IN THE SUPREME = COURT OF TEXAS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

════════&#= 9552;═══

No. 03-1189

════════λ= 2;═══

DaimlerChrysler = Corporation,=20 Petitioner,

Bill Inman, David = Castro,=20 and John Wilkins, Each Individually and on Behalf of All Others = Similarly=20 Situated, Respondents

════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══════════ = 552;═

On Petition for Review from = the

Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth = District of=20 Texas

════════&#= 9552;═════════λ= 2;══════════&= #9552;═════════_= 52;══════════= ══

Argued January 6,=20 2005

=20 Justice Hecht = delivered the=20 opinion of the Court, in which = Justice Wainwright, = Justice=20 Brister, Justice Medina, and Justice Willett joined.

=20 Chief Justice = Jefferson,=20 joined by Justice O=92Neill, Justice = Green, and=20 Justice Johnson, = dissenting.

=20 Three plaintiffs have sued for themselves and a nationwide class = of some=20 ten million owners and lessees of DaimlerChrysler vehicles, equipped = with Gen-3=20 seatbelt buckles, and sold over the course of a decade. They allege that = it is=20 too easy to press the release button on the buckle and unlatch it = without=20 intending to do so. They do not contend that this is unavoidable, = probable, or=20 even eventual, only that it is possible. Two of the plaintiffs have = never=20 experienced anything like what they claim might happen, and the third is = not=20 sure whether he has or not, but he has never been injured. They have = sued to=20 have the buckles replaced with ones that are harder to unlatch. At least = two=20 similar class actions have been brought in other states without = success.[1]

=20 Of course, the risk that seatbelt buckles will be unlatched = accidentally=20 can be eliminated by making them more difficult to operate, but that = would=20 discourage people from using them at all, resulting in more injuries. In = designing seatbelt buckles, the risk of injury from accidental release = of=20 easy-to-unlatch buckles must be balanced against the risk of injury from = non-use=20 of hard-to-unlatch buckles, for either way, there is risk. The National = Highway=20 Traffic Safety Administration is charged with being sure that balance is = struck=20 in the right place for vehicles sold throughout the country. The = decision is not=20 one for a jury in one state or another to make for the rest of the = nation. NHTSA=20 has never required that the Gen-3 buckles be recalled and replaced.

=20 The trial court granted class certification. The court of appeals = reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that =93the trial = court=20 still has significant pre-certification work to do=94 to determine which = jurisdictions=92 laws would govern class members=92 claims.[2] But the court of appeals = rejected=20 DaimlerChrysler=92s broader argument: that the plaintiffs=92 fear of = possible injury=20 from an accidental release of a seatbelt is so remote that they lack = standing to=20 assert their claims.[3] That is, DaimlerChrysler argues = not=20 merely that the plaintiffs=92 claims will fail but that the court lacks=20 jurisdiction to hear them. We agree, reverse the judgment of the court = of=20 appeals, and order the case dismissed.

=20 Three Nueces County residents, Bill L. Inman, = David=20 Castro, and John Wilkins, bought Dodge vehicles manufactured by = DaimlerChrysler=20 Corp., equipped with Gen-3 seatbelt buckles =97 respectively, a new 1997 = Dodge=20 Caravan, a new 1995 Dodge Ram 1500, and a used 1999 Dodge Intrepid. = Castro and=20 Wilkins testified that they had never experienced any problems with the = buckles=20 and had never heard of anyone who had. Wilkins had been in one accident = and the=20 seatbelt worked properly. Inman testified that his seatbelt might have = released=20 twice when it should not have, but he was =93not a hundred percent sure = of this=20 because [he] didn=92t pay any attention at the time=94. The first time, = he did not=20 know how he hit the release button, but =93all at once=94 his seatbelt = was loose.=20 The second time, he said, he thought he bumped the button while trying = to=20 replace the lid on a cooler sitting between the seats of his van. He was = not=20 hurt or endangered either time, and he does not know of anyone who was = ever=20 harmed because of a Gen-3 buckle.

=20 In June 2000, Inman sued DaimlerChrysler in the county court at = law in=20 Nueces = County, alleging = that the=20 Gen-3 buckles were defective. Castro and Wilkins joined as plaintiffs in = January=20 2002. In depositions, the plaintiffs explained why they decided to sue = even=20 though they had never been hurt because of their seatbelts. Inman = testified that=20 he had run into his lawyer on the street, who told him =93there could be = a problem=20 with the seatbelt=94, and =93some way or another [they] got around to = sort of=20 discussing a lawsuit.=94 According to Castro=92s testimony, he became = involved in=20 this lawsuit after hearing that the seatbelts in his Dodge truck were = defective=20 from his cousin, an investigator working for the law firm representing = Inman.=20 Wilkins testified that he was informed by a friend who worked for the = same firm=20 that there was litigation over whether the Gen-3 buckle was defective. = And so the three decided to sue on behalf of ten million = vehicle=20 owners and lessees across the nation.

=20 In their seventh amended petition, the plaintiffs alleged that = the Gen-3=20 buckle is =93dangerously subject to accidental release, far more = dangerous than=20 other buckle designs=94, that it is =93subject to release at any time, = and=20 especially in the event of a collision=94, and that the buckle =93design = does not=20 minimize the possibility of accidental release=94. The plaintiffs do not = contend=20 that the buckle will release by itself; it must be pressed. They contend = only=20 that it is too easy for the button to be pressed inadvertently, either = by the=20 wearer or something else in the vehicle. The plaintiffs allege = negligence,=20 negligent misrepresentation, breach of = express warranty=20 that the vehicles are safe and meet all safety requirements,[4] breach of the implied = warranties of=20 merchantability [5] and fitness for a particular = purpose,[6] and violations of the Texas = Deceptive=20 Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act.[7] They do not contend that the = Gen-3=20 buckles made their vehicles worth less than they paid for them, and they = expressly =93do not seek damages for personal injury, property damage or = death.=94=20 They claim damages only for the cost of replacing the buckles with ones = that are=20 harder to unlatch, which they =93believe[] to = be not in=20 excess of $75 per buckle=94, and any lost use while repairs are made, = =93believed=20 not to exceed $500.00 per vehicle.=94 Thus, if we assume four seatbelts = per=20 vehicle, plaintiffs claim no more than $2,400 for themselves and no more = than $8=20 billion for the class.

=20 DaimlerChrysler moved for summary judgment on the ground that the = plaintiffs=92 pleadings failed to state a viable cause of action. The = plaintiffs=20 offered evidence of the defect they allege in the Gen-3 buckles. They = contended=20 that the buckle design violates a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard=20 requiring that a =93[b]uckle release = mechanism shall be=20 designed to minimize the possibility of accidental release.=94[8] The plaintiffs offered evidence = that the=20 buckles failed =93ball tests=94 used by the industry to determine the = force required=20 to press the release button, but they offered = no=20 evidence that there was any governmental requirement that the buckles = pass such=20 tests. They also offered evidence that DaimlerChrysler received fifty = complaints=20 documenting over one hundred instances when Gen-3 buckles unlatched, and = that=20 the buckles unlatched in two NHTSA crash tests and in crash tests = conducted by=20 the Canadian government and DaimlerChrysler itself, but they offered no = evidence=20 that any determination has ever been made that the buckles unlatched = more easily=20 than they should. The trial court denied DaimlerChrysler=92s motion. In = certifying=20 the class, the court found:

Plaintiffs=92 claims are not based on any = hypothetical defect in=20 the Gen-3 buckle that may, or may not, manifest itself=20 in the future. Instead, Plaintiffs=92 allege that the sale of Gen-3 = buckles=20 breached warranties and consumer remedies because each buckle was sold = in=20 violation of federal standards, industry standards, and Defendant=92s = internal=20 standards and that each Gen-3 buckle has manifested this breach from the = moment=20 it was sold until the present.

=20 The trial court certified two classes. One was for:

All United States resident persons (except residents = of=20 California or Nevada) who own or lease new vehicles, model year = 1993-2002,=20 manufactured and/or sold by Daimler/Chrysler and equipped with Gen-3 = seat belt=20 buckles ... [excluding] any person who has an action for damages for = personal=20 injury or death or property damage against Defendants.

The other=20 class was identical except for the word =93used=94 in place of = =93new=94. On appeal,=20 DaimlerChrysler argued that the case should be dismissed because the = plaintiffs=20 had not sustained any legally cognizable injury and therefore lacked = standing to=20 assert their claims. Alternatively, DaimlerChrysler argued that the = class should=20 be decertified because the trial plan adopted by the trial court was = flawed and=20 incomplete, the plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives, and = they had=20 not satisfied the predominance, superiority, and manageability = requirements for=20 class certification contained in Rule 42(b)(3) of the Texas Rules of = Civil=20 Procedure. Specifically, DaimlerChrysler argued that the trial court = would be=20 required to apply the laws of 48 states and adjudicate issues peculiar = to=20 individual class members. The court of appeals rejected = DaimlerChrysler=92s=20 standing argument but agreed that the trial court had not fully examined = what=20 law should govern the class claims.[9] There it stopped; without = addressing=20 DaimlerChrysler=92s other arguments, the court reversed the class = certification=20 and remanded the case for further proceedings.[10]

=20 We granted DaimlerChrysler=92s petition for review to consider = its argument=20 that the plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims.

=20 The parties agree that the plaintiffs cannot succeed on any of = their=20 claims without showing they have suffered legally compensable injury. = But the=20 plaintiffs argue that they need not show that they can prove the = requisite=20 injury until after class certification has been decided and the trial = court=20 reaches the merits of their claims.[11] DaimlerChrysler argues that = the claimed=20 injury is so hypothetical, so iffy, that the plaintiffs do not have = standing to=20 assert it and the court does not have jurisdiction to hear it.[12] The issue is important because = courts=20 must not decide hypothetical claims.[13] Practically speaking, the = timing is=20 important, because a disagreement over $2,400 is one thing and a = disagreement=20 over $8 billion is quite another.

=20 A person who buys a defective product can sue for economic = damages,[14] but the law is not well = developed on the=20 degree to which the defect must actually manifest itself before it is=20 actionable. For example, in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, we observed that =93the law in most = states=20 (including Texas) is unclear=94 on =93whether = to permit=20 express warranty claims for unmanifested = defects=94.[15] The plaintiffs here argue that = this=20 issue cannot be resolved until the trial court determines whether a = class should=20 be certified. Nor, they say, can the court consider at this stage = whether the=20 defect they allege in the Gen-3 seatbelt buckle has manifested itself=20 sufficiently for them to recover damages on their other claims for = negligence,=20 negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied warranties, or DTPA=20 violations.

=20 But DaimlerChrysler does not argue here that the plaintiffs=92 = claims=20 cannot succeed (although that is certainly their position). Rather, it = argues=20 that whatever the plaintiffs=92 causes of action may require, they have = not=20 suffered the kind of injury to give them standing to invoke the trial = court=92s=20 subject-matter jurisdiction. If there is no injury sufficient for = jurisdiction,=20 surely there is no injury sufficient for a cause of action. But if the=20 plaintiffs have no standing, the trial court has no more jurisdiction to deny their claims than it does to = grant them.=20 Without jurisdiction, the trial court should not render judgment that = the=20 plaintiffs take nothing; it should simply dismiss the case.[16]

=20 The requirement in this State that a plaintiff have standing to = assert a=20 claim derives from the Texas Constitution=92s separation of powers among = the=20 departments of government, which denies the judiciary authority to = decide issues=20 in the abstract, and from the Open Courts provision, which provides = court access=20 only to a =93person for an injury done him=94.[17] A court has no jurisdiction = over a claim=20 made by a plaintiff without standing to assert it.[18] For standing, a plaintiff must = be=20 personally aggrieved;[19] his alleged injury must be = concrete and=20 particularized,[20] actual or imminent, not = hypothetical.[21] A plaintiff does not lack = standing=20 simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks = standing=20 because his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford = redress.

=20 We have drawn this distinction in a recent case, M.D. Anderson = Cancer=20 Center v. Novak.[22] Attorney Novak received a form = letter=20 from the M.D.=20 Anderson Cancer Center soliciting donations and = stating=20 that =93well over 50%=94 of its cancer patients =93return home = cured=94.[23] Novak did not contribute; = instead, he=20 sued the hospital on behalf of everyone who received the letter, = alleging that=20 the stated cure-rate was false and the letter therefore fraudulent.[24] This Court held that he lacked = standing=20 to assert his individual claim:

=20 Even if Novak was an intended victim of a =93completed=94 mail = fraud for=20 purposes of governmental prosecution, he was not actually defrauded. His = lack of=20 any actual or threatened injury prevents him from being =93personally = aggrieved=94=20 such that he has any personal stake in the litigation. Therefore, Novak = lacks=20 standing as an individual . . . .[25]

It = was=20 irrelevant whether M.D. Anderson=92s fund-raising letter was false, or = whether=20 recipients might have been deceived into giving when they would not = otherwise=20 have done so. The point was that Novak was not himself deceived or = injured, and=20 therefore he did not have standing individually to assert fraud. = Accordingly, we=20 dismissed the entire action for want of jurisdiction.[26]

=20 M.D. Anderson is different from the present case in that = once=20 Novak decided the letter was false, he could never be deceived and = therefore=20 could never be injured, other than out of concern for others. In this = case, the=20 plaintiffs could accidentally unlatch their Gen-3 seatbelt = buckles and=20 subject themselves to harm, though that has never happened to two of = them and=20 the third is unsure. M.D. Anderson is important because it shows = that=20 standing, and the concrete injury it requires, is quite=20 distinct from the merits of a claim and the injury required to prove = it.

=20 Two decisions from the Fifth Circuit illustrate this point. In = Rivera=20 v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Rivera used Duract,=20 a prescription painkiller manufactured by Wyeth.[27] Wyeth had instructed that the = drug=20 should not be used for more than ten days generally and not by anyone = with=20 preexisting liver conditions.[28] Over the course of a year, = before Wyeth=20 voluntarily withdrew Duract from the market, = twelve=20 users reportedly suffered liver failure.[29] Eleven of them had used the = drug for=20 more than ten days, and the twelfth had a history of liver disease.[30] Although Rivera suffered no = physical or=20 emotional harm herself, she sued for a refund of the purchase price on = behalf of=20 all other users of the drug who also had not been harmed, alleging that = the=20 product was defective.[31] She sued only for breach of an = implied=20 warranty of merchantability and sought only economic damages.[32] The court concluded that the = kind of=20 injury Rivera alleged did not give her standing to sue.[33] Accordingly, it dismissed the = action for=20 want of jurisdiction.

=20 Contrast Rivera with Cole v. General Motors Corp.[34] There, GM determined that a = defect in=20 side-impact-air-bag sensing modules would improperly trigger inflation. = As the=20 court explained:

GM sent a voluntary recall notice to all DeVille record owners and lessees explaining that=20 GM

has=20 decided that a defect which relates to motor vehicle safety exists and = may=20 manifest itself in your 1998 or 1999 model year Cadillac DeVille. [GM] ha[s] learned of a condition that = can cause=20 the side impact air bags in your car to deploy unexpectedly, without a = crash, as=20 you start your car or during normal driving.

=20 GM indicated that it had received 306 reports of inadvertent = deployment=20 out of approximately 224,000 affected vehicles.[35]

Three=20 plaintiffs sued for economic damages because repairs to the vehicles = were=20 unreasonably delayed. GM argued that they lacked standing, based on=20 Rivera. The court disagreed.[36]

=20 An important difference between these two cases is that the = Cole=20 plaintiffs alleged a defect that would cause GM=92s side-impact air bags = to deploy=20 by itself unexpectedly during normal operation, something GM conceded in = its=20 voluntary recall, while the Rivera plaintiffs alleged a defect in = medication which had caused injury only when taken by someone contrary = to=20 Wyeth=92s instructions. In Cole, injury was a matter of time; in=20 Rivera, it might never happen. The air bags in Cole=92s vehicle = might=20 deploy improperly regardless of what she did, just as they might in the = other=20 vehicles in which they were installed. Taking Duract=20 had not hurt Rivera, and there was almost no chance that the defect she = alleged=20 in the drug ever would injure her, given that she was fully aware of the = restrictions on its use.

=20 Any possibility of injury to the plaintiffs in the present case = is even=20 more remote than it was in Rivera. There, Wyeth received twelve=20 complaints over a year before it voluntarily withdrew the drug from the = market.=20 Here, according to the plaintiffs themselves, DaimlerChrysler received = only=20 fifty complaints from ten million vehicle owners and lessees over ten = years =97=20 five per year, one for every 200,000 owners and lessees. By comparison, = in=20 Cole, GM received 306 reports in two years, one for every 732 = owners and=20 lessees. In any event, evidence of such complaints cannot prove = defect.[37] The plaintiffs contend that = ball tests=20 showed how easily the Gen-3 buckle release button could be pressed and = that=20 crash tests showed that the buckle could somehow be unlatched, but there = is=20 nothing to indicate that the design of the buckle failed to minimize the = risk of=20 accidental release versus the risk of non-use so as to pose any concrete = threat=20 of injury to the plaintiffs.

