tax suit | ad valorem tax protest | property tax assessment | appraisal | dispute |  unequal appraisal | appeals process | administrative remedies | exhaustion | deadlines | notice | judicial review suit | Texas Property Tax Code 2008 Ad Valorem Property Tax Litigation - Houston Appellate Decisions The Appraisal Review Board of HCAD v. O'Connor & Associates (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 19, 2008)(Yates) (property tax appeal, failure to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit requires jurisdictional dismissal) REVERSED AND RENDERED: Opinion by Justice Leslie Brock Yates   Before Justices Brock Yates, Anderson and Brown 14-07-00354-CV The Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District, and Robert Cunningham, former Chairman v. O'Connor & Associates, Wolverine Crosby LP, E Pointe Properties I Ltd, Baker-Orr Joint Venture, and J. Frederick Welling Appeal from 127th District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Sharolyn P. Wood Public, Inc. v. County of Galveston (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 10, 2008)(Anderson) (taxing of non-profits) AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Anderson   Before Justices Brock Yates, Anderson and Brown 14-07-00458-CV        Public, Inc. v. County of Galveston and City of Galveston Appeal from 212th District Court of Galveston County Trial court judge: Judge Susan Criss Verm v. HCAD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st. Dist.] July 1, 2008)(Yates) (property tax appeal, no violation of due process) AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Brock Yates   Before Justices Brock Yates, Guzman and Brown 14-06-01046-CV Ray A Verm & Jane Verm, as the Property Owners and the Property Owners v. Harris County Appraisal District and the Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District Appeal from 190th District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Jennifer Elrod Walker   We cannot imagine how the [property owners] were deprived of due process when they were given the opportunity to present their arguments to a legal panel and they reached an agreement fully satisfying their stated contentions.   Sondock, 231 S.W.3d at 70.  The Verms presented their protest to the panel, were provided a hearing before the panel on the matter, and raised no further complaints after the HCAD representative concurred with their proposed property valuation.  Accordingly, we find the Verms were afforded due process.  See id.; see also Hartman, 251 S.W. 3d at 601 (holding property owners who had opportunity to be heard before appraisal review board were provided due process); BPAC Tex., LP, 2004 WL 2422033, at *3 (holding that when property owner chose to reach agreement with HCAD, it was not deprived of its statutory due process right to appeal appraisal board's order because agreement, not order, determined outcome). We affirm the trial court's judgment. HCAD v. Spencer Square Ltd (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 29, 2008) (Seymore) (property tax appeal, procedural issues, second hearing sought by mandamus, no jurisdiction) REVERSED AND RENDERED: Opinion by Justice Seymore   Before Justices Fowler, Frost and Seymore 14-07-00567-CV The Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District v. Spencer Square Ltd as the Property Owners and the Property Owners Appeal from 334th District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Sharon McCally   Mann v. HCAD (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 17, 2008)(Radack) (tax appeal, unequally and excessively appraised, SJ for taxing authorities affirmed, no due process violation) AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Chief Justice Radack   Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Jennings and Bland 01-07-00436-CV Paul M. Mann and Carolyn S. Mann v. Harris County Appraisal District and the Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District Appeal from 280th District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tony Lindsay HCAD v. Sigmor Corp. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 3, 2008)(Higley)(property tax litigation, taxing gas stations) REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND RENDER JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Higley Before Justices Nuchia, Hanks and Higley 01-06-00740-CV Harris County Appraisal District v. Sigmor Corporation, et al Appeal from 11th District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Hon. Mark Davidson    Previous owner of property lacked standing to challenge HCAD's appraisal and to file suit for judicial review of board's decision in property tax protest; new owner's suit barred for failure to comply with exhaustion-of-remedies requirement, which is jurisdictional under Texas Supreme Court precedent Koll Bren Fund VI LP v. HCAD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28, 2008) (Radack) (property tax protest, tax appeal, suit for judicial review, standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Property Tax Code) AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Chief Justice Radack Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Jennings and Bland 01-07-00321-CV Koll Bren Fund VI LP and Hartman 3100 Weslayan Acquisitions, LP v. Harris County Appraisal District and The Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District Appeal from 113th District Court of Harris County (Judge Hon. Patricia Hancock) 2007 Texas Property Tax Cases HCAD v. CCH Parkhearterwood LTD (Tex.App.- Housotn [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2007)(per curiam)(tax appraisal contest appeal, voluntary dismissal) DISMISSED: Per Curiam Before Justices Frost, Seymore and Guzman 14-05-01266-CV Harris County Appraisal District and the Appraisal review Board of Harris County Appraisal District v. CCH Parkhearterwood Ltd., as The Property Owners and the Property Owners Appeal from 55th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Jeff Brown) Ex Parte Waller ISD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist] Dec. 21, 2007)(Keyes) (bond validation suit, challenge to school bonds by taxpayer) AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Keyes 01-07-00900-CV Ex Parte Waller Independent School District Appeal from 155th District Court of Austin County (Hon. Dan R. Beck) In this accelerated bond validation suit,  appellant, DeWayne Charleston, appeals the judgment of the trial court that granted a final judgment in favor of appellee, Waller Independent School District (“WISD”) and the orders of the trial court requiring him to post security and dismissing him from the proceedings. In five issues on appeal, Charleston argues that (1) the bond election and sale of the bonds should be voided; (2) the trial court lacked authority to enjoin proceedings in federal court; (3) the trial court erred by ordering the Attorney General to approve the bonds; (4) the trial court erred in declaring that WISD was entitled to state debt-relief funds; and (5) the trial court should not have required Charleston to post bond. We affirm the trial court’s October 2, 2007 order which required Charleston to post a security bond of $715,000 to continue as a participant in this lawsuit. We likewise affirm the trial court’s October 13, 2007 order which dismissed Charleston from the lawsuit. We dismiss the portion of the appeal that relates to Charleston’s remaining claims for want of jurisdiction. HCAD v. CCH Parkhearterwood LTD (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2007)(per curiam)(tax appraisal contest appeal, voluntary dismissal) Justices disagree on delinquent tax penalties and interest in tax suit HISD v. Old Farms Owners Ass'n (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 26, 2007)(Higley)(tax suit, penalties and interest) REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Higley Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Keyes and Higley 01-04-00538-CV Houston Independent School District, et al., v. Old Farms Owners Association, Inc., et al.,--Appeal from 270th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Brent Gamble) Dissenting Opinion by Justice Keyes in HISD v. Old Farms Owners Association (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 26, 2007) County held immune to award of attorney's fees in tax dispute Waller County, Texas v. Simmons (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 18, 2007)(Taft) (government entity law, tax suit, attorney's fees, sovereign immunity, interlocutory appeals) REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Taft Before Justices Taft, Hanks and Higley 01-07-00180-CV Waller County, Texas v. Oscar Simmons a/k/a Oscar C. Simmons Appeal from 9th District Court of Waller County (Hon. Frederick Edwards) MHCB v. Galveston Dentral Appraisal District (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Sep. 20, 2007)(Taft) (property tax appraisal, refinery, plea juris, declaratory judgment) REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Taft Before Justices Taft, Keyes and Hanks 01-06-00529-CV MHCB (USA) Leasing and Finance Corporation and Valero Refining-Texas, L.P. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District; Galveston Central Appraisal Review Board Appeal from 405th District Court of Galveston County  (Hon. Wayne J. Mallia) In these interlocutory appeals, MHCB (USA) Leasing and Finance Corp. ("MHCB") and Valero Refining-Texas, L.P. ("Valero Refining") (together, "the protesting parties"), who were plaintiffs below, and Galveston Central Appraisal District ("the District") and Galveston Central Appraisal District Review Board ("the Board"), who were defendants below, each appeal from the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part the District's and Board's joint plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2006). We determine (1) whether either or both of the protesting parties lacked standing to protest, and to seek judicial review of, the District's and Board's complained-of actions and (2) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the protesting parties' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief when, at their core, those claims sought a determination of whether the District had the statutory authority unilaterally to rescind an appraisal agreement between itself and the protesting parties. We reverse the order and remand the cause for the trial court to render an order dismissing certain claims asserted by MHCB and to deny the District's and Board's jurisdictional plea against certain of the claims of Valero Refining. Court Issues New Opinion on Rehearing in Excel v. Alief I.S.D. Excel Auto and Truck Leasing LLP v. Alief ISD (Tex. Aug. 31, 2007)(op. on rehr'g by Hanks)(tax appeal) AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Hanks Before Justices Taft, Keyes and Hanks 01-04-01185-CV Excel Auto and Truck Leasing, L.L.P. v. Alief Independent School District et al. Appeal from 11th District Court of Harris County (The Honorable Mark Davidson) In this suit for delinquent ad valorem taxes, Excel Auto & Truck Leasing, L.L.P., appellant/taxpayer, complains of the trial court's granting summary judgment in favor of the various taxing units, appellees. In three issues, Excel argues that the trial court erred in (1) finding that it was the owner of the vehicles and liable for ad valorem taxes; (2) finding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact as to ownership of the vehicles; and (3) granting summary judgment to Pasadena Independent School District ("ISD"), which filed no Motion for Summary Judgment, rendering the judgment interlocutory. We affirm. Prior opinion: Excel Auto v. Alief ISD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 19, 2007)(superseded opinion by Hanks) (property tax suit) Court Rejects Argument that Defendant in Delinquent Personal Property Tax Suit Did Not Own the Leased Vehicles - Leases clearly stated that they may be terminated; contrary summary judgment evidence excluded Excel Auto v. Alief ISD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 19, 2007)(superseded opinion by Hanks) (property tax appeal; judicial review, affirmative defense of nonownership of leased vehicles rejected) AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Hanks Before Justices Taft, Keyes and Hanks 01-04-01185-CV Excel Auto and Truck Leasing, L.L.P. v. Alief Independent School District et al. Appeal from 11th District Court of Harris County  (Judge Mark Davidson) AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Hanks Before Justices Taft, Keyes and Hanks 01-04-01185-CV Excel Auto and Truck Leasing, L.L.P. v. Alief Independent School District et al. Appeal from 11th District Court of Harris County  (Judge Mark Davidson) Property Tax Appeal Fails Sondock v. HCAD (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] May 31, 2007)(Hedges) [property tax, HCAD appeal, unequal assessment] AFFIRMED: Opinion by Chief Justice Hedges Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Hudson and Guzman 14-06-00676-CV Deborah S. Sondock, as the Property Owners and the Property Owners v. Harris County Appraisal District Appeal from 125th District Court of Harris County (Hon. John A. Coselli) In this case, the Sondocks filed a protest and were given an opportunity to present their contentions before the Board.  During that protest hearing, HCAD stated that it agreed with the Sondocks' opinion regarding the value of the property and the Sondocks offered no further complaints following HCAD's stated accord.  We cannot imagine how the Sondocks were deprived of due process when they were given the opportunity to present their arguments to a legal panel and they reached an agreement fully satisfying their stated contentions.  As a result, we find that the Sondocks' agreement with HCAD did not violate their due process rights by precluding them from appealing the appraisal issue.  We hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of HCAD. We note the close similarity between our facts and those that came before our sister court in BPAC Texas, LP as the Property Owners and the Property Owners v. Harris County Appraisal District and the Harris County Appraisal Review Board,  No. 01-03-01238-CV, 2004 WL 2422033 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] October 28, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.).  In BPAC, the appellants (BPAC), owners of the property at issue in that case, filed a protest from the valuation of their property after the property was appraised by HCAD (same entity involved in this case) for purposes of assessing property taxes.  Id. at *1.  At the protest hearing, which was also before the Harris County Appraisal Review Board, HCAD's representative stated that HCAD had lowered its appraised value of the property.  BPAC's representative was then asked if the revised value was "agreeable" to BPAC, to which he replied it was.  The hearing then ended, and the Board issued an order that appears to contain the exact same boilerplate language as the order issued in this case regarding the property owner=s right to appeal the Board=s decision to a district court.  BPAC subsequently filed suit against HCAD and the Board in district court regarding the matter, but the trial court granted the taxing authorities= motion for summary judgment.  Id.  After analyzing BPAC=s complaints regarding the district court=s granting of summary judgment, the First Court of Appeals held, pursuant to Section 1.111(e), that the parties reached an agreement during the protest hearing, and because the protest had not yet been determined by the Board, the agreement was final, thereby precluding BPAC's right to appeal.  Id. at *2-3.  The Court held that any subsequent actions by the Board had no effect on the finality of that agreement.  Id. at *3.  The Court also found that BPAC's due process rights were not violated by this preclusion, as BPAC Awas given an opportunity to present and argue the grounds of its protest" and that "instead of pursuing its protest, BPAC chose to reach an agreement."  Id. at *3.   As a result, the court found that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the taxing authorities.  Id. at *4.  We find the court's analysis in deciding that case thoroughly instructive to the remarkably similar facts at hand.  We overrule the Sondocks' sole issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Sheriff Sale of House Not Undone Mark McCoy v. Rogers (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] May 31, 2007)(Radack) [suit to set aside constable sale deed, notice issue] AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Chief Justice Radack Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Keyes and Higley 01-06-00240-CV Mark McCoy v. Renee Rogers and Timothy Rogers Appeal from 165th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Elizabeth Ray) Appellant, Mark McCoy, filed this action to set aside a deed conveyed pursuant to an execution sale of real property that he previously owned. McCoy brings this appeal to challenge the summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees, Renee Rogers and Timothy Rogers, who purchased the property at the sale. McCoy presents a broad issue contending that the trial court erred by rendering summary judgment. (1) In two additional issues, McCoy contends that the sheriff's execution sale should be set aside (1) because of lack of compliance with the notice provisions of rules 637 and 647 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) because he was not notified of the sale at his home address, and (3) because the Rogerses purchased the property at half its fair market value. We affirm. HCAD v. Blue Flash Express, LLC (Tex.App.- Houston [ 1st Dist.] May 10, 2007)(Taft) [tax appeal, suit for judicial review, exhaustion of administrative remedies, due process, notice] REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Taft Before Justices Taft, Alcala and Hanks 01-06-00783-CV The Harris County Appraisal District and the Harris County Appraisal Review Board v. Blue Flash Express, LLC, City of La Porte and La Porte Independent School District, and San Jacinto Community College District Appeal from 234th District Court of Harris County  (Judge Reece Rondon) HCAD v. CCH Parkhearterwood LTD (Tex.App.- Houston [14th dist.] Jan. 25, 2007)(per curiam)(tax appraisal contest appeal, voluntary dismissal) DISMISSED: Per Curiam Before Justices Frost, Seymore and Guzman 14-05-01266-CV Harris County Appraisal District and the Appraisal review Board of Harris County Appraisal District v. CCH Parkhearterwood Ltd., as The Property Owners and the Property Owners-- Appeal from 55th District Court of Harris County (Judge Jeff Brown) Tax Protester must exhaust available administrative remedy before filing suit for judicial review HCAD v. Blue Flash Express, LLC (Tex.App.- Houston [ 1st Dist.] May 10, 2007)(Taft) [tax appeal, suit for judicial review, exhaustion of administrative remedies, due process, notice] REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Taft Before Justices Taft, Alcala and Hanks 01-06-00783-CV The Harris County Appraisal District and the Harris County Appraisal Review Board v. Blue Flash Express, LLC, City of La Porte and La Porte Independent School District, and San Jacinto Community College District Appeal from 234th District Court of Harris County  (Judge Reece Rondon) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Opinion issued May 10, 2007 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NO. 01-06-00783-CV -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, HARRIS COUNTY REVIEW BOARD, CITY OF LA PORTE, LA PORTE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, HARRIS COUNTY, HARRIS COUNTY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY OF HARRIS COUNTY, HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, and SAN JACINTO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Appellants V. BLUE FLASH EXPRESS, L.L.C., Appellee -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- On Appeal from the 234th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2003-50513 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellants City of La Porte, La Porte Independent School District, Harris County, Harris County Education Department, Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Harris County Flood Control District, Harris County Hospital District, San Jacinto Community College District ("the Taxing Entities") appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Blue Flash Express, L.L.C. ("Blue Flash") on the Taxing Entities' suit to collect delinquent taxes owed by Blue Flash. Appellants Harris County Appraisal District and Harris County Review Board ("the District and Board") appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for partial summary judgment and the granting of Blue Flash's cross-motion for summary judgment on Blue Flash's third-party claims against the District and Board to set aside an appraisal. We determine (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the District and Board's motion for partial summary judgment and by granting Blue Flash's motion for summary judgment because Blue Flash's failure to comply with the administrative review procedures of the Property Tax Code deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over Blue Flash's claims against the District and Board and (2) whether the trial court erred by granting Blue Flash's motion for summary judgment in the Taxing Entities' delinquent tax suit because