law-statutory-construction, interpretation of statutes

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE LAW

We review the trial court’s interpretation of applicable statutes de novo.  See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774
S.W.2d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 1989).  In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the
legislature’s intent.  See Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000).  If possible, we
ascertain that intent from the language the legislature used in the statute and we do not look to extraneous
matters for an intent the statute does not state.  Id.  If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous,
we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision’s words.  St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp.
v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997).  We must not engage in forced or strained construction; instead,
we must yield to the plain sense of the words.  See id.
Allday Dental v. The Dental Solution (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 25, 2010)(Frost)
(contract dispute over placement fees, argument that contract is illegal and thus unenforceable rejected)
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Frost      
Before Justices Brock Yates, Frost and Brown    
14-08-00746-CV  Allday Dental & Amar Al-Kutob v. The Dental Solution    
Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 4 of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Roberta Anne Lloyd   


In construing statutory provisions, our objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.  Nat'l
Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000).  We assume that the legislature tried to say what
it meant; therefore, its words should be the surest guide to its intent.  Segal v Emmes Capital, L.L.C., 155 S.W.
3d 267, 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. dism'd).  If the meaning of the statutory language is
unambiguous, we will adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words.  St.
Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997).  We must not engage in forced or strained
construction; instead we yield to the plain sense of the words the legislature chose.  See id.
Mattox v. County Commissioner's Court-Grimes Cty. (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2009)(Hedges)
(mandamus against public official, commissioner's court)(cancellation of road dedication, subdivision)

When possible, we will not interpret one portion of a statute in a manner that renders other parts of it
meaningless.  See Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 442 (Tex. 2009); Saade v. Villarreal,
280 S.W.3d 511, 522 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).
Robertson v. Barnes (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2009)(Sullivan)
(home owner, consumer law, DTPA, home in poor condition, stucco problem, seller was not required to disclose
prior water damage because repair was not "structural" which the court construes as referring to load-bearing)
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Sullivan  
Before Justices Brock Yates, Guzman and Sullivan  
14-07-00791-CV  Chris Robertson v. Joe Barnes and Sandion, Ltd d/b/a Coldwell Banker United, Realtors   
Appeal from 280th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: TONY LINDSAY

Our objective when construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent.  Fitzgerald v.
Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999); Guthery, 112 S.W.3d at 721.  To ascertain
that intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute.  Phillips v. Beaber, 995 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex.
1999); Guthery, 112 S.W.3d at 721.  We presume the legislature acted with complete knowledge of and with
reference to existing law.  See Phillips, 995 S.W.2d at 658; Beatty v. Holmes, 233 S.W.3d 475, 488 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. granted).  If a statute creates a liability unknown at common law, we must strictly
construe the statute and will not apply it to cases not clearly within its purview.  N.P. v. Methodist Hosp., 190 S.W.
3d 217, 233 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Hadley v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (Tex.App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2009)(Yates) (doctor not a seller for indemnity purposes against manufacturer of
medicine)


Statutory construction is a question of law that the appellate court reviews de novo. In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d
373, 376 (Tex. 2004). "Th[e] enacted language [of a statute] is what constitutes the law, and when a statute's
words are unambiguous and yield a single inescapable interpretation, the judge's inquiry is at an end." Alex
Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651-52 (Tex. 2006). The primary objective in
construing any statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d
681, 683 (Tex. 2004). We begin with the plain and common meaning of the statute's words. Id.; Tex. Gov't Code
Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). "If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we adopt . . . the
interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words and terms." Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine
Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999). Briggs Equipment Trust v. HCAD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st
Dist.] Jun. 4, 2009)(Radack)
(property tax litigation, valuation of equipment for property tax purposes, subsequent sales)

When interpreting the meaning of a rule, a court will follow the rule's plain language.  See Bragg v. Edwards
Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. 2002).

Our ultimate goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent as expressed in the language
of the statute.  F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 683 (Tex. 2007); Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Tex. 2000).  In doing so, we must always consider the statute as
a whole rather than its isolated provisions.  Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001).  “We
should not give one provision a meaning out of harmony or inconsistent with other provisions, although it might
be susceptible to such a construction standing alone."  Id.  Instead, we presume that both the statute and the
legislative act are intended to be effective in their entirety.  Allegheny Mut. Cas. v. State, 710 S.W.2d 139, 141
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd).  Thus, in construing a statute - regardless of whether it is
ambiguous on its face - we may consider, among other matters, the following:  the object sought to be attained;
the circumstances under which the statute was enacted; common law or former statutory provisions, including
laws on the same or similar subjects; and the consequences of a particular construction.  See Tex. Gov't Code
Ann. ' 311.023 (Vernon 2005).[8]
Tara Partners, Ltd. v. City of South Houston (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 13, 2009)(Seymore)
(city governmental immunity)
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED & REMANDED IN PART: Opinion by Justice Seymore  
Before Justices Frost, Seymore and Guzman
14-07-00330-CV  Tara Partners, Ltd., Granada Terrace, Ltd., David R. Wise, 1606 Savannah LLC, Windsor
Gardens Ltd., and Freeport Villa Brazos Apartments, Ltd. v. City of South Houston
Appeal from 157th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Randy Wilson
Concurring Opinion by Justice Frost


Statutory interpretation is a legal matter subject to de novo review.  Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d
729, 734 (Tex. 2002).  The overriding goal of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's intent.  
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Downs, 81 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex. 2002).  To glean legislative intent, we look first to the plain
and common meaning of the words used by the legislature.  Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d 526, 529
(Tex. 2002); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005).  We begin with the plain language
because we assume that the legislature tried to say what it meant; therefore, its words should be the surest
guide to its intent.  See Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999);
Segal v. Emmes Capital, L.L.C., 155 S.W.3d 267, 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. dism'd).  It is a
well-settled rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for
a purpose.  Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 123 (Tex. 1998).  Likewise, every word excluded from a
statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.  Id.  This rule complements another
general statutory construction principle that courts should not insert words into a statute except to give effect to
clear legislative intent.  Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1995).
In Interest of SN, SMN, DAN (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Oct 14, 2008)(Yates)
(termination, constitutionality)
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Brock Yates  
Before Justices Brock Yates, Anderson and Brown
14-07-00161-CV In the Interest of S.N., S.M.N., D.A.N., Children
Appeal from 314th District Court of Harris County


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