law-supersedeas bond amount net worth |


A judgment debtor may suspend or supersede execution of a judgment while the debtor pursues appellate
review by filing with the trial court clerk a good and sufficient bond or, as in this case, making a deposit with the
clerk in lieu of a bond.  TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a)(2)–(3); Whitmire v. Greenridge Place Apartments, 333 S.W.3d
255, 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism’d).  When the judgment involves an interest in real
property, the amount of the supersedeas bond or deposit must be “the value of the property interest’s rent or
revenue” during the pendency of the appeal.  TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(2)(A); Whitmire, 333 S.W.3d at 260.  
Furthermore, the surety on a bond or the deposit made in lieu of a bond is subject to liability “for all damages
and costs that may be awarded against the debtor—up to the amount of the bond, deposit, or security,” if “the
judgment is for the recovery of an interest in real or personal property, and the debtor does not pay the creditor
the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue during the pendency of the appeal.”  TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(d)
(3); see also Whitmire, 333 S.W.3d at 260.     


Enviropower v. Bear, Stearns & Co. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] May 10, 2007)(Hanks) (foreign judgment)
[Case of first impression, definition of net worth, book value, amount of supersedeas bond]
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Hanks
Before Justices Taft, Keyes and Hanks
01-04-01111-CV Enviropower, L.L.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.
Appeal from 164th District Court of Harris County (
Hon. Martha Hill Jamison)
In this action to enforce a
New York judgment, EnviroPower, L.L.C., appellant, complains of the trial court's
orders denying its motion for new trial, motion to vacate, and motion to stay enforcement of the judgment. In
three issues, EnviroPower contends that (1) a foreign default judgment based on "death penalty" sanctions is
"penal" in nature and excepted from enforcement in Texas under the
full faith and credit clause; (2) it is
entitled to a stay of enforcement because the New York judgment against it is subject to modification on appeal
by the New York appellate court; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to stay enforcement of the New York
judgment and in setting the bond amount at $200,000.
In this
case of first impression, we affirm.
Here, the trial court weighed all of the pleadings and evidence presented by the parties, which included
testimony that EnviroPower was in negotiations with at least three other willing buyers, all of whom offered to
assume its liabilities and pay a range of $1 to $10 million for the company. EnviroPower eventually entered an
active agreement with Khanjee, whereby Khanjee would pay $10 million for the company and assume "certain
liabilities." By using only its book value to determine its net worth, we would enable EnviroPower to potentially
postpone this active agreement with Khanjee to avoid satisfying the judgment against it. We, therefore, hold
that the trial court was within its discretion in finding EnviroPower's current net worth to be $8 million. We further
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion setting the bond amount at $200,000.

LMC Complete Automotive, Inc. v. Burke (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jun. 21, 2007)(Bland)(workplace safety,
negligence, nonsubscriber, amount of supersedeas bond)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Bland
Before Justices Nuchia, Hanks and Bland
01-06-00694-CV  LMC Complete Automotive, Inc. v. Ronald Burke
Appeal from 127th District Court of Harris County (
Hon. Sharolyn P. Wood)
We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient and sufficiently reliable to support the jury’s negligence finding,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence that Burke received compensation for
his injury from collateral sources.  We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.  We further hold that the record
demonstrates that LMC has a net worth of $149,736.04.  We therefore vacate the trial court’s July 25, 2006
order denying LMC’s motion to decrease the security required to suspend enforcement of the judgment, and
order that the security for supersedeas for LMC be set at $74,868.02, fifty percent of LMC’s net worth.  Our
order entered on February 15, 2007, staying the enforcement of the judgment in this case, will remain in effect
for fifteen days after the date this opinion is issued to allow the parties to seek further review of our security
determination.  We dismiss appellate cause number 01-07-00126-CV for want of jurisdiction.

Plenary Power & supersedeas bond

In his fifth issue, Whitmire contends that the county court erred in increasing the supersedeas bond to $15,000
after the expiration of its plenary power.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c)–(g).  Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
24.3(a), however, expressly provides that “[e]ven after the trial court’s plenary power expires, the trial court has
continuing jurisdiction to do the following: (1) order the amount and type of security and decide the sufficiency
of sureties; and (2) if circumstances change, modify the amount or type of security required to continue the
suspension of a judgment’s execution.”  Tex. R. App. P. 24.3(a).  Greenridge requested the trial court to
increase the supersedeas bond to $15,000 because the appellate process was taking longer than anticipated
and Whitmire remained in possession of the apartment.  The county court therefore had the authority to modify
the amount of the supersedeas bond after the expiration of its plenary power.  See id.; see also Miller, 80 S.W.
3d at 164; Hamilton v. Hi-Plains Truck Brokers, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 442, 443 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.).[4]  
Whitmire v. Greenridge Place Apartments (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2007)(Bland)(forcible detainer)

[2] The proper method to seek review of a trial court’s determination of the amount of a supersedeas bond is to file a motion in
the court of appeals under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.4(a).  See Tex. R. App. P. 24.4(a); City of Fort Worth v. Johnson,
71 S.W.3d 470, 471 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).  We therefore construe Whitmire’s appeal of the county court’s
determination of the amount of the supersedeas bond as a Rule 24.4 motion.  See Johnson, 71 S.W.3d at 471 (“For the
purposes of review . . . we consider Johnson’s notice of appeal and brief as a motion under Rule 24.”); see also Tex. R. App. P.
38.9 (requiring briefing rules to be construed liberally); Tex. Mexican Ry. Co. v. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. 1998) (“Courts
should liberally construe briefing rules.”); Anderson v. Gilbert, 897 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1995) (“Courts are to construe rules on
briefing liberally.”).

[3] A supersedeas bond is intended to indemnify the judgment creditor from losses caused by delay of appeal.  Muniz v. Vasquez,
797 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ); see also Tex. R. App. P. 24.1(e) (“The trial court may make
any order necessary to adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage that the appeal might cause.”).  When,
as here, the supersedeas bond covers items such as rentals, which accrue while the case is on appeal, the damages cannot be
determined in an appellate court.  See Baxter v. Gates of Normandie, No. 05-03-00245-CV, 2004 WL 303594, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Feb. 18, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.); State v. Watts, 197 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1946, writ ref’d).  In such a
case, access to the supersedeas bond may be achieved by bringing a common-law action against the sureties as with any other
contract.  See Baxter, 2004 WL 303594, at *1; Muniz, 797 S.W.2d at 150.