the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to consider Blue Flash's affirmative defenses protesting its property's inclusion on the appraisal records. I recommend that we reverse the judgment of the trial court, that we render judgment in part, and that we remand the cause. (1) Background In March 2002, Blue Flash, a trucking company with a facility in Harris County, Texas, filed a rendition with the District listing its business personal property for taxation. Blue Flash listed a total of 67 vehicles, which included both vehicles that it had owned and vehicles that it had leased. The District listed the vehicles under two accounts: account number 0595563, which included the 33 vehicles that Blue Flash owned, and 0950209, which included the 34 vehicles that Blue Flash leased. On January 1, 2003, Blue Flash paid the taxes on account number 0595563 (the owned vehicles), but not on account number 0950209 (the leased vehicles). In July 2003, Blue Flash filed with the Board a correction motion under section 25.25 of the Texas Property Tax Code to correct account number 0595563 ("the account number 0595563 correction motion") for the 2001 and 2002 tax years. The account number 0595563 correction motion alleged that the property had been over-appraised by more than one third for both of these years. The Board issued an order granting Blue Flash's account number 0595563 correction motion, decreasing the appraised value of the property from $409,400 to $189,390 to reflect interstate allocations. In May of 2003, Blue Flash received a 2002 tax statement for account number 0950209 (the leased vehicles). On September 5, 2003, the City of La Porte and La Porte Independent School District filed a suit to collect delinquent taxes against Blue Flash, alleging that taxes were due to them for tax year 2002 on account number 0950209. Harris County, Harris County Education Department, Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Harris County Flood Control District, Harris County Hospital District, and San Jacinto Community College District intervened in the City of La Porte and La Porte Independent School District's delinquent tax suit against Blue Flash, each seeking to collect delinquent taxes for the tax year 2002. On September 26, 2003, after the delinquency date for the 2002 taxes, (2) Blue Flash filed a correction motion under section 25.25 of the Texas Property Tax Code with the Board to correct account number 0950209 ("the account number 0950209 correction motion") for tax years 2002 and 2003. The account number 0950209 correction motion alleged that Blue Flash was seeking a correction because its property was over-appraised by more than one-third, explaining, "These are leased vehicles that are used about 1/2 [of the] time out of state & need to be prorated for time/use in Texas." That motion also requested that the Board schedule a hearing to decide whether to correct the alleged error in the appraisal roll. On November 7, 2003, the Board issued a notice denying Blue Flash's account number 0950209 correction motion for the 2002 tax year because neither the Board nor the District had the legal authority to change the appraisal roll upon a motion filed after the delinquency date for the 2002 tax year. (3) However, in a separate notice dated November 20, 2003, the Board granted Blue Flash's account number 0950209 correction motion for the 2003 tax year. (4) On May 10, 2004, Blue Flash filed its third-party petition against the District and Board in the Taxing Entities' collection suit, alleging that it had been denied due process of rights because the District and Board had failed to provide it proper notice of account number 0950209 under section 25.19 of the Texas Property Tax Code, that the District and Board had over-appraised its property and were attempting to assess value and to tax property improperly, and that the District and Board were aware of errors, but refused to correct them. Blue Flash alleged that it was entitled to a mandatory injunction compelling the District and Board to correct the 2002 appraisal roll to reflect the proper appraised value of its property and to refund to Blue Flash any excess taxes paid. On October 28, 2005, Blue Flash amended its answer and third-party petition, alleging that (1) account number 0950209 was a duplicate account and that Blue Flash had been unlawfully double taxed on the same property; (2) Blue Flash had not received proper or valid notice of appraised value in compliance with section 25.19 of the Texas Property Tax Code; (3) the values for Blue Flash's personal property were excessive because it was entitled to a partial exemption; (4) Blue Flash was wrongly denied an opportunity to comply with the administrative review procedures of the Texas Property Tax Code; and (5) Blue Flash was wrongly denied the allocations ordered by the Board for the property on account number 0950209. The District and Board filed their motion for partial summary judgment on the grounds that Blue Flash had not exhausted its administrative remedies and, therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Blue Flash's declaratory judgment cause of action against them. The trial court denied the District and Board's motion for partial summary judgment in an order dated April 10, 2006, reciting that the trial court had jurisdiction and that material issues of fact existed. Blue Flash filed its motion for summary judgment on the Taxing Entities' collection causes of action and its declaratory cause of action against the District and Board. (5) In its motion for summary judgment, Blue Flash asserted that (1) it was excused from having to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review because the District and Board acted outside of their statutory authority and took actions that amounted to a deprivation of property and a violation of Blue Flash's due process rights and (2) the appraisal roll was defective because Blue Flash was double taxed or entitled to a partial exemption. On May 30, 2006, the trial court granted Blue Flash's motion for summary judgment, ordering that the District remove "duplicate" account number 0950209 from the appraisal roll for the year 2002 and that the Taxing Entities refund all payments on account number 0950209 for the 2002 tax year. The trial court's final judgment also included a recital that the Taxing Entities take nothing from Blue Flash as to their claim for taxes, penalty, interest, and attorney's fees on account number 0950209 for the tax year 2002. The District and Board's Appeal In their issues one and two, the District and Board argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for partial summary judgment and by granting Blue Flash's motion for summary judgment because Blue Flash's failure to comply with the administrative review procedures of the Texas Property Tax Code deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. (6)A. Standard of Review and the Law A motion for summary judgment may raise a challenge to a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. City of Hedwig Vill. Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Howeth Invs., Inc., 73 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts affirmatively showing that a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 236 (Tex. 2004); see Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). A court should take the plaintiff's allegations to be true and construe all inferences in favor of jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. The question of whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is one of law, and we thus review it de novo. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction to determine a matter, a litigant's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the administrative body's actions deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims within the body's exclusive jurisdiction, and the court must generally dismiss such claims without prejudice. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.171 (Vernon 2000); Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W. 3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002); see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.034 (Vernon Supp. 2006) ("statutory prerequisites to suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity."). Taxing authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over tax disputes, and taxpayers must therefore exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. 1991) (recognizing that taxpayer is required to exhaust administrative procedures before challenging tax assessment); Webb County Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, 792 S.W.2d 952, 954-55 (Tex. 1990) (holding that taxpayer who failed to appear at administrative protest hearing was deemed to have failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, thus depriving district court of its jurisdiction to hear case); ABT Galveston Ltd. P'ship v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 137 S.W.3d 146, 157-58 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (stating that taxpayer who did not timely file protest was deemed to have failed diligently to pursue or to exhaust its administrative remedies under Texas Property Tax Code, thus depriving district court of jurisdiction to hear claim); Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Lal, 701 S.W.2d 44, 46-47 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that taxpayer's suit challenging excessive property tax valuation be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because taxpayer failed to exhaust administrative remedies); see also Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09(a) (Vernon 2001) (stating that remedies set forth in Texas Property Tax Code are exclusive except as provided by subsection (b) of section 42.09). An aggrieved party is excused from exhausting its administrative remedies under certain circumstances: (1) an administrative agency purports to act outside its statutory powers; (2) the issue presented is purely a question of law; (3) certain constitutional issues are involved; (4) the administrative remedies are inadequate, and the exhaustion of administrative remedies would cause irreparable injury; and (5) failure to provide the taxpayers notice of the appraised property's value deprives the taxing authority of jurisdiction and voids the appraisal. See Gibson v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 971 S.W.2d 199, 200-03 (Tex. App.