ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS DOCTRINE
As intimated by appellees, a party cannot treat a judgment as both right and wrong. See Carle v. Carle,
234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (Tex. 1951). Under the acceptance of benefits doctrine, generally, a party who
has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a judgment may not thereafter prosecute an appeal from it.
Footnote See Carle, 234 S.W.2d at 1004; see also Tex. State Bank v. Amaro, 87 S.W.3d 538, 544
(Tex. 2002); McCartney v. Mead, 541 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no
Cantu v. McKinney (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 19, 2009)(Higley)
(sanctions, injunction, challenge to agreed judgment, Rule 11 agreement)
(challenge to agreed judgment barred by acceptance of benefits doctrine)
AFFIRM TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Higley
Before Justices Jennings, Higley and Sharp
01-07-00638-CV Tony Cantu v. Wade E. McKinney, Jr., Rebecca McKinney, Justin McKinney, Daniel
Broussard, Craig Dehaan, Jonnie Harker, Epernay Homeowners Association
Appeal from 129th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Grant Dorfman
Similarly, when a judgment debtor voluntarily satisfies the judgment, the case becomes moot and the debtor
waives any right to appeal. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex.
2006); Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop. Owners, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 370, 370 (Tex. 1993) (citing Highland Church of
Christ v. Powell, 640 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1982)). This rule is intended to prevent a party who voluntarily
satisfies a judgment from later changing his or her mind and appealing. See Highland Church of Christ, 640 S.W.
2d at 236 (holding that parties should not be allowed to mislead their opponent into believing that the
controversy is over and then contest payment and seek recovery).
To the extent that they felt that they had not given proper consent to the settlement agreement or that certain
terms were unenforceable, the Cantus should not have accepted the funds under the judgment or satisfied their
obligation by selling their townhouse. That is, the Cantus cannot treat the Agreed Judgment as both right and
We conclude that the Cantus may not now prosecute an appeal from the Agreed Judgment because they
voluntarily accepted the benefits under the Agreed Judgment and voluntarily complied with their obligations
thereunder. See Carle, 234 S.W.2d at 1004; Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786–87.
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