=20 The dissent criticizes us for assuming that Texas law = governs, but it=20 unquestionably does =97 over the issue of standing, a part of = subject-matter=20 jurisdiction, which is the only issue we decide. The dissent argues that = we have=20 improperly focused our standing analysis on the plaintiffs=92 claims = rather than=20 on the plaintiffs themselves, but that is incorrect. We do not rule out = the=20 possibility that somewhere there may be owners or lessees of vehicles = with Gen-3=20 seatbelt buckles that can allege concrete injury. Our focus is on Inman, Castro, and Wilkins, and they have not = shown that=20 they can. The dissent argues that standing requires only, one, a real=20 controversy that, two, will be determined. Those are requirements for=20 standing,[38] but so is concrete injury, = because if=20 injury is only hypothetical, there is no real controversy.[39] The dissent argues essentially = that our=20 conclusion that the plaintiffs lack standing is nothing more than a = summary=20 judgment on the merits of their claims, that we have =93equate[d] = standing with an=20 unsuccessful claim=94,[40] but this is simply wrong. We = agree that=20 the allegations in Cole gave the plaintiff standing, regardless = of=20 whether she could prevail on the merits of her claim, and even though = the Fifth=20 Circuit denied class certification.[41] We do not render judgment that = the=20 plaintiffs take nothing, as we would if their claims failed on the = merits; we=20 dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. We do not decide the degree = to which=20 a defect must manifest itself in a product before a warranty is = breached.=20 Standing in this case is a separate inquiry, just as it was in M.D.=20 Anderson and Rivera.

=20 Both of those cases show that when a claim of injury is extremely = remote,=20 the jurisdictional inquiry cannot be laid aside in an expectation that = the=20 claimant will also lose on the merits. A court that decides a claim over = which=20 it lacks jurisdiction violates the constitutional limitations on its = authority,=20 even if the claim is denied. As the United States Supreme Court has = warned, the=20 denial of a claim on the merits is not an alternative to dismissal for = want of=20 jurisdiction merely because the ultimate result is the same because the=20 assertion of jurisdiction =93carries the courts beyond the bounds of = authorized=20 judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of = powers.=94 [42]

=20 The dissent charges that our decision =93suggests a visceral = distaste of=20 class actions=94. We disagree. We simply think that the rights of ten = million=20 vehicle owners and lessees across the United States should not be = adjudicated in an action brought by three plaintiffs who cannot show = more than=20 the merest possibility of injury to themselves. To hold that Inman, = Castro, and=20 Wilkins have standing would drain virtually all meaning from the = requirements=20 that a plaintiff must be =93personally aggrieved=94 and that his injury = must be=20 =93concrete=94 and =93actual or imminent=94.

* * * * *

=20 If the named plaintiffs in a putative class action do not have = standing=20 to assert their own individual claims, the entire action must be = dismissed.[43] Accordingly, the judgment of = the court=20 of appeals is reversed and the case is dismissed for want of = jurisdiction.

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 _________________

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Nathan L. Hecht

&nbs= p; = ; = &= nbsp; &n= bsp; =20 Justice

Opinion delivered: = February 1,=20 2008

^[1]=20 Quacchia v. DaimlerChrysler = Corp., 19=20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) = (affirming the=20 trial court=92s refusal to certify a class); Hiller v. = DaimlerChrysler=20 Corp., No. 02-681, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 442, = 2007 WL=20 3260199 (Mass.=20 Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2007) (refusing class=20 certification). In remanding Hiller to state court after removal, = the=20 United States District Court could not help but observe that = =93plaintiffs=92=20 lawsuit appears to be as manufactured as defendant=92s cars=94. Hiller v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. Civ.A. 02-10533-RWZ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4578, at *3, 2004 WL = 574331 (D.=20 Mass. Mar. 23,=20 2004). Two other state court class actions have been removed and = remanded.=20 Coker v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (N.D. = Ga. 2002); Sylvester v. DaimlerChrysler = Corp., No.=20 1:02CV0567, 2002 U.S. Dist.=20 LEXIS 17989, 2002 WL 32005242 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2002).

^[2]=20 121 S.W.3d 862, 886 (Tex. App.=96Corpus Christi = 2003).

^[3]=20 Id. at=20 885.

^[4]=20 See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code =A7=20 2.313.

^[5]=20 Id. =A7=20 2.314.

^[6]=20 Id. =A7=20 2.315.

^[7]=20 Id. =A7=A7=20 17.41-.63.

^[8]=20 49 C.F.R. =A7 571.209 S4.1(e).