--Waco 1998) (enumerating the exceptions), vacated on other grounds, 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000); see also Strayhorn v. Lexington Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004), affirmed, 209 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2006). B. Analysis In its motion for summary judgment, Blue Flash asserted that it was excused from having to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review because the District and Board (1) acted outside of their statutory authority and (2) took actions that amounted to a deprivation of property and a violation of Blue Flash's due process rights. (7) 1. Exception: Acting Outside of Statutory Authority Blue Flash specifically argues that the District and Board acted outside their statutory authority "by creating a duplicate account for property already assessed and taxes paid in an existing account; by attempting to retroactively apply a newly created account to prior tax years already closed; by failing to give notice of the new account; by failing to give notice of assessment on the new account by the unilateral refusal to grant a properly requested hearing; by not recognizing or complying with their own final orders; and by failing to perform their administrative functions to delete their duplicate account and failing to conduct a statutorily required hearing." We disagree. If a state agency acts without authority, the aggrieved party may appeal directly to the courts without having to exhaust administrative remedies. Lexington Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d at 780; Mitchison v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). In such a case, the purposes underlying the exhaustion rule are not applicable, judicial and administrative efficiency are not served by waiting for remedies to be exhausted, and agency policies and expertise are irrelevant if the agency's final action will be a nullity. Lexington Ins. Co., 128 S. W.3d at 780. First, we consider Blue Flash's argument that the District and Board acted outside of their statutory authority by creating a duplicate account for property already assessed and taxes paid in an existing account. The crux of Blue Flash's argument is that the District and Board made a mistake that should have been corrected. This is a complaint of "getting it wrong," not of acting outside of statutory authority. See Williams v. Houston Firemen's Relief & Ret.Fund, 121 S.W.3d 415, 430 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Blue Flash was entitled to protest the District and Board's mistake, i.e., the appraised value of its property in the allegedly duplicate account, under either chapter 41 (8) or section 25.25 (9) of the Texas Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 25.25, 41.41 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2006). Blue Flash did not avail itself of either of these remedies. Instead, Blue Flash filed the account number 0950209 correction motion for the 2002 tax year to correct "[p]roperty over-appraised by more than 1/3," not to correct multiple appraisal accounts. See id. § 25.25. Blue Flash was entitled to protest the allegedly duplicate account within the administrative scheme, but it did not. See id. §§ 25.25, 41.41. Blue Flash cannot now do so in court. Second, we consider Blue Flash's argument that the District and Board acted outside of their statutory authority by attempting to apply a newly created account retroactively to prior tax years already closed. Blue Flash in essence contends that an increase in the appraised value after the tax roll had been certified was not authorized by the Texas Property Tax Code; thus, the District and Board acted without statutory authority when they established account number 0950209 for the leased vehicles. Section 25.25 of the Texas Property Tax Code prohibits the District and Board from changing the appraisal roll after it is certified unless (1) Blue Flash files a chapter protest or a corresponding chapter 42 lawsuit or (2) a correction motion is filed under section 25.25 of the Texas Property Tax Code. See id. § 25.25. However, section 25.21 of the Texas Property Tax Code permits the chief appraiser to include omitted property in the appraisal records at any time: (a) If the chief appraiser discovers that real property was omitted from an appraisal roll in any one of the five preceding years or that personal property was omitted from an appraisal roll in one of the two preceding years, he shall appraise the property as of January 1 of each year that it was omitted and enter the property and its appraised value in the appraisal records. (b) The entry shall show that the appraisal is for property that was omitted from an appraisal roll in a prior year and shall indicate the year and the appraised value for each year. Id. § 25.21 (Vernon 2001). Section 25.23 specifically authorizes additions to the appraisal roll for "supplemental appraisal records," such as previously omitted property. (10) See id. § 25.23(a)(1) (Vernon 2001). Therefore, the District and Board acted within their statutory authority when they assessed Blue Flash's additional tax reflecting allegedly omitted property. Third, Blue Flash argues that the District and Board acted outside of their statutory authority by failing to give notice of an assessment on the new account number 0950209. The crux of Blue Flash's argument is that the District and Board did not deliver notice as required by section 25.19 of the Texas Property Tax Code. (11) Section 25.23 of the Texas Property Tax Code provides that the chief appraiser shall deliver notice as required under 25.19 as soon as practicable after determining the appraisal value of supplemental appraisal records. Id. § 25.23(c). The Texas Property Tax Code allows a property owner to protest the failure of the appraisal review board to give the proper notice to which a property owner is entitled. Id. § 41.411(a) (Vernon 2001). Section 41.411 expressly grants the appraisal review board jurisdiction to hear taxpayer complaints regarding lack of notice. (12) Id. § 41.411. Blue Flash did not protest the failure of the appraisal review board to give it proper notice. The crux of Blue Flash's argument is that the District and Board made a mistake by not sending it notice of the new account. This is another complaint of "getting it wrong," not of acting outside of statutory authority. See Williams, 121 S.W.3d at 430. Blue Flash was entitled to protest administratively the failure of the Board to give the proper notice, but it did not. See id. § 41.411. Fourth, Blue Flash argues that the District and Board acted outside of their statutory authority by not recognizing or complying with their own "final orders." Blue Flash does not explain with which of their "own final orders" the District and Board have failed to comply. The record reflects that the District and Board issued three determinations related to this appeal: (1) an order granting Blue Flash's account number 0595563 correction motion for the 2001 and 2002 tax years, which decreased the appraised values to reflect interstate allocations; (2) a notice denying Blue Flash's number 0950209 correction motion for the 2002 tax year because neither the Board nor the District had the legal authority to change the appraisal roll upon a motion filed after the delinquency date for the 2002 tax year; (13) and (3) a "notice of approval" granting Blue Flash's account number 0950209 correction motion for the 2003 tax year, which decreased the appraised values to reflect interstate allocations. We interpret Blue Flash's argument to be that because the District and Board issued a notice decreasing the appraised values to reflect interstate allocations for the same property and on the same account in the 2003 tax year, the District and Board were acting outside of their authority when the same property was over-appraised and not corrected for the 2002 tax year for account number 0950209. Blue Flash was entitled to protest the District and Board's alleged mistake, i.e., the over-appraised value of its property for the 2002 tax year for account number 0950209, under either chapter 41 or section 25.25 (14) of the Texas Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 25.25, 41.41(a). However, Blue Flash did not protest the over- appraised value of its property under chapter 41 or timely file its account number 0950209 correction motion before the 2002 taxes became delinquent. Moreover, the District and Board had the statutory authority to assess Blue Flash's additional tax reflecting allegedly omitted property and had no authority to correct the 2002 appraisal rolls absent a section 25.25 or 41.41 challenge. See id. §§ 25.25(d), 41.41. Lastly, Blue Flash argues that the District and Board acted outside of their statutory authority by failing to conduct a statutorily required hearing. Blue Flash contends that on September 26, 2003, it filed a written request for a hearing before the Board on its account number 0950209 correction motion for tax year 2002. Blue Flash's request for a hearing was made in its section 25.25 motion to correct, which was a fill-in-the-blank form and which included the following, form-typed text: "I request the Appraisal Review Board (ARB) schedule a hearing to decide whether or not to correct the error in the appraisal roll. I request that the Appraisal Review Board send notice of the time, date, and place fixed for the hearing, not later than 15 days before the scheduled hearing." In its November 7 notice denying Blue Flash's account number 0950209 correction motion for its 2002 taxes, the Board advised Blue Flash that it was entitled to a hearing before the Board even though the only action that the Board could take would be to dismiss its "appeal for lack of jurisdiction." The notice further explained that the Board was withdrawing Blue Flash's motion from consideration and that if Blue Flash wished to proceed to a formal hearing to present its appeal, it should contact the Board in writing within 15 days of the date of the letter. The crux of Blue Flash's argument again is that the District and Board made a mistake by failing to hold a hearing. This is another complaint of "getting it wrong," not of acting outside of statutory authority. See Williams, 121 S.W.3d at 430. Blue Flash could have pursued its administrative remedy to correct the Board's failure to hold that hearing, but it did not. There is no evidence in the record that Blue Flash followed the instructions in the November 7 notice by contacting the Board in writing within 15 days of the date of that notice, nor does Blue Flash contend that it sent any such written request after it had received that notice. Further, had the Board denied Blue Flash a hearing properly requested after the date of the letter, Blue Flash would have been entitled to bring suit against the appraisal review board by filing a petition or application in district court to compel the Board to provide the hearing. