law-moot-mootness-doctrine | no advisory opinions | no actual controversy between parties |


MOOTNESS DOCTRINE - CASE LAW


The Mootness Doctrine - Dismissal required when controversy becomes moot

Neither the Texas Constitution nor the Texas Legislature has vested this Court with the authority to render
advisory opinions. See Tex. Const. art. II, _ I; see also Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149,
151 (Tex. 1988).  The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists
between the parties. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994).  

When there ceases to be a controversy between the litigating parties due to events occurring after the trial court
has rendered judgment, the decision of an appellate court would be a mere academic exercise, and the court
may not decide the appeal. See Olson v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 901 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. App.- El
Paso 1995, no writ).  

Stated differently, if a judgment cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is moot. Id.  In
that situation, the appellate court is required to vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the underlying
cause of action. See Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. 1993);
see also Gen. Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990) (if no controversy continues to
exist between the parties, the appeal is moot and the court of appeals must dismiss the cause); Guajardo v.
Alamo Lumber Co., 159 Tex. 225, 317 S.W.2d 725, 726 (1958) (when a case becomes moot on appeal, all
previous orders are set aside by the appellate court, and the case is dismissed).[1]

When a trial court appoints a receiver to sell real property, and the real property is sold after the appellant has
perfected its appeal, the appeal of the appointment of the receiver becomes moot. See Beard v. Beard, 49 S.W.
3d 40, 71- 72 (Tex. App.- Waco 2001, pet. denied) (concluding that appeal of appointment of receiver was moot
when real property that was sole subject of receivership had been foreclosed upon after appellant perfected her
appeal).  Therefore, we will examine the record to determine whether the Property - the sole subject of the
receivership - was sold after Pirate's Lake perfected its appeal, thereby rendering its appeal moot.
Pirate's Lake Ltd. v. Vestin Realty Mortgage I, Inc., No. 14-08-00085-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 12,
2008)(challenge to appointment of receiver, foreclosure of property moots issue)

Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine

The Texas Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, neither of which apply here:
(1) the “capable of repetition yet evading review exception"; and (2) the “collateral consequences exception."
See Gen. Land Office, 789 S.W.2d at 571. The former applies where the challenged act is of such short duration
that the appellant cannot obtain review before the issue becomes moot. Id.  This exception has been used only
to challenge unconstitutional acts performed by the government. Id.  The latter is invoked only under narrow
circumstances, when vacating the underlying judgment will not cure the adverse consequences suffered by the
party seeking to appeal that judgment. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex.
2006).  In order to invoke the collateral consequences exception, Pirate's Lake must show (1) a concrete
disadvantage resulted from the judgment; and (2) the disadvantage will persist even if the judgment is vacated
and the case dismissed as moot. Id.  Pirate's Lake does not contend that either exception applies to the present
appeal. Pirate's Lake Ltd. v. Vestin Realty Mortgage I, Inc., No. 14-08-00085-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 12, 2008)(challenge to appointment of receiver, foreclosure of property moots issue)

Stephens v. City of Houston (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] June 12, 2008)(Keyes) (public employment,  City of
Houston litigation, UDJA claims stemming from termination of city employment moot, no standing)
There is no live controversy affecting Stephens's constitutional rights. Because Stephens was permanently
dismissed as a City employee and he failed to appeal the final dismissal order of the CSC on constitutional
grounds, his claims are now moot and he lacks a legally cognizable interest in obtaining the declaratory relief he
seeks.  See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184.
Moreover, the legislature has not conferred on the district courts the right to
review a municipal employee's termination and to order reinstatement and back pay. See Ferrell, 248
S.W.3d at 159. Nor does the Declaratory Judgment Act confer jurisdiction on the courts to adjudicate claims
seeking to establish the basis for monetary relief. See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855, 856. We hold that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Stephens's declaratory judgment action and, therefore,
the court did not err in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction.