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VENUE & MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

We overturn a trial court’s ruling on a motion to transfer venue only if the trial court’s decision is an abuse of
discretion. In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1998). In determining proper venue, the trial
court’s discretion is limited by the parties’ pleading and proof. In re Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216
(Tex. 1999). The nature of the suit must be determined solely from the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s petition, the
rights asserted, and the relief sought. Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 276 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. 1955). On
review, though, if any evidence in the entire record supports the venue, then we must uphold the trial court’s
determination. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 2002); Bonham State Bank v. Beadle,
907 S.W.2d 465, 471 (Tex. 1995).
Beard v. Endeavor Natural Gas, LP (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19, 2008)(Bland)
(oil and gas law, royalties, declaratory judgment, attorney's fees)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Bland
Before Justices Jennings, Hanks and Bland)
01-08-00180-CV Joseph Mitchell Beard v. Endeavor Natural Gas, L.P., and Tepee Petroleum Company
Appeal from 113th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Patricia Hancock

Under § 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, actions for recovery of real property or an
estate or interest in real property shall be brought in the county where the real property is located. Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.011 (Vernon 2002). An oil and gas lease is an interest in real property, but this
provision applies only when ownership of the property is in dispute. Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, 53 S.W.3d
368, 371 (Tex. 2001). As in Yzaguirre, the dispute here is not one over the boundaries of the lease or the
percentage of the royalty owners’ interest, thus the mandatory venue provision does not apply. See id.

It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule on a motion to transfer venue without giving the parties
notice as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc. v. Salinas, 838 S.W.2d 246,
247-48 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam); Henderson v. O'Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905, 905 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). A trial
court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding
rules or principles. Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).

In his first issue on appeal, Kelly argues that he was not given sufficient notice of the hearing on appellees'
separate motions to transfer venue. Kelly asserts that the trial court's order was granted and conveyed to him
only 29 days before the scheduled date of the hearing. As a result, he contends not only was he denied the
required 45 days' notice of the hearing, but it was impossible for him to timely file a response in opposition to
appellees' motions at least 30 days before the hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(1).
Kelly v. American Interstate Insurance Co. (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 25, 2008)(Brown)
(venue, motion to transfer venue, MTV, exhaustion of administrative remedies, plea to the jurisdiction, workers
comp, compensable injury, benefits denial, preauthorization, plea to the jurisdiction, workers comp, compensable
injury, benefits denial, preauthorization)
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Jeff Brown
14-07-00083-CV Jimmy J. Kelly v. American Interstate Insurance Co., Hammerman & Gainer, Inc., and Sheryl
Butman--Appeal from 334th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Sharon McCally

Liu v CiCi Enterprises LP (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 2007)(Opinion by Justice Guzman)
(venue, motion to transfer venue was untimely, venue vs. forum selection)
REVERSED AND REMANDED: Opinion by Justice Guzman
Before Justices Anderson, Hudson and Guzman
14-05-00827-CV Frank M. K. Liu and Edward R. Perry, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of IV Pizza, LLC v. CiCi
Enterprises, LP, Successor by Conversion to CiCi Enterprises, Inc.
Appeal from 125th District Court of Harris County (Judge John A. Coselli)
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss a Harris County suit based on a contractual provision stating that the
parties "irrevocably submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the State Courts of Dallas County, Texas . . . [and]
agree that venue for any proceeding relating to or arising out of this agreement shall be Dallas County, Texas . .
. ." Because the provision is not a mandatory forum selection clause requiring dismissal but is instead a venue
selection clause, and because venue was not timely challenged in accordance with the governing procedural
rules, we reverse and remand.
Conclusion: Because the trial court abused its discretion in granting CiCi's motion to dismiss, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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