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(m) (providing that hearing on motion under section 25.25 be conducted in manner provided by chapter 41 of the Texas Property Tax Code); see also id. § 41.45(f) (Vernon 2001) (stating that property owner who has been denied hearing to which he is entitled may bring suit against appraisal review board by filing petition or application in district court to compel board to provide hearing). Accordingly, we hold that the acting-outside-of-statutory exception did not apply to excuse Blue Flash from exhausting its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the District and Boards actions. 2. Exceptions: Constitutional Issues Involved and Failure to Provide Notice Blue Flash further contends that because the District and Board did not provide it with proper notice or a meaningful opportunity to dispute the Board's action, Blue Flash was deprived of notice and due process. Collection of a tax constitutes a deprivation of property; accordingly, a taxing unit must afford a property owner due process of law and must provide meaningful, backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of Bus. Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18, 31, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2250-51 (1990); Fisher, 88 S.W.3d at 813. At a minimum, due process in this context requires notice and a fair opportunity to be heard before a taxpayer is deprived of a protected property interest. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 37, 110 S. Ct. at 2250-51. "However, '[d]ue process affords only a right to be heard before final assessment; it does not detail the review mechanism.'" ABT Galveston Ltd., 137 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Lal, 701 S.W.2d at 47). In tax cases, Texas courts have held that due process is satisfied if the taxpayer is given an opportunity to be heard before an assessment board at some stage of the proceedings. Id.; Denton Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. CI.T Leasing Corp., 115 S. W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). Firmly rooted in Texas jurisprudence is a constitutional-claim exception to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine. E.g., Fisher, 88 S.W.3d at 813 (holding that taxpayer was denied due process and any taxes assessed from appraisal were void because evidence that taxpayer neither received notice nor had opportunity to contest appraisal was undisputed); Gibson, 971 S.W.2d at 202-03 (holding that challengers of school district's new policy did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing constitutional challenge because Texas Education Code did not provide administrative appeal for state or federal constitutional challenges to decisions of school board). The constitutional-claim exception to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine was created to protect property owners from the loss of property without an opportunity to be heard at the administrative level and without recourse to judicial review. See CIT Leasing, 115 S.W.3d at 266. Before the enactment of section 41.411, the property tax scheme did not provide taxpayers with adequate remedies at law to cure defective notice. See id.; see, e.g., Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Dincans, 882 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that, under the law as it existed at time, taxpayer was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because it did not receive notice of appraised value); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 765 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988, writ denied) (holding that, under law as it existed at time, appellant was denied procedural due process); New v. Dallas Appraisal Review Bd., 734 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, writ denied) (holding that appraisal district must deliver notice of appraised value before it obtains jurisdiction to increase value). Thus, courts developed equitable remedies in order to provide taxpayers with due process protections. See C.I.T. Leasing, 115 S.W.3d at 266-67 n.3. The addition of section 41.411, however, provided taxpayers with the due process protections that had previously been lacking under the prior statutory scheme. (15) See id. at 266. The purpose of section 41.411 is to determine whether a property owner failed to receive notice of a tax assessment, thereby depriving it of the right to be heard at the administrative level. See id.; Harris County Appraisal Review Bd. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 819 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Assuming without deciding that the District and Board did not send Blue Flash the notice to which it was entitled, the Texas Property Tax Code provided Blue Flash with administrative procedures specifically created to allow it to protest defective notice of such actions and to protest improper actions that the District and Board took adverse to Blue Flash's interests. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 41.41, 41.411. As discussed in the section above, Blue Flash was provided with statutory administrative remedies under which it could have protested objectionable District and Board actions, but chose not to avail itself of the administrative remedies. See id. §§ 25.25, 41.41(a), 41.411(a). Because Blue Flash was presented with an opportunity to be heard, deprivations of property that stem from account number 0950209 for the 2002 tax year are not unconstitutional. We hold that Blue Flash received the process that it was due when it was afforded an opportunity to protest defective notice and to be heard on the merits of its tax dispute during the administrative process. The constitutional-claims exception thus did not excuse Blue Flash from exhausting its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. C. Conclusion We have already held that none of the exceptions that Blue Flash asserted on appeal to the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine applies to except Blue Flash from pursuing its administrative remedies. Blue Flash failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the District and Board's complained-of actions. Consequently, the district court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction over Blue Flash's third-party claim against the District and Board because that claim fell within the administrative body's exclusive jurisdiction. The district court erred by denying the District and Board's partial summary judgment motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction Blue Flash's cause of action against them and by granting Blue Flash's motion for summary judgment. We sustain the District and Board's issues one and two. The Taxing Entities' Appeal In two points of error, the Taxing Entities argue that the trial court erred by granting Blue Flash's motion for summary judgment in their delinquent tax suit against it. Specifically, in issue one, the Taxing Entities argue that the trial court erred because Blue Flash did not prove as a matter of law that it was double-taxed or entitled to a partial exemption. In issue two, the Taxing Entities argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Blue Flash because Blue Flash did not exhaust its administrative remedies, nor was it excused from having to do so; thus, the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to consider Blue Flash's affirmative defenses protesting its property's inclusion on the appraisal records.A. Standard of Review Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Under the traditional standard for summary judgment, a movant has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). We view all evidence in a light favorable to the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference in the non-movant's favor. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215. A defendant moving for summary judgment on an affirmative defense must prove each element of its defense as a matter of law, leaving no issues of material fact. Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473, 475 n.10 (Tex. 2005) (citing Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1996)). B. Analysis Blue Flash moved for traditional summary judgment on the Taxing Entities' delinquent tax suit against it on the basis that collection was improper because the tax roll was defective. Specifically, Blue Flash argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defense because it was double-taxed or, alternatively, it was partially exempted from the tax. The Taxing Entities did not move for summary judgment on their delinquent tax suit. We recognize that the trial court has jurisdiction over the Taxing Entities' collection suit against Blue Flash. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.41(a) (Vernon 2001) (stating that at any time after tax on property becomes delinquent, taxing unit may file suit to foreclose lien securing payment of tax, to enforce personal liability for tax, or both.) However, the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Blue Flash's affirmative defense that the appraisals on which the Taxing Entities' delinquent tax suit was based were defective. See Northwest Tex. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Happy Indep. Sch.Dist., 839 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1992, no writ) (holding that failure of taxpayer to pursue remedies established in Texas Property Tax Code to protest property's inclusion on appraisal records deprived trial court of jurisdiction to consider taxpayer's defense that property was exempt); see also Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09 (a) (Vernon 2001) (stating that procedures prescribed by Texas Property Tax Code provide exclusive remedies for adjudicating the grounds of protest authorized by the Texas Property Tax Code and that property owner may not raise any of these grounds as basis for relief in defense to suit to enforce collection of delinquent taxes). We have already held that Blue Flash did not exhaust its administrative remedies, nor was it excused from having to do so; thus, the district court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether Blue Flash was double-taxed, or whether it was partially exempted from the tax. Blue Flash thus did not carry its summary-judgment burden. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by granting Blue Flash's motion for summary judgment against the Taxing Entities because the trial court was jurisdictionally prohibited, for the reasons stated above, from considering Blue Flash's defense, raised in its motion for summary judgment, that the appraisal roll was defective.Conclusion We reverse the judgment. We render judgment that Blue Flash's third-party claim against the District and Board be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We remand the cause. Tim Taft Justice Panel consists of Justices Taft, Alcala, and Hanks. 