as Tex. = Loc. Gov=92t Code = =A7=A7 43.052, .053,=20 .056. Further references are to the Local = Government=20 Code.

^[8]=20 Quo warranto proceedings are used by the = State to=20 protect itself and the good of the public through agents of the State = who=20 control the proceedings. See Fuller Springs v. State ex rel. City of=20 Lufkin, 513 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. 1974); State ex rel. Candler v. = Court of=20 Civil Appeals, Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist., 75 S.W.2d 253 (1934);=20 Staples v. State, 245 S.W. 639=20 (1922).