Schuring v. Kingwood Horsemen's Ass'n (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 23, 2009)
(Bland) (no jurisdiction over further appeal from eviction appeal to county court from JP court involving
nonresidential premises, here horse stall)(dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction)
DISMISS APPEAL: Opinion by Justice Bland
Before Justices Keyes, Hanks and Bland
01-08-00760-CV Thomas G. Schuring, Rose Schuring v. Kingwood Horsemen's Association
Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 2 of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jacqueline Lucci Smith
Trial Court Cause No. 918,039
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this suit over possession of a horse stall, Thomas and Rose Schuring appeal a judgment in
favor of Kingwood Horsemen’s Association (Kingwood) awarding Kingwood possession of the
stall, $1,000 in expenses, and $8,000 in attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Schurings’ complain that
the trial court erred in granting Kingwood’s motion for summary judgment because (1) fact issues
exist as to the Schurings’ rightful possession of the barn stall; and (2) they are not estopped from
pursuit of possession of the stall because they failed to disclose it in their bankruptcy proceeding.
Kingwood responds that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal, because, as this is a forcible
entry and detainer suit, no appeal may lie from the county court’s award of possession. The
Schurings cannot appeal a final judgment of a county court in an eviction suit concerning non-
residential premises. We agree we lack jurisdiction, and therefore we dismiss the appeal.
Background
On May 27, 1994, the Schurings’ daughter, Theresa Schuring, leased Stall and Tack Room
Number O, located in Barn Number 2, Trails End Stables, from Kingwood to house her horse,
named Nageem. In 2003, the Schurings signed a lease modification which would add them as
parties to the lease, but no representative of Kingwood ever signed it. Nageem died in July 2007,
and the stall became vacant. In January 2008, Kingwood sent a letter to Theresa Schuring
notifying her that her lease had terminated and Kingwood planned to release the stall.
Accordingly, on March 1, 2008, Theresa removed her belongings from the stall. But, after Theresa
moved out, the Schurings moved some of their items, and later a new horse, into the stall. After
efforts to remove the Schurings’ possessions were unsuccessful, Kingwood notified them of its
intent to evict them, by certified mail and a posting on the stall door.
After a hearing in the justice court, the justice of the peace signed a final judgment awarding
Kingwood possession of the stall and tack room and its reasonable attorney’s fees. The
Schurings appealed the decision to Harris County Court at Law, number two. Kingwood moved
for summary judgment establishing its right to possession of the stall, which the trial court granted.
The Schurings waived the right to proceed to trial on the issue of attorney’s fees. The county court
awarded a final judgment to Kingwood for possession, expenses, and attorney’s fees. The
Schurings do not appeal the award of attorney’s fees. Thus we do not address this issue.
Jurisdiction
Kingwood observes that, because final judgments of county courts in eviction cases concerning
non-residential premises are not appealable, our Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
Schurings’ appeal. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.007 (Vernon 2000) (“A final judgment of a
county court in an eviction suit may not be appealed on the issue of possession unless the
premises in question are being used for residential purposes only”). A court must have
jurisdiction before it can make a ruling in a case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.
W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Otherwise, it must be dismissed. Id. at 446. The Texas Constitution
and the Legislature vest courts of appeals with jurisdiction over civil appeals from final judgments
of district and county courts where the amount in controversy exceeds $100. Tex. Const. art. V, § 6
(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 2008); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220(a)
(Vernon 2004); Volume Millwork, Inc. v. West Houston Airport Corp., 218 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). The Legislature, however, has the power to limit the
right of appeal. Volume Millwork, Inc., 218 S.W.3d 722 at 726 (citing Sultan v Mathew, 178 S.W.
3d 747, 752 (Tex. 2005)).
The Government Code prohibits appeals to the court of appeals from final judgments of county
courts or county courts at law if the claim originates in small claims court. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §
28.053(d) (Vernon 2004); Sultan v. Mathew, 178 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. 2005). No similar
restriction exists for cases that originate in justice court, as this one did. See Sultan v Mathew,
178 S.W.3d 747 at 752. The Property Code, however, restricts appeals from a final judgment of a
county court in an eviction suit on the issue of possession, unless the premises are for residential
use only. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.007 (Vernon 2000). It is undisputed that the Schurings did
not use the stall and tack room as a residence. We therefore lack jurisdiction to hear their
appeal. See Volume Millwork, Inc., 218 S.W.3d at 727.
Conclusion
We dismiss the Schurings’ appeal for want of jurisdiction. All pending motions are dismissed as
moot.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Hanks, and Bland.