1. The Taxing Entities did not file a motion for summary judgment seeking affirmative relief in the trial court. Consequently, on appeal, the Taxing Entities request that this cause be remanded on their delinquent tax suit against Blue Flash. 2. The delinquency date for the 2002 taxes was February 1, 2003. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 31.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (stating that taxes are generally due on receipt of tax bill and are delinquent if not paid before February 1 of following tax year). 3. In its November 7, 2003 notice, the Board advised Blue Flash that it was entitled to a hearing before the Board even though the only action that the Board could take would be to dismiss its "appeal for lack of jurisdiction." The correspondence further explained that the Board was withdrawing Blue Flash's motion from consideration and that if Blue Flash wished to proceed to a formal hearing to present its appeal, it should contact the Board in writing within 15 days of the date of the letter. 4. The record does not contain a copy of the November 20 notice. However, none of the parties disputes that it was issued. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (stating that, in civil case, appellate court will accept as true facts by appellant stated unless another party contradicts them). 5. Although Blue Flash states in its brief that the City of La Porte and La Porte Independent School District filed a motion for summary judgment, the record on appeal does not reflect that any such motion was filed, nor do the City of La Porte and La Porte Independent School District contend that they filed a motion for summary judgment on their collection cause of action against Blue Flash. 6. The Taxing Entities assert this argument on appeal, as well. We discuss this argument's effect on their cause of action below. 7. Blue Flash also contends in its brief that the jurisdiction of the trial court has been invoked under section 42.01 of the Texas Property Tax Code, for which there is not a deadline to seek appellate review. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.01 (Vernon 2001). Section 42.01 applies to a taxpayer's right to appeal a determination of the appraisal review board. See id. Blue Flash is not appealing any order or determination of the appraisal review board, but, rather, asserts that the appraisal roll is defective as an affirmative defense to the Taxing Entities' collection suit and as a declaratory judgment cause of action against the District and Board. Although there is a determination on Blue Flash's account number 0950209 correction motion for the 2002 tax year based on whether Blue Flash was entitled to an exemption, Blue Flash did not file a motion to correct for the 2002 tax year based on whether account number 0950209 was a duplicate account. Moreover, the Texas Property Tax Code has deadlines for appealing an order of the appraisal review board. Section 42.06 provides that to exercise a right to appeal an order of an appraisal review board, a party must file written notice of appeal within 15 days after the date that the taxpayer received the notice. See id. § 42.06(a) (Vernon 2001). Additionally, section 25.25 provides that within 45 days after receiving notice of the appraisal review board's determination the taxpayer may file suit to compel the board to order a change in the appraisal roll. See id. § 25.25(g) (Vernon Supp. 2006). 8. Section 41.41(a)(9) of the Texas Property Tax Code specifies that property owners are entitled to protest any action of the chief appraiser, appraisal district, or appraisal review board that applies to and adversely affects the property owner. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 41.41(a)(9) (Vernon 2001). A protest under section 41.41 must be filed no later than June 1 or the thirtieth day after the notice of appraised value is delivered to the property owner, whichever is later. Id. § 41.44(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006). 9. Under section 25.25(c) of the Texas Property Tax Code, a property owner is given up to five years to request that the appraisal review board change the appraisal roll to correct (1) clerical errors, (2) multiple appraisals, or (3) the inclusion of property that does not exist in the form or at the location described in the appraisal roll. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25 (c). The purpose of section 25.25(c) is to allow late changes to otherwise finalized appraisal records only in situations in which "the decision to make the change is based on an objective, factual determination and the payment of taxes based on the uncorrected records would be fundamentally unfair." GE Capital Corp. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 971 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1998, no pet.). 10. Section 31.04(a-1) of the Texas Property Tax Code provides specific guidelines for when tax bills become delinquent if the bill includes property that was erroneously omitted. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 31.04(a-1) (Vernon Supp. 2006). If a tax bill is mailed and it includes taxes for one or more preceding tax years because the property was erroneously omitted from the tax roll in those tax years, the delinquency date that is provided by section 31.02 is postponed to February 1 of the first year that will provide a period of at least 180 days after the date that the tax bill is mailed in which to pay the taxes before they become delinquent. Id. 11. The Taxing Authorities are required to provide property owners notice in writing. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.19(a), (b), (g), (h), (j) (Vernon Supp. 2006). The notice must cite appraised property value, segregate real and personal property appraisals, and provide a detailed explanation of the time and procedure for protesting the appraisal value. Id. Supplemental appraisal records are the proper way to add omitted property to the appraisal roll, subject to review, protest, and appeal under chapters 41 and 42 of the Texas Property Tax Code. Id. § 25.23(a)(1), (d) (Vernon 2001). 12. In addition, the Texas Property Tax Code expressly provides that a taxpayer's failure to receive notice does not affect the validity of the appraisal or "the imposition of any tax on the basis of the appraisal." Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.19(d); Denton Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. CIT Leasing, Corp., 115 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Lal, 701 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e). 13. On appeal, Blue Flash also argues that the notice denying Blue Flash's number 0950209 correction motion for the 2002 tax year was not an order and thus the District and Board "never heard Blue Flash's motion" and "no final order existed." However, the Texas Property Tax Code does not mandate that the District and Board issue an order on a section 25.25 motion to correct. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25. To the contrary, section 25.25(g) provides that a property owner may file suit to compel the board to order a change to the appraisal roll within 45 days after receiving notice of the appraisal review board's determination. See id. § 25.25(g). 14. Section 25.25(d) of the Texas Property Tax Code provides, "At any time prior to the date the taxes become delinquent, a property owner or the chief appraiser may file a motion with the appraisal review board to change the appraisal roll to correct an error that resulted in an incorrect appraised value for the owner's property. However, the error may not be corrected unless it resulted in an appraised value that exceeds by more than one-third the correct appraised value." Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(d). 15. Section 41.411 provides: (a) A property owner is entitled to protest before the appraisal review board the failure of the chief appraiser or the appraisal review board to provide or deliver any notice to which the property owner is entitled. (b) If failure to provide or deliver the notice is established, the appraisal review board shall determine a protest made by the property owner on any other grounds of protest authorized by this title relating to the property to which the notice applies. (c) A property owner who protests as provided by this section must comply with the payment requirements of Section 42.08 or he forfeits his right to a final determination of his protest. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 41.411 (Vernon 2001). ========================================================================================= IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS ════════════ No. 04-0359 ════════════ Cameron Appraisal District, Petitioner, v. Thora O. Rourk, et al., Respondents ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ PER CURIAM The Cameron Appraisal District assessed ad valorem taxes against the owners of 34 travel trailers for the tax years 2000 and 2001. After some but not all filed unsuccessful administrative protests and then timely appeals in the district court, the latter (1) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the claims by those who had not exhausted administrative remedies, (2) granted summary judgment against the remainder because their trailers were taxable as a matter of law, and (3) refused to certify a class action. The court of appeals reversed, finding error in all three rulings. 131 S.W. 3d 285 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2004).[1] Because exhaustion of administrative remedies was mandatory, we reverse. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.225(d). The Texas Tax Code provides detailed administrative procedures for those who would contest their property taxes. See §§ 41.01-.71. Administrative decisions are final if not appealed to the district court within 45 days. Id. § 42.21(a). The administrative procedures are “exclusive” and most defenses are barred if not raised therein. Id. § 42.09.[2] Thus, we have repeatedly held that “a taxpayer’s failure to pursue an appraisal review board proceeding deprives the courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to ad valorem taxes.” Matagorda County Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P., 165 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. 