^[9]=20 121 S.W.3d 862, 885-886 (Tex. App.=96Corpus Christi 2003) .

^[10] Id.

^[11] See Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 = S.W.3d 398, 404=20 (Tex. 2000) (=93Deciding the merits of the suit in order to determine = the scope of=20 the class or its maintainability as a class action is not appropriate. . = . .=20 However, in determining whether the class-certification requirements = have been=20 satisfied, the trial court may look beyond the pleadings.=94); see = also=20 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (=93In = determining the=20 propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff = or=20 plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, = but=20 rather whether the requirements of [the procedural rule governing class = actions]=20 are met.=94 (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int=92l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th = Cir.=20 1971))).

^[12] See Texas Ass=92n of Bus. v. Tex. = Air Control=20 Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (=93An opinion issued in = a case=20 brought by a party without standing is advisory because rather than = remedying an=20 actual or imminent harm, the judgment addresses only a hypothetical=20 injury.=94).

^[13] See id.

^[14] E.g. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., = 772 S.W.2d 442, 443-445 (Tex. 1989).

^[15] 135 S.W.3d 657, 679 (Tex. 2004) = (footnote=20 omitted). Cf. Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So.2d = 988=20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that plaintiff=92s complaint that = the value of=20 her car was less because it was equipped with Gen-3 seatbelt buckles is=20 actionable under the state consumer protection law even though the = alleged=20 defect has never manifest itself in an emergency or caused = damages).

^[16] See, e.g., Martinez v.=20 Second Injury Fund of Tex., 789 S.W.2d 267, 277 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht, = J.,=20 dissenting) (=93Rendition of judgment on the merits is inappropriate in = an action=20 over which the trial court lacks jurisdiction.=94); West v. Brenntag Sw., Inc., 168 S.W.3d 327, 339 (Tex.=20 App.=96Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (=93Having found that West lacked = standing to=20 sue for negligence or nuisance, the judgment as to those claims is = reversed and=20 judgment is rendered that those claims be dismissed for want of = jurisdiction.=20 The judgment as to the remaining claims is reversed and judgment is = rendered=20 that West take nothing.=94).

^[17] Texas Ass=92n of Bus., 852 = S.W.2d at=20 444; Tex. Const. = art.=20 I, =A7 13 (=93All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury = done him, in=20 his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course = of=20 law.=94).

^[18] Texas Ass=92n of Bus., 852 = S.W.2d at=20 444.

^[19] Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County = Appraisal=20 Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996) (=93A plaintiff has = standing when it=20 is personally aggrieved.=94).

^[20] Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d = 297, 305=20 (Tex. 2001) (stating that for a = plaintiff to=20 have standing he =93=91must establish that he has a =93personal stake=94 = in the alleged=20 dispute=92 and that the injury suffered is =91concrete and = particularized=92=94, quoting=20 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997), citing Lujan = v.=20 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 = (1992)).

^[21] Texas Ass=92n of Bus., 852 = S.W.2d at=20 444.

^[22] 52 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. = 2001).

^[23] Id. at 706.

^[24] Id.

^[25] Id. at 707-708 (citations and = emphasis=20 omitted).

^[26] Id. at 711.

^[27] 283 F.3d 315, = 316-317=20 (5th Cir. 2002).

^[28] Id. at 316-317.

^[29] Id. at 317.

^[30] Id.

^[31] Id. at 317, = 319-320.

^[32] Id. at 319-320.

^[33] Id. at 321-322.

^[34] 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. = 2007).

^[35] Id. at 718-719.

^[36] Id. at 722-723.

^[37] Nissan Motor Co. v. = Armstrong, 145=20 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Tex. 2004) (=93we have never held = that mere=20 claims of previous accidents can prove a product is = defective=94).

^[38] Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. = Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005); Nootsie,=20 Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 = (Tex. 1996); Texas Ass=92n of=20 Bus. v. Tex. Air=20 Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446(Tex. 1993).

^[39] Texas Ass=92n of Bus., 852 = S.W.2d at=20 444.

^[40] Ante at ___.

^[41] 484 F.3d 717, 730 (5th Cir.=20 2007).

^[42] Steel Co. v. Citizens for a = Better Env=92t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 = (1998).

^[43] M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. = Novak,=20 52 S.W.3d 704, 711 (Tex. 2001) (=93Accordingly, if the = named=20 plaintiff lacks individual standing, the court should dismiss the entire = [class=20 action] suit for want of = jurisdiction.=94).