2005); Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam); Webb County Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc., 792 S.W. 2d 952, 954‑55 (Tex. 1990); see also In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321‑22 (Tex. 2004) (applying the same rule generally when an agency has exclusive original jurisdiction). Here, the summary judgment record establishes that some of the named taxpayers pursued administrative remedies and filed timely appeals, but others did not. The record does not indicate how many unnamed class members might be in either category. By mandating class certification of all claims nonetheless, the court of appeals allowed taxpayers to bypass the statutorily required administrative remedies. A class action cannot be used to alter these statutory prerequisites to taxpayer recovery. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 693 (Tex. 2003); Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437 (Tex. 2000). The court of appeals held the exhaustion requirements inapplicable because purely legal and constitutional questions were involved here. 131 S.W.3d at 292. We disagree. In addition to claiming that taxing their trailers was unconstitutional, the taxpayers claim that their trailers were nontaxable “recreational vehicles” rather than taxable “manufactured homes” due to their size, shape, and intended use. See Tex. Tax Code § 11.14 (incorporating by reference id. § 11.432(c), Tex. Occ. Code § 1201.003(9) & (15), and 24 C.F.R. § 3282.8(g)). The taxpayers here are seeking more than a declaration that taxing trailers is unconstitutional — they are seeking to have their individual assessments set aside. While the former claim need not be brought administratively, the latter must. See Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex. 1995). The Texas Constitution expressly allows the Legislature to bestow exclusive original jurisdiction on administrative bodies. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. There is no question the Legislature intended to do so here. By finding “no sound reason” to require exhaustion, see 131 S.W.3d at 292, the court of appeals simply substituted its own judgment for that of the Legislature. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s partial dismissal and requiring certification of a class of taxpayers who had failed to pursue administrative remedies. We agree, however, with the court of appeals that fact issues preclude finding the remaining taxpayers’ trailers taxable as a matter of law as “manufactured homes” rather than “recreational vehicles.” Whether a class can be certified as to those claims is a matter that must be decided by the trial court in the first instance. See Schein, 102 S. W.3d at 700. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, see Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in part and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Opinion delivered: June 2, 2006 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Although remanding to the trial court for class certification, the court of appeals appeared to approve a class of “[a]ll individuals located in Cameron County, Texas who own park model or travel trailers located on r.v. or travel trailer parks, who have been either previously taxed and/or whom the Cameron County Appraisal District has sought to appraise for the purpose of placing the park model or travel trailers on the tax rolls of various taxing entities within Cameron County, Texas and whose park models and/or travel trailers . . . are not held or used for the production of income.” 131 S.W.3d at 300. [2] Those who do not file administrative protests may still assert that (1) they did not own the property, or (2) the property was outside the boundaries of the taxing unit. See Tex. Tax Code ' 42.09(b). The class here asserts neither. =========== Excel Auto and Truck Leasing LLP v. Alief ISD (Tex. Aug. 31, 2007)(Hanks)(tax appeal) Ad Valorem Taxes All tangible personal property is taxable unless otherwise exempt by law. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 11.01 (Vernon 2004). Property taxes "are the personal obligation of the person who owns or acquires the property on January 1 of the year for which the tax is imposed." Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 32.07 (Vernon 2004). In a prosecution for the collection of delinquent taxes, certified copies of a taxing unit's tax records or tax statements constitute prima facie evidence of all of the elements of the taxing unit's petition, including ownership of the property, and create a presumption that the taxing units complied with all of the requirements imposed upon them by law. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.47(a) (Vernon 2004); Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1982); Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ogg, 122 S.W.3d 257, 263- 64 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.). It is an affirmative defense to tax liability that the person against whom the tax is assessed was not the owner of the property at the time of assessment. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09(b)(1) (Vernon 2004). It has also been held that a person holding a lien or other security upon the property is not an owner for tax purposes. Comerica Acceptance Corp. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 52 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Here, the taxing units attached certified copies of their tax records to their motions for summary judgment, thus establishing their prima facie case. In response, Excel asserted the affirmative defense that it was not the owner of the vehicles because its leases should be interpreted as security agreements, making the lessees the actual owners of the vehicles. Excel did not dispute the amount of taxes or any aspect of the levy of the taxes. Its only dispute is whether it can be taxed as the owner of the vehicles. The taxing units argue that, because Excel is the owner of the property and not merely a lienholder or a secured party as it claims to be, Excel is personally liable for the property taxes imposed. Analysis The Texas Business and Commerce Code controls the determination of whether a transaction, in the form of a lease, creates a lease or security interest. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.203 (Vernon Supp. 2006). Section 1.203 sets forth the following two-part test to determine whether an agreement constitutes a lease or a security interest: Lease Distinguished From Security Interest (a) Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of each case. (b) A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if the consideration that the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease and is not subject to termination by the lessee, and: (1) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods; (2) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods; (3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement; or (4) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement. . . . Id. (emphasis added). By enacting Section 1.203, Texas has adopted the official version of Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-201(37). Accordingly, we are guided by decisions from other jurisdictions which interpret this uniform statute. See e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Boser, 972 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, pet. denied). To create a security interest, the first part of this test requires that the rental payments the lessee must pay cannot be terminable by the lessee during the term of the lease. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.203. This factor requires the existence of a "hell or high water" clause. See In re Triplex Marine Maint. Inc., 258 B.R. 659, 669 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000). A "hell or high water" clause requires that the lessee, once it accepts the leased item, must pay its rent in all events (i.e., come hell or high water) without regard for the proper function of the item or the conduct of the lessor with respect to the subject or any other transaction. See id. at n.20. (2) The second part of the conjunctive test lists four factors, one of which must also exist for the lease to be deemed a security interest. (3) This two-part test focuses on the economics of the transaction rather than the intent of the parties or the label of the document. Boser, 972 S.W.2d at 103; In re Triplex Marine Maint. Inc., 258 B.R. at 668-69. For leases which satisfy the foregoing bright-line two-part test, the inquiry comes to an end--such leases constitute security interests as a matter of law. In re Triplex Marine Maint. Inc., 258 B.R. at 668-69. If the bright-line test is not satisfied, the finding of a security interest is not mandated, and the court may examine additional facts, recognized by the statute, to determine whether the economic realities of a particular transaction create a security interest. Id. In this case, Excel's Motor Vehicle Lease Agreements do not meet the first part of the test because they do not contain "hell or high water" clauses. Instead, they contain provisions, which specifically state that the entire lease, including the provisions for the payment of the rent over the term of the agreement, can be terminated at any time at the will of the lessee. Paragraphs 23 of Excel's Motor Vehicle Lease Agreements provide as follows: 23. LEASE TERMINATION: This Lease will end ("terminate") when one of the following events occurs, whichever happens first: (a) You choose to end this Lease early and return the Vehicle to us; . . . This language cannot meet the first part of the test because, unlike a hell or high water clause, it does not require the payment of all rents, both past due and due in the future for the term of the lease, upon a lessee's termination of the lease. See, e.g, In re Triplex Marine Maint. Inc., 258 B.R. at 669 (holding that the first part of the test was met by the inclusion of the following language in the lease in capital letters under the heading of "Important Conditions" that: YOU [the debtor] UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT: (A) THE LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELED BY YOU AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON . . . ."). Nevertheless, Excel argues that its leases satisfy the first part of the test because a "hell or high water" clause is not required--the leases' early termination clause serves the same function. We disagree. Excel has not cited to us, nor do we find, any case law under the current version of Section 1.203 that dispenses with the requirement of an express hell or high water clause to establish the existence of a security interest. (4) Furthermore, the early termination provision cannot substitute for a hell or high water clause because it does not prevent the lessee from terminating the agreed upon consideration to Excel--the payment of the full amount of the rental payments under the lease. The early termination clause does not require that, at the time of termination, the lessee still be responsible for payment of past due and unmatured or future rental payments under the terms of the lease. In fact, in the event of a lessee termination, the amount paid to Excel for future rental fees will vary depending on the calculation of the "realized value" of the vehicle versus the "adjusted lease balance" due on the vehicle at the time of termination. Paragraph 24 of Excel's Motor Vehicle Lease Agreements provides that: 24. EARLY TERMINATION: This section applies if the Lease terminates before the end of the scheduled Lease term. . . . On early termination, you will return the Vehicle to us. You will deliver it to our address or to another reasonable location at our request. (a) Early Termination Liability. On early termination, you agree to pay us: (1) A VEHICLE RETURN FEE, if any, given in section 28(b); (2) All accrued and unpaid amounts that are due or past due at that time . . . ; (3) The amount by which the "Adjusted Lease Balance" is greater than the "Realized Value: [sic] of the Vehicle (5). . . ; and (4) All official fees and taxes imposed in connection with the Lease termination. At best, this provision is nothing more than a liquidated damages provision, not the functional equivalent of a hell or high water clause. Thus, we hold that Excel's leases do not satisfy the two-part test for establishing the existence of a security interest. Other Considerations We next turn to an examination of the lease to determine whether there are any other factors that have been recognized by the courts to indicate the existence of a security interest. Courts have recognized that, if, under the terms of the lease, a lessee has no equity interest whatsoever in the property, the lease may be a true lease and not a security interest. Touch of Class Leasing v. Mercedes-Benz Credit of Canada, Inc., 591 A.2d 661, 665-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991). This is the case here. Excel's leases expressly provide that the lessee has no equity interest in the vehicle. Paragraph 27 of Excel's Motor Vehicle Lease Agreements provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 27. TITLING, OFFICIAL FEES AND TAXES: You understand and agree that this agreement is a lease only. We own the Vehicle and it will be titled in our name or in the name of our assignee. You have no ownership interest in the Vehicle except for any future options to purchase provided in this Lease. Excel argues that, despite the language above, the leases are security interests, not true leases, because, under their terms, the lessee is required to: pay taxes, if any, on the vehicle; pay for and maintain insurance on the vehicles; and pay for the service and maintenance of the vehicle. However, contrary to Excel's arguments, courts have held that lessee's acceptance of the costs similar to those stated in Excel's lease are typical of true leases, not secured transactions, and more likely reflect the relative bargaining power between parties rather than the character of the transaction. See Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 631 P.2d 389, 395 (Wash. 1981) (stating that "lessor is either going to include those costs within rental charge or agree to lower rent, if lessee takes responsibility for them"); Mr. C's Rent To Own v. Jarrels (In re Jarrells), 205 B.R. 994, 998-99 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1997) (recognizing that, while debtor would be responsible for all repairs, maintenance, taxes, and insurance, these factors alone are not controlling). Business and Commerce Code Section 1.203(c) specifically addresses this issue and notes that such facts are not controlling in the determination of a security interest: (c) A transaction in the form of a lease does not create a security interest merely because: . . . (2) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods; (3) the lessee agrees to pay, with respect to the goods, taxes, insurance, filing, recording, or registration fees, or service or maintenance costs; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.203 (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Excel's leases do not comply with the two-part test for the existence of a security interest rather than a lease. This mandates the conclusion that the agreements are true leases, and Excel is the owner of the vehicles. Accordingly, Excel's affirmative defense of nonownership, based on its claim that its leases with its customers were security interests, fails as a matter of law. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.203(b); In re Powers, 983 F.2d 88, 90 (7th Cir. 1993) ("where a lessee has the right to terminate the lease before the option arises to purchase the property for no additional or nominal consideration, the lease is a true lease and cannot be a conditional sale); In re Yarbrough, 211 B.R. 654, 658-59 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1997) (noting that court found it sufficient for finding of true lease that lease was terminable at will); In re Arthur Rigg, 198 B.R. 681, 685 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (court held that "[a] lease agreement can be construed to create a security interest only if the agreement prohibits the lessee from terminating the lease," if it does not, then the agreement is considered a true lease rather than a security agreement). We hold that, because the taxing units' production of certified copies of tax records or tax statements constituted prima facie evidence of all the elements in their petitions and Excel's affirmative defense of nonownership failed, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the trial court to determine in this case. Excel failed to rebut the taxing units' prima facie case of ownership. We overrule Excel's issue one. Fact Question In issue two, Excel contends that the trial court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact as to ownership of the vehicles. Once the movant establishes that it is entitled to summary judgment, the non-movant can defeat that showing only by producing evidence that raises a fact issue. Haight v. Savoy Apartments, 814 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). "To constitute competent summary judgment evidence, affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to matters stated therein." Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f). Larry Tschoerner, Excel's general manager and finance director, submitted an affidavit in which he testified that Excel's customers were responsible for paying the taxes on their vehicles. Most of Tschoerner's affidavit focused on addressing the four factors listed in Section 1.203 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Having already held that Excel's leases expressly provide that they are subject to termination by the lessee--the prerequisite to considering the four additional factors--we need not examine Tschoerner's affidavit pertaining to these four factors. The affidavit further states that, "in addition, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, these agreements could not be terminated by a customer." This is contrary to the plain language of the agreement. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. 2000). If a court determines that a contract is ambiguous, then the court may consider extraneous evidence to ascertain the true meaning of the instrument. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995). Here, neither party has claimed ambiguity in the subject lease agreements. Accordingly, we may not consider Tschoerner's testimony that changes the plain language of the lease agreements, as noted above. We hold that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to ownership of the vehicles. We overrule issue two. Conclusion Because Excel failed to raise a material fact issue refuting the ownership of the vehicles, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Excel's summary judgment. We affirm the trial court's judgment. George C. Hanks, Jr., Justice Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Hanks. Justice Keyes concurring in the judgment. Justice Keyes dissenting from denial of rehearing. 1. Excel Lease Fund, Inc. as successor in interest to BLJ & Associates, Inc. d/b/a Excel Financial Company is not a party to this appeal. 2. Under the previous version of this statute, the existence of a "hell or high water clause" was also a requirement to create a security interest. See, e.g., In re Rigg, 198 B.R. 681, 685 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that "[a] lease agreement can be construed to create a security interest only if the agreement prohibits the lessee from terminating the lease."). 3. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the parties do not dispute that one of these four factors exists in this case: (4) that the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement. 4. To the extent that Excel relies on caselaw developed under the previous version of Section 1.203 to argue that a hell or high clause is not required for a security interest to exist, we find this caselaw not helpful to our analysis in this case. As noted by the court in Triplex, the current version of Section 1.203 contains significant changes to the statute. In re Triplex Marine Maint. Inc., 258 B.R. at 669. As a result, prior cases consider certain factors as attributes of a security interest, which are no longer considered as such under the current version. Id. 5. Paragraph 24 (c) provides as follows: (c) Determining the Realized Value. If the law so requires, we will send you a notice and wait any required period of time before taking action to establish the Vehicle's Realized Value. Unless otherwise required by law, the Realized Value will be determined in one of the following ways: (1) by a written agreement between you and us reached within 15 days of the Vehicle's return; (2) by the professional appraisal of an independent third party agreed to by you and us and obtained at your expense within 15 days of the Vehicle's return (or longer period, if all parties so agree or if the law so requires). The appraisal shall be of the Vehicle's wholesale value and shall be final and binding on both you and us; or (3) if it is not determined within 15 days of the Vehicle's return, we will determine the Realized Value in accordance with accepted practices in the automobile industry for determining the wholesale value of used vehicles by obtaining a wholesale cash bid for the purchase of the Vehicle or by disposing of the Vehicle in an otherwise commercially reasonable manner. . . . =========================================================================================================

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